A Social Constructivist Analysis of Civil-Military Relations: US-Mexican Bilateral Military Relations, 2000-2008

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By

Colin John Campbell

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis looks at the nature of civil-military relations in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 era through the theoretical lens of social constructivism. The study looks at the inter-relationship between the civil-military relations and US-Mexican bilateral ties from a constructivist perspective, with the aim of deconstructing the ideational structures of civil-military relations within the state and the state based international system to promote stronger organic structures for civilian control over the state agents of violence.

The case study of US-Mexican relations provides an insight both into the individual countries' civil-military relations as well as bilateral relations. Furthermore, it provides an overview and constructivist analysis of the wider hemispheric security architecture in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 era in which non-state actors are playing an increasing role in the security of the Americas. To this end, the thesis uses a social constructivist analysis of the dominant rhetorical ideational structures of the security architecture of the hemisphere, namely the 'war on drugs' and the 'war on terror'.

The aim of the thesis is to provide a theoretical model to both unite the theoretical study of domestic and external social realities of the state, while also providing a theoretical rationale for the humanisation, indeed demilitarisation, of security concerns within the Western Hemisphere and in particular the US and Mexico. Hence, creating a novel theoretical model for the understanding and explanation of civil-military and bilateral military relations.

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I hope and pray that I have done justice to you all in writing this thesis. All errors are mine and mine alone.

PREFACE

This thesis examines the relationship between the civil-military relations and bilateral military relations using the case study of US-Mexican relations. The thesis is structured as follows.

Chapter One begins with an introduction into the theory of civil-military relations. The chapter continues by discussing the *problematique* of civil-military relations and the nature of the state within the international system. The final section of this chapter seeks to formulate a theoretical model linking civil-military relations and bilateral relations.

Chapter Two provides the historical context to the US-Mexican relationship, looking back to the formulation of both states through the process of conquest to the present day, particularly concentrating on historical bilateral military relations.

Chapter Three outlines the role of Western Hemispheric security architecture within US and Mexican policy-makers perspectives to bilateral relations. The chapter first provides a historical overview of US-Mexican relations through the prism of Western Hemispheric affairs before providing insight into the role of regional and sub-regional view points. The chapter gives particular reference to the dominant geopolitical presence of the US within the hemisphere.

Chapter Four discusses the role of narcotics on US-Mexican bilateral relations as well as the civil-military relations of both parties. The chapter first outlines the historical context of the prohibition of narcotics and its role in US-Mexican relations. The chapter moves on to discuss the role of illegal drugs in US and Mexican domestic political structures, particularly the civil- military relations in the respective countries. The chapter continues to discuss the role of narcotics in bilateral military relations and the analysis of the war on drugs through a social constructivist model.

Chapter Five details the impact of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) on US-Mexican relations. In particular, the chapter examines the affect on the civil-military relations of the respective countries. In the case of the US, the chapter examines the developments within the government bureaucracy and military command structure in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001. In the case of Mexico, the chapter examines how the Mexican government has managed its relationship with its northern neighbour.

Chapter Six concludes with an analysis of the empirical data and hypothesis in order to create a theoretical model for the role of military diplomacy within the international system and to humanise the security architecture.

The methodological framework and fieldwork notes are provided in an appendix following the main body of the thesis as well as the bibliography.

I

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Introduction

This thesis attempts to take empirically-based data and weave it together with the theoretical literature to explore US-Mexican military-to-military relations. The empirical topics touched upon include: the issue of narcotics transhipment, the ‘war on terror’ and the contemporary debate over the nature of regional security architecture in the context of the end of the Cold War and the events of 11 September 2001. Each of these empirical elements provides a partial insight into the dense network of ties which combine to make up US-Mexican security relations.

Drug trafficking and production has had differing effects upon civil-military relations of both countries. In the case of Mexico it has led to the Mexican military’s position within the state as an inward looking institution, in relation to a neighbour possessing a globally projecting military from at least the Great War (1914-1918) onwards. In the case of the United States the ‘war’ on narcotics has resulted in vast expenditure, leading to the creation of a security apparatus bureaucracy focused towards Latin America supply-end solutions.

The events of 11 September 2001 and the resultant declaration of a ‘war on terror’ have created a paradigm shift within US policymaking circles. As such, the ‘war on terror’ has deeply affected US-Mexican ties generally, but in particular, security issues. Important developments within US civil-military policy in this context include the development of the notion of ‘Homeland Security’ post-9/11, in opposition to (or arguably in concurrence with) the Department of Defense’s (DoD) pre-9/11 notion of ‘Homeland Defense’. In terms of US-Mexican relations, issues such as the militarisation of law enforcement and immigration remain contested political terrain. The events of 9/11 have also brought a massive re-structuring on the ground, most notably with the creation of a NORTHCOM and the Department of Homeland Security.

The last element of the empirical data is the study of the changing nature of hemispheric security within a post-Cold War context and the attempt to cement a new overarching and interdependent security architecture. This remains a topic of controversy, due to the failure on all sides to provide theoretical bedrock to allow for a regional security architecture to situate itself. The thesis seeks to analyse the factors behind this diplomatic impasse - the failure to assemble a commonly adhered to concept of national security throughout the region. In so doing, enabling the development of a sense of comity required throughout the region in order to formulate a common regional security architecture. Indeed, this politico-military stalemate has created difficulties between the United States and its southern neighbour, as shown in a practical sense by Mexico’s unilateral withdrawal from the common defence pact of the Rio Treaty and its call for the re-configuration of the hemisphere’s security architecture.

The thesis uses this empirical data in the formulation of a theoretical model for the understanding and explanation of bilateral military relations from multiple levels of analysis. Through the use of constructivist analysis and security studies theory, the thesis seeks to broaden the analytical and theoretical framework of civil-military relations by the incorporating of novel elements. To the analytical framework, the thesis seeks to include policing and the intelligence community within the remit of security studies. Though this may at first glance appear paradoxical, the aim of this approach is to decrease the role of the state and its agents in the life of the individual citizen and to reject notions of the militarisation of the police.

In terms of the theoretical model, the thesis seeks to marry the development of constructivist security studies in the post-Cold War period with the largely descriptive theoretical bedrock of civil-military relations. Hence, the thesis seeks to formulate new theoretical foundations for the study of civil-military relations beyond the classical works of the Cold War era. It aims to move beyond the confines of ‘realist’ dominated theoretical models, to an arguably more complete conceptualisation of civil-military relations in the context of growing interdependence and globalisation. Such a theoretical model is based on the explicit understanding of the constructed nature of international relations and its rules and norms. From this standpoint the observer is able to better comprehend the social reality of civil-military relations. With the initial grounding of the theoretical foundations noted, it is a brief synopsis of ‘old civil-military relations’ that we now turn.

The Historical Evolution of Civil-Military Relations Theory

Civil-military relations theory until the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union relied on a particular ontological standpoint, in which the state and the geopolitical reality of the Cold War were seen as set in neo-realist stone. Hence, in large part theorists in this field saw their role as a promoter of democratic governance vis-à-vis the Soviet aggressor. The end of the Cold War has led civil-military relations theorists to re-group and re-think the theoretical basis of civil-military relations.

For the purpose of clarity the use of the realist/neo-realist schools of thought used in this thesis relates to their understanding of the state, in the broadest sense. Realism/neo-realism covers a broad sweep of intellectual thinkers and time frames, influencing the topic more than any other theoretical model. Indeed, social constructivism is in large part a critique of neo-realist thinkers such as Waltz (1959). At its core, realism of all stripes assert that the state is a unitary actor within international relations. Furthermore, realists/neo-realists argue that while other schools of thought, such as liberalism, concern themselves with how they would like the world to be, in contrast realists seek to understand and explain the world as it is. The state is seen by realists and neo-realists alike, as acting in its own rational self-interests within the confines of the international arena. As a result, they attempt to understand the nature of conflict between these self-interested states. With this aim in mind realists/neo-realists seek to apply a positivist methodological approach to the study of international relations and the relative power dynamics amongst unitary state actors (Morgenthau, {1948} 2006). Where realists and neo-realists part company is on the nature of the international sphere. For realists outside of the confines of the state is a political vacuum, consequently international relations is the study of the inter-relations amongst state actors. Neo-realist thinkers, such as Waltz (1959), argue that the international system and its structure define the actions of the states with one another while being a separate level of analysis from the state. Both schools, however, agree on the central nature of the state itself and this is the main reference to realist/neo-realist thought in this thesis.

With this in mind, let us now examine the existing literature on civil-military relations theory. James Burk (1998) offers us the clearest classification of the current theoretical models of civil-military relations. Thus for ease of explanation, Burk’s approach is employed to provide a framework for the discussion of the history of civil-military relations theory. Burk breaks down civil-military relations approaches into three camps: Hobbesian, Enlightenment and Normative. Interestingly, Burk himself states: ‘We start from the belief that the military’s subordination to civil power is necessary (though not sufficient) to an adequate definition of liberal democratic society’ (1998: 457). Indeed, it is a goal of civil-military relations scholars to formulate circumstances for the democratic control of the military.

The first of these approaches is the ‘Hobbesian’, which is, at root, a re-affirmation of neo-realist principles formulated within the context of the Cold War, a period of academic dominance for ‘neo-realism’. For many scholars, practitioners and policymakers this is the implied ontological basis of civil-military relations. The most notable scholar to frame civil-military relations theory in this light was Samuel Huntington. According to Huntington: ‘The military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society’s security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society’ ({1957} 2001: 2) This theoretisation is strictly within the ontological and epistemological constraints of neo-realist thought. For Huntington, issues of civil-military relations together with the affairs of statehood, are constrained within the context of the imagined and real anarchy of international relations. States are perceived as the primary actors within both the internal politics of the nation itself and externally towards other states. The state is the sole legitimate arbiter of violence within the international system. Such constraints are in large part implied and only partially stated within civil-military relations literature. Civil-military relations for Huntington, are a matter of relative relationships between civilians and military groupings. In Huntington’s view, it is a zero sum relationship, whereby which a balance must be kept between the civilian and military groupings in order to produce the most favourable outcome, namely civilian control of the military. Huntington further expands on the notion of civilian control stating that there are in essence, two types of civilian control vis-à-vis the military.

The first of these modes of civilian primacy is ‘subjective civilian control’. ‘Subjective civilian control’ occurs when civilian authority is gained over the military via a process of competitive power struggles amongst certain civilian interest groups in order to become the dominant civilian body relative to other groups. As Huntington states:

‘… the slogan of civilian control is utilized by groups which lack power over the military forces in struggles with other civilian groups which have such power’ ({1957} 2001: 81).

As a result, civilian dominance over the military within the notion of subjective civilian control, becomes politically charged as the military becomes a domestic political tool. Huntington argues that ‘subjective civilian control’, and by extension civilian interest groups, may occur along three levels of analysis - government institutions, social class or constitutional form.

The second type of civilian control, according to Huntington, is ‘objective civilian control’. ‘Objective civilian control’ differs from subjective civilian control through the demarcation of civilian and military spheres of influence and stratification. On this point, Huntington posits:

> Objective civilian control is thus directly opposed to subjective civilian control. Subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state. Objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state ({1957} 2001: 83).

Simply put, Huntington maintains that by demarcation of interests and emphasis being placed on the professionalism of the officer corps, the military may become a tool of government, rather than the military being a political actor within the domestic political maelstrom. Huntington assumes not only the ‘neo-realist’ perspective of international affairs, but also delimits the nature of civilian groups and military as political actors, whose agency is to be structured and measured in reference to the state. For Huntington, civil-military relations become a microcosm within the structure of the state of international relations and its enclosed autonomous political actors. Yet Huntington fails to fully explore the epistemological foundations of the notion of power within civil-military relations, a fundamental element of neo-realist theory. Huntington does, however, make an attempt at expounding on the notion of power:

> Power is the capacity to control the behavior of other people. A power relationship has at least two dimensions: the degree or amount of power, that is, the extent to which a particular type of behavior of one person is controlled by another; and secondly, the scope or locus of power, that is, the types of behavior which are influenced by the other individual or group ({1957} 2001: 86).

Huntington appears to address the narrative usage of power rather than ask the espistemological question: what is power? Huntington holds that the military and civilians interact within the structure of the state and via the structure and institutions of the state. Failing to see a social connection - indeed inter-connection - between civilians and military (the officer corps), in which both social actors are both simultaneously socially connected and demarcated through reflective and reflexive socially constructed realities. This is a key failing in Huntington’s approach to civil-military relations theory. Furthermore, Huntington argues that although no dichotomy exists between the military and civilian minds, due to the multiplicity of civilian minds, the military ethic is concrete, permanent and universal, while civilian mindsets are the opposite. As a result, any examination of civil-military relations can only occur through the framework of a comparison between the ‘military ethic’ vis-à-vis particular political ideologies, which are, according to Huntington, the sole preserve of civilian groupings. This argument is flawed, because it fails to appreciate that no social construct can be ‘neutral’ in its construction or its acts as put forward by constructivist theorists (Wendt, 1999; Katzenstein, 1996).

Huntington’s notions of a ‘neutral military ethic’ appears to be a reiteration of Hobbesian realism. Huntington states that: ‘… the military ethic holds that man is evil, weak, irrational and that he must be subordinated to the group' ({1957} 2001: 90). It is Huntington's belief that this 'military ethic' is re-enforced and reflected in the notion of the professionalisation of the military, i.e. the officer corps. A professional army is one, in Huntington's view, whose essential features are subordinated to civilians and politically neutral. Huntington argues that this professionalisation of the military is a key prerequisite to enable objective civilian control and, in consequence, permit healthy, democratic civil-military relations. Furthermore, according to Huntington, it allows for the most effective and efficient military institution, which is necessary to the provision of external security required in the context of an anarchic international system ({1957} 2001: 85). Huntington at root argues that only through the 'stratification' of the managers of violence within the international arena, can civil-military relations within the state be stabilised. In this limited sense, Huntington also recognises the interrelation between the internal nature of civil-military relations and the external threat environment. 'Threat environment' is understood as the level and scope of threats within the international system directed at the state and its agents from other unitary states. These threats are seen in the neo-realist sense as acts or threats of action by other sovereign states and/or their agents. Huntington's theory has become the classical civil military relation model upon which the field has based its foundations. The academic literature on civil-military relations has largely concentrated on public policymaking, rather than exploring the theoretical discourse occurring elsewhere in the social sciences notably international relations and political science.

Often seen as the opposing view to Huntington, though within the implied Hobbesian approach, as forwarded by Burk (1998), Lasswell is another major civil-military relations scholar from the Cold War period. Lasswell's approach towards civil-military relations originated from a sociological study of the military and their position to, and in, the state. Lasswell, like Huntington, must be understood within the context of the Cold War and the resulting geopolitical realities. Unlike Huntington, Lasswell did not publish a single monograph expounding his theoretical model, rather he wrote a series of articles on the topic. These were later brought together into a single monograph entitled, Essays on the Garrison State (1997). Lasswell holds an essentially pessimistic outlook in the context of increasing animosity amongst the bipolar powers of the Cold War. He argues for the existence of what he terms, 'the garrison state'. 'Garrison state theory' sustains that within an increasingly threatening security environment, the state would evermore be consumed by militarisation. Furthermore, Lasswell stated that the 'garrison state' would be a logical product of modern industrial society evolving overtime to its end state. As Jay Stanley states in the Introduction to Lasswell's text:

> In the development of the garrison state construct Lasswell was stimulated by the work of Comte who had suggested a social evolution moving through feudal to industrial states; and Spencer, for whom societies were either military or industrial. According to Lasswell, the garrison state would develop from the industrial state in response to technical advancement (1997: 20).

Indeed, Lasswell argued that it was this technical advancement and the social dislocation created that would both lead to the germination and maintenance of the 'garrison state'. A key result of technical advance was the democratisation of risk, i.e. as a consequence of technical developments all those settled in war zones (both civilian and military) are at equal risk. Lasswell's recognition of the democratisation of risk was formulated within the context of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. Lasswell initially posited the 'democratisation of risk' with reference to the growing sophistication of air combat, in particular air bombardment. For Lasswell and his supporters during the post-Second World War era the nuclear stand-off was seen as providing even greater justification for the 'democratisation of risk' via developments such as the atom bomb. This, Lasswell makes clear, is a contingent theory: 'The picture of the garrison state that is offered here is no dogmatic forecast. Rather it is a picture of the probable. It is not inevitable' (1997: 57). Another outcome of technical advance in the weapons of war is a growth in military power vis-à-vis the civilian population. On this point Stanley remarks that: 'Lasswell visualized the development of the garrison state as a product of the rise to power of the military elite in response to long term international tension. That is, freedom within a society is reduced as the preparation for war becomes the dominant thrust of society' (1997: 24). Lasswell's presumption that the technological 'progress' in order to conduct inter-state conflict resulted in the rise of a military elite within states, to a backdrop of a cycle of heightened international tension, appeared justified in the context of the Cold War. Interestingly, Lasswell's 'garrison state' theory stands in opposition to Huntington's notion of 'civil-military relations'. Nevertheless, the two theories have similarities. Both are sited within the intellectual confines of neo-realist thinking, arguing that the Cold War was in essence a conflict between unitary state actors. Inherent in this context is the assumption of the importance of power, ill-defined as it is, and the state actor as the arbiter and prism for power within the international context.

Where the two theories diverge is in the role of the military in relation to the conceptualisation and practice of democratic governance. Whereas Huntington holds that an international context of high levels of threat to the state will induce civilian control of the military, Lasswell argues the opposite. Lasswell argues that high levels of threat towards the state will result in the formulation of a military elite within the state. An increasing military role within the state apparatus results in the demotion of civilian groupings vis-à-vis military elites and devalues notions of democracy. This difference in the understanding of democracy is crucial to the underpinnings of both theses. Huntington points that democracy is an essentially institutionalised process of political power sharing amongst interest groups within the state. Lasswell, however, advances a broader perspective of 'democracy', arguing for a more fluid, socially constructed variant of 'democracy'. Lasswell maintains that when democracy is under high levels of constant threat in the international environment, it will be subverted into a psychological device for the manipulation of society against the external threat: 'As long as modern technology prevails, society is honeycombed with cells of separate experience, of individuality, of partial freedom. Concerted action under such conditions depends upon skilfully guiding the minds of men; hence the enormous importance of symbolic manipulation in modern society' (1997: 60). Furthermore, it is sustained that:

> In addition to the adjustment of symbols, goods, and violence, the political elite of the garrison state will find it necessary to make certain adaptations in the fundamental practices of the state. Decisions will be more dictatorial than democratic, and institutional practices long connected with modern democracy will disappear. Instead of elections to office or referendums on issues there will be government by plebiscite. Elections foster the formation and expression of public opinion, while plebiscites encourage only unanimous demonstrations of collective sentiment (1997: 64).

While Lasswell's construct of a 'garrison state' plays heavily on a study of the Soviet Union, the United States is not precluded from the following model. His theory is advanced as a possible future characteristic of civil-military relations and is premised on a continuation of the high threat levels of the Cold War. Indeed, the intent is to explore policy alternatives to the 'garrison state' within the Cold War environment.

Lasswell's and Huntington's work provided the main theoretical bedrocks to the study of civil-military relations within the context of the seeming constant of the Cold War. Understandably given the end of the Cold War, new approaches in the field of civil-military relations theory started to be developed. Particular reference needs to be given to theorists within the 'Hobbesian approach', with Michael Desch comprising a main protagonist. In his monograph Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (1999), Desch sets out a theoretical model which appears to marry the elemental strands of both Lasswell and Huntington's work in regard to the inter-play between internal civil-military relations and the level of threat towards the state and its agents, both internally and externally. Desch moves beyond Huntington and Lasswell to create his own synthesis, as shown below:

Table 1: Table of Theoretical Models of Civil-Military Relations [1]

	External threats	
Internal threats	High	Low
High	Poor civil-military relations Experienced leaders? Divided civilians Unclear control Unified military? Unclear orientation? Divergent ideas?	Worst civil-military relations Inexperienced leaders Divided civilians Subjective control Unified military Internal orientation Divergent ideas
Low	Good civil-military relations Experienced leaders Unified civilians Objective control Unified military Outward orientation Convergent ideas	Mixed civil-military relations Inexperienced leaders? Divided civilians Unclear control? Divided military Unclear orientation? Divergent ideas?

Source: Desch, 1999:14-16

The second of these approaches has been labelled the ‘Enlightenment’ outlook to civil-military relations, which argues that the maintenance of ‘balanced’ civil-military relations comes via the natural recognition of joint interests between civilian and military sectors of society. The Enlightenment perspective has been set forward by Burk (1998) who does not emphasis the contradictory nature of civil-military relationship, but argues that through reason, the military will come to recognise their joint interest in maintaining good civil-military relations and being seen as a representative of the people:

> A well-established democratic government will pursue only those military policies that the people decide are in their interests. So long as the military is representative of the people, there can be no clash between what the people expect from the military, as established through discourse in elected assemblies, and what the military is prepared to do (1998: 458).

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[1] The use of question marks denotes the tentative nature of this element of the theoretical model.

One of the most notable scholars to follow this model of civil-military relations is Janowitz, who advances a pluralistic approach to the understanding of and the study of the state within the context of the Cold War. Janowitz sees the military as political actors within the state. Indeed, he holds that the military (in the case of the US military), have entered the political sphere in order to lobby for expenditure increases and the maintenance of its interests in terms of policy. Influenced by the work of Lasswell, Janowitz also analysed civil-military relations from a sociological viewpoint. Indeed, Janowitz adopted a middle position between Lasswell and Huntington: while the military were political in the sense that they lobbied the political elite's constituent parts in the interests of the military, it retained sufficient professionalism to counter any involvement within the body politic beyond its specialisation.

Feaver builds on the scholarly work of Janowitz by examining the nature of the bargaining relation between the military and civilian sectors of the state. Indeed, Feaver (1996; 1998 (a) and (b)) argues a form of rational choice theory in which the actors are locked into a relationship of competing interests and incentives within the make-up of the liberal democracy model of the state. Burk paraphrases Feaver's work in the following terms:

> Given that the military is an organ of civilian government, the key problem is to understand (a) whether civilian leaders believe it is necessary and cost-effective to monitor military compliance with its preferences, and (b) whether military leaders believe it is necessary or cost-effective to comply with civilian directives or, alternatively, to shirk them (1998: 458).

Abrahamsson in his monograph, Military Professionalization and Political Power (1972), also expands on Janowitz scholarly work, arguing not only that the military are political actors in the sense of lobbying for their own self-interests, but further that the military through the process of professionalisation, exercise political interests within the body politic parallel to civilian interests. In this sense, the military can no longer be deemed as a politically neutral institution within the confine of its domestic body politic, due to failure to distinguish between the strategic and political. As Abrahamsson states: '… as any establishment, the military devotes part of its activity to self-preservation and for providing its own *raisons d'etre*' (1972: 153).

Indeed, for Abrahamsson the process of professionalisation (the key to Huntington's theory of democratic maintenance of civilian control over the armed forces), enables the military to not only specialise in certain roles within their own organisation but further creates a parallel administration to the civilian. This in turn, according to Abrahamsson, allows for the longevity of military governance after a *coup d'etat*:

> … the increasing similarity between the military and civilian occupational structure makes the military capable of administering a number of societal areas such as communications, transportation, health services, and education. In the event of a military *coup d'etat*, therefore, the contemporary military does not only command greater coercive resources to overcome civilian resistance, but also resources that enables it to stay in power longer than has previously been the case (1972: 154).

For Ambrahamsson, civilian control is maintained through the recognition of the military's political power within the domestic political system and the creation of suitable control mechanisms within both the governmental and societal systems.

This seemingly pessimistic view of civil-military relations is countered by the views of Bland (1999) who argues that civil-military relations can be understood as a fluid, culturally-based regime of rules and norms in which the burden of responsibility for civil-military relations is shared. In this regard Bland adapts the same approach as Feaver, for both parties are viewed as believing in the importance of mutual self-interest for the smooth maintenance of civil-military ties within the confines of the state.

The third perspective put forward by Burk (1989) is the 'Narrative' approach, which concentrates on the 'cultural understanding' of civil-military relations, in particular the formulation of a joint 'cultural understanding' of democracy that upholds the principle of civilian supremacy. According to this viewpoint, a crisis in civil-military relations, occurs when the military and civilian 'cultural understanding' of notions such as liberal democracy and civilian supremacy differ. 'Narrative' approaches include the work of those scholars who concentrate on policy based study, often along a regional basis. Dauber expands on Burk's generalised model, to argue that consideration needs to be given to the relative worth of arguments in policy debates. Indeed, Burk states: '… whoever "wins" the dispute over standards is likely to "win" the argument over policy' (1998:459). Dauber (1998) contends that the process of evaluation of competing discourses within the body politic is the key to the understanding of the state of civil-military relations. For this reason, it is important to undertake a narrative study of the political process via an evaluation of the positions advanced by competing individuals and groups. To sustain her position, Dauber uses the example of the Weinberger Doctrine, analysing arguments around the use of military force by the US government to explore the nature of US civil-military relations, although she notes the contingent nature of civil-military relations: 'In the end, the precise condition of civil-military relations is perhaps less important than a recognition that their status is contingent on a process of argument in which institutions and publics negotiate common norms of war and peace' (1998: 445). The interesting dimension to Dauber's work is the attempt to move beyond the neo-realist, positivist position within civil-military relations theory set forward by Huntington et al.

Moskos' monograph, The Postmodern Military (2001), attempts to summarise changes in civil-military relations since the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. Moskos' model concentrates on the nature of the military. Moskos splits the military as an institution into three types: 'modern', 'late modern' and 'post-modern'. The first of these types of military institutions, according to Moskos, occurred in the nineteenth century up to the end of the Second World War, in which the military consisted of conscript citizen-soldiers who identified with the state. The second grouping 'late modern militaries' consists of a mass-conscript army overseen by a thin layer of an educated elite officer class. The final, 'post-modern' category arises out of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold War. The end of the nuclear stand-off, Moskos maintained, led to five key changes: the increasing interpenetrability [sic] of civilian and military spheres; the diminution of differences between the different branches of the armed forces; a change in the role of the military towards humanitarian missions; the authorisation and use of military force by supranational bodies; and finally the internationalisation of military forces themselves. Moskos notion of a 'post-modern' military, attempts to theorize the role of the military within contemporary industrialised societies, to a backdrop of a weakening of the nation state as a mechanism of socio-economic organisation. Moskos' work is important not for providing a theoretical model of civil-military relations, but rather for setting the stage for a re-working of theory in the light of changed political realities.

These differing approaches offer insights into the nature of civil-military relations, though each has its own flaws. Every theoretical model provides aspects of the overall picture of civil-military relations from within their own perspective. On this point, Burk states that:

> What we have…are limited theories that examine one aspect of the matter and that aspect, most often is the relation between the government and the military. The question raised is whether (or to what degree) uniformed military elites follow the commands of civilian political elites. The question reflects a normative belief that civilian political control over the military is preferable to military control of the state; and so it seems that the central problem in civil military theory is to explain how civilian control over the military is established and maintained (2002: 7).

This flaw within the civil-military relations literature is also present in his own account of civil-military relations theorists, which excludes the landmark study of Samuel Finer. Finer in his monograph, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics ({1962} 2002) rather than seeking to explain how civilians maintain control of the military, examined the causes of the military tendency towards *coup d'etat*, as can be gleaned from the following statement:

> The armed forces have three massive political advantages over civilian organisations: a marked superiority in organisation, a highly emotionalized symbolic status, and a monopoly of arms. They form a prestigious corporation or order, enjoying overwhelming superiority in the means of applying force. The wonder, therefore, is not why this rebels against its civilian masters, but why it ever obeys them ({1962} 2002: 6).

Furthermore, Finer countered the Huntingtonian notion of a 'professionalisation' of the military leading to separation of military and civilian ethics, which permitted civilian control, pointing that: '…it is observable that many highly professional officer corps have intervened in politics- the German and Japanese cases are notorious. It is no use to retort that in such cases these armies cannot be described as "fully" professional' ({1962} 2002: 25). Finer's argument relates to modern, in historical terms, armed forces as the managers of violence within the confines of its client - the state. For Finer, professionalisation can result in the military intervening in politics as much as it may lead to the military being politically neutral. Intervention in Finer's view, depends on interdependent multi-layered elements within civil-military relations occurring over space and time. Finer stands alone in questioning the assumptions set forth throughout civil-military relations theory in general (Burk, 2002). It may be argued that Finer examines civil-military relations from the other side of the coin, i.e. rather than studying how the civilians gain and keep control of the military, he studies why the military allow such a state of affairs. It should be noted, however, that Finer assumes that democratic civilian control of the military is the optimum state.

Civil-Military Relations in Latin America

Studies concentrating on civil-military relations within the context of the Americas are important to this debate. Due to the largely policy-driven nature of civil-military relations, the focus of scholars within the region has centred around the role of military dictatorships and the experience of democratisation during the 1980s and 1990s. Notable writings include: Collier's (1979) The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, O'Donnell's (1988) Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-73 in Comparative Perspective, Zagorski's (1992) Democracy versus National Security: Civil-military relations in Latin America, Marcella's (1994) Warriors in Peacetime: The Military and Democracy in Latin America, Loveman's (1999) For La Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America, Silva's (2001) The Soldier and the State in South America, Pion-Berlin's (2001) Civil-Military

Relations in Latin America, and Koonings and Kruijt's (2002) Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy.

A summary of the historical development of the military as an institution is provided by both Little (1986) and Loveman (1999), both note the role of the original Spanish ethos and separation of the armed forces from civilian authority via the *fuero militar*. This created a privileged class within the institutions of the state, which has pertained through the process of independence into the modern era, in the form of a high degree of autonomy afforded militaries in the region. This is justified by the conceptualisation of the military as the protectors of the nation, which in turn has provided militaries in Latin America intellectual cover for *golpe de estado* and for the suppression of social movements in opposition.

Little (1986) also gives a summary of the different interpretations of the military within Latin America, noting the trends within the literature between those of an anti-militaristic bend and those of a neo-realist perspective who maintain a more positive outlook on the role of the military within the state. Alongside these approaches there are more nuanced critical theorists who have sought to examine the military via a class analysis, or alternatively, the military as a bureaucratic entity in the context of the process of democratisation. Little (1986) lists four trends in the interpretation of the military within Latin America, as follows: the military as predators; an intelligentsia in uniform; praetorianism and the middle class; and bureaucratic authoritarianism. The notion of the military as predators came from a perception of the armed forces as 'a vestige of some precaptialist social order' and regressive element within the state (1986: 61). This was juxtaposed with the view of civilians who are seen as a modernising force within the state. Through the process of modernisation in Latin America, the theory expounds that via economic development, social pluralism and an emerging middle class may emerge leading to political engagement in the governance of the state by civilians. This would lead to the development of civilian control of the military, if not democracy, in the countries of the region. This thesis fails to recognise the role of the armed forces of the region in the promotion of social change, for example, the critical role of the military top brass in the formation of the 1917 Mexican constitution or their involvement throughout the region in leftist governments[2] (Lieuwen, 1968). Furthermore, during the 1960s and 1970s, 'it was precisely where social mobilisation (commonly measured by indicators such as rates of literacy, urbanisation etc) was well advanced that civilian rule appeared particularly fragile' (Little, 1986: 63). The second school of thought expounded is the military as an intelligentsia in uniform. This thesis set forth that by virtue of its unique place within the state and society, the military, are able to be arbiters of the interest(s) of the nation as a whole, transcendent of class interests. This provides the justification of the military intervention in the functioning of state and society, and the removal of levers of civilian governance in the name of the greater good of the nation. Though in reality, the military does not operate the functions of the state in isolation but with the assistance of elite interests, therefore, the armed forces are not independent of class politics as their rhetoric may imply. Another analysis put forward is the military as a praetorian guard in association with the middle class, in which the armed forces prevent the development of a praetorian society in which competing class interests use force to meet their ends. The military as an institution provides political stability, or rather prevents instability due to the failure of the civilian institutions to be responsive to the economic growth and consequential increase in class interests. Notably amongst the middle classes, who are unable to gain hegemony over the apparatus of the state, resort to the use of the military, itself increasingly middle class due to the processes of professionalisation and bureaucratisation, as Little states:

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[2] During the Mexican revolutionary period, civilians often turned into military officers and were not necessarily career soldiers.

> Thus in the golden age of primary export-led growth the emerging middle class (of professionals, petty rentiers, public employees etc) sought access to the fruits of growth via the franchise but remained economically dependent and political quiescent. When growth slowed after 1929 there followed a populist phase (exemplified by Vargas in Brazil and Perón in Argentina) in which the military-middle class alliance selectively incorporated the masses in reformist strategies at the expense of traditionally dominant groups. Once this Bonapartist phase, in its turn, entered into crisis (through the exhaustion of import substitution and the inability of the state to meet the explosion of demand from the masses it had sought to manipulate) the interest of the middle class shifted again towards the maintenance of what it had already achieved. Thus it is no surprise that the anti-populist coups in Brazil, Chile and Argentina should have been welcomed by the very strata that had helped to create the populist options in the first place (1986: 66-67).

This thesis hence seeks to explain the behaviour of the military in relation to the evolution of civil society, in so doing, seeing the military as a social actor responsive to the middle classes, themselves viewed as reactionary. Indeed, this theory fails to explain the relationship between the capitalist elite and the middle classes with reference to their ties with the military as an institution. Little (1986) notes the case of the 1973 Chilean *golpe de estado*, which initial had middle class support. Though after the imposition of neo-liberal economic policies in the country support gradually waned. The final school of thought noted by Little (1986) is bureaucratic authoritarianism. This model is expounded by O'Donnell (1988) and Collier (1979) associated with the emergence of military *juntas* in the 1960s and 1970s, and the emergence of a particular modality of governance. O'Donnel (1988) sets forward the characteristics of a bureaucratic authoritarian state as follows:

> (1) It is, primarily and fundamentally, the aspect of global society that guarantees and organises the domination exercised through a class structure subordinated to the upper fractions of a highly oligopolized and transnationalized bourgeoisie...
> (2) On the institutional level, it is a set of organizations in which specialists in coercion have decisive weight, as do those who seek to "normalize" the economy...
> (3) It is a system of political exclusion of a previously activated popular sector, which is subjected to strict controls designed to eliminate its earlier presence in the political arena. This is achieved by coercion, as well as by the destruction or strict governmental control of the resources (especially those embodied in class organizations and political parties or movements) that sustained this activation….
> (4) This exclusion brings with it the suppression of citizenship and political democracy...
> (5) It is also a system of economic exclusion of the popular sector, inasmuch as it promotes a pattern of capital accumulation strongly biased in favour of large, oligopolistic units of private capital and some state institutions...
> (6) Through its institutions it endeavours to "depoliticize" the handling of social issues...
> (7) Its regime – which, usually not formalized, is clearly identifiable - involves closing the democratic channels of access to the government… (1988: 31-32).

This theoretical model fails though to expound on the relationship of the middle class and the military both in the functioning of the state apparatus and in the legitimacy of the regime, with its overemphasis on the role of the capitalist class. The theory sets forth a social reality which has a static quality, rather than a social process in constant flux as competing social actors interacting, as a result failing to accommodate the process of democratisation.

Within the context of the Western Hemisphere, the prime concern latterly has been, initially, to understand the reasoning behind 'third wave' democratisation post-1980 and, secondly, the study of the political architecture within the countries of the region as democratisation 'consolidated', raising questions about civilian control over the military. At the outset, it is important, as Rosen notes, to realise that the concept of democracy is fluid: '…the term can characterize a wide variety of legal and social agreements that give people regular and transparent powers to participate in institutions that shape their lives' (2007: 18). Indeed, the issue of civil-military relations within the newly democratising countries of Latin America is viewed as central to their progress towards democratic 'maturity' or 'deepening'. Research in civil-military relations, particularly with reference to the Western Hemisphere, is in need of further study, as after an initial period of interest in the early and mid-1990s, there has been a decline in publications. During the initial post-Cold War period, literature understandably concentrated on the challenges of transition from military dictatorship to democracy and civilian control of the military. Linz and Stephan (1996) is one such example within the literature, as it attempts to discover the social processes through which southern cone countries have transformed from dictatorships towards their own individual democratic settlements. Linz and Stephan (1996) also compare and contrast the process of democratisation amongst southern cone countries and those of southern Europe to delineate the relative success and failure of the transition in Latin America. Indeed, Linz and Stephan (1996) note the role of economic and political instability alongside gradual institutional reform which have combined to bring about an uneven transition to democracy as social actors in each country over time come to their own civil-military settlements. This political process which began in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s contrasts with the experience of Mexican civil-military relations. During this period, Mexico remained a *de facto* single party government under a civilian president, with the Mexican military, remaining loyal to both party and president, and a stoutly apolitical institution (Camp, 1992). Civil-military relations in Mexico were based on a social contract between the military top brass and the presidency, under which the military swear loyalty to the civilian leadership in exchange for institutional autonomy. It is only in recent times that Mexico has slowly sought to transform its civil-military relations as the process of democratisation has gained momentum with the election of Vicente Fox in 2000, the first non-PRI president in over seventy years. As a result, Mexican civil-military relations have differed from those of other Latin American countries who suffered during the long night of the generals, though some similarities do pertain. As Loveman notes of Latin American countries during the initial phrase of democratisation:

> The protected democracies reborn from 1979 to 1993 generally maintained old penal codes and special legislation on the internal security of the state. They also incorporated many aspects of the national security doctrines shared by the post-1964 antipolitical military regimes into the new constitutions, military law, and statutes covering internal security, terrorism, and public order. They limited presidential and congressional control and oversight of military institutions, with concomitant increases in the armed forces' relative autonomy (1999: 215).

In Mexico's case, politicians and the military alike resisted the notion of national security doctrines during the Cold War era, as the military sought to remain apolitical rather than 'antipolitical', as Ronfeldt states: '…the [Mexican] military wants to remain dedicated to fulfilling the symbolic import of its leading emblem- the Aztec eagle's knight head (*Tlacatecuhtli*)- which stands for dignity, loyalty and duty' (1984:31)

Similarity can be drawn with their Latin American counterparts though with reference to the issue of autonomy afforded the military. Indeed, with the Mexican process of democratisation, the autonomy of the military vis-à-vis the legislature has become a key issue in the future of Mexico's civil-military relations (Camp, 2005).

Latterly alongside the continuing process of democratisation and civil control of the military, the issue of destabilising non-state actors threatening the legitimacy of the state has come to the forefront. This pertains throughout Latin America, as drug *traficantes* grow increasingly violent in the face of counter-narcotics operations by the state, and crime levels rise as the wealth gap increases and powerful criminal groups from Central America to Brazil take root, alongside high levels of corruption within state institutions (Manwaring, 2007(b)). The question remains, what should the military's role be in the efforts of the state to counter these threats? The answer to this question varies country by country as a result of differing civil-military settlements; the severity of the threat at hand; and the relative strength of the state institutions. This area of key concern to policymakers in the region is in need of further research akin to that of Bailey and Dammert (2006) Public Security and Police Reform in the Americas, in which the authors sought to differentiate the concepts of 'public security' and 'national security' with reference to on-going struggle against insecurity within the Western Hemisphere and the process of democratisation. Further, Bailey and Dammert (2006) through this paradigm sought to set out the development in the importance of non-state actors to security concerns with the region in the aftermath of economic and political transformation from the 1970s onwards, as neo-liberal economic policies, the process of globalisation, and the formulation of low intensity democracy have taken affect.

To this backdrop, works such as Linz's and Stephan's (1996) Problems in Democratic Transition and Consolidation show their age, especially in the face of developments such as the rise of non-state threats and popular leftist movements[3] within the hemisphere. Consequently, further study of the militaries' of the region are opportune, as has been observed by Bruneau, who notes that: 'There is a fundamental gap in the literature…in the area of civil-military relations - that is, the roles, responsibilities, and rights of the armed forces and the elected government in consolidating democracies' (Bruneau in Bruneau and Tollefson, 2006: 2).

To conclude this summary of the history of civil-military relations, it is necessary to note that the subject has been highly influenced by the political and academic environment of the Cold War, in particular, a heavy intellectual borrowing from the international relations theory of neo-realism. The dominance of neo-realism and its assumptions have led to intellectual stagnation in academic literature on the topic.

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[3] A reference to the rise of leftist governments and movements from Venezuela to Bolivia.

Ontologically, the domination of ‘neo-realist’ perspectives has resulted in great emphasis being given to the state as the key actor within international affairs. In consequence, civil-military relations theory has become blinkered by state-centric thinking, and is in need of new ideas and approaches. Epistemologically, neo-realist dominance of the literature on civil-military relations, has led to the unquestioning adoption of certain implied assumptions, which are in need of deconstruction and re-construction in order to advance study on this topic - questions that will be examined at length in the following section of the chapter.

Challenges to the Civil-Military Relations Theoretical Status Quo

Prior to laying out the ontological and policymaking issues for the post-Cold War era development of civil-military relations theory, one must underpin it with an understanding of the challenges the theory faces, especially given the intellectual stagnation characteristic of neo-realist thinking (Cottey, Edmunds and Forster, 2002: 31-56).

Epistemological Challenges

The assumptions of neo-realism are essentially positivist, insofar as it concentrates heavily on measurable outputs and inputs within the framework of unitary state actors within an anarchic international environment (Waltz, 1959). This notion of measuring variables within an international system, as neo-realism does, centres on the premise that social science, like natural science, is the study and accumulation of knowledge of an objective reality. Furthermore, it is assumed that the role of the social scientist is as a neutral observer of this ‘objective’ reality, merely through observation to note the nature of this external reality. As such, neo-realist thought argues for the maintenance of the status quo within international relations, as this is the observed reality of the supposedly ‘neutral’ observer. Any emancipatory movement outside of this reality is discounted by neo-realists (Booth, 2005: 7). It implies that state actors and as a result, human actors, are unable to break free of continuous anarchy and war within international relations; such a situation represents the ‘natural’ order and condition of the international system of states. This approach is summed up by Waltz, who comments: ‘The beast in man may glory in the carnage [of war]; the reason in man rebels’ (1959: 224). This reality is confined within the structure of the state. For, if this external reality is constant, why continue expending energy on attempting to understand the subtleties and nuances of civil-military relations? This complacency has created a stagnant theoretical framework for civil-military relations, which has struggled to move beyond the neo-realist paradigm. Such theoretical atrophy, deepened by isolation from intellectual movements within the wider field of social science - and particularly international relations - is in need of rectifying as it has weakened the intellectual rigor of the topic and, in so doing, fails to allow for a complete understanding and explanation of civil-military relations. This limited epistemological underpinning, with its emphasis on unitary state actors and their variables, such as power and power maximisation, delimits possible understanding and explanation of both civil-military relations and bilateral military relations. In order to develop a greater understanding and level of complexity, the introduction of post-positivist theoretising is required (Booth, 2005: 10-12).

The use of constructivist analysis provides an effective theoretical model to address this conundrum. Constructivist theory allows for an understanding of social reality outside of the constraints of the unitary state and its behaviour; allowing for the inclusion of human agency at all levels of analysis. The humanisation of both international relations and civil-military relations is a critical project of utmost import in order to include the globally dispossessed and to move from an emphasis on the interests of the state and, consequently, its elite. As Booth states:

> At least as significant as realism’s stated agenda are its unspoken assumptions about how the world works and what is important. These include the prioritization of the victims of politics over the victims of economics, the disregard of human rights except as an instrument of foreign policy competition (propaganda), the neglect of gender and class as causes of insecurity, and the refusal to countence the possibility of fundamental change or learning in human society (except in the technological realm). Faced by the picture of the world offered by political realism, one is stuck by what is missing: What are the poor? Where are women? Where are the voiceless? Who benefits from those who are silenced? Where is political economy and race? (2005: 7)

The use of constructivist analysis in regard to civil-military relations and its inclusion in an attempt to marry it with bilateral relations, enables a move away from the status quo of unitary state actors in constant flux for power maximisation and an essentially negative view of both international relations and human nature towards a more emancipatory theoretical model. This thesis aims to enable, in some small part, the formation of a move towards the Kantian ideal within the international sphere and hence the promotion of democracy within the state in terms of civil-military relations (Williams, Wright and Evans, 1993: 112-122).

The state under constructivist thought is a social reality, a man-made mental landscape which as a result of its very nature is malleable. Agency is consequently given to human actors within their social realities; allowing for the re-forming of concepts such as the nation state and relations between these actors and non-state actors. As Delanty states: ‘In constructivism, the subject is an active agent as opposed to the passive conception of subjectivity in the value-free social science of positivism and hermeneutics’ (1997:112). This is not to argue that reality is the creation of the human mind, rather the formulation of external reality is known via the confines of science. Through social constructs humans are able to create social reality. That is to argue that social reality is a form of mediated knowledge. As a result, the conducting of social science research is a project of social construction. As a consequence, the social scientist should be reflexive towards the knowledge production process, in recognition of the constraints of social constructs and of social scientist as a social actor. The use of this reflexive methodology is an attempt to mitigate the ideological domination of realism and from white, middle class, male scholars within international relations and security studies [4], as Booth states: ‘Realist derived security studies continues to survive and flourish because the approach is congenial for those who prosper from the intellectual hegemony of a top-down, statist, power-centric, masculinised ethnocentric, and militarized world view of security’ (2005: 9).

Ontological Challenges

Let us now move to discuss the ontological issues arising from the changing political environment in the post-Cold War era, with the theoretical underpinning of the thesis in hand. With the end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet Union, the rigid geopolitical scene has been transformed into a more dynamic, fluid geopolitical (and hence security) environment. This has brought into question the usefulness of neo-realist thought in regard to civil-military relations theory. Realist and neo-realist theory came to dominate international relations and civil-military relations in turn, as a consequence of their ability to theorize the political external reality of their age, whether it was the interwar period in the case of E.H. Carr ({1981}2001), or the Cold War era in the case of Morgenthau ({1948}2006). However, it could not be said today that neo-realism offers the single authoritative conceptualisation of reality for the study of international or civil-military relations, as the political maelstrom between states, together with the increasing influence of non-state forces in terms of both internally and as trans-national actors, have now increased in importance. As Walker notes:

> Contemporary political life seems to be characterised both by the proliferation of particular identities and by the construction of shared modes of entanglement, participation and exclusion. Claims about an emerging global culture share the stage

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[4] The author is also a white, middle class male!

> with claims about the autonomy, integrity and vitality of more and more minutely differentiated cultures and ways of life in specific places (1991: 445).

It is the intent of this study to provide a construct of the external reality of international relations, which bears up to the scrutiny of a comparative case study.

Of particular note for this study in attempting to rework civil-military relations theory, are the ontological challenges to neo-realism. They can be summarised as: (i) the changing nature of the state and consequently the nature of 'anarchy' in international relations (ii) the changing nature of both 'military' and 'civilian' groupings as social actors; and (iii) the evolving notions of 'security' and 'insecurity', as the nature of the state changes and the role of non-state actors increases (Cottey, Edmunds and Forster, 2002: 31-56).

The first challenge for both international and civil-military relations theory is the nature of the state and its evolution in the context of the process of globalisation and the end of the Cold War. The position of states has changed markedly as a result of the rapidly moving socio-cultural-political kaleidoscope associated with globalisation. As the political reality of statehood and the role of the state in international relations changes over time, it is only fair to re-assess the theoretical analysis of the state, and by extension, the nature of 'anarchy'. For neo-realist theorists, the state has primacy within the international system, together with the concept of power maximisation vis-à-vis competing states. This perspective, however, negates the progression of global politics into the twenty-first century, particularly the growing role of civil society, whether in the form of non-government organisations (NGOs) through to transnational corporations (TNCs). To some extent, states have attempted to counter (or at least limit) the perceived negative affects and influences of non-state actors through the growing utility of supranational bodies, such as the European Union (EU) in the political sphere, or the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in the economic sphere. Paradoxically, the pooling of states' sovereignty in supranational bodies, has itself weakened the state as a social construct, by delimiting its absolute political power within the international arena, while also strengthening the state's ability to counter balance the economic and political might of non-state actors, such as TNCs.

The process of globalisation has led to the gradual demotion of the primacy of the state in international relations. Indeed, the very foundations of the unitary state actor have shifted. The state has increasingly become a more pluralistic social organisation in constant flux, along different stratum and axis of anatomization (such as, gender, class, culture and race) separating and co-joining at different levels of analysis. This has created a patchwork of interests, in which the state must both compete and organise within, in order to fulfil its role as Leviathan (Williams, Wright and Evans, 1993: 91-100). The role of globalisation has, in large part, enabled the creation of ambiguity within the social conceptualisation of the state. This is not to negate the continued role of the state in humans' lives, as Buzan notes:

> Those who have experienced the sting of state power in forms varying from tax demands and conscription notices, to bombardments and destabilisation campaigns, might argue that whether it is ephemeral or not, the state certainly manifests itself in concrete terms. The view of the state as a package of territory, polity and society suggests that it is both metaphysical and concrete (1991: 63).

In relation to civil-military relations theory, the fragmentation of the conceptualisation of the state has resulted in a crisis of legitimacy in the role of the state as the sole arbiter of violence (Walker, 1991: 445-461). This has led to the increasing, though not absolute, socio-political need for military action to gain legitimacy via, at least tacit, support from transnational civil society. Neo-realism's conceptualisation of military power as the use of violent force (or threat of force) by a unitary state for its own power maximisation, is no longer justifiable though, ironically, Clausewitz's statement that: '… war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means' still holds (Williams, Wright and Evans, 1993: 152). Indeed, one could argue that political concerns have taken both a strategic and tactical dominant role within latter day conflicts[5].

The decline in the legitimacy of the state as the sole arbiter of violence, has also had consequences in relation to democratic civil-military relations, as the role of the military within the construct of the state has come under question. One solution to this *problematique* is the elimination of the military as an agent of the state. Such solutions, however, are paper thin, as in the case of Costa Rica. The Costa Rican government scrapped the military yet in the same breath created a paramilitary police force in order to maintain internal security (Høivik and Aas, 1981: 333-350). The maintenance of a military appears to be one fundamental element of statehood: even the Pope has an army, however notional.[6] For those states that maintain armed forces, these increasingly appear socio-politically isolated from their support base, namely the citizenry, and increasingly irrelevant as a projection of military power for the sole benefit of power maximisation. Nevertheless, this is not to say the military is necessarily irrelevant *per se*, rather that it has failed to evolve in unison with political realities, remaining in essence, nineteenth century political entities. Parallel to this development, there has also been a rise in the use and importance of private security firms to shortfalls in militaries' manpower e.g. the Iraqi conflict 2003 to the present. Simultaneously, in the global south the emergence of privatised armies has fuelled resource wars, particularly in Africa. The privatisation of the military has been an increasingly important consequence of the changing nature of the state and the use of military force (Avant, 2006: 507-528). Hence, the reconfiguration of the conceptualisation of the state has a reflexive and reflective impact, not only on the socio-political architecture of the state, but also on the conduct of the state and its use of violence.

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[5] Examples include: Dafar conflict in Sudan and Chad; Iraq conflict (2003 onwards); and Afghanistan (2001 onwards).

[6] A reference to the Pope's Swiss Guard, a mercenary force dating back to the era of Italian city states.

A second issue to address is the nature of relations between military and civilian groupings within the state.[7] Traditionally, both the state and these political actors within it are viewed as unitary, either within international relations or within the affairs of state, respectively. In particular, the civilian component within the state structure is seen as a rational actor in a constant struggle for maximisation of control over the levers of state power. The military for their part, in ideal form, are imagined as politically neutral in contrast to the political charged 'civilian groupings' due to the 'professionalism' of the officer corps and the external orientation of the military as an institution (Huntington, {1957} 2001). In light of the rapid and qualitative changes in the nature of statehood, it would be wise to reformulate a more inclusive, flexible approach outside of the confines of traditional neo-realist perspectives. This anxiety about the changing nature of the state and the military as its agent has manifested itself within scholarly discourse (Moskos, 2000; Feaver and Kohn, 2001). Hence, one may note that while the academic community is aware of the challenges to civil-military relations theory, there has been a failure to note the epistemological shifts within the political paradigm underlying it. What is more, scholars have failed to bring civil-military relations theory into the wider intellectual discourse due to the persistence of scholars in maintaining the rigid theoretical bedrock of neo-realism. As Bruneau states:

> This understanding [of civil-military relations] is important not only because virtually all democracies are facing dramatic changes in their civil-military relations, but also because few researchers are prepared to undertake the work necessary to understand the civilian government side of the equation, let alone the military side (Bruneau in Bruneau and Tollefson, 2006: 6).

Furthermore, within the civil-military relations literature there is also an emphasis, often implied, on the definition of civilians as elite groupings such as politicians or executive branch officials (Huntington {1957} 2001; Feaver, 2003; Lasswell 1997). The concentration on governmental based conceptualisation of ‘civilians’, has led to the narrowing and marginalisation of the theorisation of civil-military relations among policymaking and military education circles (Cottey, Edmunds and Forster, 2002). While this may have served its purpose during the Cold War era of nuclear standoff, in the context of the globalised world today, with its diverse, fluid and asymmetric threat environment it is no longer relevant or indeed fruitful. Hence, it could be argued that the definition of ‘civilian’ within the context of civil-military relations is in need of reassessment.

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[7] 'Military and civilian groupings' is the terminology used by Huntington ({1957}2001).

Likewise, the notion of what constitutes the ‘military’ within the context of civil-military relations is in need of examination, for as the conceptualisation of the state as a social construct has changed, so has the military as an agent of the state. Most pointedly, there is a need within the framework of an emancipatory project to broaden the definition of ‘military’, both in terms of class relations and on a tactical level, to be inclusive of other state agents of violence. Broadening the definition of ‘the military’ within securitisation theory, to include militarised police, intelligence agencies and non-state actors (such as private military contractors), enables the creation of a more realistic study of the use of violence or threat of violence. Ball (2001) has suggested the creation of a ‘military family’ as part of a process to re-define the military conceptually within civil-military relations. Such a broadening of the definition of the ‘military’ paradoxically allows for the strengthening of civil-military relations. Through the inclusion of previously excluded agents of state induced violence, the resultant more rounded theoretical model will allow for a greater understanding of civil-military relations. In so doing, it will provide policymakers and civil society with greater knowledge for the future development of social constructs within civil-military relations.

Furthermore, it is key to note the deep linkages between the civilian and military elements of the state, both in a bureaucratic sense, as well as being essential in the meeting of new threats in the post-Cold War era. As Pion- Berlin states:

> In the post-cold war, post-9/11 environment, threats to national security, development, and well-being seldom come packaged in the form of an invading army. Nations are often besieged from within, the victims of ethnic or religious hatreds, internal civil wars, and insurgencies. From without, they may be vulnerable to cross-border guerrilla raids or to the operations of sophisticated networks of narcotics traffickers and terrorists. None of these threats is purely military or civilian in nature; they are both (Pion-Berlin in Bruneau and Tollefson, 2006: x).

Indeed, the separation of civilian and military groupings by Huntington ({1957} 2001) has come under question (Moskos, 2000). Moskos argues that in the post-Cold War era the difference between what could be termed ‘civilian’ and ‘military’, were increasingly porous with particular reference to the nature of military operations by 'post-modern' militaries, the US military being the prime example (2000: 21-27). While Moskos concentrated on the use of civilian employees by the military as logistic managers and technicians, one may also expand the argument to ask: to what extent can one talk of civil-military relations, due to the fluidity of social actors between these two social constructs? This is especially relevant, given the 'revolving door' employment between military and civilian institutions. In turn, this is due to the heavy reliance on the military by civilians to provide accountability of the military itself. This interdependent relationship has had the unintended consequence of creating a dearth of civilian specialisation in this field, which over time, has become a vicious cycle of continued over reliance on both ex-military and active military personnel for oversight roles (Weir Alderson, 1997: 56-63). The failure to simulate civilian intellectual discourse, in terms of accountability, demonstrates the need to renew the present stale theoretical framework of civil-military relations, in order to advance theory beyond the bureaucratic structures of the military education system and government.

The third challenge is the need to examine notions of security in the twenty-first century, which is of particular note as a theoretical bridge between all three ontological issues to civil-military relations. Through an analysis of civil-military relations and bilateral security relations, via the prism of social constructivism, one can come to a more realistic and emancipatory framework (Wendt, 1992; Katzenstein, 1996). This task is increasingly complex as the nature of security and insecurity evolve over time and space, as Kolodziej reminds us: 'A theory of security must account both for the potentially limitless expansion of violence and for the limits placed on force. Violence and the security dilemma that it prompts invite human thought and ingenuity to advance human purposes by non-violent means' (2005: 74).

In order to discuss the challenges to civil-military relations with reference to the changing notions of security, as stated above, social constructivist analysis will be used in an attempt to formulate a theoretical model which recognises the need for both a realistic and emancipatory discourse of security studies.

Social constructivism, it is argued, offers a theoretical bridge and a more realistic theory in terms of both a conceptualisation of 'security', and the role of the state and non-state actors, within this theoretical framework. As such, social constructivism offers the possibility of availing solutions to the challenges facing civil-military relations and international relations theoretical and narrative perspectives. Though realists would argue that the constructivist concern for theoretical rooting has rendered it an irrelevance to policymakers, the theoretical model utilised in this dissertation seeks to shed light on the ontological challenges facing civil-military relations in the twenty-first century. It is to a discussion of this that we now turn.

Constructivist Approach to the Ontological Challenges to Civil-Military Relations

In his landmark article (Wendt 1992), and later monograph (1999) Social Theory of International Politics, Wendt attempts to address political actors' agency and interests in relationship to social structures in international relations. He states:

> With respect to the substance of international relations, however, both modern and post-modern constructivists are interested in how knowledgeable practices constitute subjects, which is not far from the strong liberal interest in how institutions transform interests. They share a cognitive, inter-subjective conception of process in which identities and interests are endogenous to interaction, rather than a rationalist-behavioural one in which they are exogenous (1992: 394).

According to this approach, social actors and their identity and interests are the theoretical bedrock upon which the ontological study of international relations (and thus the notion of 'security') is based. Wendt (1992) argues that while the state is a social construct, it is treated as a given by many international relations theorists. Wendt does not argue for the rejection of the state as a significant element within international relations, arguing instead that recognition of state as a social construct together with the re-conceptualisation of 'anarchy', is sufficient correction to the neo-realist model. Katzenstein (1996) and Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) concur with Wendt's definition of the state and its role in the international system, emphasising the social structures external to the state. However, Campbell (1998) and McSweeney (1999) argue that this conceptualisation of the state and international relations is insufficient. These critics call for a deeper and broader re-conceptualisation of the international system and in turn, the state, through the introduction of the individual as the referent object. McSweeney holds, in opposition to Wendt (1992), that the state itself is not the referent object within international relations, but rather a construct for the referent object of the individual human being. McSweeney's thesis is thus an attempt to 'humanise' international relations, as it runs counter to the notion of the state as unitary entity with interests of its own, confined with the structure of the international system.

Although in Wendt's approach the state is the referent object, this is not a conceptualisation of the state that realist scholars would recognise. Wendt's notion of the state is one of a social construct with its own identity and interests in constant social inter-subjective making and reforming of the international system (1992: 391-425). The state is regarded as being in interaction with other states in a relationship that is in constant flux, bringing about a continued re-configuration of its interests and identity. This he labels 'anarchy'. While accepting, with caveats, the contribution of Wendt's scholarship in terms of inter-state relations and the nature of 'anarchy', the internal element of security is found wanting in terms of the study of the construction of the state, though to be fair to Wendt, this is not his intent, as he states:

> The [Social Theory of International Politics] addresses the question, 'how should we understand the social construction of the states' *system*?', not, 'how should we understand the social construction of the *state*?' The one asks how relationships among the system's parts generate certain tendencies at the level of the whole, the other asks how the parts come into being in the first place. The complaint that Social Theory reifies the state implies that these questions are the same, that part of what is going on in the states system is ongoing production of states 'all the way down', such that states are wholly endogenous to the system. This is a mistake (2000:174).

In relation to the role of the individual within the discourse of security in the international system, McSweeney argues that individual security is central to conceptualisation of the state and in turn, international relations. This position is justified through a critique of the neo-realist position:

> State security within the traditional school of security studies rests on a conception of human needs. It is a moral judgement about human needs, disguised as an objective discovery or an axiom of common sense, which grounds state security in the primacy of the survival of the state (1999:199).

McSweeney points out that a full understanding of the international system and the state within it can only be attained by the inclusion of the individual as the referent object. His conceptualisation of the individual is not that of rationalist scholars. Rather it involves social actors confined by (and in mutual construction of) their social realities with other social actors in order to inform their identities and interests, and by implication, actions. This perspective of the individual may be used to analyse the notion of 'security', as it opens the possibility of building a new theoretical model which may offer a more realistic and practical approach. The admission of the individual into the theoretical framework of international relations permits a bridging of the internal and external realities of security studies. McSweeney (1999) maintains not that the state is subject to reductionist 'all-the-way-down' thinking, instead it is influenced by the social discourse of the international system and the societal social actors within the state itself:

> The nature of the state, what kind of thing the state is, affects our understanding of the limits and possibilities of interaction among states - whether we see them as capable of sustained cooperation or not. This is a generalized category, as such it applies to all

> states, analogous to the category of human nature in individuals. But states as collective actors, also have a distinctive identity overlaying their 'nature', and there is no necessary coherence or compatibility between the two' (1999:159).

The state, as a social actor, negotiates between these two identities in order to formulate its eventual identity and, consequently, interests. For McSweeney, like Wendt, the process of social interaction and reflexive social reality is in constant flux. However, McSweeney argues in favour of a more permissive social reality, in which the actor's agency is not constrained within the structural social institutions created, via the process of reflexive feedback from the social acts of the actor, informed by social memory, though not confined by it. As a result, the actor is able to reformulate his/her social reality allowing for praxis through the changing of identity. In practical terms, this implies that the social actor - at the level of international relations this means the state - is able to transform its identity, and hence its interest, both via the social interaction within the international system and via the internal social workings of the state between sectional interests. This thesis argues that this broader approach offers a more fruitful theoretical model, as it combines both the international and national sphere.

This thesis aims to utilise the previously stated theoretical models of international relations in order to re-inform the understanding of civil-military relations theory and its connections to the international system. The inclusion of the individual within the theoretical framework of the state's relationship within the international system as cognitive entities, centring the social practice of social actors, and the production and re-imagining of identities and interests, allows the theorist to create a progressive model for the advancement of international relations and civil-military relations.

Importantly, it should be noted that social structures are not the stimulus of social actors' behaviour, rather social structures are the manifestation of the reflective inter-subjective social acts between social actors. That is, the relationship between the agency of the state and the structure of the international system are linked not in a matter akin to the naturalistic theoretical model of natural science, in which the object of inquiry is stable and available to quantitative analysis. With this in mind, the epistemological underpinning of agency and structure used in this thesis rests on the notion of the double hermeneutic of Giddens, and argues in favour of the increased role of the agent's agency in combination with structure (Cohen, 1989; Delanty, 1997). More precisely, they are different sides of the same coin. Social action is the inter-reflexive embodiment of agency and structure in social reality. As Mc Sweeney explains:

> Human agency and the structuring element of routine, the reflexive monitoring of which makes agency possible, are mutually constituted- not as cause and effect recursively being transformed into effect and cause, in the model of functionalism, but as a duality of 'instantiation' (1999: 144).

In terms of the epistemological element of the agency and structure debate, with reference to this thesis, a key factor to note is that the social world of the actor and his/her social action under investigation is not in isolation from the theorist, rather there is a mutually reflexive inter-play between the theorist, as a social actor and the social actor as object of study. As Mc Sweeney states: 'Social scientific knowledge is parasitic on knowledgability and skills of human agents, who construct, sustain, and modify the social order which provides the data for the models of social scientists' (1999:149). In understanding social action through social science theory, it is a reflexive process in constant flux between itself and the social actor as subject.

With this theoretical grounding in place, one may discuss the nuances of the 'agency' versus 'structure' debate within the philosophy of social science. In this thesis the notion of 'agency' and 'structure' is not one in which agency and structure differentiated social entities rather they are mutually embedded elements of the social reality of the actor. One can not have 'agency' without 'structure' or vice versa - not in the sense that agency equates the internal and structure the external in relation to the social actor, but rather that both agency and structure are processes within the wider process of action. Social action occurs via a process of reflexive understandings of the social structure, which are pre-existent with the cognitive social world of the social actor and the collective; this enables the social agency of the actor to make sense of his/her social world. In turn, the social agency of the actor reflexively reconstitutes and reformulates social structure. As Mc Sweeney states: 'Routine, or institutionalized habits, are what makes social action possible and is, at the same time, the product of action and the creative of human agency' (1999:142). In this dissertation it is argued that the use of a constructivist critique of civil-military relations theory will provide the much needed answer to the ontological challenges facing the field in the twenty-first century.

The first ontological challenge to civil-military relations theory (and indeed the 'realist' perspective of international relations), is its assumed conceptualisation of the state as both a unitary actor and as the sole actor within the international sphere. The social constructivist critique argues that recent developments within international politics, in particular the process of globalisation and its impact on states and their sovereignty, can be better understood by conceptualising the state as a simultaneous social actor and construct with reflexive properties rather than as a unitary actor in pursuit of rational power maximisation (Mc Sweeney, 1999). Furthermore, the social constructivist approach adopted in this thesis acknowledges the individual as a referent object. This position not only allows greater scope for the analysis of latter-day developments within both the international sphere (in terms of the increasing import of non-state actors), but also the internal ramifications of these changing social realities. It thus circumvents the difficulties faced by proponents of the rational unitary state as the referent object of international relations. Such a position not only allows for a critique of the dominant theoretical model, it opens up the study of international relations theoretical models to non-state actors and their interactions with state actors. From this perspective, the conceptualisation of progress and possible praxis over time and space, non-sequentially, through a reflexive social process is theoretically catered for.

The thesis also creates a conceptualisation of international relations which is progressive, allowing for the development of human society beyond the state and the 'anarchy' of international relations. Indeed, like Wendt sets forth:

> *If* a critical mass of states position each other as rivals, then the system will acquire a Lockean structure with certain hypothesized dynamics; *if* a critical mass of states begin to treat each other as friends then this culture will be transformed into a Kantian one; and so on' (2000: 174).

The second challenge within civil-military relations is the nature of the military and the civilian groupings as theoretical concepts. The present work seeks to remove the barrier between the internal workings of the state and elements of the state's involvement within the international community, in order to bring about a fuller, deeper understanding of civil-military relations. It should be noted that social organisations as elements within the bureaucratic structure of the state may act individually and in multiple ways, which may contradict one another due to differing identities within the governmental system. This is particularly true in reference to the self-interests of the bureaucratic entity (and that of the state a whole) and the citizenry it purportedly serves.

These social institutions and their identities are not though, solidified, but are in constant flux. Such a perspective of civil-military relations has connotations not only for the theoretical workings of the state and the institutions within; it also impacts upon the connections between states and the theoretical nature of 'anarchy' in international relations. Rather than objectifying civilian and military groupings as social constructs engaged in an internal zero sum game of control over resources and the functionality of the agents of violence, it is argued that sectional groupings are in a constant process of social production of identity and re-imagining. Such a position offers a more nuanced approach to that of Huntington, whose approach to civil-military relations is mistaken in its belief that social interaction occurs solely through the institutions of the state, together with his imagining of the civilians or the military as unitary actors acting in a uniform fashion. It is more productive to see the two groupings as social actors with multi-layered and multi-faceted social realities which are in constant flux over time and space. Indeed, the solidification of civil-military relations suggested by Huntington and others is a social construct itself. The argument advanced here, is not that civil-military relations are 'anarchic'. Rather to misquote Wendt (1992), civil-military relations are what state actors make of them. A model based on the underpinning of realist thought is unable to provide sufficient analysis of social reality to provide the methodology of inter-action and interdependence of social actors as they evolve over time. One should not, however, throw the Huntingtonian baby out with the bath water. The task is to provide greater clarity, paradoxically via greater complexity, to get closer to the reality of social interaction. Hence, it is posited that a re-working of Huntington's scholarly work on civil-military is required in the theoretical model of social constructivism. This re-working of civil-military relations according to social constructivism argues the military is a social institution and not a unitary actor. It is viewed as a multi-faceted social construct which possesses both an internal identity and external identity, akin to the state for which it is part. As such, the military as a social institution formulates its sectional interests, which manifest and feedback on the institution's identity via the process of social action. In the case of the military, this is to state that the existence of a professional officer corps ethic which is 'concrete, permanent and universal', is itself a social construct and in need of constant re-enforcement via social actions to be maintained (Huntington, {1957} 2001: 89). Although, such a 'professional ethic' is in part self-perpetuating, the possibly of social transformation still pertains, both with regard to the internal identity of the military as a social institution within the state, and its external identity, via interactions with social actors and constructs outside of the state. Factors here include bilateral military relations, as well as connections with actors external of the state system. Similar to the military's internal identity, its external identity is in constant flux, resulting in the re-formulation of sectional interests. The internal and external inter-mingle in the formulation of a 'military mind': the military's 'identity', and consequently interests, is informed via social construction within the framework of the state and the international system.

While it is maintained that constructivist analysis not only provides for an explanation of social reality, but also allows for a new emancipatory model of human relations, some critics have suggested that its main advantage is that it is not neo-realism. However, this thesis argues that it is this connection to present theoretical debate amongst proponents and detractors of neo-realism, that both roots and exemplify constructivist thought. As a result, the use of social constructivism as the theoretical framework allows for the recognition of the military as a social actor within both the domestic sphere of the state and in the international sphere.

The military, as a social constructed institution, creates different ‘life worlds’ in which its bureaucracy and individual members both interact to enable a multifaceted and multi-layered social reality in which the military within the state interacts both externally and internally (Habermas, 1987). It should be noted that this is true of all social actors vis-à-vis the development over time and space of their identities and interests (Mc Sweeney, 1999). As such, the military should not be seen as being necessarily constrained within state social structures; this notion, like statehood, is at root, a social construct. This in turn may provide theoretical understanding of the social constructions required in relation to the military’s behaviour with other social actors, e.g. the planning of a military coup or, alternatively, explaining a situation of democratic control. If the military constructs a social identity which perceives its interests as being met by control of the state and its governmental structures, a coup may occur. If, on the other hand, social constructs are in place that promote the support of and superiority of civilian politicians and/or bureaucracy, the military remains in the barracks. This does not necessitate democracy though, as is the case historically in Mexico (Camp, 2005). Huntington delineates civil control of the military along the binary notions of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ control. ‘Subjective’ control is described as being via civilian suppression of the military by one sectional civilian grouping. ‘Objective’ control, on the other hand, is dominance of the military via the formulation of a professional officer corps, whose autonomy is recognised within the bureaucracy as the professional manager of violence on behalf of the state. The author would, however, argue counter to Huntington ({1957}2001), that there is a central contradiction within civil-military relations that the military needs to be socialised, not only via its stratification within the structure of the state but also, in the wider society in which it is part. Hence, the military and other social actors create rules, norms and institutional identities and interests in order to operate which are in constant flux.

This has ramifications for the challenges faced by militaries in the Western Hemisphere today. The re-examination of their identities as essentially standing armies, navies and air forces in defence of a state to which they are part and owe their identity, to include elements of the state apparatus previously deemed outside the concern of civil-military relations theory (namely paramilitary police forces and/or intelligence services) is a major factor in the political realities of Latin American countries in need of theoretical examination (Ball, 2004). With the dominant security threats in the twenty-first century occurring within the confines of the state rather than via inter-state conflict, such a re-construction of the notion of the military within civil-military relations is required, in order to produce a theoretical model of utility for policymakers. The formulation of the notion of what is deemed ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ is a matter dependent on unique considerations of individual states. This is of particular import to democratically controlled militaries and the political contradictions this may produce in the lack of democracy within the structure of the military organisation, in relation to civilian government and wider civil society. Such considerations are not simply a matter of interest to the military as a social actor, but also to the civilian sector. As has been stated previously both actors are in a complex set of inter-subjective interactions in the production and re-formulation of their relative positioning within the social melee of the state with its differing sectional interests.

With this in mind, it is opportune to discuss the nature of the civilian grouping within the social architecture of the state with reference to constructivist analysis. The difference between what one may term ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ is blurred and grey areas do exist whether it concerns military contractors, reserve forces, or the revolving doors which exist between the military bureaucracy, civilian institutions of government and private enterprise. While for countries in the rich north, such grey areas in the division between the notions of civilian and military is related to the process of increased specialisation combined with the affects of globalisation on the fabric of the state and the military-industrial complex (Moskos, 2000), in the south, such blurring is related to the nature of security threats to their states’ internal stability in the face of weak government institutions, corruption and globalisation. In both cases, the re-evaluation of civil-military relations is itself related to the changing nature of the state, as interests and identities change overtime in the post-Cold War kaleidoscope.

This theoretical model not only allows for the meta-theoretical bedrock for civil-military relations over time and space, but hopefully allows for the possibility of the development of progressive and democratically-orientated social constructs. In so doing, promoting the democratic control of the military, the state agents of violence, not only via the consolidation of democratic institutions within countries but also by enabling of the socio-political circumstances in which the Wendtian formulation of the international system may lead towards a Kantian vision of international relations. With this in mind, let us move forward to discuss the ontological challenge of the shifting ground of security matters in the post-Cold War era.

With the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, political space opened to question the definition of security in the context of the growing complexity and interdependence in the late-twentieth-and-twenty-first centuries. There is a clear need to re-examine the notion of security within the twenty-first century to make it fit for purpose.

The process of forming an analysis of the conceptualisation of security must start at the fundamental question: what is ‘security’? Indeed, in whose interest is ‘security’ kept, and by whom? The answer is dependent on the respondent. As Booth explains: ‘Conceptualisations of security are … the product of different understandings of what politics is and should be about’ (2005: 23). Critical security theorists, like Booth, argue that the key referent object of security should be the individual rather than the state (Booth, 2005). The growing role and influence of non-state actors within security matters in the post-Cold War era of global interdependence, though uneven, is not recognised by realist scholars within the continuation of the dominant theoretical model of state-based international relations. For critical security theorists, in particular the Welsh School, such concerns may be resolved and a process of emancipatory politics emerge if security studies were to be re-configured around the placing of human emancipation at its centre (Booth, 2005). For the Welsh School, the key referent object of security studies is the individual not the state. This focus on the emancipation of the individual breaks free, not only from a central tenet of traditional international relations - the state being the key referent object - but also questions traditional realist epistemological underpinnings. As such it shares with social constructivism a critical stance vis-à-vis realist perspectives of international relations. Furthermore, through the questioning of realist theorists’ exclusive study of the state as the key referent object in international relations, allowing for the creation of political space to deepen and broaden the conceptualisation of ‘security’ in the twenty-first century. In some respects, it may be noted, they share much with those governments and policymakers who support and advance the notion of ‘human security’. The concept of ‘human security’ is a response by policymakers to the growing importance of internal security matters, relative to the diminution of the state’s power vis-à-vis non-state actors. The notion of ‘human security’ came to the political fore in 1994, with the publishing of the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP), Human

Development Report. The UNDP defined human security as follows: 'Human security can be said to have two main aspects it means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life- whether in homes, in jobs or in communities' (1994: 23). This definition has come to be seen as the definitive conceptualisation of human security for policymakers (Ewan, 2007: 182-190). The deliberately broad nature of this definition, allows individual countries to extract from the concept what they wished. This is both the principal advantage and disadvantage to the promotion of 'human security' for policymakers and scholars alike. The ambiguity allows for the creation of broad coalitions of governments and non-state actors in combating security issues as diverse as gang violence through to environmental degradation (Paris, 2001: 87-102). It should be noted that within the constructivist framework of this thesis, security cannot be afforded a fixed definition as it is a process rather than an object within international relations (Campbell, 1998). Indeed, the provision of security for the citizenry allows for the legitimating of the state and its identity: '[it] is much concerned about providing meaning to identity at home as understanding difference abroad' (Lott, 2004: 28). As a result, the constructivist approach in this thesis is as much a call for the re-examination of the internal identity of the state as it is of the international system.

For some realist theorists, this broadening of the conceptualisation of security is criticised as an ontological step too far, muddying the theoretical framework of international relations, through the inclusion of referent objects other than states. This mirrors, to some degree, the realist critique of critical security studies and social constructivist scholarship (Kolodziej, 2005), though, realists fail to provide a sufficiently consistent theoretical model to meet the challenges to the state-orientated system in the twenty-first century.

The realist school of thought is a broad church ranging from the works of Morgenthau to those of Buzan. However, certain elements are common to all realist scholars' writings in relation to the study of security. First among these is that the state is the primary referent object of security, allowing for 'both the framework of order and the highest source of governing authority' (Buzan, 1991: 22). Hence, realists concentrate their efforts on studying the state vis-à-vis one another in order to understand the nature of security and conversely, insecurity. Critical to this understanding of security is the concept of the security dilemma. The Melian dialogue, or security dilemma, was first postulated by Thucydides and asserts that a state has to defend itself via force from the ambitions of other states in order to survive. However, the very process of militarisation and/or armament can be interpreted as an act of aggression by other states and lead to an arms race, or at worst, conflict (Evans and Newnham, 1998: 320, 494). The realist school of thought therefore sees the state as the most important political actor, viewing the individual as secondary in international relations. This is not to say that the individual plays no role within the constructs of some neo-realists. As Anthony D. Lott notes: ‘The state, it should be remembered, *incurs the obligation* to manage international uncertainty on behalf of its citizenry’ (2004: 21) From this perspective, legitimacy of statehood is given through the state’s protection of its population from the anarchic realities of the international system.

Another issue of critical importance in the realist study of security is the role of power. The realist view of humanity is essentially pessimistic, arguing that states, being human organisations, necessarily act in an egotistical fashion. As such, states need to use power principally in terms of military force in order to survive in the international system. Realists argue that it is the imbalance of power between states which leads to conflict. Only through the balancing of relative power can violence be mitigated. For this reason, Kolodziej claims that: ‘All states must be concerned, first and forever, with their power position relative to other states’ (2005: 130). This not to say that states will necessarily automatically be violent. Rather that they must balance policy options of both conflict and cooperation in order to maintain their best interests. As Lott posits: ‘Power, for realists, is a necessary but insufficient component to an overall security plan. States cannot rely solely on power to enhance security, but each state must possess a certain level in the event that it becomes necessary for maintaining security’ (2004: 23).

For realists the conceptualisation of security centres around the role of the state in an anarchic international system and the methods it must use in order to survive. For realists, the state is an ontological given of international relations for which security cannot be found, rather insecurity is mitigated against, due to the constant flux of power relations amongst states. Notions of ‘human security’ are seen by realists as a reductionist theoretical model which fails to acknowledge the *realpolitik* of the international system in which the state is the primary political unit.

This theoretical difference between ‘realists’ and the proponents of ‘human security’ is particularly notable in regard to the notion of ‘national security’ within the Western Hemisphere. While for some realist scholars the notion of ‘human security’ within international relations may be anathema (Paris, 2001: 87-102), it has increasingly found favour among policymakers and progressive academics (UNDP, 1994; Booth 2005). For some states in the hemisphere, the concept of ‘human security’ is critical to the meeting of regional political, socio-economic and environmental challenges, while for others, agreement around the concept of 'human security' within the hemisphere is little more than a rhetorical consensus upon which little practical cooperation amongst states or non-state actors is hinged.

From this sketch of the critical studies and realists theories, it can be seen that while both schools offer insights into the nature of the international system, they do not provide for a rounded theoretical model. While the realist approach concentrates overly on the analysis of relations amongst states and assumes the state is a unitary actor which acts in accordance with its interests regarding power relations, critical theorists argue from the opposite end of spectrum, in favour of a reductionist approach in which human individuals are the referent object. The latter perspective fails to account adequately for the relationship between states, arguing that security studies should be viewed from the individual level. In the light of the security environment in post- 9/11 world, the notion of human security provides a theoretical analysis which marries the *realpolitik*, and has subsequently gained popularity amongst policymakers. Though the nation state as a political actor within international relations clearly cannot be sidelined, nor is it realistic to argue that the state is the only actor of import within the world system. The two theoretical approaches are consequently in need of reconciliation (Lott, 2004). The theoretical disagreement may be paraphrased as follows: realists argue that critical theorists study what *should* be rather than what *is*; critical theorists for their part, argue that realism is far from 'realistic' in its depiction of a state-based international system, negating its *raison d'etait*. Overcoming this impasse between these schools of thought is attained via the use of McSweeney's notion of social constructivism which allows for the individual as the referent object, as well as the existence of the state within the framework of the international system.

McSweeney (1999) argues that individual security is central to any conceptualisation of the state and, in turn, international relations, justifying this position through a critique of the neo-realist position: 'State security with the traditional school of security studies rests on a conception of human needs. It is a moral judgement about human needs, disguised as an objective discovery or an axiom of common sense, which grounds state security in the primacy of the survival of the state' (1999:199).

McSweeney further points out that a full understanding of the international system, and role of the state within it, can only be brought about by the inclusion of the individual as the referent object. His conceptualisation of the individual, is not that of rationalist scholars, but rather of social actors, who mutually construct their social realities with other social actors in order to inform their identities and interests, and by implication, actions. This conceptualisation of the individual may be used to analyse the notion of 'security' in reference to this referent object. The inclusion of the individual within the constructivist model of international relations opens the possibility of building a new theoretical model which may offer a more 'realistic' and practical approach. The admission of the individual into the theoretical framework of international relations, permits a bridging of the internal and external realities of security studies. McSweeney (1999) argues not that the state is subject to reductionist 'all-the-way-down' thinking rather the state is influenced by the social discourse of the international system and the societal social actors within the state itself. As a social constructivist, McSweeney's understanding of the international system rests on its cognitive nature and the mental landscapes of individuals in a reflexive loop of identity, interests and social practice. This is not to state that social reality exists solely in the minds of the individual human, rather: 'we project a world of norms, rules and institutions, and they thereby acquire a facticity which we perceive as the objective constraint on our thinking and behaviour' (McSweeney, 1999: 202). McSweeney distinguishes between the identities of the individual and the state, referring to them as the 'societal identity' and 'state identity'. Using this model it is therefore possible to have the best of all possible worlds, to misquote Pangloss (Voltaire, {1758} 1947), as it allows for the provision of a sound theoretical bedrock to the individual as the referent object within international relations, whilst also allowing for the theoretical foundations of the state. Using the theoretical bedrock provided by McSweeney (1999), it is possible to utilise the notion of human security within a framework of a state-based international system in the twenty-first century, in which the conceptualisation of security is under reflexive re-evaluation by both state and non-state actors.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the use of social constructivism in this thesis proffers possibilities for the intellectual renewal of civil military relations in the face of the challenges facing the state in the twenty first century. As such, the theoretical model used rejects the stagnant traditional bedrock of civil-military relations, realism or neo-realism, instead favouring the humanisation of international relations and civil-military relations theory via the individual becoming the referent object. Furthermore, this is a theoretical model based on the fundamental understanding of social reality as being in constant flux and as such, enabling the possibility of social emancipation from the constraints of the international system and the use and management of state-sponsored violence.

The ontological challenges faced by civil-military relations theorists in the twenty-first century are threefold: (i) the changing nature of the state and consequently the ‘anarchy’ of the international system, (ii) the changing nature of both military and civilian groupings as a social actors, and (iii) the evolving notion of (in)security. The first of these challenges, the changing conceptualisation of the state is due to the twin processes of globalisation and localisation. As a consequence, the weakening of the state has afforded greater political space for non-state actors both within the territory of the state and within the international system. This challenge is best understood via the theoretical framework previously set out of social constructivism, allowing for both the existence of the state as a social actor and construct within the framework of the international system alongside the countervailing social actors and social processes acting upon and within the state in the era of globalisation. Through the use of the individual as the referent object of the state’s sovereignty as well as the international system, one is able to re-conceptualise the nature of the state and its connection with the international sphere in a more humane fashion. With the individual at the centre of the discourse of (in)security and the use of social constructivist analysis, the constrictions of realist/neo-realist concept of the state as a rational unitary actor can be replaced with a theoretical framework that permits the bridging of the internal and external realities of security studies. Furthermore, this conception of the state and international relations via social constructivism allows for the interaction of agency and structure in such a manner as to avail of the social actor, whether state or non-state, with both stratification within social structures and the agency to reformulate these very structures through social interaction and reflexive social construction. Thus, creating a theoretically cohesive framework for the state and the international arena, that is sufficiently flexible to meet the changing nature of and challenges to the state in the twenty-first century. Just as these social actors and processes have affected the development and understanding of statehood and its role as the sole arbiter of violence within an international setting, they have also impinged upon the internal mechanism of civil-military relations, the second challenge which faces theorists in this field. The thesis expounds a theoretical analysis of the current malaise of civil military relations theory in an attempt to renew the research field and to make it more relevant to the concerns and challenges facing both the state and its citizenry in the twenty first century. One is able to gain new light on the inner-workings of civil-military relations through a re-examination of the role of the internal social actors, via social constructivism and the Weberian notion of institutions. This, allows for the redefinition of ‘military’ and ‘civilian’ constructs within the context of the re-conceptualisation of civil society, the state and the international sphere afforded by a social constructivist analysis. Indeed, the use of social constructivism enables for the theoretical flexibility to note the inter-connections amongst social actors within and without the confines of the state as a social construct and at differing levels of analysis. This theoretical framework allows for the acknowledgement of different social organisations as elements within the bureaucratic structure of the state that may act as individual social actors and/or in multiple ways, which in turn may contradict one another as a result of differing identities and interests within the governmental system. This is not to objectify civilian and military groupings as in a form of zero sum game over the control of resources and political capital, rather it is to argue that these sectional identities and interests are in a process of social production and re-imagining in constant flux. Consequently, civil-military relations should not be seen as a mini-version of unitary state actors within the state, as envisioned by realists/neo-realists. Instead, the military and the differing civilian groupings within the confines of the state are each multi-faceted social constructs that possess an internal and external identity. The internal and external identities inter-mingle in the formation of the ‘institutional mind’, the institution’s identity and consequent interests being informed via the process of social construction and interaction with other social constructs within the framework of the state and the international system. As a result, the use of social constructivism acknowledges the military and civilian groupings as social actors within both the domestic and international spheres. Moreover, the use of this theoretical model enables an examination of the military and civilian groupings as social actors whilst also social constructs. This not only provides for a richer understanding of the social realities of individual states’ civil-military relations and bilateral relations as well as allowing a broader conceptualisation of the ‘military’ to include paramilitaries and intelligence services. The re-examination of the notion of the ‘military’ is of particular significance to the armed forces of the Western Hemisphere, given the region’s recent history and continued political realities. With the dominant security threats in the twenty-first century occurring within the confines of the state rather than via inter-state conflict in the hemisphere, a re-configuration of the construct of the ‘military’ within civil-military relations is of particular utility to policymakers in the region. The third ontological challenge to civil-military theorists is the ever-changing nature of the threats to the state, as it is hollowed out by the policies of neo-liberalism and the processes of globalisation, non-state actors have emerged to challenge it.

The thesis inter-weaves ontological issues of civil-military relations with an analysis of the conception of (in)security allowing for the humanisation of security studies within a backdrop of a state dominated international system. The thesis re-examines security within the theoretical framework of social constructivism, broadening and deepening its conceptualisation by making the individual the key referent object. The growing importance of (in)security within the territory of the state and the relative diminution of the state's power vis-à-vis non-state actors, has been noted by policymakers with the development of the concept of 'human security'. This is a notion born of necessity, and for a broad coalition of governments and non-state actors attempting to combat these growing security challenges of the twenty-first century from global warming through to human trafficking. As such, the conceptualisation of 'human security' has been deliberately broad in order to promote consensus amongst governments in fighting these new threats. Social constructivism is able to provide human security a theoretical underpinning arguing that the notion of (in)security itself is a social construct, and as such, a result of social actors' identities and interests. Consequently, such notions cannot be fixed definitions as they are a process rather than an object within international relations. The thesis exploits the existing notion(s) of 'human security' and in connection with social constructivism reformulates it into a more complete theoretical framework for the understanding and explanation of (in)security, whilst also providing a practical concept for policymakers in the context of the growing challenges facing the Western Hemisphere. Hence, via the use of social constructivist analysis of the state and the international system, the thesis has provides a cohesive and rounded theoretical framework in which to meet the ontological challenges of civil-military relations theory as well as provide a critique of the pre-existing dominant school of thought, realism/neo-realism.

In order to ground this thesis, in accordance with social constructivist thought, the empirical study of US-Mexican bilateral security relation has been chosen. This case study provides fertile opportunities to analyse the nature of the state and the international system. The thesis will now move forward to discuss the empirical topics of US-Mexican security relations: the issue of narcotics transhipment, the 'war on terror' and, the contemporary debate over the Western Hemisphere's security architecture. A historical survey is essential, however, in order to gain a rounded comprehension of the nature of the US-Mexican relationship. With this in mind, let us now turn to this backdrop of latter day US-Mexican security relations.

II

A HISTORY OF US-MEXICAN RELATIONS

Introduction

The military relationship between the United States of America (USA) and Mexico is one which, more than most, is dominated by a tangled and often violent history. Any study of the two countries in this field would be incomplete without at least a working understanding and illustration of the historical background to bilateral military interaction over time. As Paul Pierson states: ‘Placing politics in time can greatly enrich both the explanations we offer for social outcomes of interest, and the very outcomes that we identify as worth explaining’ (2004: 2). With this in mind, the chapter will look at US-Mexican diplomatic history and its context within the Western Hemisphere. The chapter aims to explore the perspectives of the two nations and some relevant non-state actors. However, it is not meant as a definitive history of US and Mexico. Rather the goal is to illustrate, from a historical institutionalism perspective, the body politic of the US and Mexico, so as to provide contextualisation for the later chapters and, importantly, the theoretical basis of the thesis.

A historical analysis of the ties between the US and Mexican nation-states and their respective militaries enables us to greater understand the present-day interaction among these two parties. Solely viewing US-Mexican relations via a cross-sectional analysis outside of temporal context allows for only limited understanding of the linkages between US and Mexican authorities. Through a historical analysis one can better understand social processes over time and the temporal connections amongst actors and events, as Pierson comments: ‘… a focus on temporal processes can point to fruitful lines of theoretical, methodological, and substantive inquiry’ (2004: 8). Hence, for the purposes of this thesis, historical institutionalism is used to develop a comparative historical analysis. The use of this provides not only for the study of institutions temporally, but also for a theoretical mirroring of social constructivist thought used within the thesis. Such dovetailing is compatible for historical institutionalism, like social constructivism, argues that social reality is formulated via a dense matrix of social institutions, themselves acting in a reflexive manner among a political actor’s identities and interests. The political actor operates within the social realm both within and upon the social institutions which surround him/her. In turn, this leads to the formulation of the actor’s means and ends.

Historical institutionalism's roots lie in the behavioural revolution in the 1950s and early 1960s. It rejected the study of formalised political institutions as the focus of analysis and sought to research the underlying informal mechanism of social behaviour (Steinmo et al, 1992: 3-4). Historical institutionalism is not alone in this respect, as it shares its roots with another theoretical approach, that of rational choice theory. Rational choice analysis shares with historical institutionalism a general interest in the understanding of the role of institutions within human interactions and wider society. However, it is differentiated in its methodology and in turn has divergent assumptions of the nature of our understanding of social reality. Rational choice scholars argue that an institution's importance to social science study lies in the contextualisation for rational individual actors; institutions provide a rule book within which actors frame their decision-making processes. Rational choice analysis, is consequently exogenous and deductive in methodology. As Steinmo et al state: '[Rational choice analysis is]…premised on deduction from a limited number of theoretical assumptions and the application of a set of concepts that are held to be universally applicable' (1992: 12).

Historical institutionalism is the preferred theoretical framework for this historical analysis of US-Mexican relations over rational choice theory, for as Steinmo et al state:

> For historical institutionalists the idea that institutions provide the context in which political actors define their strategies and pursue their interests is unproblematical. Indeed, this is a key premise in historical institutional analysis as well. But historical institutionalists want to go further and argue that institutions play a much greater role in shaping politics, and political history more generally, than that suggested by a narrow rational choice model (1992: 7).

Rational choice analysis emphasises the role of social actors' agency upon institutions and that such action is rational. As a consequence, rational choice analysis seeks a quantitative model for the explanation, and what is more, prediction of social actions over time. In contrast, historical institutionalism does not seek to explain social actions by institutions via the agency of social actors alone, but through a combination of multiple causal variables over time. Hence, historical institutionalism offers the social scientist an inductive methodology using empirical data at its centre, grounding social reality temporally. As a result, it is historical institutionalism which is most suitable within the context of the theoretical model under exploration in the wider dissertation. The theoretical and methodological underpinnings of historical institutionalism dovetail with those of social constructivist model of analysis used in this thesis. The use of historical institutionalism permits the inclusion of a temporal analysis within the social constructivist analysis. For while social constructivism seeks to understand social reality via the complex web(s) of interactions of social actors' and institutions' interests and identities, it is a conceptual model which is ahistorical in nature, in the sense that it is a mental construct for the understanding of social reality which operates outside of temporal analysis. While the notion of time is implied via the notion of a cyclical relationship between social actors' interests, identities and actions, this is not the explicit inclusion of the evolution of social actors and institutions provided by historical institutionalism. Further, the understanding of a cyclical relationship within social constructivism is meant as a conceptual means of understanding, with social actors' interests and identities interacting in a duality of instantation in practical terms.

The marriage of social constructivism and historical institutionalism in the theoretical understanding of US-Mexican bilateral relations, allows the reader to engage with social constructivism over time, providing a fuller appreciation of how the social actors and institutions have evolved. As a consequence of this understanding of the evolving nature of US-Mexican bilateral relations, the creation and continuing evolution of societal and institutional historical memories is of central importance to this chapter and the wider theoretical model used. Through an exploration of the evolution of social actors' and institutions' interests and identities over time one may gain greater insight into the present day US-Mexican bilateral relations, for latter day events do not occur within a temporal vacuum. Rather they are a result of the ever-changing interests and identities of social actors as they evolve over time to the present day. Simply put, the historical interactions between these two neighbours have had, and continue to have, consequences for contemporary policymakers in both the US and Mexico. Likewise, the social, economic and political interactions across the Rio Grande over time have also consequently affected the civil-military relations in the respective countries as interests and identities evolve. With the theoretical model in hand let us now look at the history of US-Mexican bilateral relations. This discussion of the historical evolution of the relationship between these two neighbours has been artificially sub-divided into a formative period, the late nineteenth century, the Revolutionary era in Mexico to the Second World War, and the Cold War through to Mexican democratisation in 2000. Such divisions of history are clearly not meant to denote a change in epoch but rather are convenient cut off points in the architecture of the chapter. Further, the author would posit that the notion of historical periods with its hermetically sealed sections of time are not a true depiction of history but a useful tool in the comprehension of the development of social actors' and institutions' interests and identities as they evolve.

The Formative Period: Independence to the US-Mexican War 1846-48

The initial period in the development of independent statehood from their respective colonial motherlands, up to the nineteenth century when the two countries first became neighbours, is a critical period in the historical relationship between the US and Mexico. As it was during this period that both countries began to formulate their own national myth and identity through both an internal narrative within their body politic and also through interaction with, and in relation to, their mother country and neighbouring states. In the case of both the US and Mexico, the role of their neighbour in each other's identity has been great, particularly for the Mexicans. That is, the social interaction between these two neighbours impacted on the development of the institutional memory of each other's nations. This institutional memory or national myth of a state feeds back into the institutional identity over time and vice versa. Hence the social interaction of these two countries has had a cumulative effect on latter day relations as regards to the on-going development of the national zeitgeist and the subsequent world view(s) of policymakers in respective administrations. As a result, an exploration of the formative period of US-Mexican relations is critical in the development of a rounded understanding of latter day ties.

The formative period of the US military, like the country as a whole, was the US War of Independence (1775-1783). It commenced with George III (1738-1820), the British monarch, seeking to tighten control over his North American colonies with a re-organisation of the taxation and administrative systems, however, this centralisation of power led to friction with the settler population (Heidler and Heidler 2003: 3). By 1770 the presence of troops in Boston had resulted in the deaths of settlers at British hands, eventually the bloodletting led to the American War of Independence in 1775 (Black, 2002: 5-38). On 14 June 1775 the Continental Army came into existence under the leadership of George Washington (Black, 2002: 9). The timing of war with Great Britain was not propitious for the American settlers as there were no European conflicts to distract the British military.

The war reached a decisive turning point with the entry of France to aid American forces on 6 February 1778 (Black, 2002: 18). The importance of the French intervention came from the new found ability of the Americans to counteract the naval dominance of the British and widened the geographical focus to include all colonial possessions (Kennedy, 1989: 151-152). Hence, British forces began to be allocated elsewhere in the Empire, as the political preoccupation changed from a simple domestic difficulty to a large-scale imperial chess game between the two European rivals. As the political mindset began to change in 1778, Parliament decided to back down over the issue of taxation and called for American representation in Parliament. Such attempts at peace proved too little, too late (Black, 2002: 18-19). The War of American Independence finally ended in 1781 with the defeat of Cornwallis' army after being besieged in Yorktown by a combination of French and American forces. Though, the war only *de jure* ended with the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1783.

As a result of this initial period of US history, the myth of freedom fighters seeking to free themselves from the yoke of British suppression, rather than the burden of high taxes and restrictive trading practices emerged. Indeed, the identity of the US military was built on the notion of an army of the citizenry, for the protection of the common man against wrongdoing from external forces. This in George Washington's view was to be an army of peasant free men who would rally to the cause of freedom. There was no standing army. Such idealism was countered by Alexander Hamilton, a fellow founding father, who argued in favour of a standing army in order to defend against the threats posed by the British and French militaries in the region. While Washington was initially able to play the British and French against one another to his advantage and avoiding the need for standing armies, such good fortune failed to last. The matter of standing armies was eventually resolved in the aftermath of the 1812-15 War with Great Britain, as victory was afforded the American Republic more by good fortune than military might as a consequence of their reliance on militia. Thereafter, the US established a standing army, small by European powers standards, with a heavy emphasis on defence from external aggression. The US military was born of the necessity to defend the US from European powers, hence the identity of the US military was born out of the interests of the white property-owning class to protect the state. Indeed, such issues of the role of the military within society in the US are as real today as they were in the eighteenth century.

Within US and Mexican bilateral relations several key themes emerge over time these include but are not limited to; race, class, the processes of industrialisation and urbanisation, the spread of the concepts of the French revolution and mass migration into the US. The combination of these factors to differing degrees over time has led to the evolution of US-Mexican bilateral relations to the present day.

An issue of central importance during the formative period of the US, still eagerly felt today, was racial politics. From its inception the US was a slave owning democracy, the institution of slavery had been and continued to be up until the late nineteenth century a pillar of the economic life of the country. During the eighteenth century, the economy of the US was largely based on agriculture and the labour provided by slaves. As a result, in the constitution notions such as life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness pertained to free white men and not to Native Americans or Blacks. The exclusive nature of the American Revolution and creation of the US, by a land and slave owning elite has not and should not be forgotten. For, the concepts of exclusivity and racism expressed by the forefathers of the US have coloured the formulation of and understanding of the national identity over time. Such notions of racial superiority vis-á-vis particularly Blacks and Native Americans evolved over time. This has had consequences for US foreign policy towards not only Mexico but also the wider Western Hemisphere into the twentieth century.

During the early nineteenth century, however, with the end of the 1812-15 war, the American frontier to the north met with the British dominion of Canada and, to the south, with New Spain’s Florida and Texas provinces. The Americans, nevertheless, were not satisfied with the Purchase of Louisiana and sought to extend migration westward, through the Meriwetier Lewis and William Clark Trail to the Pacific Northwest and later to the Southwest via the Santa Fe Trail (Billington, 1960: 446-465). To the south, the ‘Yankee’ army under the leadership of General Andrew Jackson, against expressed orders, invaded Spanish Florida in 1818. Jackson quickly gained *de facto* control as the Spanish had already evacuated their troops to resolve rebellions in the rest of their American colonies (Winders, 2002: 3). The Transcontinental Treaty (or Adams-Onís Treaty) of 1819, saw the Spanish ceding their claims to both Florida and Oregon to the US, in exchange for the ceding of US claims to the lands of Texas (Winders, 2002: 3). Through this process of expansion, by 1819 the American Republic consisted of twenty-two states, a growth continually fuelled by mass immigration from Europe (Heidler and Heidler, 2003: 9). As the West grew, so its political weight within the delicate balance of power between the South and the North in the US also increased (Heidler and Heidler, 2003: 45). The processes of industrialisation and urbanisation in the north east corridor of the US combined with mass migration from Europe and the development of a railroad network south and westward further amplified the expansion of the white population into sparsely populated formerly Spanish and/or Native American territory until they reached their nature limits of the Pacific Ocean to the west and the deserts of northern New Spain.

Similarly for the Mexican military its formative period came via the process of independence, in the face of Spanish colonial decline in the hemisphere, as a result of the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815). The Spanish approach to its imperial possession had concentrated on how its empire could benefit metropolitan Spain, rather than any concerns for individual colonies, such as New Spain (Hamnett, 1999: 82). Animosity between New Spain and the motherland was given teeth by the relative economic decline of metropolitan

Spain. In the 1700s New Spain was subject to a silver mining boom which the crown encouraged to pay for its wars. By the end of the 1700s, however, control of the mining industry by the crown for export was depressing the local economy, furthermore, drought and bad harvests helped to compound New Spain’s economic woes. New Spain also had growing social and ethnic tensions, between liberal and conservative elements in the polity (Williamson, 1992: 233-234). These tensions culminated with the insurrection of 1810 under the leadership of Father Miguel Hidalgo. The rebellion was the first widespread popular mobilisation of the people of New Spain, sponsored by middle class professionals, and the local *criollo* elite, against the interference of the Spanish authorities (Hamnett, 1999: 129). With the issue of home rule at its heart, Father Hidalgo used the hatred of metropolitan Spain and religious fervour, to ferment rebellion. Even so, the viceroyalty of New Spain did not collapse in 1810 and maintained control of the bulk of the military. While the rebellion failed, the insurgents were, however, able to form a parallel government under the leadership of Father José María Morelos, aiming to marry the ideas of the French Revolution with home rule (Hamnett, 1999: 135-137).

Eventually, the collapse of the Spanish viceroyalty came in 1820, as the exhausted royalist forces loss their fight against rebel forces creating a political vacuum in the viceroyalty (Hamnett, 1999: 141). The Mexican Empire was born in May 1822, with Iturbide becoming Emperor Agustin I (Suchlicki, 2001: 59). As De Palo Jr. comments:

> Political legitimacy actually began to decay in 1816 but was not completely expunged for another five years. The royalist army had been too powerful and there was no one in whom the colony could vest authority until Ituribe managed to assemble the requisite corporate coalition. A decade of brutalizing civil war had enervated the royalists to the point at which it lost all incentive to preserve the interests of the crown (1997: 22).

From this précis of the formative period of the Mexican state and military one may see that there were both similarities and differences with the US’ experience in the birth of nationhood. While, in the early nineteenth century Mexico had managed to gain independence, it had done so much later than its northern neighbour and the role of the military was dissimilar.

The military of the American Republic was, born out of the state militias or citizen army in the colony at the time. As such, the independence fighters were virtually exclusively white Europeans with a limited indigenous presence as pathfinders and guides. Indeed, the independence war was a fight between white settlers and their white motherland within the context of British and French imperial rivalry. The American Republic’s army was an army of commoners fighting for their perceived freedoms vis-à-vis the British Crown as such it was rooted within the white society from which it came. Indeed, it operated as an insurgent movement against the ranks of British Redcoats in the state of Georgia. The minutemen, as they became known, could not operate as an insurgent movement without the support of the populace. From its birth, the US army saw its aim as the protector of the population against external aggression resulting in the external orientation of the military mindset in its formative years (Black, 2002).

This contrasts with the formulation of the independence movement in Mexico. The embryonic independent Mexican military was made of elements of the previous imperial military apparatus of Spain. Hence, Mexico's war of independence was a conflict between different elements of the same former motherland's military. What is more, this new army was more racially mixed than its counterpart in the US. As DePalo states:

> Spain's humiliating defeat in the Seven Years' War (1756-63)…prompted an urgent quest for resourceful and prudent means to redress territorial vulnerabilities. This strategic reassessment engendered a sweeping military reorganisation of the Viceroyalty of New Spain that for the first time sanctioned provincial militias and bestowed officer commissions and military privileges upon creoles. This momentous decision afforded creoles an opportunity to extend their political activities beyond the municipal council (*cabildo*) and had long term ramifications for the army that emerged in republican Mexico (1997: 3)

Initially, the *mestizo* militia operated in parallel to white regular units. The lack of suitable white settlers willing to serve in the Viceroyalty's army increased the number of *mestizos* and those previously considered unsuitable and unemployable into the regular ranks. Indeed, eventually even indigenous people were enlisted by the Spanish Crown in the North of the Viceroyalty. *Mestizo* officers were largely up and coming *nouéau riche*, more interested in the promotion of their own status and interests than serving the Spanish Crown. This fermented a culture within the officer corps which echoes to the present day. As DePalo states:

> In an environment of such uninspired leadership, and with little prospect of social advancement, negative regard for service in the ranks persisted into the republican era, contributing fundamentally to the inability of the institution to modernise and professionalise. Not only did this perpetual dearth of patriotic volunteers inhibit the development of a competent professional army; it also promoted praetorianism among the officer corps by fostering a callous disregard for the welfare of subordinates (1997: 7).

With the involvement of Spain in the Napoleonic wars, it attempted to squeeze money out of its colonies in order to pay for war on the peninsula resulting in economic hardship within New Spain, weakening the Spanish Crown in the Viceroyalty and adding to existing racial undercurrents, as DePalo states: '… the animosity between native-born creoles and peninsular-born Spaniards was inching inexorably toward violent confrontation' (1997:12). This led eventually to the reactionary coup of 16 September 1808, under the leadership of Gabriel de Yermo, which sought to exclude *criollos* from the government. With the coup by the *Junta Suprema de Sevilla*, *criollos* were left with no alternative but violent insurrection if they wished to secure their vested interests. Several *criollos* officers attempted coups, however, they were unsuccessful. This was followed by another guerrilla movement this time under the leadership of José María Morelos y Pavón. This too failed and Morelos was executed. Morelos was part of a new bred of *mestizo* officer class who saw their interests lying not with the Spanish Crown, for whom they had previously served, but with self-determination. It was via a union of *criollos* insurgents and former royalist militia regiments over time wearing down the peninsular royalists that independence was attained in 1821. For the Mexican military, much like its colonial forerunner saw its main objective as the internal order of the country rather than the protection of the citizenry from European powers. The initial make up of the Mexican military consisted of part *castas* and *criollos* former insurgents and part European whites and *castas* who were a legacy of the royalist forces who switched sides. The creation of a broad *criollo-casta* coalition was central to the eventual victory of the independence movement in New Spain, as Archer comments:

> The division between Spanish and American whites was only one element in the complex racial mosaic. ... The *castas*, including mulattos and free blacks, fought on both sides during the wars [of independence] to improve their social, economic, and political status. ... They became the foot soldiers, cavalrymen, muleteers, pioneers, and labourers on both sides. After years of combat, many of them emerged as tough guerrilla fighters, insurgent-bandits, and sometimes royalist counterinsurgents. Without their support ... Agustín de Ituribe could not have won independence ... (2000: 8).

Furthermore, the Mexican military maintained much of the institutional identity and interests of the colonial army as it was dominated by a white officer class. The collapse of the royalist forces in 1821-2 simply saw them switch sides, a practice which would become a pattern throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century history of the Mexican military as the concept of *caudilloismo* developed. These factors combined with the legal notion of *fuero militar*, a legacy of the colonial administration, to create within the military as an institution, an element of separation from the wider society and the interests of the state in Mexico. The themes of race, class, processes of industrialisation and the concepts of the French Revolution would also pay a key role in the evolution of the national identity in Mexico with reference to and in connection with the US. The legacy of colonialism brought with it racial divisions, the heavy influence of Catholicism, and an economy suffering from the curse of resource rich countries. That is, an elite enriching itself on profits from natural resources extraction and a failure to develop a broad mixed economy, much as had been the case in colonial Spain. The racial divisions of colonialism which sought to divide and rule the population, whilst justifying white minority rule were over time socialised into all colonial social actors. This created a paradigm of racially based class which re-enforced the socio-economic status quo. The eventual deterioration of this social system was a result of the growing economic power and cultural confidence of *criollos*, leading to calls for home rule and eventual independence. However, the racial divisions persisted albeit in a modified form as a means of social control. Likewise, the introduction of Catholicism in New Spain provided a means of both social control and meta-physical justification for the establishment of Spanish rule. The cultural knitting together of Catholicism with the numerous Indo-American faiths also provided a social cohesive within colonial New Spain. The Catholic Church sought to aid the embedding of a racial hierarchy within the Americas, providing justification for the exploitation of Native Americans and Blacks via slavery. Church authorities also used the opportunity afforded by colonisation to profit financially, either via the extraction of raw materials or the development of large landholdings. Consequently, Catholicism played a critical spiritual and cultural role in the embedding of Spanish rule and subsequent institutional mind of the Mexican state. These factors interacted within a matrix of interests and identities current within colonial New Spain in the formation of the new independent state. Consequently, the colonial period and its themes had a continuing influence on the early development of the Mexican state. Archer posits on the legacy of colonialism:

> ... It is important to remember that the wars of independence continued for over a decade. Men and women who grew up as rebels knew no other trade than that of soldier or guerrilla-bandit. As might be suspected, they continued these occupations in the new nations that desperately required peace and order to restore devastated economies. Taken together, these factors underscore the fact that the roots of nineteenth century instability in Spanish America must be traced to the conflicts that gave birth to the new republics (2000: 36).

Similar racial fractures formulated within US society, and continue to exist though more overt and institutionalised than may be the case in present day Mexico. As Merrell states:

> This tells us much about US-Mexican distinctions. In Mexico the Spaniards imposed their culture on the Amerindians, while at the same time adapting themselves to many

> facets of the Amerindian cultures. In the US, the Amerindians and their cultures were shoved aside, and if they did not move out of the way, they were often virtually exterminated (2003: 9).

The relevance of this to the thesis is that this fracture denotes from the birth of nationhood a failure to come to terms with not only indigenous cultures and subsequent black slave cultures but also a failure or insecurity within one's own culture or self as a nation as a whole. Hence, on independence while indigenous people(s) retained their culture(s) independent of the new nation, the white elite's identity lay with the mother country to which they may never have actually visited. While black slaves' original culture had, in whole or in part, being stolen from them; like *mestizos* in Mexico they were forced to create a new identity of their own. Whereas, in Mexico this *mestizo* identity over time became the hegemonic cultural identity of the Mexican state, in the US racial cultural barriers were rarely crossed with white Anglo-Saxon culture remaining dominant and exclusive with those outside this grouping marginalised. Race also continues to be a factor in US-Mexican relations, helping to colour the cultural atmosphere in which policymakers operate and inform their decision making processes.

By the first half of the nineteenth century as the expanding power of the US came to the border of Mexico, the Mexican state like its economy was comparatively weak. This era saw the North American colonies in a critical stage of their development, as for the first time the US and the Mexican Empire/New Spain would share a common border. Bilateral relations intensified, as the American settlers pushed to expand both southward and westward, while the Mexican Empire attempted to maintain its territorial integrity (Black, 2002: 115).

By the 1820s, with the Latin American Republics in rebellion against their motherland, and the British and US profiting from trading with them, it became in their interest to stop re-colonialisation by Spain. The US response came in 1823 with the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine (Heidler and Heidler, 2003: 12). It called for the US to free the Latin American Republics from European intervention. However, due to the continuing dominance of the British Royal Navy in the hemisphere and the US's own lack of military power projection during this period, the doctrine was more a statement of intention than actual working policy. Nevertheless, in 1829 Andrew Jackson became president - the same Andrew Jackson who had previously invaded Florida and won it for the Union - his presidency's aim was the creation of an American empire. In order to establish this empire, Jackson realised that settlement throughout the West would not be possible as long as Native Americans remained (Hoxie and Ivesson, 1998: 145,152). American Indians were perceived by whites in the US not only as dangerous and violent barbarians, but also as a fifth column in the American Republic (Heidler and Heidler, 2003: 13). In 1830 a solution was found: the Indian Removal Act (Heidler and Heidler, 2003: 185). Indian tribes were 'ethnically cleansed' from the Louisiana Purchase, in what became known as the 'Trail of Tears' and forced into what the US Congress termed, Indian Territory in present day Oklahoma (Black, 2002: 92). As the Indian tribes were pushed off their land, more white settlers continued to move westward (Jones, 1995: 118). This ever-expanding white population even crossed into Mexico after its independence in 1821, as Mexico attempted to populate the sparse province of Texas (Winders, 2002: 3). Though these new migrants were meant to learn Spanish and become Catholic, they did not and quickly became a threat to the cohesion of the Mexican state. By the 1830s, the conflict between the white Americans and Mexico's elite came to a head, as on 15 September 1829 Mexico abolished slavery, even though the Texan economy was based on cotton plantations, and the institution of slavery. As a result the Texans *de facto* retained slavery. The threat of Texan independence began to be taken seriously in Mexico, as a consequence in 1835 President Antonio López de Santa Anna attempted to establish direct rule, which only aggravated the American settlers into forming a Texan militia (Winders, 2002: 18). The Texan milita was destroyed by Santa Anna's troops, but the level of violence used led to their declaration of independence from Mexico on 1 March 1836. Santa Anna's response was continued suppression, however, his efforts failed and his army was forced to surrender and recognise the Texan Republic on 24 May 1836 (Winders, 2002:30-31).

Texas remained an independent state until the aftermath of James K Polk's victory in the 1844 US presidential elections. Polk had won the presidency on a platform of expansion of the US empire to the Pacific Ocean, with this political mandate in mind the exiting President Tyler authorized Texas' application into the Union (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985:37-41). The Mexican government resented American interference in what they considered a rebel province, while the US was growing resentful of the increasing influence of the British in Texas in the 1840s, a matter which hastened moves towards annexation (Heidler and Heidler, 2003:112-113).

The winning of the US presidency by Polk meant that the political establishment became increasingly eager to expand the US empire by the late 1840s (Heidler and Heidler, 2003:17-24). To the Americans, with their desire for expansion, Mexico was perceived as a weaker and easier power to defeat than the British to the north. To this backdrop, in 1845 Polk began to plan for war while sending John Slidell (a former congressman from Louisiana) to Mexico to attempt to purchase California and New Mexico for US$25 million and demarcate the United States and Mexican border at the Rio Bravo (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985:42). By 1846, it was clear that the Mexicans would not surrender their territory, President Polk decided to send General Zachary Taylor and 4,000 troops to the banks of the Rio Grande. This provocation eventually led to a Mexican response causing the death and injury of sixteen troops, creating a pretext for Polk's war with Mexico, as Váquez states: 'Polk wanted a small war, sufficient to obtain a peace treaty. It was known that Mexico could not pay any indemnities, therefore, the Polk administration expected to demand territory in exchange' (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 44).

The Mexican-American war commenced in spring 1846 as the US military invaded Mexico and its navy seized the Pacific ports of San Francisco and Monterrey in California (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 44). General Winfield Scott, head of the US military forces in Mexico, meanwhile attacked Mexico via Veracruz, while military forces on the Rio Grande moved to annex California by 1847 (Suchlicki, 2001: 75). Understandably, the situation in Mexico became politically volatile, eventually leading to the return of General Santa Anna to the presidency in autumn 1846, with the agreement of the American government. Such complicity was necessary in order to circumvent the US naval blockade. The Americans had expected Santa Anna to sell out and end the conflict in exchange for acceptance of the annexation of California, however, he decided to fight the invasion (Black, 2002: 122-124). Even so, by 20 August 1847 General Winfield Scott had reached Mexico City, as Vázquez states: 'The US forces – disciplined and well-equipped – faced numerous but improvised troops with almost no weapons' (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 45).

The Mexicans were clearly in a weak situation, with the American troops at the doors to Mexico City and Mexico politically divided. The Americans logically sought to take full advantage. In the subsequent negotiations, the Mexicans stubbornly maintained their demand for the border to be the Rio Nueces (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 46). By 15 September 1847, Mexico City had fallen to the US in a bloodbath and the Mexican government moved to Querétaro under Manuel de la Pena y Pena (Winders, 2002: 135-136). On 7 December 1847 Polk warned of total annexation. Faced with total annexation, on 2 February 1848 the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 47).

The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo annexed half of Mexico, making it one of the harshest treaties ever recorded. Many in the US wanted more, as Vázquez states: 'The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo disappointed the believers in the manifest destiny of the United States. Some groups tried to get around it by organizing filibusters' (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 49). For Mexicans, the Mexican-American War and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo scarred the

Mexican polity, giving rise to an undercurrent of anti-American sentiment and fuelling Mexican nationalism (Suchlicki, 2001: 77-78). Indeed, the 1848 war continues to be an issue within the make-up of the US-Mexican relations today, as it undermines the level of trust between the two administrations.

As both colonies gained their independence from their former European masters, the level of interaction between the two neighbours increased as the US economy boomed and pressure on land increased. The process of industrialisation in the US combined with a latent racism and political opportunism to expand at the expense of Mexico. From the birth of the US and Mexico, they have had opposing identities, while the US placed emphasis on the expansion of their empire and with it ‘liberty’. The notion of ‘liberty’ is a central theme within the institutional identity of the US. For the US has come to internalise its national myth as the exemplar republic, the light at the top of the hill. Consequently this notion has provided justification for base motives within US foreign policy. The relevance of this is evident within the contemporary setting, for it is this narrow and introverted strand of US nationalism that has provided political justification for the foreign policy of George W. Bush. This contrasts with the progressive tradition of US foreign policy built on the best elements of Jeffersonian notion of the American Republic, Wilsonian self-determination and the writings of Thomas Paine.

Mexico’s identity and interests coalesced around counteracting the imperial ambitions of their northern neighbour towards their own territory. This formative period for both respective countries is central to the understanding of US-Mexican bilateral relations today, as the historical institutional memory of these social actors informs their identity and interests. For the development of the institutional memory within the apparatus of the Mexican state has imbued with an in-built resistance to the idea of cooperation with the US and the concept of a North American identity. This particular strand of Mexican nationalism is strongly held between the strange bedfellows of the military and leftist movements, as both seek to defend and hold to an early twentieth century notion of statehood. This view contrasts with the latter day political and business classes that seek to expand Mexican nationalism into a transnational North American community in line with their interests. The friction between these two ideas of nationalism in Mexico and the US, are central to contemporary civil-military and in turn, bilateral security relations.

The 1848 Mexican Republic to Mexican Revolution 1910

The late-nineteenth century period was a key period for the development of the institutional memory of both the US and Mexico, as the intellectual consequences of the French revolution and the embedded interests from the colonial era combined to violent ends in both respective countries. The results of the conflicts in both the US and Mexico has echoed through the development of both countries and their respective elite's identity and consequently interests over time. In the US, the conflict of vested interests between the industrialised, and for a large part though not exclusively non-land owning elite in the north east of the country and the plantation and slave owning southern states. Hence, the ideological battle between progressive liberals and regressive conservatives to a lesser or greater degree was a varnish to a deeper vested interest between an industrial north who saw its main market as the Americas and an agricultural based southern economy based on the institution of slavery and the export of primary goods to Great Britain in particular.

Map 2.1: The Expansion of the United States of America

[Map deleted due to copyright issues]

Source: Ward, Sir A.W. et al (1912), The Cambridge Modern History Atlas, Cambridge University Press, London: map 72, accessed:
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/historical/ward_1912.html

By the end of 1848, the map of North America looked very different from that of 1820. The US had taken shape on the map that is recognisable today, having *de jure* claim over the states which comprise the US southwest bordering the Mexico. In 1848 Mexico was an occupied country with its provinces unstable, with unrest in Yucatán and the landed class elsewhere concerned about attacks by nationalists after the departure of the US military (Williamson, 1992: 263). With the approval of the US government, President José Joaquín de Herrera came to power and immediately sought to stablise the country. The main tool used by Herrera was the military, for as Benítez Manuat notes: 'During the nineteenth century, the State in Mexico amounted almost exclusively to the armed forces' (2004: 3). The Mexican military was reorganised into a more efficient system of defence of the northern region through the creation of local militias and *presidios* (fort settlements). This, it was hoped, would deter raids from both white American filibusters and from Indian tribes (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 52).

By 1851, the American authorities were keen to relieve themselves of this source of friction, a matter only exacerbated by continuing cattle rustling to Texas. Furthermore, the border became an area of widespread smuggling with merchants on both sides of the Rio Grande experiencing rapid economic growth (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 53 - 54). This is an issue of continuing importance today in US-Mexican relations in regards to the narcotics trade.

A much more grave matter to Mexico and its territoriality in the nineteenth century was the issue of filibusters. One notable American filibuster was William Walker, even been mentioned by President James Buchanan in a speech to the US Senate in 1858, who stated: ‘It is beyond question the destiny of our race to spread themselves over the continent of North America’ (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 64). While such filibusters were eventually defeated, their adventures caused damage to Mexico’s economy through the instability generated and the continuing costs of defence. This also created a point of friction between the two countries.

By 1853 with expansion along the Pacific Coast and the Californian gold rush of 1849, the US government wished to build a transcontinental railway via the southwest (Jones, 1995: 191). The railway would have to traverse the Mesilla Valley, at the time still part of Mexico. As a result James Gadsden, a railway contractor, with the blessing of the US government, negotiated the Gadsden Treaty (also known as the Treaty of Mesilla in Mexico). This saw the Mesilla territory sold for US$10 million and the repealing of Article 11 of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. In Mexico, the signing of the Gadsden Treaty brought back memories of the national humiliation of 1848 and created a hue and cry. Santa Anna was seemingly betraying his nation, his liberal enemies sought to use events to their full advantage (Suchlicki, 2001: 80).

Eventually on 17 August 1855, Santa Anna was forced out of office and out of Mexico (Suchlicki, 2001: 81). This resulted in civil war (1855-1857) between conservative and liberal sectional interests within the elite, instability which smuggling gangs and filibusters were only too keen to take advantage of (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 62). In 1857 the civil war in Mexico was won by the liberals, who took the opportunity to introduce a new radical constitution, this quickly found objection in the US, particularly in regard to the status of slaves and the non-return of escaped slaves back to US slave states (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 62). Furthermore, the constitution sought to make American land owners in Mexico equal to Mexicans under law. This was a manifest attempt by the liberals to incorporate the concepts of liberty, justice and fraternity from the French revolution into the national body politic and identity of Mexico. These issues added to the push for further expansion southward, particularly from the southern slave states who perceived such occurrences to the south as a direct threat to their vested interests in the institution of slavery. With this in mind, President James Buchanan offered US$12-15 million to the Mexicans for Baja California and northern sections of Sónora and Chihuahua. The offer was rejected (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 63). In 1859 with conservatives in rebellion under Felix Zuloaga, President Comonfort suspended the new constitution and jailed his main liberal competitor, Juarez. After Zuloaga complained, Comonfort had second thoughts and resigned himself, unsure of his political support. The result of Comonfort's political error was a conservative junta and the installing of Felix Zuloaga as president. Juarez was forced to withdraw to Guadalajura, with the result that the civil war continued under the title of the War of the Reform (Suchlicki, 2001: 85).[8] While the liberals under Juarez enjoyed popular support among the Mexican people with the issuing of the Reform Laws in 1859, the conservatives under Zuloaga gained support from the bulk of the Mexican military, the Church and were also diplomatically recognised by the Americans (Suchlicki, 2001: 85).

On 25 December 1860, the liberals took Mexico City as result of popular support not only in Mexico but also in the US. By the end of the conflict Mexico was economically weak and political divided, a situation which culminated in 17 June 1861 with Mexico defaulting on its foreign debt. As a consequence Napoleon III, the nephew of Napoleon I, sought to create a French colony in America and mobilised his troops (Suchlicki, 2001: 89). However this initial French offensive failed. Fortunately for the French, the US government was unable to enforce the Monroe Doctrine and militarily intervene against the French invasion - due to their own engagement in the civil war between the Northern Union forces and the Southern Confederation forces, which had commenced in 1861 after the election of Abraham Lincoln as president (Jones, 1995: 215-216). The French, therefore, were able to overpower the Mexican army and President Juarez was forced to flee the capital (Suchlicki, 2001: 89). The political situation on both sides of the Rio Bravo was in flux.

With the French victory in Mexico in June 1864, Napoleon III installed Maximilian of the Habsburg dynasty as the Emperor. Maximilian failed to live up to the expectations of the Confederates in America and the Mexican conservatives by being both liberal in his political outlook, and maintaining Mexico's neutrality in the American Civil War (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 70). In 1865, with the victory of the Union, the position of Maximilian became less than secure, by 1867 Maximilian was deposed and executed by firing squad (Hamnet, 1999: 173).

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[8] The battle lines were similar as elsewhere in nineteenth century Latin America - liberal versus conservative (Williamson, 1992: 233-284).

With the political ascendancy of the Mexican liberals and US Union forces in their respective civil wars, both countries looked towards reconstruction and economic progress, rather than conflict between the two neighbours. As a result, in the aftermath of the civil war on both sides of the border, the Union and liberal administrations' interests coincided temporarily with regards to their bilateral relations. What is more, as the US sought to rebuild and reintegrate the Southern states into the wider economy, the demand for raw materials from Mexico grew. The imperialistic impulse within the US was not removed rather its attentions shifted to outlying areas in the Pacific Rim, such as the British protectorate of the Sandwich Islands (also known as Hawaii), which were annexed on 7 July 1898 (Healy, 1970: 51). Likewise, the US continued to expand through its opposition to European powers in what it deemed its sphere of influence, in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine, as seen in the US-Spanish war (Smith, 1994: 216).

Within the US, however, domestic politics were in turmoil as the northern states attempted to impose civil rights in the southern former slave states, an era known as the Reconstruction, which was violently resisted (after a brief hiatus of black representation in state legislative bodies) by southern whites (Jones, 1995: 237-259). In Mexico the political situation was more stable, with Juarez remaining in power until 1871. The problem of presidential succession remained as Juarez's successor, Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, suffered from an attempted coup. The coup organiser, General Porfirio Díaz, re-emerged in 1876, when he succeed in gaining control of the presidency (Suchlicki, 2001: 99-100). Díaz, like Mexican rebels before him, used and abused the US-Mexican border region, employing it as a shelter from Mexican authorities with the Americans turning a blind eye. Indeed, Díaz and his supporters used arms from the United States in order to depose Lerdo (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 79). Díaz remained in power until 1911, establishing a puppet regime between 1880 and 1884 in order to fulfil his democratic rhetoric (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 84). For the purposes of the US government, General Díaz was seen as a godsend, providing stability in the governance of Mexico, together with liberalised markets in which American investment was encouraged. Mexico in essence became a client state of the US; European competitors, who had previously off-set the influence of American interests, were pushed out of the Mexican market due to the increasing dominance of American capitalists. By the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, the earlier economic growth and spread of the railway system in Mexico was concentrated on mining, oil and other natural resource extraction industries, rather than the development of the internal market. US inward investment produced mixed results. Mexico did not become the post-war economic miracle that Díaz had hoped for, but Mexico's economic position was improving, albeit as a satellite of the US (Suchlicki, 2001: 104).

In 1904 Díaz, now 74 years old, began his sixth term in the National Palace. His position appeared secured, although the question of his successor remained open. While to the casual viewer the political situation in Mexico appeared to be political stable under a continuing *de facto* dictatorship, the political elite were beginning to politically manoeuvre with reference to the succession: '… [T]he political elite were concerned about the consequences of a regime which was more personal than institutionalized and their fears were shared by some US politicians' (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 95). To this end, a group of intellectuals within the government administration developed, who became known as the *científicos,* due to their liberal positivist outlook (Knight, 1986(a): 21). In large part the group attracted its members from the political elite in northern Mexico, where industrialisation was most advanced and importantly, from where a large degree of the officer corps within the Mexican military originated. As the internal political in-fighting together with labour unrest began to increase over the first decade of the twentieth century, the US political elite began to gain a renewed interest in Mexico's stability (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 100). In November 1910, the American capitalists' worst nightmare occurred, an armed movement sheltering in the US-Mexico border region attempted to end the rule of the 79 year old General Díaz, a regime which had been in government for 34 years. This rebel group under the leadership of Francisco Madero, with the unintended assistance of American military manoeuvres threatening invasion and stoking mass anti-American and in turn anti-Díaz hysteria in Mexico, brought down the administration by 1911 (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 100-102). The end of the Díaz presidency not only finished the reign of the elderly *caudillo,* it marked the start of the Mexican Revolution, as liberal, revolutionary and conservative elements within the body politic fought for power.

In Mexico, the divide between liberal and conservatives, in terms of an ideological battle was even more opaque than in their northern neighbour. For much like the US, Mexico's civil war in the nineteenth century was a fight between vested interests in the elite rather than a mass movement of peasants fighting for their rights, though this was to occur in the early twentieth century. The conflict between liberals and conservatives was one of the landed classes and privileged classes, the Church and the pre-existing officer corps sought to maintain their vested interests in the face of an emerging middle class and elite whose interests lay in the processes of industrialisation and urbanisation notably in Mexico City and in the northern cities of the country.

As a consequence, the eventual success of the liberals on both sides of the border was not necessarily a victory of ideology but rather in the case of the US, the military power of the industrialised north and its ability to fight total warfare. Whereas, in Mexico, the victory of the liberals was due to a gradual shift of alliances, and with it vested interests, until the number of *caudillos* on the side of the liberals was able to countervail against conservative elements.

For the Mexicans, role of the military was both in physical battle and in the political conflict. That is, that the conflict in Mexico centred on the political interests of *caudillos* and the forces they controlled, with strongmen switching sides as they saw fit. This has the result of directly involving the military in the political rule of Mexico, and a failure to establish a political means for the succession in the office of the president. The civil war in Mexico was one of *caudillos* and political calculation, whereas in the US the civil war was one of the northern economic powerhouse war machine versus a southern white dominated culture which saw the conflict as a fight for their survival and their property rights. In the case of Mexico, the frequent interference and eventual annexation in 1846-1848 engrained the nationalistic ethos into the body politic. Nationalism and its rhetoric quickly became a political tool of both liberals and conservatives as a pretext for their actions, masking vested interests.

Hence on both sides of the border the *de jure* victory of the concepts of the French revolution did not preclude the return of regressive politics and policies. Quite the contrary, it was simply a case that policymaking was conducted in the name of 'democracy' and 'liberty', and for different social actors. Though within Mexico, the liberal constitution was eventually withdrawn by Porfirio Diaz in his desire to concentrate power as the nation's *caudillo* under the order of '*pan o palo'*. The general outlook of liberalism and in particular the influence of the enlightenment, and the power of science to economic growth were key ideologies in the reign of Diaz. From a US perspective, the Diaz government offered them all they wished for, namely an administration which enabled its goal of providing stability for economic growth and foreign investment in the country.

Revolution to the Second World War

The period of the Mexican Revolution saw a marked increase in bilateral relations, as social actors on both sides of the border sought to further their interests. Consequently over time, as the respective political and business classes interacted this had a knock-on effect on the institutional memory in both neighbours. For the part of the US, the main result of the Mexican Revolution upon their zeitgeist was the importance to the present day by government policymakers placed on maintaining stability, even in preference to functioning democracy south of the Rio Grande. While for Mexico, early twentieth century was a key period in civil-military relations, as control of the military slowly shifted from *caudilloismo* to civilian authorities.

With the removal of Díaz, the Mexican presidency, under an agreement brokered between Díaz loyalists and Madero's revolutionaries, was placed in the temporary hands of León De la Barra until elections could be arranged (Knight, 1986(a): 248). In November 1911 Madero became president. By the end of 1911, both De la Barra and Madero managed to disband and disarm most revolutionaries, with the core of the military coming from the *Ejército Libertador* and the remainder from the *federales* (Lieuwen, 1968: 13). Not all rebels disarmed; the Zapatistas remained independent and distrustful of authority in their fight for land reform. The US response was less than positive, as Vázquez and Meyer note:

> …the US ambassador to Mexico, the unbending and arrogant Henry Lane Wilson, was writing to the Department of State that Madero's project of bring democracy to Mexico was not practicable: democratic reforms could not be carried out in the social context of the poverty and illiteracy of the Mexican people (1985: 104).

These views echoed those of the Washington political elite, in a seeming self-fulfilling prophecy they foresaw violent uprising in Mexico.

Arguably more important to Madero, was the opposition within the military officer class to his administration, not surprising given Madero's anti-militaristic views. This rebellion soon gathered a head of steam as Lieuwen states:

> Once fighting broke out, the Revolution gained support from rising middle-class elements hungry for material gain and political power; from the peasants anxious to acquire their own lands; and from bandit and guerrilla hordes who relished the prospect of new and exhilarating experiences (1968: 6).

Although the rebellion was no threat to the US directly, it was a threat to capitalists' investments and US citizens resident in Mexico. US citizens complied with their government's request and evacuated. The relationship between the United States and Mexico only worsened, as Ambassador Wilson continued to urge Washington into military intervention against Madero and his government, a government Wilson believed did not have

US interests at heart (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 107). This view though was not initially the case, as Knight explains:

> Wilson's attitude to Madero was not (as some have suggested) hostile *ad initio*. In fact, he was 'greatly pleased' with the composition of the original Madero cabinet, and he predicted, with both gratification and foresight, then, as president, Madero would be 'compelled by the force of circumstances to more and more revert to the system implanted by General Díaz.' But in the course of 1912 Wilson grew disillusioned and his reports became increasingly critical, inaccurate and derivative of the Mexican Herald, Mexico City's English language newspaper which was strongly anti-Madero (1986 (a): 485).

This led to the issuing of a diplomatic memo from Washington to Madero in protest about their failure to protect US citizens and property, though the US refrained from military intervention directly in the affairs of the Madero administration. This went to the heart of the US policy towards Mexico: the preference for stability rather than democracy (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 108). As Madero came to power based on the Plan of San Luis Potosí, this platform was anti-militaristic and emphasised civilian dominance of the military, calling for an end to the nineteenth century military dictatorships in Mexico (Leuwin, 1968: 8). Madero, however, came to be beset with rebellions from differing elements in the military elite (Bazant, 1986: 135).

By the end of 1912, the Madero government apparently appeared to have control of the various rebel groups in Mexico. However, Madero failed to realise the threat from within the ranks of the military by conservative elements friendly to US interests, led by General Felix Díaz. In October 1912, Díaz, the nephew of the infamous Porfirio Díaz, led an uprising in Veracruz only to fail in the same month. Ambassador Wilson did not give up his wish to replace Madero in the presidency. The result was a further coup on 9 February 1913:

> … [T]he American ambassador Henry Lane Wilson, in conjunction with several *cientificos* and *ex-porfirista* generals, especially Victoriano Huerta, had overthrown Madero. On the night of 22nd February Madero and vice-president, José María Pino Suarez, were murdered. Now *maderistas* had a martyr and a cause. A few days later, on 4th March 1913, Woodrow Wilson replaced Taft in the White House (Raat, 1992: 107-108).

As Huerta was installing *federales* generals into state governorships, creating a *de facto* government, the US administration under Wilson was not keen to recognise Huerta as the *de jure* president of Mexico. The change from President Taft to Wilson fundamentally altered the view of Huerta within Washington (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 109). Wilson saw Huerta as a regressive anti-democratic figure, even seeing the coup as a British sponsored adventure.

For Wilson, the solution to Mexico's problem was self-determination and liberal democracy, despite the success of Ambassador Wilson in deposing Madero from power. With this in mind, President Wilson made arrangements, as Meyer notes: 'General Leonard Wood had prepared a contingency plan to invade Mexico in October 1913 …' (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 112).

Internally the position of Huerta was increasingly difficult, for the fighting between *federales* and rebels continued, while his forces were constantly outnumbered. Not only were the insurgents more numerous, they also received heavy backing from the Wilson administration with armaments (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 110). The main rebel force was the Constitutional Army or *Constitucionalistas*, the rump of Madero's army of 1910 and other revolutionaries united behind the example of Madero's martyrdom (Knight, 1986(b): 13). The conflict was a process of constant guerrilla activity in a war of attrition. By 15 July 1914 Huerta was forced to resign and into exile after US threats of occupation after the invasion of Veracruz under the pretext of the arrest of servicemen after they anchored the USS Dolphin in Tampico without permission (Bazant, 1986: 143-144; Knight, 1986(b): 150-157).

On 15 July 1914 Huerta went into exile in Barcelona, as Venustiano Carranza took over the reigns of power (Knight, 1986(b): 170). However, Carranza was not Wilson's ideal alternative, as he refused to allow Wilson a power broking position within Mexican politics. The *Constitucionalistas* therefore came to power in Mexico without US approval (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 113).

By mid-1914 the situation in Europe grew ever more serious and so Wilson left Mexican affairs in large part to the US State Department and with it Wilsonian idealism. In October 1914, the Aguascalientes convention of Villistas and Zapatistas led to the acceptance by Villistas of the 1911 Plan de Ayala, its main platform being the introduction of land reform and the joint occupation of Mexico City (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 114). The Villistas and Zapatistas controlled Mexico City under the provisional president Gutiérrez, though, by early 1915, the Constitutional Army under the command of General Obregón regained Mexico City (Bazant, 1986: 146). The *Constitucionalistas* responded to this revolutionary threat with their own attempt at land reform in January 1915. The Villistas and Zapatistas soon withdrew back to operating independently against a common enemy, Carranza (Bazant, 1986: 146). While, Francisco 'Pancho' Villa operated in the northern border states, Zapata operated in the southern states of Mexico[9]. It was the Villistas who concerned the US government, as they operated in the US-Mexican borderlands, as Raat states: 'Until Villa's defeat at Celaya in April of 1915, it was he who won Wilson's favour, as the man who could best meet Washington's objectives in Mexico' (1992: 110).

Villa had initially been able to finance his revolutionary forces through the confiscating of Mexican property and land, making a point of not seizing American property. As the Great War (1914-1918) took hold in Europe, the demand for US arms increased, leading Villa and Zapata alike to become caught between dwindling resources and high prices for armaments (Knight, 1986(b): 330-332). As a result, Carranaza gradually came into military ascendancy over Villa and Zapatista:

> Carranza's victory over his rivals turned him into the man to restore order - the "new order" that Wilson was supposedly seeking. Nevertheless, because of Carranza's nationalistic arrogance and his contempt for US recommendations, President Wilson and the State Department preferred to look for an alternative (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 115).

However, it soon became clear that Wilson had no alternative but to recognise Carranza's government. As Lieuwen states: 'Mexico's old-style militarism had thus been utterly destroyed, but what was not yet realized was that a new type of militarism had been developed in its stead' (1968: 24). In October 1915, Wilson recognised the Carranza government, further alienating Villa. Seemingly in revenge, Villa's forces attacked the settlement of Columbus, New Mexico where the 13 Regiment of the US Cavalry were stationed, burning it to the ground and killing eighteen US citizens. The attack on Columbus, New Mexico led to hysteria in US public opinion and brought calls for retaliation (Knight, 1986(b): 344-349). In an attempt to placate the US, Carranza condemned the act and ordered the arrest of Villa, but the atmosphere in Washington was such that Carranza could not stop a punitive expedition. The invasion under the command of General John Pershing began on 15 March 1916. The assault resulted in mass panic among the Mexican population and led to further disorder in the north of the country. Understandably, the Carranza administration was very suspicious of Pershing's mission in Mexico, as Raat states: 'Mexico officials believed that the expedition was more than a bandit-hunting force and that an army of pacification could easily be given the new mission of cleaning up Mexico …' (1992: 112). As a result, Carranza attempted to delimit Pershing's push into Mexican territory, even on occasion exchanging shot (Knight, 1986(b): 349-352).

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[9] Franciso 'Pancho' Villa's real name was Doroteo Arango

Indeed the expedition/invasion failed in its main *raison d'etre*, the capture of Pancho Villa (Knight, 1986(b): 349). With Pershing's forces out of Mexico, Carranza's government conducted a national election for the re-drafting of the 1857 Mexican Constitution. To this end, the constitutional convention met in Querétaro between November 1916 and February 1917 (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 118-119). The constitutional congress fell into two main camps, the Renovators (or the supporters of Carranza) and the Jacobins, who supported more radical measures and General Obregón (Lieuwen, 1968: 42). The role of the Mexican military cannot be underplayed in the formulation of the 1917 constitution. The dominance of the military strongmen in the Jacobin group forced Carranza's supporters to accept measures, such as anti-clerical articles, land reform and the public ownership of subsoil resources (Lieuwen, 1968: 43). The leftist nature of the 1917 constitution alarmed the US, especially in the context of the Bolshevik Revolution and civil war in Russia.

In April 1917, while American attention focused on the European conflict, the Germans began conducting unrestricted submarine warfare in the Western Hemisphere. This together with the leaking of the Zimmerman telegraph, eventually led to the US entering the First World War (Jones, 1995: 421-422). General Pershing's rest in the United States was short as in April he headed the American Expeditionary Force to the trenches of the Western Front (Jones, 1995: 425). On 11 November 1918 the First World War came to an end with the United States on the side of the victors and with a relative growth in American power vis-à-vis the European Imperial powers of Great Britain and France (Kennedy, 1989: 312-321). In 1920 elections were due in Mexico, the main candidates being General Obregón and Zapata. President Carranza had other ideas and arranged for the assassination of Zapata on 19 April 1919 at the hacienda Chinameca (Ross, 2000: 45). In 1920, Carranza attempted to implement a puppet regime in Mexico City, however Obregón, who by this stage had support both in Northern Mexico and in the Southwest United States, went into rebellion. In May 1920 Carranza himself was assassinated and Obregón became president of Mexico after a short provisional government under Adolfo De la Huerta. During this period Mexico's foreign relations began to be seen increasingly through the prism of its relations with its northern neighbour. This is not to state that Mexican foreign policy had not previously been influenced by their northern neighbour. Rather during the Revolution, the Mexican state was particularly weak as competing vested interests fought for control, as such it became more susceptible to the influence of the US.

> Thus, for all practical reasons, after the First World War, Mexico and the United States stood facing each other with no intermediaries. For a long time thereafter, Mexico's

> political and economic relations with the rest of the world could be equated with its relations with the United States, precisely the situation that Mexican rulers had traditionally tried to avoid (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 125).

Meanwhile in the US, Warren G. Harding became the new president in the 1920 election. With the election of Harding, US policy makers began to return to their previous *realpolitik* perspective and argue harder for the formulation of a treaty in order to protect US capitalists' interests in Mexico, particularly that of the oil industry (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 127). Obregón's refusal to cooperate led to his administration being denied recognition by the US between 1920 and 1923 (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 128). This period, at the end of the Mexican Revolution, is marked by the attempts of the *obregónistas* to purge the military of any *anti-obregónista* generals, often through court martial and firing squad. Where this was not possible, they were forced into exile; cashiered out of the military or like Villa, given 'peace payments'. On 20 July 1923, Villa was assassinated and the payments stopped (Lieuwen, 1968: 62-63). Though, Obregón continued to employ such measures, as Lieuwen states: '… Obregón adopted tactics similar to those used by Porfirio Díaz, that is, he encouraged the generals to exchange their political independence for material gain' (1968: 64). While this may have created a peaceful political scene in Mexico City, in the provinces law-and-order came under threat. The danger came from the *Jefe de Operaciones*, or regional military commanders, who often abused their powers for private gain. The result was the development of vigilante groups such as the *guardias blancas* ('white guards') (Lieuwen, 1968: 66). The solution to this instability was a combination of the dis-arming of the vigilante groups and the creation of a unified national army. The recognition of Obregón's administration by the US in 1923 proved timely, as De la Huerta rebelled against attempts to place General Plutarco Elias Calles in the presidency. By 1924 De la Huerta had been defeated and on 1 December of the same year General Calles became president (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 133).

When Calles came to power the Mexican Treasury was under pressure as revenue declined from the oil fields and the military costs of the De la Huerta rebellion needed to be paid. In an attempt to increase production by oil companies Calles tried to enact Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution. During the 1920s the issue of the oil industry played a key role in US-Mexican relations due to the pressure of Standard Oil, an American corporation, on the US Department of State (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 126-152). US-Mexican relations were not helped by the election of Calvin Coolidge to the US presidency in 1925 and the appointment of James Rockwell Sheffield as US ambassador to Mexico:

> Sheffield believed, as he wrote a friend, that the obligation of the Anglo-Saxon people toward societies such as the Mexican, a “non-white” society, was to serve as guides so the natives would eventually understand their true interests and obligations, which could never be contrary to US interests; if persuasion failed, force would become morally justified (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 135).

The situation deteriorated to such a degree that a return to non-recognition by the US seemed on the cards. Calles was not helping himself from Washington’s perspective, by serving Bolshevik interests through support of Nicaragua’s Liberal Party (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 136). Meanwhile in Mexico Calles was faced with the Cristero rebellion. The rebellion was linked to religion and property rights, which made for a powerful and bloody conflict (Meyer et al, 1999: 567-569). To the American government the Cristero rebellion seemed to provide ample opportunity to invade Mexico and teach Calles a lesson, however the US Congress did not support the action in 1927. As the White House was perceived as being too close to oil industry interests, this contrast with the recent voting record of the US Congress during the presidency of George W. Bush. (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 136-137).

In 1928 Obregón was re-elected as president only to be assassinated. Therefore, Calles set up a puppet regime nominally headed by Emilio Portes Gil, as Meyer states: ‘When Obregón was assassinated in 1928, the last great revolutionary caudillo disappeared. The resulting political vacuum made it possible to create an official political party- the National Revolutionary Party (PNR) in 1929’ (1985: 142). Unhappy and frustrated with the political situation, General Gonzalo Escobar together with other former *obregónistas*, rebelled in 1929. The rebellion failed, in no small part due to the assistance of the American government in terms of provision of arms and the enforcing of the Neutrality Act of 1818 (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 139). The geo-political situation did not improve as the Cristero rebellion continued, while in 1929 the Wall Street Crash saw the start of the Great Depression. The Depression made the Mexican Treasury’s position in meeting its foreign creditors very difficult, eventually leading to a suspension of payments in 1932. As the economic situation worsened, Mexicans took to migrating northwards to look for work. However, the US repatriated workers only to create additional unemployment in the Mexican labour market.

During this period, Calles remained in *de facto* power while a series of puppet regimes took *de jure* power until 1934 and the ascendancy of Lazáro Cardenas. The US approval of this arrangement again reflected their desire for stability and a period of bedding down of the

Mexican political scene.[10] With Cardenas in the presidency, the Mexican revolution came back to life, as policies shifted from Calles' right-wing approach to a leftist and populist stance. When strikes commenced, Calles interfered in the disputes causing a political crisis in 1935 between himself and Cardenas. However, Cardenas won out, gaining the support of the military (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 145).

The coming to power of Cardenas seemed to catch the mood of their northern neighbour in the aftermath of the Depression and the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933. Both Roosevelt and Cardenas were in agreement over the role of the state in the economy, believing, unlike Calles and Hoover, that the role of the state was to alleviate social injustice (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 146).With regard to foreign relations, importantly Roosevelt followed the Good Neighbour Policy in the Western Hemisphere. In essence, the Good Neighbour Policy aimed to create an inter-American alliance against the Axis powers, both in Europe and in Asia (Germany, Italy and Imperial Japan) (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 146). With the election of Roosevelt, Cardenas also felt better able to pursue his leftist policies, passing a law allowing the government to expropriate private property and to postpone compensation for ten years.

For the first time in many decades, US-Mexican relations remained friendly. On 18 March 1938 Cardenas nationalised the foreign oil industry in Mexico. While the oil companies protested, the US government with its attention fixed on the geo-political situation in Europe and Asia, acted moderately, asking only for timely compensation. For FDR, it was more important that Cardenas provided stability and fitted into Roosevelt's geo-political strategy for the Western Hemisphere, than the interests of oil moguls. In Mexico's initial push for industrialisation in the 1940s it suffered from a lack of foreign investment due to the recent memory of Cardenas' nationalisation of the oil industry. Though, by the 1950s direct foreign investment began to return to Mexico[11].

In 1940 General Manuel Avila Camacho became Mexican president. With Camacho, Mexico returned to a more moderate position, both politically and economically. Indeed, the Mexican economy benefited from the reactivation of the American economy through Roosevelt's New Deal and the later push to arm the United States and in 'making America the great arsenal of democracy' (Ambrose, 1993: 7).

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[10] US politics during this period was also volatile with the encampment of the Bonus Army on the US Mall and rumours of a right wing coup called the 'Business Coup'.

[11] This was alongside a policy of import substitution industrialisation.

When on 7 December 1941 the Japanese attacked the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour, the following day FDR declared war on Japan, but not Hitler’s Germany. On 11 December, Adolf Hitler took it upon himself to declare Germany at war with the US. By 1942 Camacho decided to enter the war on the side of the US due to German U-boats sinking Mexican merchant vessels, leading to the formation of the US-Mexican Joint Defense Commission to oversee the war effort (Niblo, 1995: 63-65). For the US, the main concern, in regard of the US-Mexican Joint Defense Commission, was defence of the US homeland from Japanese naval attack. To this end, Camacho created a unified command called the Pacific Military Region, under the leadership of ex-president Cardenas. This enabled Camacho to appear moderate at home while supporting the American war effort, as Cardenas was known as a nationalistic figure in Mexican politics (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 157-158). Mexico’s military contribution to the Second World War was more symbolic than having any great impact on the path of the war. Though, the Mexican Air Force 201 Squadron did fight in the Philippines in 1945. The main contribution of Mexico was economic, both in terms of natural resources and manpower (Niblo, 1995: 75-76, 97).

To reiterate, during the period of the Mexican revolution, the US and Mexico experienced a period of intense bilateral relations, as social actors on both sides of the border sought to further their own interests. While over time, this interaction between the political and military elite in each of the respective countries was both reflective and reflexive upon the perceived identities and identities of these social actors. As a result, adding to the institutional memory of both the US and Mexican governments and militaries as they evolved.

The early twentieth century commenced much as the nineteenth century had, with on-going conflict(s) amongst competing *caudillos* and their vested interests. The occupying of the presidency by Diaz offered little more than a respite to Mexico’s political system, though with his eventual removal from power the competition between *caudillos* continued as before. The US government for its part sought to bring stability to Mexico for its own vested interests, while also seeking to support those forces which best dovetailed with the philosophy of US foreign policy. As US administrations changed and with it views on foreign policy, so support shifted.

The early twentieth century is notable in Mexican civil-military affairs for the eventual shift away from *caudilloismo* towards civilian presidencies and civilian control of the military. This was a consequence of war-weariness in the general populace and a convergence of vested interests among the political class in favour of stability to promote economic growth. In practice this meant the development of the notion of the president as *caudillo* in the form of Obregón, prior to the re-socialisation of the military under Calles. The first step in this process came with the Obregón administration's re-intervention of Diaz's policy of '*pan o palo'* to remove the remaining *caudillos* and their power bases in the military. Though, the *de facto* power of the regional military commanders remained intact, however, within the framework of a unified national army. With the assassination of Obregón in 1928, saw the death of the last *caudillo* and the beginnings of the institutionalised state which sought to co-opt all, even competing, vested interests within the body politic. This came about by a combination of a generational shift in political leadership and a war weariness within both the military and the general public.

The US for its part was increasingly focusing its political energies elsewhere in the foreign policy sphere as the country became increasingly a global power. As a consequence, US interests in Mexico centred on political stability and economic cooperation. Mexico's policymakers likewise, saw their interests lying in the promotion of foreign investment from, and good relations with, their northern neighbour in order to provide economic growth. Hence, Mexico was eager to cooperate with the US in the Second World War for economic purposes, though remaining politically distant as a consequence of the institutional memory of the 1846-1848 war and occupation.

The Cold War Period 1945 to Democratisation in Mexico, 2000

During the last half of the twentieth century, the Mexican state first solidified into a single party, corporatist state which managed social order via co-opting the differing vested interests with the society under the flag of the PRI (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*). This system was maintained via a combination of bribery, both political and monetary, together with the threat of violence and the creation of the Mexican revolutionary myth as justification. The Mexican military for its part, maintained its loyalty to the national myth and the presidency. As a result, the Mexican military, over time isolated itself from the body politic and the era of *caudillos,* seeking to remain apolitical. The Mexican military in the Cold War era onwards became a willing tool of the president, within the remit of the constitution. In the aftermath of the Second World War, US-Mexican bilateral relations which had been promising withered on the vine, as the Mexican political class sought to distance themselves from their northern neighbour.

As the Second World War came to an end on 15 August 1945, with the defeat of Japan, US attention shifted towards the threat of communism; the Cold War had begun. Though the

Soviet Union under the dictatorship of Joseph Stalin was an ally, strains in the relationship between the 'Big Three' of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain came to the fore as the issue of the post-war balance of power concentrated people's mind. George Kennan's article in Foreign Affairs (July 1947) showed the attitude within the Truman administration towards the Soviets: 'Kennan argued that the Soviets were motivated by two beliefs: (1) the innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism; and (2) the infallibility of the Kremlin. Their goal was world conquest …' (Ambrose, 1993: 95). The article called for the 'firm and vigilant containment' of communism, in particular the Soviet threat; this applied to the Western Hemisphere as much as anywhere else on the globe (Ambrose, 1993: 95). The American emphasis was on containment, not through economic means but military intervention in the Hemisphere. As Kennan himself would explain in the top secret document, Policy Planning Study 23: 'The final answer might be an unpleasant one but … we should hesitate before police repression by the local government. This is not shameful since the Communists are essentially traitors. … It is better to have a strong regime in power than a liberal government if it is indulgent and relaxed and penetrated by Communists' (Chomsky, 1992: 11). Hence, the US government would act militarily against democratic regimes either directly or by proxy in order to, as the US policymaking circles saw it, protect the people from themselves and maintain the economic and political status quo. In essence, the geo-political power politics adhered to by the Realist school of international relations rode roughshod over Latin American civil society. Mexico though, would be spared the worst of US intervention, due to its geographical position combined with an understanding that Mexico would be able to repress any internal leftist elements itself. The US government for domestic consumption during the Cold War: 'glossed over the gross injustice built into its relations with Latin America with glib rhetoric about republican forms of government' (Landau, 1993: 7).

In consequence, the US approach to the region put much store on the hemisphere's governments signing up to the Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty of 1947, signed in Rio de Janeiro. This became an equivalent to NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) for the Western Hemisphere, with its political wing being the Organisation of American States (OAS), which came into existence in 1948. The lack of an emphasis on economic development from the Truman administration created disagreement by 1946 with the Mexican government under the leadership of Miguel Alemán Valdés (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 164). Though in March 1947, the first US presidential visit to Mexico City by Harry Truman, was received warmly by Alemán, who emphasised the close nature of the relationship between the two neighbours: ‘In the final joint communiqué, Mexico’s support for the Good Neighbour policy and for hemispheric security was reiterated, and the United States agreed to extend two credits of US$50 million each ...’ (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 165).

Mexico remained politically and economically stable; hence out of sight and mind in Washington’s policymaking circles, though investment capital continued to flow into the Mexican economy. US-Mexican relations faced their first major crisis in the Cold War in 1954, with the US sponsored coup of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala on behalf of the United Fruit Company (Schirmer, 1998: 14). The US actions contravened the long held Mexican foreign policy pillar of non-intervention. The two countries shared diplomatic blows, as Mexico defended the policy of non-intervention and the US government condemned Arbenz’s regime as ‘communist’ at the 1954 Inter-American Conference in Caracas. In the final analysis though, Mexico did not act on its disagreement over intervention in Guatemalan affairs.

After the Guatemalan episode, US-Mexican relations returned to their previous state until 1959 and the Cuban Revolution. The Cuban Revolution highlighted differences of opinion between the US and Mexico over time, as the revolution underwent: ‘its rapid transformation into a socialist revolution that presented itself as an alternative mode of development in Latin America’ (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 173). Importantly, the influence of the Soviet Union served to alienate not just the United States, but also Mexico, though for different reasons (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 173-174). While Mexico condemned Soviet intervention; the US government under the leadership of John F. Kennedy could not allow a communist revolution in its own backyard. Hence, while Mexico postured diplomatically, the United States in April 1961 attempted invasion. The Playa Girón/ Bay of Pigs assault and its failure provoked an anti-American response on the streets of Mexico, while Mexican diplomats condemned the invasion attempt (Gaddis, 1997: 184-185).

At the OAS meeting in 1962, the US sought to bring about a blockade. Mexico, on the other hand, vetoed the expelling of Cuba from the OAS. By the end of 1962 the political situation between the United States, Cuba and the Soviet Union escalated as JFK imposed a naval blockade to force the removal of nuclear warheads from the island (Gaddis, 1997: 260-280). The Mexican response was to support the Americans in calling for the removal of the warheads, though in Mexican eyes the crisis should not be used by the Americans as an excuse to invade Cuba. Fortunately, the missile crisis was resolved via diplomatic means. The US government, nevertheless, still applied pressure on the Cuban government, calling on the

OAS to impose sanctions on the regime for supporting leftist guerrillas in Venezuela and elsewhere. While the majority of OAS members broke diplomatic ties with Cuba, Mexico refused (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 179). This did not led to deterioration in US-Mexican relations, as Washington understood that Mexico's stand was one of principle over the issue of non-intervention rather than the support of communism (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 175). While Mexico may have maintained *de jure* diplomatic ties with the Cubans, they attempted to impose a *cordon sanitaire* with regards to the revolutionary socialist regime, screening travellers to and from Havana.

In 1964, Mexico's government acquired a more conservative tone in the hands of the new president, Gustavo Díaz Ordaz. Díaz Ordaz's administration concentrated on internal politics rather than outside relations (Suchlicki, 2001: 140-141). During the Díaz Ordaz presidency, one of the most important events in Mexican twentieth century politics occurred on 2 October 1968: the Mexican military and security services killed an unknown number of students attending a protest rally.[12] Notably, the US government remained silent. The events in Tlatelolco, had a profound knock-on effects on the Mexican polity (Hamnett, 1999: 270-272). The deaths led a generation of student leaders to question the system of PRI domination in which they had grown up. The following decade would see the rise of guerrilla movements in rural areas, particularly Guerrero, as well as urban guerrilla activity. The Mexican government's response was to attempt to co-opt groups; if this failed, leftists were subject to low-intensity conflict tactics in rural areas and death squad operations in urban areas (Lesdesma Arronte et al, 2001: 4-9). The 1970s consequently became known as the era of the 'dirty war' in Mexico, in which the armed forces and their proxies aimed to repress and kill leftists and their support networks, as well as those who questioned the PRI system and its operation. In this regard the US remained on the sidelines: 'In spite of the 1968 conflict and appearance of guerrilla forces in the early 1970s, the United States did not press to increase cooperation since it felt the army and the civilian intelligence and security agencies could face the threat with their own resources' (Benitez Manaut, 2004: 19). This it could be argued, saved Mexico from becoming another Guatemala, as Mexican tactics were more moderate, in relative terms, than both the US and Guatemalans during this period.

At this juncture, Mexico also began to play a greater role in the supply of narcotics to the US market, following crackdowns in other drug producing-countries (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 182). Hence, from the late 1960s Mexican drug gangs often based in northern states and with the assistance of Mexican military officers, began to export narcotics to the US. Between 21 September - 10 October 1969, the issue of narcotics came onto the radar in terms of the US-Mexican relationship, when the former began to inspect vehicles to such an extent that it started to affect the flow of cross-border traffic (Carpenter, 2003: 11-15). The US government wished to signal to its neighbour that both parties needed to equally work to suppress the narcotics trade, as Vázquez and Meyer state:

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[12] Estimates vary between 25 (official) and circa 500 student deaths, an exact figure is not known.

> The US authorities felt that the Mexicans could do far more about the drugs than they were bothering to do and believed that a brief show of strength would be a salutary reminder to the Mexicans that their cooperation in limiting drug traffic would make life generally easier for them on the frontier (1985: 182).

The drug problem continues to be an issue in US-Mexican relations to this day.

In 1970, Díaz Ordaz gave way to Luis Echeverría Alvarez, who had been in charge of Gobernación or the Interior/ Justice department, which had been at the heart of both the anti-leftist and anti-narcotics measures under Díaz Ordaz. Indeed Echeverría's administration focused on internal difficulties, attempting to resolve the growing wealth gap between the rich and the poor, which, together with the events of 1968 were undermining the legitimacy of the PRI (Hamnet, 1999: 272). Echeverría's attempts at rebuilding the legitimacy of the political system failed and Echeverría resorted to the López Mateos' tactic of focusing on foreign policy in an attempt to distract from internal failings. In this mission, Echeverría sought to promote Mexican industry and trade both within and outside the Caribbean Basin; he also moved to distance Mexico from its northern neighbour (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 184). Even so, while Echeverría could diplomatically court the non-aligned movement, he could not ignore the economic pull of the United States.

As Mexico became a victim of the post-1973 oil crisis, which led to economic recession in the US, the devaluing of the peso by fifty per cent and a rapidly expanding foreign debt, the country became more dependent on the US, not only in terms of servicing the foreign debt, but also in terms of the development of foreign investment zones on the US-Mexican border. Migration into the US also rocketed (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 185-186). While these represented a socio-economic pressure valve for the Mexican political system, they also created friction with the US, especially since the US economy was in recession during the 1970s (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 186). In 1976, with Mexico in economic meltdown, Echeverría's presidency came to an end, being replaced with José López Portillo. Just as Echeverría had been at the centre of his predecessor's administration, so Portillo, as Finance Secretary, was closely connected with the previous government.

The López Portillo administration saw its key task as restoring stability to Mexico's economy. It did this through a policy of austerity in the public sector; the following of monetarist fiscal policy and joining the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Such neo-liberal economic policies served to warm relations with the US, as did López Portillo's desire to further exploit Mexico's oil reserves outside the remit of the Organisation of Petroleum Export Countries (OPEC). This improvement in relations between the two neighbours was not to last, due to miscommunication and growing differences of opinion.

By October of 1979, relations hit rock bottom, at least in US eyes, following the Mexican president's decision to refuse exile to the Shah of Iran. The Iranian Revolution proved to be the key event of the Carter administration, together with the hostage taking of US embassy staff and a failed rescue attempt (Ambrose, 1993: 293-302). From a US government perspective, the decision vis-à-vis the Shah of Iran was the tip of the iceberg in Mexico's seemingly unfriendly foreign policy. Mexico continued to maintain good relations with Fidel Castro and in 1979 broke diplomatic relations with Somoza's Nicaragua, in support of the rebel Sandinistas. To the Mexican government, the rise of leftist rebel groups in Central America was perceived as simply the inevitable revolutionary struggles of people under the yoke of dictatorships, akin to the Mexican Revolution. Indeed, the Mexican government took it upon itself to supply armaments to the Sandinistas (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 191-192). However, from an American viewpoint: '… it was yet another reminder of Mexico's apparent ingratitude and refusal to accommodate a US leader [President Carter] who, unlike his predecessors, was genuinely trying to achieve a new understanding with Latin America' (Langley, 1991: 85).

This difference in policy towards the Latin America between Mexico and the US, in many respects, deepened with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. The Reagan administration argued that the Central American revolutionaries were nothing more than agents of the Soviet Union and Castro's Cuba, who, one-by-one aimed to bring Marxist-Leninism to the hemisphere via a 'domino effect' that would eventually spread northwards to Mexico and Texas (Evans and Newnham, 1998: 134-135). As a result, the US government overtly and covertly began to increase military aid and training to Central American right-wing governments and paramilitaries (Hahn, 1987; Landau, 1993). The view of the Reagan administration towards Central America was clearly as a zero-sum gain in the context of the Cold War with the Soviet Union.

While on the foreign policy front Mexico and the United States differed, the neighbours were becoming closer in terms of economic co-operation. Indeed, the closeness of the two economies gave birth to the idea of a common market, though the two countries had different views on how such a common market could progress: the Reagan administration pinned its hopes on the Caribbean Basin Initiative, while Mexico opposed this due to the absence of Cuba and Nicaragua. Such disagreements were soon overtaken by more pressing events. By 1982, the Mexican economy was unable to service its foreign debt after a fall in oil prices. To the rescue of the Mexican economy came the US government, acting not only to support the peso but also to prevent other Latin American governments defaulting (Vázquez and Meyer, 1985: 195). In the same year, López Portillo made way for Miguel de la Madrid and with him came a period of renewed austerity in public sector spending. In foreign policy terms this meant the decline of the country's geopolitical activism in the hemisphere. Indeed, the de la Madrid administration's main security interests lay in the southern border with Guatemala. Due to the on-going counter-insurgency and resultant slaughter in Guatemala, refugees established themselves on the Mexican side of the frontier. As Langley states: 'Guatemala's military, in turn, now found kindred spirits among their Mexican counterparts who [also] looked on immigration as a security threat' (1991: 91). The Mexican army consequently militarised the border with Guatemala and sought to isolate the refugees from the local population, creating camps throughout the Southern region of Mexico. Furthermore, the Mexicans turned a blind eye to actions undertaken by the Guatemalan military towards refugees settled within Mexican territory. These incursions occurred so frequently that the Mexican military even had to change its uniform so that Guatemalan soldiers were not confused with Mexicans. Meanwhile, the US-Mexican border was causing increasing concern in Washington DC due to the continuing flow of illegal immigration, both economic migrants and political refugees. As Senator Jesse Helms complained in 1986: 'We are disturbed because we see a condition of flight from Mexico. We see a flight of capital. We see a flight of workers. We see a flight of drugs' (Langley, 1991: 97). Senator Helms' statement illustrates the central concerns of US-Mexican relations in the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries: narcotics, the economy and immigration.

As the 1980s progressed the PRI's grip on power came under threat again due to the economic difficulties of the Mexican economy, in particular, the ever growing gap between the wealthy and poor. As Langley comments: 'The PRI created the modern Mexican state, all the while using its rhetoric to position itself as protector of the powerless. In truth the powerless were the losers in the making of post revolutionary Mexico' (1991: 101). By the mid-1980s there had been a shift in the tectonic plates of Mexican politics, in the aftermath of the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, which inspired the creation of a new force on the left of centre, the National Democratic Front under the leadership of Cuauhtemoc Cardenas (Meyer et al, 1999: 668-669). In 1988 Cardenas faced the PRI candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari in the presidential elections. Although Salinas officially won the election for the PRI, it was seen as fraudulent, producing a further decline in the legitimacy of the political system. Despite the desperate attempts to maintain the status quo, however, the 1988 election saw a loosening of the reins by the PRI political system, which now contained three main parties; the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI), the *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN) (right of centre) and the *Partido de la Revolución Democrática* (PRD) (left of centre). The latter two had greater freedom to operate openly.

In terms of US-Mexican relations, as these shifts in the balance of power simmered, Washington continued to concentrate on the issues of the economy, narcotics and immigration. Indicatively, the US government did not intervene in regard to the 1988 election fraud. Simply put, it remained more important to American interests that Mexico was stable rather than a fully democratic state, especially as from a US government perspective, Salinas proved a suitable replacement for de la Madrid. Salinas' rise also marked a strengthening of the modernising wing of the PRI bureaucratic machine. The Salinas presidency with its radical, in Mexican terms, view of economic liberalisation, transformed the macro-economic model, away from ISI, through the privatisation of state industries, reducing interest rates and creating a more business friendly environment (Hamnet, 1999: 284-287). All these policies were applauded in Washington. This transformation, as Salinas thought, was confirmed by Mexico's entry into a common market agreement with the US and Canada in 1992. The signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) not only confirmed apparent macro-economic progress in Mexico's economy, but encouraged government-to-government relations. Particularly notable was the rekindling of US-Mexican bilateral military ties. As Benítez Manaut states:

> In the 1990s, in addition to the context generated by the end of the Cold War, there was an unprecedented effort in the United States to increase military cooperation programs with Mexico because it was felt that with the imminent signing and entry into force of the Free Trade Agreement, Mexico needed to be supplemented in the area of security. This resulted in increased 'High Level' contacts between the armed forces of the two countries, which many analysts interpreted as a radical turn in military relations (2004: 19).

Eventually, closer contact led to the first visit of a US Defence Secretary, William Perry, to Mexico City in October 1995. As the Salinas administration came to an end, Mexico entered a difficult phase in its long history. The political crisis in Mexico began in January 1994 with the launching of the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas (Harvey, 1998: 6). The Salinas government sensed growing tensions in the political system from those who had lost out from the neo-liberal agenda. Growing dissatisfaction deepened the political in-fighting within the PRI between young reformers pushing neo-liberal economic policies and the old PRI-ista *dinos* who argued for a more conservative and populist economic policy. This rupture turned violent on 23 March, when Luis Donaldo Colosio, the PRI presidential candidate, was assassinated. Colosio's replacement was a hardened reformer, Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León, from the Salina fraction, as Suchlicki comments: '[Zedillo] continued the policies initiated by the Salinas administration, particularly expanding the economy, supporting NAFTA, reforming the judicial system, improving the educational system and accelerating Mexico's move toward full democracy' (2001: 163).

Optimism about the future of Mexico, both within the country and from policymakers in Washington, evaporated on 20 December 1994 when the peso was forced into a devaluation leading to a seeming repeat of earlier currency crises. The solution came in the form of a US$50 billion bailout from Washington DC and in particular President Clinton (Hamnet, 1999: 291-292). The loan, however, was not without a cost. Pressure for political reform came not only from internal political actors, but also externally from the Clinton administration, which with the end of the Cold War saw liberal democracy as a means to promote stability. Though internal and external forces worked towards democracy, the most important actor was President Zedillo himself. Zedillo actively worked towards the reform of the Mexican political system while attempting to prevent political instability. Most notably, he moved to de-link the presidency from the PRI system: 'Like Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, Zedillo was laying the foundation for the dismantling of the authoritarian structure the children of the 1910 Revolution had put into place' (Suchlicki, 2001: 199).

For the US government during the Cold War, relations with their southern neighbour were of minor interest as long as the domestic authorities were able to contain the perceived communist threat. Therefore, US political energies were focused elsewhere in the world. This combined with Mexico's wish to conduct an independent minded foreign policy in line with the national myth of the Mexican revolution. As a consequence the foreign policies of the two neighbours, particularly towards the hemisphere, diverged during the Cold War. Though, the Mexican political class was savvy enough to accommodate US policymakers concerns for communist subversion south of the border. Indeed, in relation to the leftist threat within Mexico, the interests of the Mexican elite mirrored those of Washington.

Another critical theme within late twentieth century US-Mexican relations has been economic development vis-á-vis the growing demographics of Mexico and the rest of Latin America during this time frame. While in general the US policy towards the region's rapidly growing population in relation to the ability of the economy to grow in line with it, was to support military regimes in the region. These governments enforced political as well as economic repression on both the working class, and to a lesser degree, the middle class. The consequence was an increasing wealth gap between the rich and the poor, as regimes implemented neo-liberal economic policies. The case of Mexico was the exception to the rule, in terms of the civilian control of the military. While Mexico's economic reliance on US inward investment and petrodollars is not unusual in the region, Washington's response to the economic crises in Mexico has been. This has been the result of both countries' geographical proximity and strong economic ties. Mexican economic policy has evolved over time in line with the fashion in the hemisphere, from ISI in the 1950s through to neo-liberalism in the 1980s and 1990s. The implementation of neo-liberalism in Mexico had unintended consequences. While Presidents De La Madrid and Salinas sought to liberalise the economy in order to sign a trade agreement with the US and, as they saw it, to join the First World. The consequences for the apparatus of the corporatist state were marked over time, as successive administrations sought to hollow out the state and vested interests sought to express themselves via truly independent political parties. This was particularly true in the northern states of Mexico where the educated middle class sought to express their interests in good governance alongside their conservative Catholic identities via the PAN. Likewise in Mexico City, the independent left split from the PRI machine as a result of the government response to the earthquake in 1985 and regressive neo-liberal policies. As the central state machine became weaker, civil society became stronger.

In 1994, the PRI *dinos'* attempts at resistance to this liberalisation of the political and economic spheres came to a head. By the year's end, the Mexican military was involved in a low intensity conflict in the south of the country, with US military assistance, a PRI presidential candidate had been shot dead while campaigning and the Clinton administration had rescued the Mexican economy from collapse. 1994 was also a watershed in US-Mexican bilateral relations, as the Mexican military came to realise that it was unable to prevail in the new postmodern reality of warfare with a nineteenth century orientated army. As a consequence, the Mexican top brass sought assistance from Washington both in terms of technical assistance and in armaments. The US military was more than willing to help.

With the coming to power of President Zedillo in 1995, he sought to further liberalise the economic and political systems in order to gradually prepare the country for democracy. For by the mid-1990s, the Mexican elite saw their interests as lying with the development of even closer links with their northern neighbour in the aftermath of NAFTA and the end of the Cold War.

To this backdrop, in 2000, presidential elections occurred in both the US and Mexico. In a strange twist of fate, while in Mexico, the country entered a new epoch with the election of a PAN candidate, Vicente Fox, the first democratically elected president for over seventy years; in the US, the presidential election saw George W. Bush placed in office by the Supreme Court. US-Mexican relations thus entered a new era, which will be discussed at further length throughout the rest of the thesis.

Conclusion

In conclusion, one may see patterns over time in the relationship between Mexico and the US which would not be possible without the use of a historical institutionalist analysis. As such this has allowed, not only for the study of the development of social institutions through both time and space, but also for a deeper understanding of US-Mexican relations, contextualising the later empirical chapters. Further, the author would posit that it is only possible to have a full and clear understanding of US-Mexican bilateral relations via such an analysis, as it enables the explanation and understanding of social actors' interests and identities over time along a continuum to the present day. As such, present-day bilateral relations are directly related to, and a consequence of, the ties between the US and Mexico from late eighteenth century through to the present.

Historical institutionalism offers more than the embedding of the present within its historical context in a paradigm of single-issue analysis. Further, it allows for an understanding of historical contextualisation which permits for an understanding of historical social reality via a matrix of social institutions in constant and ever changing, indeed, evolving process of which the present is part. In this sense historical institutionalism allows for an exploration of temporal analysis alongside a more cerebral theoretical understanding. Indeed, in this chapter I have argued that it is this ability to connect social actors' and institutions' social memories through time that allows one to develop a more realistic and holistic explanation for and understanding of US-Mexican bilateral relations, creating a linkage between social constructivism, historical institutionalism and historical narrative. With this in mind, let us commence with a short précis of US-Mexican historical relations before discussing the overlaying patterns and institutional ramifications of this on latter day relations.

From its creation in 1776 the US has placed heavy emphasis on material and cultural expansion within the American continent. Eventually, in the nineteenth century, this led to direct conflict with Mexico and other countries in the region (Billington, 1960). Indeed, for many US citizens the conquest of the other countries in the hemisphere was perceived as the nature order, gained voice through formulation of doctrines such as ‘Manifest Destiny’ and the Monroe Doctrine. This coincided with rapid industrialisation and the birth and growth of private corporations. Henceforth, US policymakers perceived Latin America through the prism of commercial self-interest coloured by an element of racially based colonialism. Such views of Latin America as a market for the exploitation of raw materials, resources and labour, remain very much in evidence today along with the notion of a growing consumer market. It is in this light that one has to contextualise the US military’s relations with the US’ southern neighbours in general and particularly with Mexico.

The Mexican government, for its part, attempted to limit the US government’s intervention in its affairs. Mexico has found itself in a unique situation compared to other Latin American countries, given the reality of a three thousand mile common border. This has resulted in a special relationship with its northern neighbour and the myriad of issues in their relations, which have ebbed and flowed as matters of dispute over time.

However, using comparative historical analysis one is also able to note and explore patterns of relationship between Mexico and US from their initial creation as nation states to the present day. Both states have emerged over time from a history of initial European colonisation of Amerindians to their gaining of independence from their European mother countries. This process of emergence and maturity as independent states has been directly and indirectly affected by the interaction between these two neighbours.

In the case of Mexico, one sees at the heart of the colonisation a desire for economic exploitation of the territory and peoples heavily coloured by racist considerations. Mexico has from its inception being fractured along racial divides; white and indigenous. Though the myth of the *mestizo* nation has become the accepted official national narrative in the modern era, racial undercurrents still pertain.

Another important factor over time within US-Mexican relations has been economic development (or lack there of) in the relative power relations. This is most markedly shown in terms of US-Mexican relations in the nineteenth century. During the nineteenth century and in particular the 1840s, the US economy was vastly expanding from it industrial north eastern base through the rapid westward expansion and European immigration, notably from Ireland, Italy and Eastern Europe. Indeed, westward expansion in the 1840s had reached the border with the Mexican states of Texas and California. The movement ever westward of white settlers in search of freehold land did not halt at the international border. As Mexico's northern states saw an influx of white farmers wishing to settle within Texas in particular, these white settlers maintained their cultural and economic linkages with the US rather than with the Mexican elite in Mexico City. The major agricultural product of the era in Texas, cotton, relied on slavery and the resultant subjection of the black population. Even though slavery had officially been abolished in Mexico in 1829, it was still in practice within Texas. This volatile mixture of vested economic interests, racial politics and high minded revolutionary liberalism eventually saw the ill-fated invasion by Santa Anna and the eventual annexation of Texas to the US under President Polk. Not satisfied with this massive territorial gain, Polk provoked conflict with Mexico in order to annex New Mexico and California, leading to one of the most important historical event in US-Mexican bilateral relations, the war of 1846-48 and the resultant Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which saw the harshest treaties signed under virtual diktat. With this massive lost of territory and occupation under the US army, the Mexican populace and elite have gained an anti-American resentment in response to the historical attitude and policy decisions towards Mexico from their northern neighbour over time. Hence, anti-Americanism or at least an inherent mistrust towards the US of Mexican policymakers has been learnt behaviour based on historical events over time. That is, the approach of Mexicans towards the policies of the US government is not a position reached in temporal isolation of the individual policy or policymaker but rather it is a coloured by the historical memory of the society in which the individual is part.

In a similar fashion, US political decision making was also coloured by the socio-political context of the political elite's zeitgeist of nineteenth century America. A zeitgeist in which it was believed that it was Manifest Destiny that westward expansion would result in the unification of the Americas under the control of the US government, itself an agent of Anglo-Saxon economic and cultural self-interests. Hence, for some elements within US society in the nineteenth century, the continued existence of an independent Mexico after 1848 was an anathema due to their supposed God given rights and the racial inferiority of non-whites. Such conceptualisation of the American Republic came to clash with the liberal, industrialised elite in the north east of the country, resulting in the US Civil War, 1861-65. The defeat of the Confederacy in 1865 not only saw the re-unification of the US but the defeat of the ideology behind the southern states and its economic interest in slavery. Such historical institutional memories have evolved over time, so that today while the US government is not overtly racist nor does it believe in its Manifest Destiny to directly control the hemisphere. Such views have evolved, so that today the US government simply regards not only Mexico but the hemisphere as its backyard, that is, within its sphere of influence (Manwaring, 2007 (a) and Marcella, 2007).

Similarly in Mexico, while the government may not promote anti-Americanism there pertains an air of mistrust while simultaneously encouraging interagency cooperation in issues such as immigration, counter-narcotics and homeland security (Davidow, 2004 and Marcella, 2007). Merrell invokes the image of Janus' twin faces to describe the relationship between these two neighbours, as he states:

> These two faces are like those of that Greek mythical figure, Janus, one face looking forward to the future and the other face, on the back of Janus' head, looking to the past. The two faces portray two visions of the world, two senses of time and space. One is perpetually optimistic, inordinately self-confident. The other face, remaining fixed on the past, is caught up with doubt and suspicion; it is always uncertain and hesitating, laden with an enormous load of historical baggage that has become increasingly burdensome (2003: 8).

In discussing these two particular aspects of history one is not to state that they are necessarily more important than others not mentioned, rather it is to illuminate a discussion of the analysis of the historical social reality and its continuing relevance in the present.

Hence, one's understanding of the evolution of social institutions should not be based on singular binary dialectic relations within social institutions. Rather, an interconnectivity between different dialectical relationships which change over time and space for which, different societies will reach differing synthesis in relation to the relative strength of vested interests and resultant identities over time of the different variables.

In the case of both the Mexican and the US militaries, they have developed over time and space through a matrix of social institutions interacting with one another. That is, issues such as race, socio-economics, and geographical identity have interacted with one another within the society's zeitgeist, resulting in the evolution of social institutions over time.

In conclusion, however, I would argue that social institutions remain open to the agency of social actors, both in their perceptions of yesteryear and latter day relations. As such, the possibility exists for the evolution of social institutions within both societies, enabling social actors to bring about an understanding of the commonalities between these neighbouring countries, promoting good relations.

With this historical contextualisation of US-Mexican relation in place, let us now discuss the wider relationship between the US, the hegemonic power in the region and the hemisphere, through a summary of Western Hemisphere security architecture.

III

WESTERN HEMISPHERIC SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Introduction

This chapter will look at the nature of the relationship between the US and Mexico within the context of regional developments in the security environment and the response of state actors over time. The aims of this chapter are twofold, first it focuses on the hegemonic nature of the USA within the Western Hemisphere and Washington's inter-play with countries below the Rio Grande, as a key element within the wider study of US-Mexican relations. Second, this chapter is a critical element of the thesis, as it also allows for the exploration of the present challenges to civil-military relations theory with reference to the wider Western Hemispheric region. This sub-section looks at an issue of possible diplomatic conflict between governments in the region, in relation to the definition of national security, both since its inception during the Cold War and up to the present. Marcella describes the present strategic environment:

> Today … the hemispheric agenda faces immense challenges …. Two stand out: (1) a culture of resentment, and (2) states deficient in meeting the needs of the people. These two realities are making a number of Latin American countries less reliable security partners and adding a new interpretation to strategic denial. A third challenge, the penetration of the state and societal institutions by corruption from illegal narcotics, weakens the already weak state capacities (2007: 5).

This discourse in the region surrounding the issue of national security lies at the heart of one of the ontological challenges facing civil-military theory. Namely, the inability of realist thought to provide a theoretical explanation and consequently policy options to the growing role of non-state actors within security issues. This has resulted in a questioning of the sovereignty of the state with regard to its *raison d'etait* – the provision of law and order – together with a restating of the concept of 'national security'. This is of particular concern within the Western Hemisphere with its history of the misuse of the term 'national security' during the Cold War era and suppression of civil society. As country by country, the region has come out of dictatorship into democracy, each has evolved its own understanding of 'national security' in light of their individual civil-military relations.

With this knowledge of the discourse surrounding the creation of hemispheric security co-operation, the chapter will proceed to discuss the changing approach of the US government towards the region in the light of 11 September 2001. This sub-section of the chapter will concentrate on the effects of the bureaucratic re-structuring of the security architecture of the US and its consequences on its bilateral relations with Mexico. Furthermore, in this sub-section the ideological framework in which both the US Northern Command and Southern Command are discussed, along with the consequences of this to US-Mexican relations. As a result, providing an examination of how over time the institutions, both ideational and bureaucratic, have evolved to meet the changing identities and interests of both parties in US-Mexican bilateral military relations.

However, it begins by looking at the history of the relationship between the countries of the Western Hemisphere and attempts to highlight patterns of behaviour by state actors, in the development of an organised security architecture. This element of the chapter uses historical institutionalism in order to analyse the inter-connections amongst states' agency and the structure of the international system in the Western Hemisphere as they interact over time. This, as stated in Chapter Two, proffers a deeper, more rounded explanation of state actors through the incorporation of historical institutionalism with social constructivist analysis. In order to contextualise the later discussion of Western Hemispheric security architecture let us first turn our attention to the examination of the relations between the US government and its Latin American neighbours to the south.

History of Regional Security Environment

This discussion of the history of Western Hemisphere security architecture via a historical institutionalism perspective aims to show the evolution of the region's security institutions over time. In particular, the role of the US as the regional hegemon and Latin American countries' attempts at limiting the latter's influence. With this in mind, let us now turn to the formative period of Western Hemisphere cooperation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The notion of Western Hemisphere cooperation originated in 1889 at the First International American Conference. This eventually led to the establishment of the Pan American Union, serving Washington's purposes by promoting both trade and the notion of the Monroe Doctrine: '… it moved diplomatic practice away from the reactive, improvisational style so characteristic of the immediate post-Civil War era and toward a more systematic, expansive approach' (Gilderhus, 2000: 2). With the US economy industrialising and expanding rapidly in the nineteenth century, so its quest for new trading partners grew. The Pan American Union in the late nineteenth century also served a *realpolitik* role for the US, to apply its writ throughout the Western Hemisphere. The US-Spanish War of 1898 solidified opinion towards the hemisphere within US policy circles, both of Latinos as a ‘race’ and the role of the Latin America nations vis-à-vis the US (Johnson, 1980). Hence, the US government in the aftermath of the US-Spanish War did not liberate those nations under colonisation rather it created protectorates in the Caribbean and annexed Guantanamo Bay as a naval base on the island of Cuba (Schoultz, 1998:148-151).

In 1901 President McKinley was assassinated, bringing Vice-President Theodore Roosevelt to the White House. Roosevelt sought to consolidate US control over its southern neighbours and to exclude any competing powers (in particular European powers) from the region. To this end, Roosevelt’s administration brought out the New Panama Canal Company, helped to bring about the independence of Panama from Colombia and funded the building of the Panama Canal through the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903 (Skidmore and Smith, 1997: 335). The Panama Canal has, since its opening in August 1914, been an arterial route for US commerce and its protection a key concern for the US government. This aggressive foreign policy within the hemisphere had certain repercussions for, by the early twentieth century, ‘… displays of US paternalistic condescension has the counterproductive consequence of arousing nationalistic responses’ (Gilderhus, 2000: 32). One such nationalistic response came in Mexico with the 1910 revolution of Francisco Madero, this served to highlight for the US government their need for stability within the Western Hemisphere (Hamnett, 1999: 209-221). With the concluding of the Great War (1914-18) and the vital role played by US intervention, the US achieved a dominant position vis-à-vis its European rivals in the hemisphere.

To this backdrop, the Good Neighbour policy under the Republicans promoted the idea of ‘liberal capitalism’ as an economic engine, and peace maker within the hemisphere with Washington acting as the creditor (Gellman, 1979: 6-9). The Republicans wished merely to continue existing policy towards the region, seeing it as a market for finished goods and the exploitation of raw materials. Albeit financial intervention, these interventionist policies served only to breed resentment and bitterness towards the US within the Latin American polity. This sentiment surfaced in 1928 at the Sixth International Conference of American States, held in Havana, when Latin American countries pushed for acceptance of the notion of non-intervention, something the US government managed to block, although the issue of non-intervention in the hemisphere remains (Connell-Smith, 1966:68-71).

With the election of Democrat, Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932, in the context of the Great Depression, the Good Neighbour policy changed markedly in its approach towards the hemisphere (Gellman, 1979: 29-39). Roosevelt envisaged the Good Neighbour policy as an internationalisation of the New Deal, this initiative was much needed: ‘No Latin American country escaped the effects of the Great Depression’ (Gilderhus, 2000: 84). The consequent promotion of trade and commerce between Latin America and the US solidified the ties within the region and was reinforced by US concern over the influence of the German and Italian governments in the hemisphere (Gregg, 1968: 53). Such preoccupations deepened following a supposed attempted Nazi Putsch in Bolivia (Morales, 2003: 122).

By the mid-1930s concern over the influence of German and Italian governments, as embodied in resident expatriates, created great concerns amongst US policymakers as they began to lose market share to the German’s aggressive export drive. This concern merely increased over time as Friedman states:

> As with the fear of military invasion, US officials believed the German economic offensive depended upon the collaboration of Germans residing in Latin America … it was their presence on the ground that gave Germany an advantage over the United States. As hostility between the two great powers increased, it would not have occurred to most people in Washington to draw a distinction between military and economic aims in the quest for national security (2003: 4).

The consequence of this view of Axis power expatriates combined with a latent racism towards Latinos, which viewed the peoples of South America as incapable of independent foreign policies and/or economic growth without an underlying German or Italian hidden hand. This moral panic resulted in the establishment of concentration camps in Texas to hold this supposed fifth column for the duration of the Second World War (Friedman, 2003). German residents in Latin America, with the notable exception of the ABC countries, were forcibly deported and interned in the Texas desert as enemy aliens. As Friedman explains these actions, which had been sought to allow the US to gain predominance economically, politically and strategically, had long term consequences for US-Latin American relations:

> The deportation and internment program was, by any calculation, a net loss. It worsened US-Latin American relations in a period of elevated hopes for long-term improvement. It deprived many people who posed no threat to US interests of their livelihoods and property, and in the absence of due process forced them to spend the war years imprisoned behind barbed wire. It diverted precious resources that could have been used to fight the real war. It required the violation of international and national law. It encouraged corruption within Latin American countries, while tightening unofficial collaboration between the US and Latin American police and intelligence establishments, fostering the kind of extralegal approach to internal security throughout the region that proved so harmful during the latter half of the twentieth century. … And it accomplished all of this while doing very little to enhance US or regional security (2003: 6).

Latin American countries' approach towards the development of the Second World War differed. For example, while all Latin American countries had declared war on the Axis powers by 1945, at least rhetorically, however, only Brazil and Mexico actually sent materiel and troops to the frontline.

Against this backdrop, as early as 1938, the notion of a hemispheric security zone figured high on the diplomatic agenda of the Eighth International Conference of American States. The end of the conference statement, 'affirmed continental solidarity against foreign intervention in the Western Hemisphere but refrained from designating any nation as a specific threat', though Argentina objected (Gilderhus, 2000: 94).

By 1940, with the collapse and surrender of the French to Nazi Germany, US policymakers recognised the future need to fight on both sides of the American continent, a strategy which came to be known as the 'Rainbow Strategy' (Mallof and Snell, 1953). This plan required a peaceful hinterland in the Western Hemisphere, making the region of paramount importance to the national security interests of Washington. As the Second World War entered the Western Hemisphere through the Japanese Navy's attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the goals of the US administration and the other governments in the Western Hemisphere coincided, in maintaining a peaceful region. The Second World War consequently witnessed an unprecedented impetus towards cooperation between the countries of the Americas (Langley, 1989: 158). This cooperation eventually gave birth to the Organisation of American States (1948) and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (1947) (Mecham, 1962: 209-245). To a large extent this diplomatic backing took a practical form in the provision of raw materials that contributed towards the war effort and, in the case of Mexico, labour also. Only two Latin American countries, though, actually fought against the Axis Powers. The Brazilians participated during the Italian campaign of 1944, while the Mexicans fought in the Philippines and Taiwan in 1945 (Mecham, 1962: 227).

The Second World War also witnessed the commencement of US military aid throughout the Western Hemisphere, in order to prevent foreign intervention in the region and maintain stability and trade routes (Chomsky, 1993: 161). The military cooperation between the US military and its southern neighbours often came via the good offices of the Inter-American Defence Board and brought fruit in the form of military aid via the Lend Lease programme. Once ties had been established, the US military preferred to arrange its affairs with other militaries through bilateral relations (Mecham, 1962: 209-245). In the case of US-Mexican bilateral military relations this led to the creation of the US-Mexican Bilateral Defence Commission. Diplomatically and culturally, the US government sought to create a sense of ideological unity within the hemisphere through the use of propaganda emphasising the notions of democracy and liberal values. Through this cultural understanding, the US government hoped to promote trading links aimed at encouraging economic growth.

This attempt to promote a Pan American system in the military, diplomatic, cultural and economic spheres was not, for the US government, a temporary project (Mecham, 1962: 205). In contrast, for Latin American states, the close ties established during the Second World War were considered links of temporary political and economic advantage (Gilderhus, 2000: 104).

This study of the formative period in Western Hemispheric relations demonstrate the beginnings of a pattern of behaviours which persist to the present day. Most notable amongst them being the emphasis placed on the extraction of raw materials from and subsequent sale of manufactured goods to Latin American countries by the regional hegemon, the US. Indeed, the US capitalist class have played a central role in the origin of and inculcating of the notion of a common Western Hemispheric identity and hence interests. The need to create and preserve markets for US finished goods alongside access to Latin American resources has been emboldened by the belief in the supremacy of the US government and its citizens vis-á-vis those south of the Rio Grande. This mêlée of social constructs merged into the formulation of US foreign policy within the region. This is particularly true in the contention by the US of a sphere of influence encompassing the hemisphere, together with a readiness to use military might to enforce it, as witnessed from the US-Spanish War through to the covert actions in support of regressive elements in Latin America during the Cold War era. Interestingly, the rhetorical justifications of US administrations have evolved, even if their central goal as remained the same. For over time, Latin American governments and by inference indigenous political and business classes in the region have sought to limit the influence of the hegemon in their affairs. Latin American countries, to a greater or lesser extent, have attempted to utilise a combination of both regional competition amongst states and extra-hemispheric powers competition with the US to enable an advantageous balance of power. Consequently, Latin American governments interests and identities have to no small measure being developed within a zeitgeist resentful of interference and on occasion, military intervention by the US. Faced by the overwhelming economic and military might of the US, Western Hemisphere countries have sought to use international law and customs in an attempt to limit the excesses of US power politics. As a result within the hemisphere, notions of sovereignty and non-intervention have taken on legal, political and cultural significances.

This is particularly true of Mexico given its history and geographic position relative to the US.

Cold War Era

On 12 April 1945, the Good Neighbour policy lost both momentum and its main backer with the death of President Roosevelt and the accession to the presidency of Republican, Harry S. Truman (Gilderhus, 2000: 113). During the Second World War, the nations of the Western Hemisphere were embraced by the US government as military and economic allies. As the Nazi regime in Germany fell and the Japanese empire collapsed, US policymakers became increasingly anxious about the Soviet Union. The Western Hemisphere, though formally part of the global collective security regime of the US government, became increasingly seen as a geopolitical backwater (Coerver and Hall, 1999: 111). Consequently, post-war hemispheric relations became based on the foundations created during the Roosevelt administration of increasing bilateral military and diplomatic relations but with different emphasis. Though the architecture of cooperation continued, a divide grew between the Latin Americans and the US. Differences revolved around three issues: the role of Argentina in the post-war era; the fledgling relationship between the OAS and the new United Nations (UN); and the Latin American desire for economic aid akin to that received by Europe through the Marshall Plan.

During the Second World War the Argentine government had maintained a policy of neutrality towards the Axis powers. For the US government, the maintenance of unilateral opposition to US dominance in the region during a period of Pan American solidarity against the Nazi threat left a bad taste of pro-fascist sentiment (Mecham, 1962: 213-216). From the perspective of Buenos Aires however, the Argentine government's decision to remain neutral was not simply an act of pro-fascist support, rather a multifaceted political decision. To the Argentine political elite, the notion of Pan American solidarity was little more than an attempt to undermine its sovereignty by the US government (Gilderhus, 2000: 114). Furthermore, Argentina had experienced a heavy degree of inward migration by Italian and German citizens, fostering sympathies in the general population for the respective European homelands as well as creating a sense of European identity in Argentina. Indeed, Argentina's main economic links remained with the export market of Great Britain. Such factors coloured Argentine foreign policy and although Argentina's fellow Latin American governments supported these efforts to create an independent position, the US government opposed such a move, having withdrawn recognition from the Argentine government in 1944 with the rise to power of General Edelmiro Farrel and Colonel Juan Domingo Perón (Mecham, 1962: 215).

In order to discuss this matter and other issues, foreign ministers met at Chapultepec Palace, Mexico City from 21 February to 8 March 1945. The issue of Argentina remained alive with the censure of the Argentine government at Chapultepec and the topic continued to be an undercurrent in US-Latin American relations until the 1950s, when US geo-political priorities changed and the Perón government was finally recognised. The Chapultepec conference, however, concentrated on the future relationship between the United Nations, agreed in principle at the Dumbarton Oaks conference of 1944, and the Organisation of American States (Coerver and Hall, 1999: 107-109). Two schools of thought dominated the debate: ‘universalists’, who wanted the dominant decision making body to be the United Nations Security Council; and ‘regionalists’, who called for the Western Hemisphere to have its own independent international body. The result of this debate was the Act of Chapultepec. This treaty served only to muddy the waters as it simultaneously argued for a Western Hemispheric regional security arrangement, while also affirming support for the UN. On 25 April 1945, the Treaty of San Francisco gave birth to the United Nations. The Latin Americans had hoped to gain influence on the architecture of the organisation, only to be rebuffed by the Great Powers (Great Britain, France, China, the Soviet Union and the USA). Indeed, the failure to obtain a Latin American permanent seat on the UN Security Council remains a political issue today.

Having failed to win a permanent seat on the Security Council for the hemisphere, Latin American countries concentrated their energies on accommodating ‘regionalist’ and ‘universalist’ schools of thought in the region (Gilderhus, 2000: 119). The eventual solution came through Article 51 of the UN Charter, which allowed for the development of regional organisations within the framework of the UN Security Council (Mecham, 1962: 273-274). To complicate matters, on 12 March 1947, the Cold War entered the overt political scene in the United States with the presentation of the Truman Doctrine before the US Congress by President Truman (Hogan, 1998: 10-13). The Truman Doctrine, in effect, globalised the Monroe Doctrine. It represented a response to the perceived threat from the Soviet Union, in essence seeking to maintain control over strategic assets deemed to be key to Washington’s national interests. The Cold War was now openly recognised in the diplomatic and military circles. In an historic step, on 15 August 1947 a collective defence treaty for the Western Hemisphere was formulated at the meeting of American Republics in Rio de Janeiro. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, otherwise known as the Rio Treaty, became the cornerstone of the region’s security architecture (Coerver and Hall, 1999: 107-108). From the US perspective, the Rio Treaty was seen as guaranteeing the ‘freedom’ of the Western

Hemisphere from ‘Soviet aggression’, while for Latin American governments support for the Rio Treaty was not merely based on possible Soviet Union aggression: ‘… One gets the impression that the mutual defence treaty was a secondary concern, perhaps looked upon as something to trade to the US in return for economic assistance’ (Gilderhus, 2000: 124).

Latin American politicians viewed economic assistance to the hemisphere as part of a comprehensive strategy to both maintain peace and deliver social and political stability (Connell-Smith, 1966: 150). To this end, Latin American governments urged US administrations to implement the equivalent of the Marshall Plan within the region. Truman’s response, however, was stark: ‘The problems of countries in this Hemisphere are different in nature and cannot be relieved by the same means and the same approaches which are in contemplation for Europe’ (Truman in Gilderhus, 2000: 124).

As far as the Latin Americans were concerned, Truman’s words were a reminder of the double standards previously practised by the ‘Colossus of the North’ in the not too distant past. In this atmosphere of growing tension, all parties met in Bogotá, on 30 March 1948 for the Ninth International Conference of American States. It ended on 2 May 1948 with the Pan American Union becoming the Organisation of American States. The Bogotá Declaration completed the institutional framework for Inter-American security, which in combination with the Rio Treaty, remains today.

With the end of the Second World War, Mexico unlike many other Latin American countries, withdrew from the strong military-to-military relations it had developed with the US. The Mexican military reverted to their internal security mission, whilst the country’s foreign policy likewise returned to its pre-Second World War pillar of non-intervention and a Grotian approach to international relations. The Cold War and Mexico’s geographical location gave it a unique ability to operate an independent foreign policy whilst also acting as good offices for the US and leftists in the hemisphere. Like other Latin American governments, Mexico, saw no hindrance in signing mutual defence pacts which it viewed as supporting the concept of non-intervention. Likewise, Mexico saw its main security threat emanating not from the Soviets but rather the gap between the level of economic development and demographic growth.

This contrasted with US geopolitical strategic planning during the Cold War which rested on the dominant concept of preventing Soviet intervention in the Western Hemisphere (Lieuwen, 1965: 87).This policy was heavily influenced by a George F. Kennan 1947 article, ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’ and a latter article called ‘Latin America as a Problem in United States Foreign Policy’. For Latin American nations this meant US support to all governments that were deemed anti-Communist, regardless of their democratic credentials or otherwise (Schoultz, 1998: 332-348).

The implementation of this policy was distorted by a level of general ignorance within policymaking circles about Western Hemispheric affairs. The consequences of this were twofold. First, policy towards the Western Hemisphere contained an element of racism, as the region was seen as somehow inferior to the US. Second, and arguably more important, was policymakers' inability to understand the socio-political nature of the countries of the region (Gilderhus, 2000: 332-348).

In the context of the Cold War, such ignorance resulted in US policymakers and diplomats being unable to distinguish between Soviet sponsored radical subversives and popular opposition to repressive governments based, in part, on a growing and confident middle class. This led to the destruction of the buds of liberal democracy in Latin America by the US in the name of halting the imagined threat of international communism (Schoultz, 1998: 332-348). In this struggle against the 'communist threat', the US government not only sidelined the sovereignty of countries in the region, but also their commitments towards Inter-American solidarity. Washington concentrated its efforts in developing its relations with the region's militaries: 'Viewed by US leaders as anti-communist bulwarks, Latin American armies became the recipients of increased military aid … Military officers wielded power in so many of the countries that US leaders regarded shows of support for them as essential' (Gilderhus, 2000: 143).

The 1954 *coup d'état* in Guatemala against the social democratic government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in support of the nation's conservative landowning elite and the United Fruit Company, was the first example of US intervention in the Cold War era in the region which would latterly be repeated elsewhere. For Latin American governments in the 1950s, the main concern was not the international Communist threat, but economic and social development. US policymakers, rather than embracing this concern, chose to continue the long standing policy of emphasising free market capitalism to bring about economic and social progress (Coerver and Hall, 1999: 115-116). Such policies acted to maintain oligarchic conservative elites in power together with a significant wealth gap within Latin American societies. Furthermore, US policy continued to regard the region as an area of raw material exploitation with a limited finished goods market, consequently there was no regional Marshall Plan. For their part, Latin American administrations saw this as a return to the nineteenth century period of economic dependence on foreign markets. Under pressure from Latin American governments, the US did eventually establish the Inter-American

Development Bank (IADB) in October 1960 (Gilderhus, 2000: 157). The creation of the IADB, however, proved to be more of a sop than a true *volte face,* given that US policymakers continued to believe economic development would come via free market capitalism.

Such complacent attitudes had been shaken by the Cuban Revolution of 1959. Fidel Castro's victory proved a geo-political earthquake for the US body politic, especially in the context of the hysterical political atmosphere of the McCarthy era (Schoultz, 1998: 355). In response, the 1960 election brought a new, seemingly more dynamic, leadership from a youthful senator from Massachusetts, John F. Kennedy. Kennedy came into office on a proactive ticket against the Soviet threat; with this in mind he called for an invasion of Cuba in order to topple Castro and 'liberate' the island (Rabe, 1999: 12).

From a Mexican perspective, the Cuban Revolution was an internal matter, subject to the notion of national sovereignty and non-intervention. This position was, to a greater or lesser extent, coloured by their experience of the Mexican Revolution. Mexico's position toward the Cuban Revolution should not be misconstrued as a blind support of a communist regime. Rather, the Mexican approach was more nuanced, as the US government understood, for this acceptance of the Cuban Revolution was based on support for the concept of sovereignty not the ideology of communism. As a result, the Mexican government viewed Soviet interference in Cuba as equivalent to that from the US.

At the hemispheric level, the election of the Kennedy administration, it appeared, wished to fulfil a long-held wish of Latin American governments by supporting a policy of promoting economic development within the region in order to alleviate the obvious social ills. This policy was labelled the 'Alliance for Progress':

> The proposal called for 'a vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the Latin American people for homes, work and land, health and schools- *techo, trabajo y tierra, salud y escuela*'. Among other things, Kennedy sought the eradication of literacy, hunger and disease (Gilderhus, 2000: 172).

However, despite the grandiose rhetoric of the Kennedy administration, the practical outcomes proved disappointing. Rather than producing a Marshall Plan for Latin America, the region's economies languished; democratic regimes were shattered under the socio-economic and demographic pressures, being replaced by (in almost all cases) repressive military dictatorships (Chomsky, 1993: 160-195). These military regimes, from the perspective of the US government, had the advantage of providing stability against

Communism intervention and formed a bulwark against possible revolution. Concerns over the Soviet threat prevailed over concerns for the maintenance of liberal democracy. Indeed, over time the Alliance for Progress initiative became more associated with the development of low-intensity conflict than economic aid (Lieuwen, 1965: 101-104).

In this fashion, the Kennedy administration came to rely heavily on proxy Latin American military power in the containment of the Communist threat, which in turn led to an emphasis on the training of Latin American military personnel in counter-insurgency, as well as supplying ever increasing quantities of related military equipment. With almost unquestioned backing from Washington, the Latin American military became the arbiters of power, the usually reliable conduit through which the US government could act (Chomsky, 1993: 161-162). Dependence on the use of the military in pursuit of strategic goals was not amended in light of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 and the subsequent Cuban missile crisis of 1962, though the tactics changed: 'Struggle would continue, most obviously in the Third World, but preferably at a lower level' (Ambrose, 1989: 188-189).

In 1963 President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. Upon assuming the presidency, Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) vowed to maintain the Alliance for Progress; however, the administration saw its priorities as lying elsewhere, in particular, Vietnam and the pushing through of domestic civil rights legislation (Gilderhus, 2000: 184-185). Given their telling external and internal distractions, the Johnson administration tended to react to events in Latin America rather than pursuing a proactive policy.

The 1965 US military intervention in the Dominican Republic was a defining incident in the history of Cold War Western Hemisphere security architecture. On 24 April 1965, former President Bosch backed by a faction inside in the military, attempted to seize power in a putsch, resulting in a political and military stand-off edging towards civil war. Flustered by events and believing it was a 'Communist' plot, the Johnson administration unilaterally invaded Santo Domingo (Langley, 1989: 211). To Washington, this represented a simple case of *realpolitik* in the Caribbean Basin - the US government could not allow the spread of Communist threat, as they perceived it, from Cuba. *Post facto,* the administration looked to the OAS to create diplomatic cover for the military expedition by calling for the creation of a multi-national force to police a cease-fire agreement. This unilateral approach revealed Johnson's apathy towards the OAS. Ambrose colourfully records the President's reaction: ''The OAS' he remarked, 'couldn't pour piss out of a boot if the instructions were written on the heel!" (Ambrose, 1989: 208). Five Latin American countries rose to the US government's call, namely Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. To other Latin

American countries, in contrast, this blatant disregard for the OAS Charter and the principle of non-intervention appeared to show a regression of US policy in the region to that of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Gilderhus, 2000: 193).

With this intervention, the final fig leaf of inter-American solidarity appeared to be lost and disenchantment spread. Given such a level of diplomatic division throughout the hemisphere, the idea of the creation of a permanent inter-American peace force supported by the US became dead in the water. Meanwhile, in Washington the concerns of Latin American governments moved down the political agenda as the Vietnam quagmire deepened. Discontent over Vietnam, however, allowed for the return of former Vice-President Richard Nixon, to the presidency in 1968. The Nixon administration took little interest in the Western Hemisphere. With regard to the OAS, the administration largely sat on its hands and ignored the organisation with the exemption of matters concerning Cuba. Indeed, the Nixon administration became infamous for its support for the Chilean *coup d'état* of 1973, and the dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet (McSherry, 2005).

With a change of administration in 1976, hopes were high for a revival of US government interest in the region. The new Democrat president, James Carter, came to power in the aftermath of the collapse of Saigon, US withdrawn from Vietnam in 1975 and the Watergate scandal of 1974. With regards to Latin America, what he lacked in experience he made up for through a sense of conviction based on his Baptist religious belief. Moral concerns entered into foreign policy decision-making as the Carter administration emphasised its commitment to human rights, perceiving little real threat from the Soviet Union within the Hemisphere. However, the administration failed to act on the abuses in Central America, as it was viewed as secondary to political stability and repression of leftists. The rhetoric of human rights achieved little in practice, except for alienating the ABC countries (Blum, 1995). Whilst, relations between the US and Mexico soured after President José López Portillo refused the Shah of Iran exile. In sum, the Carter administration's efforts to move beyond the traditional foreign policy stance towards the Western Hemisphere in the Cold War era, failed due to trenchant opposition from dominant conservative elements both in the US defence establishment and Latin American upper echelons. Concerns over human rights soon fell down Washington's political agenda: as the Carter administration came to a close in 1979, with the geo-political humiliations in Nicaragua, Iran and Afghanistan; which led, in part, to the return of a Republican president, Ronald Reagan, in 1980.

Reagan came to the White House promising to rebuild the honour of the US, through showing strength against the Communist threat. It was in the context, that Central American-wide conflict erupted in July 1979 with the defeat of the dictator Somoza and the *Frente Sandinista Liberación Nacional* (FSLN) taking power in Nicaragua. In 1980 the Reagan administration perceived the Sandinista government as representing a spread of the Cuban revolution on to the Central American isthmus. The increasing violence in both El Salvador and Guatemala, where powerful guerrilla movements challenged the entrenched oligarchies, raised Washington's concerns. In the aftermath of the Vietnam conflict, however, the Reagan administration could not act directly as there was no political stomach domestically for such action. Reagan, as Wiarda states:

> … believed that in Central America the Cold War was coming awfully close to home, that the Soviet Union and Cuba were manipulating these conflicts for their own advantage and to embarrass the United States … , and that it was his duty to stand up to and resist these aggressions (1992: 8).

Reagan embarked on a policy of military re-armament of Central American regimes to combat the perceived growing threat of the Soviet Union, an initiative given academic respectability by the distinction of Ambassador Kirkpatrick between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Thus armed, the Reagan administration brought a more 'hard-boiled' ideological stance to Latin American policy (Gilderhus, 2000: 218).

US government policy consequently returned to a stance of promoting free market capitalism in the guise of the neo-liberal 'Washington Consensus' and military aid to fight a perceived Communist threat. In terms of economic policy, Reagan introduced the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which offered modest economic aid for tied reform fostering the expansion of free markets. In the military sphere, vast increases in aid were channelled to friendly Central American governments in their fight against 'subversion'. However, with regard to Nicaragua the US gave its support to the *Contras,* or *contrarevolucionarios* (Landau, 1993: 38-39). US intelligence services also mined Nicaraguan ports and supplied training in counter-insurgency tactics to *Contras* in neighbouring Honduras (Landau, 1993: 44-50). Indicatively, such blatant unilateral actions, against the principles of non-invention and the OAS Charter, were not censored by the OAS. Rather the institutions of the post-war settlement of Western Hemispheric security were largely neglected; the nations of Latin America and the US chose to operate outside the legally binding and inflexibility confines of the OAS and Rio Treaty.

In this context, Latin American governments began to act collectively outside the framework of the post-war regional security settlement as evinced by the creation of the Contradora Group and the Support Group. Both groups were set up out of concern for the instability generated within the Central American sub-region by the on-going civil wars in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua (Landau, 1993: 54). The Contradora Group was founded on a Panamanian island of the same name in January 1983, after a call by Olof Palme (the then Prime Minister of Sweden) and several Latin American Nobel Peace winners for the formation of a grouping of interested Latin American countries to promote peace and stability in Central America. Contradora Group membership included Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Panama. In 1985, Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay met in Lima to support the Contradora initiative, this collective later became known as the Support Group. Buoyed by these developments, the Contradora process gained a certain momentum in September 1984, with the formation of the Contradora Act on Peace and Co-operation in Central America. Although it failed to make ground towards a peace, due in large part to continuing opposition from the US government, which believed any peace would favour leftists (Gilderhus, 2000: 232).

Despite this *contretemps*, a later peace process built on the carcass of the Contradora process by the Costa Rican President Oscar Arias in 1987 succeeded. A peaceful process towards conflict resolution was aided by policy changes in the Reagan administration towards the Sandinista government. The Contradora Group and the Support Group countries went on to form the Rio Group, or Permanent Mechanism of Political Consultation and Coordination in 1986. The Rio Group acted as a diplomatic sounding board for Latin American governments to discuss Western Hemispheric relations outside of the confines of the legalistic environment of the OAS and became a parallel consultative body.

The Central American conflicts and subsequent peace talks played a key role in US-Mexican relations in the 1980s. While the US as previously mentioned sought to eliminate perceived Soviet influences in the hemisphere, for the Mexican authorities the conflicts were not seen in such a Manichaean light. The leftist movements of Central America in the 1980s were viewed to some extent a mirroring of the Mexican Revolution. Furthermore, Mexico's strong adherence to the concepts of national sovereignty and non-intervention resulted in opposition to US interference in both post-revolutionary Cuba and Nicaragua. These factors combined with a strong sense of nationalism and subsequent desire for an independent policy position vis-á-vis the 'Colossus of the North', led to seemingly contrary foreign policy to its northern neighbour. In actuality, however, Mexico during the Cold War era managed to skilfully manoeuvre its relations with the US, and its northern neighbour's desire for stability to the south of the Rio Grande, and the removal of Soviet influence in the region, together with its own policy centred on the concept of non-intervention. In so doing, Mexico sought to develop an independent foreign policy, or at least the perception of one, whilst meeting its own aims in the region of stability and an increase in its own influence within the Central American isthmus.

In conclusion, during the Cold War era US policy in the region continued along the same themes that had been established in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, these patterns of relations between the US and its southern neighbours did modify the justifications used in order to maintain the underlying capitalist interests both in the US and in the wider hemisphere. Indeed, to some extent, the tactics changed with a greater propensity to use the military as an agent of suppression in the region over time. While some US presidencies during the Cold War attempted to recalibrate hemispheric relations, however, they came across persistent resistance from vested interests throughout the region. Consequently, the underlying interests in the Western Hemisphere have remained surprisingly similar over time, even as justifications and social actors have changed.

The Post-Cold War Era

In 1989 George H.W. Bush assumed the US Presidency, in time for the epoch changing period of history between 1989 and 1991 which saw the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the eventual disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Cold War had ended with not only the demise of the Soviet Union but also to a considerable degree its ideological backbone, communism. Suddenly the entire geo-political context of Western Hemispheric security architecture and, along with it, the US government’s policy towards the region, was defunct or at least in question. For Latin American countries the consequences were mixed. While radical leftist movements based on Marxist-Leninism became ideologically moribund, so did ultra-right wing movements and governments that had primarily based their existence on communist subversion. This de-frosting of the ideological framework of the Cold War encouraged the return of democracy in the hemisphere, at least in name. Likewise, US policy towards the region had to be reformulated, as Loveman states:

> With *perestroika* and the declared end to the Cold War, the US military and the Latin American armed forces were obliged to reconsider the meaning of national security and defence missions. As the US Southern Command sought to reorient its programs for the region, it developed new roles for itself and made efforts to incorporate Latin Americans into the ‘new security agenda’. In particular, this included concern for democratization, human rights, the ‘war on drugs’, environmental protection and undocumented immigration in the hemisphere (1997: 131).

Following these momentous transformations, US policy toward the region quickly reverted to past emphasis on trade and economic matters, with heavy focus on free market reform through the Free Enterprise Initiative of the Americas. This sought to spread and deepen US economic influence in Latin America. In the case of Mexico and Canada a free trade agreement was also signed with the US, called the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which sought to create a single North American common market. The signing of NAFTA was a continuation of US economic policy within the region of neo-liberalism.

The collapse of the 'evil empire' of the Soviet Union did not automatically re-inject life into the OAS, for the US government continued to ignore it in favour of unilateral agreements, as dictated by its self interest. This was shown most pertinently in the invasion of Panama on 23 December 1989.

The early 1990s also saw the end of Central American civil wars: in February 1990 the Nicaraguan public elected the opposition candidate, Violeta Chamorra; while on 31 December 1991, the civil war in El Salvador ceased with the signing of a peace accord (Gilderhus, 2000: 235). Guatemala had to wait until 1996 for the signing of a peace agreement.

However, the collapse of the Cold War geo-political structure did, to some extent, reinvigorate the OAS, primarily because the US government found new purpose in the organisation. The OAS in the post-Cold War era became an advocate for both hemispheric democratisation and solidarity, as the hegemonic power and the other countries in the region attempted to find a new focus for the security architecture of the Western Hemisphere. According to one observer: 'The United States and Latin American states have developed a common agenda of security concerns that includes consideration of human rights, democracy, the environment, government reform, social equality, and a free-market environment' (Shaw, 2004: 153). In reality this agenda amounted to little more than diplomatic fudge, allowing for solidarity among American states while meaning little in practice. The OAS proceeded to pursue 'solidarity' with the creation of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy in 1990, followed by passing of Resolution 1080 in 1991 and the Inter-American Democratic Charter on 11 September 2001. This according to show comprised as: '… a comprehensive document that lays out the links between democracy and a variety of related topics including economic development, human rights, institutional development, and political culture' (Shaw, 2004: 156).

All this diplomatic activity, paradoxically, highlights the lack of progress in the debate over the security architecture and security threats in the post-Cold War era. The OAS offers us only a partial view of the political debate over the nature of the security threat environment following the collapse of the Soviet Union. While diplomats in the OAS attempted to maintain an air of regional solidarity, the reality was a divergence in security priorities within the Hemisphere.

With the end of the Cold War, the justification for the US' geo-political strategy within the hemisphere alongside it indigenous political classes' support for military was removed. The result has been a gradual shift in the 1980s and 1990s within the Western Hemisphere away from authoritarian regimes towards differing versions of democracy as the region's militaries return to barracks. Likewise, US policy has shifted from the removal of Soviet influence in Latin America to the promotion of democratisation and a good governance agenda rhetoric whilst maintaining its central theme of seeking to maintain trade links in the region.

Mexico's foreign policy has also evolved alongside its northern neighbour. As the Cold War era came to an end, Mexico was unable to use its geographical location as political leverage to the same extent vis-á-vis the US. For the US was no longer preoccupied with counteracting the Soviet influence in other regions of the globe, and as a result the political imperative of stability along its southern border was relaxed. Consequently, Mexico became subject to political pressure to both liberalise its corporatist state system and to democratise its political system. Though the pressure to liberalise the Mexican economy began in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 1982, it intensified with the end of the Cold War. The process of economic liberalism as an attempt to revive the Mexican economy's dynamism and to reduce government spending by hollowing out the state programmes of social up lift. The result for Mexico was a relaxing of the grip of the corporatist state model, with the growth of the black market, independent civil society movements, the creation of a super-rich class as public companies were privatised, alongside a relaxing of the PRI's political control. Mexico's foreign policy over time began to mirror that of the US, as the economies of the two countries became increasingly interwoven. Indeed, the Mexican political class increasingly sought to develop the notion of a North American identity in line with a common market for goods and labour. With the signing of NAFTA, the Mexican political class perceived this as a symbol of their acceptance to the First World. However, NAFTA provided for a common market for goods not labour and consequently, the problem of

Mexico’s continued demographic growth vis-á-vis the size of its economy remained and with it illegal immigration into the US.

Much like other Latin American governments, Mexico’s main security threats emanated not from possible inter-state conflict but rather from the social ills created by insufficient economic growth and the hollowing out of the state. As a consequence in the post-Cold War era, the Mexican political class has been in the awkward position seeking to establish a North American identity under an unofficial US security umbrella (much to the resentment of the Mexican military), whilst sharing security challenges with its fellow Latin American countries.

For Latin American governments, economic development and human rights appeared to be central pillars of their post-Cold War national security strategies. From a US perspective, national security concerns in the hemisphere centre on economic liberalisation and the process of democratisation. The OAS has played a critical role in attempting to bring together these seemingly competing notions of ‘national security’. Shaw offers an insight into the perspective of the US government towards the OAS:

> Multilateral action presents the strongest type of response inspired by united support of regional principles. An added benefit for the United States is that the United States is able to avoid the appearance of ‘imperialism’ by engaging in multilateral instead of unilateral actions (2004: 158).

This difference of opinion has created an element of diplomatic friction. To the present day, the notion of ‘nation security’ within the Western Hemisphere remains a contested concept.

Much like the Cold War era before it, the underlying patterns in hemispheric relations have remained similar over time, changing only in the use of rhetoric and political justification in line with social actors’ perceived interests. Notable in terms of US-Mexican relations is the post-Cold War era’s shift in discourses alongside the growing closeness between the two countries’ capitalist classes since the 1980s, as the economies began to interweave. Indeed, Mexico’s identity is increasingly becoming fractured between that as a North American economy and a Latin American nation. This is illustrated in the on-going debate over the concept of ‘national security’ in the hemisphere, as will now be discussed.

Notion of National Security in the Western Hemisphere

The concept of ‘national security’ is a key element of the challenges facing civil-military relations theory. This sub-section seeks to explore the differing conceptualisations of national security in the twenty-first century and how these notions relate to the historical evolution of social actors' interests and identities over time to the present day. As a consequence, this sub-section seeks to provide an empirical understanding of the link between civil-military relations in individual countries and wider geo-political environment of the Western Hemisphere.

The term national security has a long and colourful history within the Western Hemisphere. The term was used ubiquitously throughout the Cold War period as shorthand for (and justification of) the actions of military dictatorships. Latterly, the concept of 'national security' has evolved from a *raison d'être* for brutal internal repression to a more nuanced post-Cold War policy of hemispheric co-operation and interdependence. Nevertheless 'national security' remains a contested concept. Interpretation of 'national security' within the hemisphere has traditionally fallen into two distinct schools of thought, which have been formulated over time, as a result of differing historical and socio-economic backgrounds within the respective countries.

One approach views 'national security' and, by implication, the role of the military, as involving more than simply the defence of the state from external threats. This conceptualisation also included internal socio-economic issues as a key concern in the security of the state. The reasoning behind defining national security in such a broad fashion is twofold.

The first reasoning is that Latin American countries which support this conceptualisation of national security have a historical legacy of military involvement in the economy of their respective nations dating back to implementation of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) policies (Cardoso and Helwege, 1995). This was particularly true in countries such as Mexico and Brazil who both have military involvement in the wider economy. Such economic policies of state intervention in order to boost economic growth and promote the process of industrialisation, came to end in the aftermath of the credit crunch of the 1980s. As these Latin American countries defaulted, they joined other countries in the region which had already undergone austerity programs to counter high inflation under dictatorships in the 1970s (Cardoso and Helwege, 1995: 73-107). By the 1980s the region as a whole was undergoing a process of economic liberalism. Even though Mexico sought rapidly to liberalise its economy joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

(GATT), leading to the signing of NAFTA, the Mexican military has maintained its presence in the economy. [13]

The second and related reasoning behind the rationale of a broad notion of national security was the growing internal instability within the context of the processes of globalisation and democratisation. The process of globalisation combined with neo-liberal economics has accentuated the wealth gap, which has in turn fermented and/or strengthened internal threats, such as gang violence and narcotics trafficking.

This combination of an ambiguous view of the military, as the provider of common goods and defender of the nation has been accentuated by the growing importance of internal threats leading to a broad definition of 'national security'.

Since the end of the Cold War, for Latin American governments their primary national security concern is not terrorism, rather the socio-economic situation of the majority of their population. Latin American governments argued resolving of uneven economic development would be key to the solving of the hemisphere's security concerns. Implicit in this is a belief that the military provides a suitable means for the state in Latin American countries to project programmes of social betterment to a local level. Wesson explains: 'The armed forces are probably the most important and certainly the strongest single locus of power in Latin America' (1986: ix). This reliance on the military due to weak central government bureaucracy in Latin America has coincided with the theoretical formation of human security by critical theorists, notably the Welsh School, as a reformulation of security in order to circumvent the narrow realist approach.

Critical security theorists, like Booth, argue that the key referent object of security should be the individual rather than the state (Booth, 2005). The growing role and influence of non-state actors within security matters in the post-Cold War era of global interdependence though uneven is not recognized by realist scholars. For critical security theorists, such concerns may be resolved and a process of emancipatory politics to emerge if security studies were to be re-configured around the placing of human emancipation at its centre (Booth, 2005).

The deliberately broad nature of this definition, allows individual countries to get from the concept what they wish. This is both the principal advantage and disadvantage to 'human security'. This ambiguity inherent within the concept, though allows for the creation of broad coalitions of governments and non-state actors, in combating security issues as diverse as gang violence through to environmental degradation (Paris, 2001: 87-102). The concept is so broad that it has even been co-opted for promotion of a notion of 'human security' more akin to low-intensity conflict, than its original intended theoretical purpose of humanising international relations.

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[13] No recording due to tape failure. Aide memoir note: 'SEDENA has far too many functions to do anything well, should be delimited to national security- includes farming and animal breeding'. Interview, Academic Interviewee 5, 19 April 2005.

The second school of thought in regard to the conceptualisation of 'national security', urges for a far more limited notion, concentrating almost solely on the military as a fighting organisation. This position is held by the US government and as a result of its hegemonic position, has had a significant effect on security issues and policies in the region. In the post - 9/11 era, the US government has emphasised the ideological rationale of 'effective sovereignty' within the region. The US views its role in the Western Hemisphere as a facilitator for the development of capitalist free markets and the process of democratisation (USSOUTHCOM, 2007). The US sees its interests lying in maintaining its regional hegemony and ensuring continued stability in favour of its own political and economic strategic goals, i.e. the maintenance of the *status quo* (National Security Strategy, 2002). For this reason, US policymakers conceptualise national security within a neo-realist framework emphasising the role of the military, to underpin US power in the region. This heavy emphasis on militaristic solutions to the challenges facing the region is a central tenet of the Bush Doctrine, named after President Bush's National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002). This strategy emphasises the importance of the emerging non-state threats to US and its allies' interests in the Western Hemisphere. It highlights Washington's willingness to act in a pre-emptive fashion, in *ad hoc* coalitions or indeed unilaterally to not only maintain the *status quo* but further, to fulfil the US policy objective of 'freedom'. Begging the question, under what definition of 'freedom' are US policymakers operating? The answer is found within the National Security Strategy, where it states:

> The US will stand beside any nation determined to build a better future by seeking the rewards of liberty for its people. Free trade and free markets have proven their ability to lift whole societies out of poverty- so the US will work with individual nations, entire regions, and the entire global trading community to build a world that trades in freedom and therefore grows in prosperity (2002: 3).

Hence, the concept of 'freedom' refers primarily to a freedom of markets and capital rather than citizenry with a limited pretence of genuine political freedom. US interests under the Bush Doctrine appear to be those of the US capitalist elite and their local counterparts in the region. This is not a radical departure from historical US policy towards its southern neighbours rather the continuation of the example set by Teddy Roosevelt. As Cope states: ‘The US traditionally has seen the region as a strategic zone where it could economise resources and still secure the continental US’ (Cope in Tulchin and Rojas Aravena, 1998: 62). Though, this is not to say that the National Security Strategy (2002) is simply a re-stating of existing policy towards Latin America, but rather a consolidation of US policy and tactical reconfiguration in the role of the state, in consultation with its allies within the hemisphere. This has taken theoretical form within the National Security Strategy through the notion of ‘effective sovereignty’.[14] Though this concept was formulated with reference to the particular concerns of US policymakers in regard to the control of large areas of East Colombia by the leftist guerrilla movement the FARC, it has ramifications for the wider region. The concept of ‘effective sovereignty’ is a reference to the work of Hernando de Soto, the Peruvian economist. Soto argues, using the case study of Peru and *Sendero Luminoso* (the Shining Path), that effective *de jure* and *de facto* control of the country and its economy is critical to suppression of insurgents and the water in which they swim. Whereas, Soto himself argues solely on the grounds of economics, US policymakers have expounded this thesis into the realm of military strategy for the region.[15] US policymakers argue that through the use of the military to gain control of ungoverned spaces, governments can suppress insurgent movements and curtail narco-trafficking routes and gang activity in the region. The use of the term ‘effective sovereignty’ by US policymakers, begs the question as to what sovereignty is within the context of globalisation and the increasing importance of non-state actors? Sørensen offers us some useful insight into the nature of sovereignty using a constructivist approach:

> … The study of IR [International Relations] will have to face up to a situation where sovereign statehood and the relationships between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ are variables that always undergo redefinition over time, simply because there is no such thing as a final destination where states sit back, relax and exclaim: ‘We are finally there! We have made it to perfect statehood, let’s go no further’. The development of statehood is an ongoing process; both juridical and substantial aspects of statehood change continuously in response to ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ challenges (2001: 146).

For Sørensen (2001), the space between the state and the international system is mediated by the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty is a social institution, or set of rules and norms, by which states interact. These rules are divided in two, between rules that remain unchanged

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[14] Text of powerpoint presentation of US defence policy in Latin America, given to author by Federal Government Official 9: ‘DoD Guiding Concepts. A Strategic Aim: ‘Effective Sovereignty’’, 31 March 2004.

[15] Federal Government Official 9 waved copy of de Soto, H. (2000), Mystery of Capital in author’s face, stating it was the intellectual rationale of defense policy in the region.

(constitutive) and rules of sovereignty which change (regulatory) (Sørensen, 2001: 146). The constitutive rules are primary to the development of sovereignty, that is, the essential building blocks for statehood – a territory, a people, and a government. Without these constitutive rules being met, the regulative rules could not be either. Regulative rules set out the social norms and rules of interaction amongst states and evolve over time in relation to the interests and identities of state. Sovereignty within the constructivist approach set out by Sørensen (2001) seeks not only to account for the empirical reality of the state but also for its ideational structure. The notion of 'effective sovereignty' within a social constructivist analysis, provides for the interests of US policymakers by providing justification for the strategic denial of non-state threats in hemisphere. 'Effective sovereignty' as a concept in military diplomacy seeks to adjust the regulative rules of sovereignty and in turn to strengthen the constitutive underpinning of the state in the Western Hemisphere. Simultaneously, 'effective sovereignty' in practice also creates and maintains a reliance on outside assistance and/or the indigenous military in order to establish the *de facto* control of the state's territory and may over time erode the legitimacy and as a result sovereignty of the Latin American countries in question. Though, due to events in the Middle East and Afghanistan, Washington's attentions have largely been elsewhere rather than concentrating on its southern neighbours (with the possible exemption of immigration concerns). Hence, Latin American governments and their militaries have been left to their own devices in formulating a security policy for the region. While for some policymakers, agreement around the concept of 'human security' within the hemisphere is little more than a rhetorical consensus, upon which little practical cooperation amongst states is hinged. For other states in the hemisphere, the concept of 'human security' is critical to the meeting of political, socio-economic and environmental challenges within the region. There is also a division between the countries in the region. While Mexico and the ABC countries argue in favour of the military within the process of social development as part of the solution to security concerns, other countries such as the US and Guatemala, argue in favour of a more 'hard-boiled' approach based on low-intensity conflict. This difference amongst states within the Western Hemisphere has being diplomatically papered over by the OAS, with the imposition of rhetorical unity about the concept.

The US government, for its part, while considering itself under attack from Islamic terrorists, views its southern border with measured concern. Similar to the Second World War era, the US government perceives the security of its backyard as critical in the fight against Islamist terror groups from a global perspective, for the US military would be unable to secure the US-Mexican border region via force of arms while also continuing its operations in the Middle East and South Asia. With this in mind, the US government has taken a pragmatic approach towards the issue of human security in the region, issuing rhetorical endorsements for the concept. In practice, however, the US government's approach towards the concept of human security offers little more than a rationale for a continuation of pre-existing policies, while seeking to improve bilateral military relations throughout the region. (Manwaring, (a) 2007 and (b) 2007; Marcella, 2007). This does not exclude the possibility of nations in the hemisphere using the notion internally, in order to meet the socio-economic need of a country's citizens, by providing justification for the use of the military to provide social labour the state would otherwise be unable to provide. Such actions though can only serve to alleviate the extreme levels of deprivation rather than providing a cure for nations' social ills. Only through regional co-operation can the transnational threats posed in the hemisphere be resolved. This need for hemispheric, or at the very least, sub-regional cooperation is agreed by all parties. What is unresolved is methodology for action, that is, to state the differing approaches to 'human security' within the hemisphere. In order to resolve such concerns and to develop a new comprehensive, non-controversial regional security architecture, a Special Conference on Security was arranged in 2003.

The nations of the region, through the auspices of the OAS, in 2003 witnessed the signing of the Declaration on Security in the Americas, the result of the Special Conference on Security in Mexico City. The Declaration failed to re-model the security architecture. Instead it offered only a re-stating of the present *status quo* and a political fudge, with the fig leaf of a flexible hemispheric security architecture. As the Declaration states in Article 2: 'Our new concept of security in the Hemisphere is multidimensional in scope, includes traditional and new threats, concerns and other challenges to the security of the states of the Hemisphere…' (OAS, 2003: 2). In reality governments have had to devise *ad hoc* regional and bilateral arrangements to meet security concerns.

The issue of the relationship between the Inter-American Defence Board (IADB) and the OAS, and in turn between the UN and OAS, continues to be a live issue in hemispheric security architecture. Similar to the *problematique* of the conceptualisation of national security, this issue continues to be a source of diplomatic friction. The US has urged for the transformation of the OAS into a regional version of the UN Security Council, enabling it to sanction military operations in the hemisphere, Latin countries have seen, and continue to see, the OAS as a regional organisation for the promotion of hemispheric solidarity and peace rather than a body for the legal justification of intervention. Furthermore, Latin countries interpret the creation of an OAS security council as contravening the UN Charter and consequently oppose attempts to reformulate hemispheric security architecture along these lines. Such arguments over the future role of the IADB and the OAS are, in some respects, similar to the post-Second World War debate between ‘regionalists’ and ‘universalists’. This is not, however, a case of *déjà vu*; rather it reflects the nations in the hemisphere having to come to terms with the changing political realities. The failure to reach a consensus throughout the hemisphere though, does not mean that the security architecture in a more generalised sense is stagnant. Indeed, outside of the scope of formalised agreements, the hemispheric security architecture has been left to bilateral relations and unilateral actions.

In regard to the US government’s transformation of its security architecture in the post-Cold War era in response to the multi-dimensional security challenges previously mentioned combined with the impetus of events of 11 September 2001 has had two major practical impacts. First, the US government and more particularly, the US military, in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 has transformed its Commanders in Charge (CINCs) to include for the first time the continental USA. This has both theoretical as well as practical ramifications. The other consequence has been the ideological re-drafting of US policies in the context of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) has reawakened US concepts of pre-emptive action in the hemisphere, unilaterally or in *ad hoc* coalitions (National Security Strategy, 2002). The revision of the US’ strategic position in the region has had knock-on consequences for US-Mexican relations, both direct and indirect.

The Latin American countries, meanwhile, have maintained their focus on ‘sovereignty’ ‘non-intervention’ and ‘liberal democracy’ as central tenets for hemispheric security. Even in the face of Latin countries either open dissent or passive diplomatic disagreement, US policy towards the region remain critical to the future of the hemisphere due to the continuing reality that as the world’s sole hyper-power, the US government is unparalleled in its economic, geo-political and military power projection. In this context, let us now discuss the changing nature of US policy towards the region.

Role of US Policies in the Western Hemispheric Security Architecture

The redefinition of the Areas of Responsibility (AOR) of military commands within the Western Hemisphere has had a significant effect on the bureaucratic workings of US bilateral relations in the region and internal viewpoints of bilateral relations within the US military and this is particularly true of US-Mexican relations. As Academic Interviewee 2 comments:

> ...they [the Mexican military] obviously don’t want to be under some kind of shared collaborative command with the US for reasons that you are already aware of. In my

> conversations with Vega [Mexican Chief of Defence, 2000-2006] support that view that you have heard from American officials, they aren’t crazy about it and it has to do with their long standing positions. [General Vega] also said to me that they were happy to help the US and they understood US security concerns but they do not want to be part of a US command structure, dealing with those issues.[16]

This section of the chapter provides an insight into the institutional mindset and identity of both the US and Mexican military. Through an examination of the internal mechanisms of bilateral military relations via social constructivism afforded in the thesis, to discuss how states’ identities have had a direct effect on both the internal and external relations of the armed forces. As such, providing empirical evidence of the linkage between civil-military relations and bilateral ties, together with the fluidity of the inter-connections in the social construction of the state and its agents within the international system. Consequently, this discussion of the US government’s role in the Western Hemisphere security architecture and the examination of how the global hyper power has sought to extend its influence in the region, seeks to provide empirical justification for the theoretical model set out in Chapter One.

The reordering of AORs has resulted in the creation of a new military command for the North American continent (including Mexico) (USNORTHCOM); while the pre-existing United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) has maintained its AOR for the rest of the Western Hemisphere.

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[16] Interviewed by author, 18 April 2005.

Map 3.1: The World with Commanders' Areas of Responsibility


THE WORLD 1:60,000,000
THE WORLD WITH COMMANDERS' AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY
EDITION 8 NGA
BASED ON UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN 17 DECEMBER 2008
SERIES 1107
USNORTHCOM
USEUCOM
USCENTCOM
USPACOM
USSOUTHCOM
USAFRICOM
ARCTIC OCEAN
NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN
NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN
SOUTH PACIFIC OCEAN
SOUTH ATLANTIC OCEAN
INDIAN OCEAN
SOUTHERN OCEAN
ANTARCTICA
1:60,000,000
MILLER CYLINDRICAL PROJECTION

Source:

http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/unifiedcommand/images/unified-command_world-map.jpg

The most significant elements in this reconfiguration have been the creation of USNORTHCOM. Previously, the Mexican military had conducted bilateral relations via the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in Washington DC - an administrative privilege historically only otherwise given to the Soviet Union and Canada.[17]

This transformation of US military bureaucracy has not been achieved without considerable friction on both sides of US-Mexican bilateral relationship, as Federal Government Official 1 posits:

> '… [the US government] are in a slow process, an evolution process [sic] of trying to convince the Mexicans that in fact it would be better they don't fall under anyone, but for purposes of dealing with the Mexican military … is the commander of US Northern Command … we [the US government] would be very appreciative if you [the Mexican

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[17] '… historically the Canadians and Mexicans were not part of any regional command and those secretaries of defence from Canada and Mexico had direct access to US secretary of defence ….' Interview, Academic Interviewee 1, 9 February 2004.

> military] would consent to interact with the commander of NORTHCOM … it’s a slow process’. [18]

On the US side, friction has been caused within the military apparatus because of the decision to create a stand-alone US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), rather than a command under the control of the USSOUTHCOM. As Schulz states: ‘Self-preservation and growth are the ultimate interests of bureaucratic organisations, and the military is no exception’ (1998: 180). Officials within USSOUTHCOM perceived a two-pronged attack on their institutional status quo. First, USSOUTHCOM viewed the creation of a stand-alone USNORTHCOM as an affront to its own dominant position within military bilateral relations in the Western Hemisphere. The perception was that they had suffered a ‘loss of face’ within the US military’s strategic think-tanks and educational institutions. USSOUTHCOM had argued for the maintenance of its dominant position by placing the new northern command under them, while USSOUTHCOM would simultaneously be re-organised and re-named as a Hemisphere wide command. Commenting on this development, Schulz notes that:

> In December 1997, the National Defense Panel issued a provocative recommendation to reorganise the Unified Command Plan (UCP), eliminating the Atlantic Command and creating an Americas Command and a new Homeland Defense Command as subordinate commands (2000: 75).

The second perceived attack on the USSOUTHCOM was the creation of a new northern command which brought with it a new ideological and strategic outlook to the Hemisphere as it notably included Mexico. This new command, USNORTHCOM, is a child of the war on terror and has moved away from USSOUTHCOM’s emphasis on Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) and social labour[19], which presumptively views Latin American militaries as the guardians of their nation state. Instead, the USNORTHCOM works on the ideological basis of the military as being subordinate to civilian authorities. This radical break with military bureaucratic tradition towards the region has arisen, in large part, due to the inclusion of the US itself within the command and the associated legal framework of US civil-military relations, in particular the *Posse Comitatus* Act of 1878, which bans the use of the federal military for the purpose of domestic civilian law enforcement. This is perceived latterly as an enlightened and democratic pillar of US civil-military responsibilities, though its roots lie in the tumultuous history of post-US civil war Reconstruction era (Black, 2002: 171).

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[18] Interviewed by author, 4 March 2004.

[19] Social labour is a military term for activities other than core competencies, e.g. humanitarian actions, provision of medical assistance to the populace.

This two-pronged administrative attack on USSOUTHCOM has resulted in friction between the two commands and competition for dominance within the Department of Defense bureaucracy. USNORTHCOM's response to this friction has been to close itself to the ongoing debate within military and academic circles.[20] In terms of US-Mexican bilateral military ties, the creation of USNORTHCOM has affected the relationship at the highest levels while also creating political tension in Mexico.[21] The Mexican approach has been one of hostility to the US military unified command structure re-organisation, based on the perception of Mexican security forces being under the 'command' of the US military.[22] This re-organisation, seen through Mexican eyes, appears to interfere in Mexico's national sovereignty and, as such, was seen as unwarranted intervention. This view was widely held in the Mexican press and indeed public. For the Mexican top brass, the placing of their forces under a unified command was seen as a loss of face and 'down grading'. In effect, it was interpreted as a demotion in the importance of US-Mexican bilateral military relations: now instead of dealing directly with the US Chief of Staff and/or the Secretary of State for Defense, the Mexican high command operate bilateral relations through a general, in 'provincial' Colorado. The Mexican top brass responded to the 'affront' by simply ignoring US military administrative structures and continuing to operate bilateral relations as before. NGO Official 3 confirms this, stating that: '… [The Mexican military] are really skeptic about working with the US military they have kind of begrudgingly done it on some issues but they aren't that interested in getting that close, the US military is, the Mexican military resists it. And that is part of the whole nature of the relationship'.[23]

From the perspective of the US policymakers, the initial reasoning behind the moving of US-Mexican bilateral military contact to the new USNORTHCOM was to create a filter for the over-worked Secretary of State for Defense, as well as to allow for greater efficiency in relations. The idea was that the initial contact with the Mexican military would have at his finger tips any and all resources required, as Federal Government Official 1 explains:

> … In fact if you want to get the attention of the US military establishment, you will never get it by going to the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the

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[20] Charting New Approaches to Defense and Security Challenges in the Western Hemisphere Conference, Miami, 9-11 March 2005. It was noted by the author and other participants in casual conversation that USNORTHCOM had not send a representative as in the previous year to this conference.

[21] '… the Soviet Union to the extent they dealt with anyone dealt with the secretary of defence and the chairman of chief of staff, now I guess the idea is they should go work with USEUCOM … apparently the Russians don't like it and the Mexicans don't like it either …'. Interview, Federal Government Official 1, 4 March 2004.

[22] '… Mexico was never willing to deal with USSOUTHCOM for various reasons partly they would regard it as a demotion … and now its under USNORTHCOM, never say that to a Mexican, they are not under anybody!' Interview, Federal Government Official 1, 4 March 2004.

[23] Interviewed by author, 15 February 2004.

> Joint Chiefs of Staff. There is only a certain amount of limited time and their responsibilities being what they are the amount of time they get to spend paying attention to a country like Mexico. … The [CINC] on the other hand has a smaller universe in which to deal and he has even [greater] incentives to make sure he has good working relationship because Mexico is in his AOR.[24]

However, the Mexican military chief of staff interpreted this re-organisation otherwise. The result has been, at least initially, a greater administrative workload for the US military with two possible points of first contact. The US military has had the difficult task of explaining their unified command reforms to the Mexicans and to reassure them. Over time this issue may be resolved, US policymakers hope that the Mexican military will come to see USNORTHCOM for what it is: an intended up-grade in relations.[25]

The USSOUTHCOM is furthermore undergoing an attempted re-assessment of its operational effectiveness and bureaucratic working, moving from a solely DoD operation, stove-piped organisation, working in isolation from the State Department and USAID, toward a multi-agency approach. As the USSOUTHCOM Command Strategy 2016 states:

> The USSOUTHCOM is working to build a culture of innovation to meet the challenges and opportunities for the twenty-first century. We hope to transform USSOUTHCOM from a traditional military organization into a Joint Interagency Security Command by 2016. We envision a future organisation that has a regional focus seen through an interagency lens (USSOUTHCOM Command Strategy 2016, 2007).

Indeed, this bureaucratic re-working of the USSOUTHCOM is a pioneering enterprise, which appears likely to be copied by other CINCs, as is the case with the newly created AFRICOM. USSOUTHCOM has followed this organisational re-evaluation due to the perceived lack of effectiveness at delivering US interests in Latin America. As the external environment has evolved so too, it is believed, must the US government.

Outside North America, the US military has maintained bilateral military relations in the Western Hemisphere, via USSOUTHCOM. The US also continues direct bilateral relations with militaries in the region via the Pentagon bureaucracy, via counter-narcotics programmes. Bilateral relations since the end of the Cold War have concentrated on the support of ‘democratic’ regimes and ensuring stability for the development of ‘free markets’ and ‘free trade agreements’. US bilateral relations differ from country to country within Latin

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[24] Interviewed by author, 4 March 2004.

[25] ‘[CINCs] … are like gods, I mean, the US defence establishment has put enormous resources at their disposal and enormous power, the system is set up that way, if I were running a country in Latin America … [and] I had the choice between getting very little attention from the Office of the Secretary of Defense or a lot of attention of the [CINC], I mean that’s a no brainer’. Interview, Federal Government Official 1, 4 March 2004.

America, ranging from the supportive relationship with Colombia, to a more distant relationship with Brazil, though both hold friendly relations with the US military.[26] At the other end of spectrum Hugo Chávez's Venezuela is hostile, rhetorically at least. Although the relationship between the US and its southern neighbours has been and continues to be imbalanced, the key bonding factor is political will. For this political will to exist, there is a need to educate civilians in military affairs and civil-military relations in the democratic era. This need for civilian enlightenment to military affairs relates to the US itself as much as its southern neighbours. Academic Interviewee 4 comments on this: '… Ironically our [US] military has more professional education than our [US] Congress. Our Congress probably needs to engage in some professional civil military education so that our Congress properly understands the civil-military relationship'.[27] One could argue that since Latin American countries are perceived as being in a process of transformation to liberal democracy, they are in greater need, given the recent history of military dictatorships within the region. This process of educating civilians in military affairs also enables greater bilateral and regional cooperation in joint security concerns.[28] This may be useful for those countries and their associated elite friendly to US interests, it will not cure the bellicose tones of Hugo Chávez. Having stated this, the education of both Latin American military personnel and civilians is critical, not only for US policies within the region but more importantly, for the consolidation of democracy.

The importance of this to the US government is showed by the degree to which it funds bilateral military relations and military education in the region. There are several funding streams relating to the training and equipping of Latin American militaries these include but are in no way limited to: International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Narcotics Control Program (INCP), Section 1004 Counterdrug funding, Section 1033 Counterdrug funding, Excess Defense Articles (EDAs) and Emergency Drawdowns. The vast majority of funding comes via Congressional authorisation, however, Emergency Drawdowns are authorised directly by the president in accordance with the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act.

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[26] Interview not recorded due to security reasons. Aide memoir notes: 'Mexico should not overshadow relations with other countries in Latin America, especially Brazil. Mexico should not be seen as template for the rest of Latin America (some in US see it as a template)'. Interview, Federal Government Official 9, 31 March 2004.

[27] Interviewed by author, 19 April 2005.

[28] '… The indicators are that people from countries that have traditionally been at conflict have developed relationships, friendships here [WHISC] that … have helped in relieving or … easing tensions between two countries'. Interview, NGO Official 6, 13 May 2005.

Initially, as set out in the Foreign Assistance Act (1961), all foreign aid, including military, was administered via the State Department. This provided for a central governmental point of responsibility; in essence, somewhere where the buck stopped with accountability to the US Congressional Foreign Relations and Foreign Operations Appropriations committees. However, as the Congress over time began to introduce human rights pre-requisites, increasingly there has been a shift in appropriations for military aid via the DoD's budget, as Isacson et al state:

> Today […] the foreign aid budget is not the only source of military aid funding. The Defense Department's budget, which is about twenty times larger than the annual foreign aid budget, is now a huge factor. Defense-budget funds pay for about twenty five percent of all aid to Latin American military and police (2007: 7).

The State Department funding streams have the most oversight and most publicly known and include IMET, FMF and the Andean Counternarcotics Initiative (a sub-set of the International Narcotics Control Program) with reference to Latin America. The IMET program provides training of military personnel mostly within the US but also provides for mobile training within the host country. The FMF program provides grants to Latin American militaries in order to buy US arms and training. Though generally used to pay for the supplying of US military material, it can include the provision of training for the usage of weapon systems for instance. This has particularly been used in Latin American to bolster counternarcotics programs in the Andean region. Today the State Department has only a limited role in specific funding for counternarcotics and counter-terror programs funding, as they are primarily funded via the DoD and the intelligence services. It is notable that the funding streams via the DoD are counter-narcotics and counter-terror related programmes. These programmes began to gain favour under the administration of George HW Bush starting with the 1991 Defense Authorization Act, which under section 1004 allowed for the use of military funding to be used for counter-narcotics assistance. This provision came about after the designation of the military as the lead agency within the US government for the interdiction of narcotics in 1989. Since that time it has become the DoD's preferred route for military aid funding. These include: section 1004 for the counter-narcotics assistance program, section 1031 which allows for non-lethal funding to Mexico; section 1033 which initially allowed for a riverine training programme and latterly a more generalised counter-narcotics program; section 1206 which allows for the building of foreign military capacity (though ostensibly for the Iraqi conflict it is open to the possibility of funding Latin American militaries); and section 1207 which allows for US$100 million to be transferred to the State

Department for stabilization funding, within the Western Hemisphere including the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Panama. All the above sections of authorization bills have sunset clauses, however, they are routinely extended. Another new funding programme, with the start of the 'war on terror', is the Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) it is now the third largest source of training funding (Isacson et al, 2007: 10). Forty percent of those trained under the CTFP (357) are from Mexico (Olson and Isacson, 2006: 6). Alongside this wide variety of military aid programs, the intelligence community also operates in the region together with funding assistance. Such activities are classified.

Table 3.1 US Aid to Latin America and Caribbean, 1997-2008



Source: Isacson, A et al (2007) Below the Radar: US Military Programs with Latin America, 1997-2007, Center for International Policy, Washington DC.

Together with the military aid given by the US government to the region, military material is also sold to Latin American countries. The US government has two programs for the export of arms sales, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) or government-to-government sales and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) that is arms brought directly from a US private company under licence. While the amount of FMS is publicly reported, the same is not necessarily true of DCS, as the full value of a licence may not actually be delivered. Hence, figures for arms sales need to be analysed with an element of caution. The US is the number one supplier of arms both globally and within the Western Hemisphere, though the US market share within the region may dip due to the ban on US sales to the former number one buyer of arms amongst Latin American countries, Venezuela (as a result of its large oil reserves) (Isacson et al, 2007; Grimmett, 2003). In its place, Colombia is taking much of the slack, climbing up the ranks of US customers in its continued fight with leftist guerrillas (Isacson et al, 2007: 22). The relative position of the region as a whole compared with the rest of the global south is small due to the economic circumstances of Latin American countries and socio-economic pressures upon them. As a result, only Chile has invested heavily in high-tech, high-dollar armaments with particular reference to the procurement of F-16s from the US government in 2002 due to the Chilean constitution giving a percentage of earnings from copper mining to the military. Consequently, military purchasing in the region is heavily dependent on economic circumstances at the time, resulting in an ebb and flow of military spending. Notably some Latin American countries, particularly Brazil, are increasingly becoming arms producers as well as consumers.

Table 3.2: Regional Arms Transfer Agreements (Sales) by Percentage, 1995-98.



Table 3.3: Regional Arms Transfer Agreements (Sales), 1999-2002.



Table 3.4: Percentage of Total Arms Agreements Value (Sales) by Supplier to Latin America, 1995-98.



Table 3.5: Percentage of Total Arms Agreements Value (Sales) by Supplier to Latin America, 1999-2002



Source: Grimmett, R.F. (2003) Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1995-2002, Congressional Research Service, Washington DC

The above pie charts demonstrate the arms (sales) trade in the Western Hemisphere from a global context. In absolute terms, sales of arms to Latin American countries, is tiny compared to the petro-dollar rich countries of the Middle East or the growing economies of Asia. Indeed, sales in percentage terms have reduced over time as African sales have increased. As a result, the Western Hemisphere as a region of relative peace, in terms of inter-state conflict together with socio-economic demands on governments, means that arms sales have limited in value. The 1995-98 pie chart shows a wide variety of suppliers to the region, a symptom of the militaries of the hemisphere deliberate policies of defusing US influence – this is the case with the Mexican military, which spent heavily in the aftermath of the Zapatista rebellion in 1994. The pie charts show a massive increase in the percentage sales by value from 21.67% in 1995-98 to 51.05% in 1999-2002. This is likely to be a result of the sale of supersonic jets to Chile. The gain of the US in percentage terms has been at the expense of Russia, France and other Europeans. Importantly, the pie charts show the diversity of arms suppliers, in competition for even the limited military expenditure within the hemisphere. Though, the vast majority of the value of the arms supplies, were in line with the history of the Cold War coming from Western Europe and the US.

Another critical element in military diplomacy in the region has been education and training of personnel. USSOUTHCOM, throughout its history, has placed great store on the use of education, in order to promote bilateral military relations. In the twenty-first century, Latin American politicians are in urgent need of education in military affairs to secure the process of democratisation. Historically, the US military's efforts in military education have concentrated on the teaching of personnel among the middle-and-high-level officer corps, as Military Official 6 states with reference to his military educational institution: 'We are emphasizing NCO education, believing that a strong NCO corps is vital to our own military forces and that the countries of this hemisphere need that same level of competence in their military forces'.[29]

The educating of middle-level ranks, namely non-commissioned officers (NCOs) has been undertaken through practical and professional courses. Such courses have been conducted both within the host Latin American country, via mobile training teams of US personnel or via the posting of NCOs to US educational institutions, in particular, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Co-operation (WHISC) where instruction is performed in Spanish. The Institute's stated vision is: '… preparing leaders to solve hemispheric security challenges and foster regional co-operation' (WHISC, 2005).

In order to fulfil this goal, the curriculum includes instruction in civil-military operations, democratic consolidation and a non-commissioned officer professional development course. The education of non-commissioned officers is regarded as a win-win activity within military circles. For Latin American countries it is seen as free professionalisation of their armed forces. For the US military, such courses are seen as a long- to medium-term investment(s) in the 'buying' of influence within the military establishments of the Latin America as Military Official 1 posits: '… All that [military education] really gets you is access, it doesn't get you to change anybody's mind, it gets you through the door, where perhaps you couldn't get through the door before …'.[30]

The education of higher level Latin American officer corps has generally emphasised instructor training and/or command and general staff officer courses. The provision of instruction to higher level officers is far less segregated from the US military's own officer corps than at the NCO level. In part, this is due to the greater language skills amongst Latin

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[29] Interviewed by author, 13 May 2005.

[30] Interviewed by author, 12 February 2004.

American top brass compared to their NCOs.[31] Language requirements aside, Latin American high level officers are instructed throughout the US military educational establishment, from Fort Leavenworth to the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS). For Latin Americans, it allows for a deeper understanding both of the US military system and mindset, together with the professionalisation of their officer corps. For the US military, such training provides a similar insight into the mindset of their counterparts - as well as an investment in goodwill.[32]

In terms of Latin American non-military students within the US military educational system, the level of interest has been very disappointing to US defence officials. The training of Latin American citizens in civil-military relations is seen as key to the promotion and deepening of harmonious relations and the process of democratisation.

Differing political cultures in Latin America to civil-military relations are at least partially due to the historical memory of dictatorship and the associated repression of civil society. This has made Latin American politicians and technocrats somewhat wary towards issues concerning the military. Latin American civilians, with their differing notion of 'national security' and preference for consensus has resulted in Latin American governments erring towards the utilisation of the good offices of the OAS for the provision of education in civil-military relations, rather than direct entry to US military educational establishments. Yet the openness of the US military establishment to Latin American countries has had some limited success in training Latin American military personnel if not the political elite. This attitude has only been altered, to a limited degree, in recent years. With specific regard to Mexico, the growing level of military transparency upon the political decline of the PRI, has led to the opening of new possible vistas in civil-military relations.[33] The Mexican military has increasingly opened itself to civilian oversight via Congress, rather than the historical position of theoretical presidential oversight, resulting in a *de facto carte blanche*.[34] Military Official 1 comments on the increasing transparency:

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[31] 'The decision was made long ago to provide Spanish-language instruction in six different schools in the system. Because many of our students are of relatively low rank , their need to learn English is not as important as their need to learn course material'. Interview, Military Official 6, 13 May 2005.
'… The [Command and General Staff] course (CGSC) we offer here in Spanish, well these countries perhaps also send students to our CGSC in Fort Leavenworth but those students have to be able to speak English…'. Interview, Military Official 6, 13 May 2005.

[32] '…[The WHISC] was created … to not just teach specific courses but also to develop relationships … it humanizes the people from the other country, it also encourages understanding not only of the military thing but also the social and political issues…'. Interview, Military Official 6, 13 May 2005.

[33] Aide memoir note: 'Key to understanding civil-military relations is the relationship between PRI and SEDENA [Spanish initials of the Mexican military] and in the post-2000 era competition between PRI and PAN over influence of SEDENA. … Emphasis on legalistic/constitutional measures to promote democratization is misplaced – need to concentrate on culture of military and democratic culture within body politic'. Interview, Academic Interviewee 9, 14 March 2005.

> … Prior to the late 1990s, if you were a [Mexican] Congressman on the Defence Committee, you probably had to go to the Ministry, you have to go to SEDENA, you had to go to the font of power to see the Secretary of Defence. Today [General] Vega Garcia goes to Congress and testifies, today you would have a press conference, today they are very aware of some the [human] rights issues of their internal justice system … its more … my view … its more a question of the Mexican armed forces trying to react to the on-going changes in democracy rather than feeling a part of the democratic change ….[35]

This has created greater need within the political system, as elsewhere in Latin America, for the creation of a cadre of civilian professional experts in military affairs - a matter of concern not only in Mexico, but to all parties interested in the maintenance and progression of democratisation in Mexico as elsewhere in Latin America.[36]

To this backdrop, over the past fifteen years the region has created a loose and informal set of bilateral military relations both between Latin American militaries and with the hegemonic power of the US military, as well as extra-hemispheric bodies[37]. The inter-American security architecture acts as a facilitator and glue to these interlocking connections of bilateral relations. As Schulz states: ‘While the ‘system’ (which consists of a collection of countries, instruments, organisations, and norms) is often poorly integrated, it is the system the hemisphere’s leaders wanted’ (1998: 160). This said, the push for reform of Western Hemispheric security architecture continues and has accelerated in recent times as the security threats within the region have evolved.

Future of the Regional Security Environment

The future of the hemispheric security architecture is still under debate. While the OAS remains the formal body of inter-American relations, it has largely become the forum of last resort and/or a forum for expression of hemispheric solidarity rather than a ‘parliament of Latin American nations’. Informal inter-American bodies, such as the Conference of

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[34] Aide memoir note: ‘civil-military relations are on-going process with give and take’. Interview, Academic Interviewee 2, 12 April 2004.

[35] Interviewed by author, 12 February 2004.

[36] Aide memoir note: ‘Mexican military – increase in civilians within educational system (both students and tutors). Cultural change – greater respect for civilians points of view/greater realization of modernization through use of civilians. Civilian oversight – in process of developing overtime/need for greater education of Congress members and public about SEDENA, as well as media’. Interview, Academic Interviewee 2, 12 April 2004.

[37] Notably the Spanish, French, British, Chinese, Russian, and Israeli militaries.

American Armies (CAA) and direct bilateral relations operate as the main channels of inter-military communication, facilitating good security relations, as Military Official 1 explains:

> I think [the CAA] is helpful, I think its good, you can say the same thing about the Canadians for that matter, they have recently come in too, and that's an opportunity to open … to talk to other countries, to talk to us, to see each other a different way. It's a confidence and security measure, all of these opportunities to exchange ideas, philosophies, get leaders to talk to one another ….[38]

On 16 March 2006, the IADB was formally linked to the OAS as an OAS agency. This move represents a formal administrative matter and the IADB is unlikely to see any change in practical terms. Significantly, the IADB will not become a security council for the OAS, as favoured by the US military establishment. This preference for informal organisation is explained by Scheman: 'If one lesson is to be learned about the functioning of international organisations from the history of the OAS, it is that informal procedures work. The moment the framework becomes too rigid or formal, the Organisation falters' (1988: 51).

This is a preference born not only of mistrust of the global hyper-power to the North but also of their fellow Latin American countries' militaries. With this in mind, the debate over the Rio Treaty and its relevance in a post-Cold War era has been coloured by the Latin American preference for informal regional security structures. Mexico continues to argue that the Rio Treaty is unsuited to a new era characterised by 'grey areas' in the field of insecurity and globalisation. In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, others, such the ABC countries and the US, argue that the Rio Treaty can be adapted to the changed requirements of the hemisphere. There appears little chance of progress in this debate in the near future, with Mexico remaining outside of the Rio Treaty system consensus.

Furthermore, the current rise of leftist governments in the hemisphere opposed to US strategic interests (particularly Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia) has encouraged a strong element of anti-Americanism within Latin American politics generally. Indeed, it has led to the formulation of the *Alternativa Bolivariana de las Americas* (ALBA) around the central axis of Venezuela, Cuba and Bolivia. While the ALBA agreement is in essence a trade agreement it has coloured the strategic environment in the region creating a secondary counter-hegemonic power bloc which has increasingly worried US policymakers both through its independent approach to economic and trade policy but also through its political connections with radical leftist and indigenous movements in the member countries and flirtations with both the Iranian and Russian governments (Manwaring, 2007). As of early

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[38] Interviewed by author, 12 February 2004.

2008, Hugo Chávez has begun to talk of the possibility of extending the reach of the ALBA to include a collective security arrangement.[39]

These concerns combined with the growing problem 'grey area' threats (such as the growing problem of gangs and the narcotics cartels), means that the issue of insecurity in the Western Hemisphere is likely to remain high on the regional political agenda, though priorities may be ranked differently by sub-region (Pion-Berlin, 2005: 221).

Table 3.6: Perception of Threat by Government Officials, Ranked According to Sub-Region

MERSOCSUR	ANDEAN NATIONS	CENTRAL AMERICA	CARIBBEAN
Drug trafficking	Drug trafficking	Drug trafficking	Drug trafficking
Terrorism	Terrorism	Terrorism	Terrorism
Arms trafficking	Poverty and social deprivation	Environmental and natural disaster	Poverty and social deprivation
Organised crime	Guerrilla activity and subversive groups	Organised crime	Environment and natural disasters
Environment and natural disasters	Arms trafficking	Poverty and social deprivation	Arms trafficking
Poverty and social deprivation	Organised crime	Arms trafficking	Organised crime
Guerrilla activity and subversive groups	Environment and natural disasters	Guerrilla activity and subversive groups	n/a

Source: Rojas Aravena, 2004: 13

The spectre of these growing grey areas in the security of Latin American countries is due to, as Eadie explains, to the Janus-faced nature of the state in the twenty-first century:

> The multiple pressures which bear upon the modern state force it into a Janus-faced position. Leaving issues of war and peace aside, co-existent conditions of neo-liberal globalisation and domestic democracy dictate that the state must balance inward and outward-orientated roles. These roles may make conflicting demands and result in the adaption of 'two faces' as the state seeks to meet its multiple responsibilities. The characteristics that are demanded of good neo-liberal players and reliable domestic providers may be contradictory, incompatible and at times impossible to reconcile (2007: 636)

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[39] BBC News (28 January 2008), 'Chávez calls for anti-US alliance'.

Another factor in the changing security architecture of the region is the geo-political decision making made by the most powerful player, the US, which is increasingly moving away from multilateral organisations, preferring *ad hoc* informal coalitions. Within the Western Hemisphere, US policy has been coloured by the combination of the US political and military attentions concerned with the Iraqi conflict and the US defence establishment's encouragement of its notion of 'effective sovereignty' as a solution to the growing 'grey areas' of insecurity (National Security Strategy, 2002).[40] In practice, US policy in the hemisphere has been a combination of diplomatic rhetoric in line with the Bush Doctrine with limited low-key military cooperation in the region, most particularly in terms of the funding of the Colombian military establishment as well as technical and financial support also being given to the Mexicans. In this political framework, Latin American governments have been left primarily to their own devices to resolve regional issues of insecurity. As Hayes states:

> The insecurity that characterizes Latin America and the Caribbean countries at the outset of the twenty-first century must be addressed principally by Latin American governments, politicians, public and private institutions, and citizens. No outside actor, no matter how well intentioned, can effect the profound changes needed if the political will to effect change is not present (Hayes in Roett and Paz, 2003: 56).

Given the lack of a consensus amongst Latin American countries and the hyper-power's attentions being elsewhere, the security architecture in the Western Hemisphere is likely to remain in its current impasse.

Conclusion

It is clear to see from the above that the influence of the US on the hemispheric security architecture has brought deep and mixed results. The US played a key role in the promotion of inter-American solidarity through institutional means, from the nineteenth century development of an international conference to the latter day Organisation of American States (OAS). It could be argued that it is the US' hegemonic role in the region that has enabled the relatively high level of co-operation amongst states in Latin America compared to other regions. This is not to state that Latin America remains the prime concern of the US political class latterly, rather that the region, as a whole, is able to co-operate under the geo-political umbrella of its northern neighbour, as Fawcett states: 'The refocus on security, including terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, did not bring Latin America to the fore. Rather, the region has been reminded of its subordinate place in the international system' (2005: 45). While the US political elite may concentrate their attention towards the Near East region and the growing influence of 'Communist' China, the Western Hemisphere, due to the US' geographical positioning in the region, will always remain a region of special interest. The converse is also true for the US still plays a critical role within Latin American political and economic life, even in the likes of Hugo Chávez's Venezuela. The US government will continue to promote cooperation within the region as a whole and between militaries in the hemisphere to maintain its strategic interests. Indeed, it is in the Latin American socio-economic elite's interest to maintain good relations with the global hyper-power and major trading partner, thus creating a rationale for the continued good bilateral relations - enlightened self-interest.

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[40] No recording for security reasons. Aide memoir notes: 'notion of effective sovereignty - National Security Policy Directive 32 – move away from counternarcotics to new threat of terrorism but not as single focus'. Interview, Federal Government Official 9, 31 March 2004.

The real or perceived subordination of regional organisations by the hegemonic power has led to the creation of informal relations and groupings for the promotion of hemispheric solidarity where US interests are perceived to be in conflict with Latin American governments' interests. It continues to be the case that the hemisphere's security architecture is a mixture of formal and informal structures centred on common interests in the fields of security and trade. Despite the commonalities, differences of opinion regularly occur, as Mares states: 'Disagreements over threat identification and tactics are attributed by US analysts to an unwillingness by Latin America to take 'responsibility' and share in the domestic cost of an activist foreign policy' (Mares in Smith and Schoultz, 1994: 272). Whilst, from the Latin American countries' perspective, disagreements centre on their concern to maintain at least rhetorical sovereignty in accordance with the Calvo doctrine; the distrust from Latin American civilians towards militarism combined with perceived arrogance and superiority complex amongst US officials towards their Latin American counterparts. This heady mix can, on occasion, result in a combustible diplomatic discourse within the region.

This chapter proffers an insight into the role of regional social institutions in the development of US-Mexican relations over time into the present day. Through the use of a historical institutionalist analysis of the evolution of institutions and their interests and identities, the central underlying themes of US foreign policy and Latin American responses to it have been delineated. Notable is the deft political manoeuvring of the Mexicans in playing the interests of their northern neighbour off the wider region to enable the development of their independent foreign policy towards the region.

The post-11 September 2001 environment followed this pattern of inter-relations within the hemisphere. Mexico's rejection of the continuation of the collective formal security arrangements in the region in 2001, and eventual formal de-ratification of the Rio Treaty in 2002 is one such case in point. For the Mexicans, this was not meant as a signal of abdication of its strategic positioning in terms of their support for common security architecture. Rather, the Mexican government hoped to push forward the re-working of regional security architecture towards a more apt form to suit the region's security concerns, while also giving Mexico a leading diplomatic role. However, Mexico's decision to leave the Rio Treaty unilaterally before the re-negotiation of a replacement agreement backfired. From the US government's perspective, Mexico's decision to leave the Rio Treaty was a strategic distancing from the US at the most unfortunate time, diplomatically, a day before the attacks of 11 September 2001. This came in the aftermath of the terror attacks, a period of rhetorical, at least, hemispheric solidarity. For Mexico's fellow Latin American counterparts, the unilateral leaving of the Rio Treaty rather than acting through diplomatic consensus at such a sensitive time, was perceived negatively, as much for acting unilaterally as for the timing.

Consequently, the regional security architecture discourse maintains the rhetoric of solidarity and low-level confidence measures and co-operation, however, progress in the fundamental reform of hemispheric security institutions remains at an impasse due to the lack of political will by all parties as well as the preference for unilateral action by the regional hegemon (Mares in Smith and Schoultz, 1994: 264).

What is required is the opening of minds and greater political will on all sides in order to formulate a new more dynamic collective approach to the insecurity facing the region in the era of globalisation and the growing threat of non-state actors. On this point Nuñez concludes: 'Thus, the United States must be willing to be less directive and more willing to listen to the concerns of other states in the region. In return, the hemispheric neighbours of the US must be prepared to share the security responsibilities, that arise from this cooperation' (2002: 2). However, such political openings are unlikely at present as the US polity's attention is centred on the quagmire of Iraq and its cost in both blood and treasure to the US people. With the Bush administration unlikely to re-deploy US military resources out of the Iraqi conflict, US policymakers are only likely to renew their focus on the Western Hemisphere in the medium term, at best, unless the new administration after the 2008 election makes it a central plank of its foreign policy agenda and/or if regime change in Cuba occurs. With this in mind, informal hemispheric level co-operation on both a strategic and tactic level is likely to centre on US interests of counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism.

Alongside those Latin America countries who had diplomatic disagreements with the United States, in terms of practicalities of means and methods, others, like Hugo Chávez, are attempting to offer an alternative mode of development similar to the example of Castro's Cuba in terms of its rejection of US intervention. The development of ALBA and the associated regional financial organisations, funded by Venezuelan oil reserves, runs counter to the economic orthodoxy of the hegemonic power to the north by attempting to bring Latin American countries together through economic linkages based on the reciprocal agreements amongst nation states rather than via neo-liberal free markets and the processes of globalisation. The alternative of Hugo Chávez within the hemisphere is perceived by the US military establishment as more than an attempt at liberation as voiced by Sìmon Bolìvar in the nineteenth century but rather as a fourth generation of super-insurgency (Manwaring, 2007). Manwaring describes this super-insurgency as follows:

> First, the 'battlefield' is everywhere. Second, twenty-first century conflict is intended to resist, oppose, gain control of, and/or overthrow an existing government or symbol of power. Third, Chavez also understands that battles are won at the tactical and operational levels, but wars are won at the strategic level (2007: 27).

Indeed, Hugo Chávez's rhetoric of creating a new self-defence pact amongst fellow ALBA members will add further concern about Chávez's intent amongst US policymakers and the socio-political elites of non-ALBA Latin American countries, notably Colombia. However, Venezuela remains a signatory of the Rio Treaty and indeed, like its counterparts, offered its rhetoric assistance in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001. Hence, in any discussion of the Hugo Chávez's foreign policy one must distinguish rhetoric and practical reality.

This chapter has used social constructivism in order to explore the bureaucratic restructuring of the US security architecture in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001, and with it the ideological and paradigm shifts. As a result, it has shed light on the development of US-Mexican relations to the present day through the marrying of the theoretical model of social actors' and institutions' identities and interests with the empirical data derived. Consequently, this chapter provides the thesis with an understanding of the wider context of US-Mexican relations with reference to the rest of the hemisphere. This understanding of the inter-connectivity between the domestic and external politics of states dovetails with the social constructivist model used in this thesis.

Furthermore, this inter-state intrigue is coloured by the internal security issues that pertain throughout the Western Hemisphere. Hence, let us now continue with a discussion of the most striking and concerning internal challenges facing the hemisphere, namely the on-going war on narcotics within the context of the case study of US-Mexican relations.

IV
THE WAR ON NARCOTICS AND US-MEXICAN RELATIONS

Introduction

This chapter examines the nature of the 'war' on narcotics and its effect on US-Mexican relations, both in a general sense as well as with particular reference to bilateral security relations. The first section of the chapter looks at how the 'war on drugs' has been interwoven into the tapestry of the respective body politics. It is apt to note that narcotics have long been part of human history, as Iverson comments: 'As a species we have a unique propensity to seek out mind-altering chemicals and sometimes to persist in their use even when we know that such behaviour may be damaging to our health' (2001: 11). Indeed, narcotics have always, to a lesser or greater extent, played a role in the relationship between the US and its southern neighbour. The second section of the chapter discusses contemporary challenges faced by the US and Mexico at the diplomatic level, to a backdrop where Mexico's state institutions are beleaguered by brutal levels of violence and corruption used by narcotics cartels and their militarised enforcement gangs. While the Mexican state struggles with these threats, Washington seeks to downplay security concerns in the border region within the mainstream media so as to not expose the vulnerability of the southern frontier in the public imagination. Additionally, one cannot discuss current policymaking between the US and Mexico on the drugs question without contextualisation within the post-11 September 2001 paradigm. Though this will be reviewed in detail in a later chapter, the post-11 September 2001 security environment as perceived by Washington has greatly effected the nature of the 'war on drugs'. The 'war on drugs' has been a significant element within security relations between the two neighbours since the 1960s and the rhetorical start of the 'war on drugs' by President Nixon.

The chapter also seeks to examine linkages between the effects of the 'war on drugs' on the individual countries' security apparatus and resultant bilateral relationship. The concluding section therefore analyses the empirical data using social constructivism as a theoretical tool which provides for an understanding of civil-military relations in the respective countries, in addition to associated bilateral relations. It also opens up questions regarding the supremacy of civilian control over the military within the state structure for the betterment of the citizenry.

Taken as a whole the chapter proffers an insight into the complex and multi-faceted nature of US-Mexican security relations. It also illustrates the degree to which the state, as a political institution, is under threat from non-state organisations and actors which are undermining its *raison d'être*, the provision of law-and-order in the face of a Hobbesian international order, and the attempts that the US and Mexico are making to maintain *de facto* sovereignty. To what extent has the 'war on drugs' adversely affected US-Latin American relations, as well as the individual well-being of citizens throughout the continent? This chapter therefore seeks a possible theoretical resolution to the socially constructed impasse of the 'war' on narcotics in the Americas.

History of US-Mexican Relations and Origins of the 'War on Drugs'

In this initially examination of the historical background to the emergence of the 'war on drugs' via historical institutionalism and social constructivism, the author seeks to bring out the themes of race, class and vested interests as social cleavages within both US and Mexican society. Furthermore, this section of the chapter examines how as these interests and identities amongst actors have evolved over time, and with it, the nature of societal attitudes to narcotics and the state's response to drug use and abuse. This study of the history of narcotics within the US and Mexico, the author would argue, is key to the wider social constructivist analysis of the latter day 'war on drugs'. For as noted in Chapter Two, the provision of a comparative historical analysis of US-Mexican relations is essential to a full understanding of the nature of the social actor and his/her interests and identities within the social realm as they evolve over time. The investigation of the historical background to the 'war on drugs' allows the reader to not only understand the temporal context of social actors and their actions, but also to root the institutional memories and assumptions of society which have evolved in line with a complex web of interests and identities, often becoming divorced from their initial origins and subsumed into the societal zeitgeist. With this in mind, the chapter as a whole seeks to root both societies' relationship with the use and abuse of narcotics in an attempt to question the assumptions and policy decisions of the political class and government officials on both sides of the Rio Grande.

The use of narcotics, or rather plant extracts, for the purpose of enjoyment or intoxication, dates to the pre-Columbus era in North America. While in what is now the US, indigenous peoples used tobacco either by chewing or smoking, in what today comprises Mexico and parts of the south west US, Indian nomadic tribes employed hallucinogens, *mescaline* and psilocybin (deviated from the peyote cactus), and *teonanactl* ('magic mushrooms') in religious rites (Iverson, 2001: 17). Alcohol consumption was widespread throughout North America, though by no means universal amongst all tribes, being used for both recreational and ceremonial purposes. The arrival of European colonists brought differing approaches to indigenous peoples by the English and Spanish authorities. While the English exploited tobacco as a cash crop, which quickly became fashionable within polite London and Western European society, creating a vast market for the cultivation and processing of tobacco, the Spanish authorities shunned indigenous narcotics, preferring instead to use alcohol and tobacco, which were perceived as more civilised. This was in part due to the perceived racial inferiority of the indigenous population on the part of the Spanish elite. Even so, in the viceroyalty of Peru, the Crown authorities encouraged the cultivation of coca for internal usage due to the profit that could be made from its popularity amongst the indigenous peoples of the region and its usefulness in the functioning of the all-important mining sector. Until the nineteenth century, coca leaves were ingested by them, or via tea infusions. In 1860, however, German chemist, Albert Niemann, isolated the active ingredient in the coca leaf, cocaine. With this, the modern form of cocaine as a white powder came into being. The drug was initially perceived by the medical community as a panacea for many ailments. Indeed, cocaine was even proscribed for opium addiction. It was most commonly taken in the US market as a tonic, the most famous example being that of Coca-Cola (Spillane in Gootenburg, 1999: 24-25). The nineteenth century also saw a rise in narcotics consumption in the United States and to a lesser degree Western Europe and Asia.

At this juncture, opium in all its forms proved to be the most widespread recreational drug, other than alcohol and tobacco. Opium was not only a recreational drug but also the most effective form of pain relief in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, though like cocaine, opium preparations of all kinds served as panacea cures for illnesses ranging from headaches to gout. By the latter half of the nineteenth century, levels of addiction began to concern polite society. This trend was in part due to a lack of medical knowledge, a lack of skilled medical practitioners and the effects of the US Civil War (1861-65). The outcome, it has been argued, was that: ‘By the turn of the century, the medical community’s inadequate information and excessive narcotics distribution had created a large, socially diverse addict population that was predominately white, middle class, and female’ (Kinder in Mabry, 1989:13). It became customary among a significant swathe of the population to self-medicate for minor ailments, or to simply ease boredom through the drinking of laudanum, a mixture of opium, alcohol and water. All narcotics were widespread and publicly available within US society in the nineteenth century and were sold in a wide variety of retail outlets, from department stores to mail order catalogues:

> Before the 1870s narcotics abuse, unlike alcoholism, was seldom linked with irresponsibility, lust or violence and the general public perceived drugs as acceptable inebriants, ignoring America's two hundred and fifty thousand to one million habitués. Indeed, the country's elite often abused opiates instead of liquor (Kinder in Mabry, 1989:14).

Though narcotics had become socially acceptable, a small, unaligned grouping of reformists sought to restrict their use, sale, transportation and production. This small, uncoordinated movement had three constituent parts, the first being sections of the medical professional who had come to oppose widespread consumption due to growing evidence of possible ill-affects. They also had a professional interest in the formulation of a regulated market for the sale and prescribing of narcotics for medical usage. The second grouping of restrictionists comprised social reformers, whose opposition derived from religious belief, which held that temperance was a matter of saving souls by ending the vice of drugs. The third and most pernicious component within the restrictionist movement involved activists that paternalistically saw it as their duty to free US society from the grip of a social ill they perceived as being brought about by foreigners. These groupings, however, were not mutually exclusive, as all three strands of thought were often weaved together:

> As these antinarcotics advocates attacked drug abuse, muckraking American newspapers and magazines published highly sensational reports of ethnic groups committing acts of passion and vendetta while abusing narcotics. Whatever their individual orientation, most drug restrictionists held or employed strong nativist feelings. Refusing to recognise that native-born citizens could abuse drugs without foreign instigation, they feared immigrant narcotics consumption would undermine cherished values, and endorsed strict antidrug laws directed against minorities (Kinder in Mabry, 1989: 14).

Such racial undercurrents within the debate over the use and abuse of narcotics in US society were evident to all at the time. Indeed, individual drugs became synonymous with individual racial groupings (Recio, 2002). Opiates became associated with the Chinese-American community, notably on the west coast where anti-Chinese racism was commonplace inside the dominant white culture, a mindset that helped to pressurise eleven western states into the passing of anti-opium laws, independent of the federal authorities. Cocaine became associated with the black population settled in the southern states, a perception rooted in the southern whites' paranoia of a black uprising against white domination in the post-Civil War, post-slavery era. On this point, Kinder notes that:

> Initially, Southern whites believed the liquor consumption would increase racial violence and several of the region's states adopted prohibition statutes. Within these 'dry' states, poor blacks then allegedly substituted cola drinks- or some source of

> cocaine- for liquor, and white began to identify ‘black crimes’ with cocaine abuse. During the height of racial segregation and lynching early in the 1900s, white newspaper reporters and police officers argued that cocaine use gave blacks superhuman strength, improved their marksmanship, and made them difficult to kill. Armed with these assertions, most Southern cities and states passed strict anti-cocaine ordinances, and many southern police departments changed from .32 caliber to .38 caliber revolvers to insure the control of black cocaine users (Kinder in Mabry, 1989: 15).

Hispanics were not immune from such racial stereotyping or indeed supposed links to narcotics. The Hispanic population, at this juncture largely Mexican-American, became associated with marijuana use which was perceived among the wider populace as a lower class activity with criminal underworld connotations. This induced: ‘Eighteen Western states approved marijuana restrictions founded on racial prejudice and fear of the narcotic’ (Kinder in Mabry, 1989: 16).The connection made by social reformers between race and heavy narcotics usage, served as an important propaganda tool in the promotion and enacting of anti-narcotics laws throughout the US, at an individual city and/or state level. The outcome was that until the early 1900s narcotics laws in the US were a patchwork of legislation that reflected the class, as well as racial interests, of individual city and/or state’s elite. This situation persisted until the Taft administration (1909-1913). Prior to ascending to the presidency, William Howard Taft had been colonial governor of the Philippines, where under its previous colonial ruler, the market for opium had been a monopoly of the Spanish authorities. This arrangement initially persisted under American rule, but under pressure from the Episcopal Church in particular, President Theodore Roosevelt ordered Taft to end this monopoly (Musto in Smith, 1992: 33). US occupation of the Philippines led to the eventual internationalisation of the anti-narcotics evangelists.

Within the US, the Taft administration sought to restrict the sale of opium for recreational usage, but not for medical purposes. Second, Taft, drawing upon his previous experience in the Philippines and encouraged by Episcopal Church Bishop Charles H. Brent, envisioned an internationalisation of the opium restrictionist policy - particularly directed at China, the main source of supply. Against this backdrop, Taft called an anti-opium conference in Shanghai in 1909, while on the home front the administration formulated the Opium Exclusion Act to forbid the importation of opium. The Shanghai conference’s achievements were limited. Its main effect for drug restrictionist activists was to increase their popular profile at home. The drug industry began to see the political tide turning against it and therefore cooperated with restrictionists in the formulation of tighter narcotics regulation. The result was the Harrison Narcotics Act (1914). This piece of legislation had a limited effect on the narcotics market, writing into statute the need for record-keeping in relation to the sale of cocaine and opium, together with the paying of an occupational tax – levied at one dollar per annum. Cocaine and opium were to be distributed via doctor's prescription, allowing for addicts to obtain a regular and safe fix, though as Holden-Rhodes acknowledges: 'A side effect of the legislation was that heroin rose from US$ 6.50 to US$ 100 per ounce' (1994: 26).

The executive, in the form of the Internal Revenue Bureau and the Justice Department, took to stringently enforcing the new anti-narcotics laws by prosecuting unregistered individuals detained with narcotics upon their person. Thereafter federal narcotics control began to be more stringently enforced:

> World War I commencing a few months before the enactment of the Harrison Act, profoundly affected US attitudes by creating an intense desire to purify and strengthen the nation as it girded itself to fight for democracy against the barbarism of the Kaiser. The fall of Russia and the spread of Bolshevism intensified fears of contagion and the desire to ensure that the United States remained pure and strong. Not surprisingly, prohibition became a vehicle for such purification and morality-building (Musto in Smith, 1992: 35).

With this new enforcement of the anti-narcotics laws across the US, the market and clientele changed from its hitherto wide socio-economic profile, where southern white, middle class ladies comprised the typical narcotics user. A new 'typical' user emerged: urbanised, young, white males attempting to escape '*anomie*'.

Restrictionists ambitions, nevertheless, did not stop at ever-stricter legislation towards narcotics, as alcohol now became a target. As had previously been the case with other narcotics, the 'moral minority' sought to link alcohol with an ethnic group perceived as a threat. In the case of alcohol, it was the German-American community which dominated the brewery industry during the early 1900s. The start of the 1914-18 Great War set German-Americans apart from their fellow countrymen, as American 'nativists' accused them of being disloyal to the American government or even operating as a fifth column, a situation which allowed restrictionists to ride the wave of anti-German hysteria (Behr, 1997). National prohibition of alcohol eventually came about via the passing of the eighteenth constitutional amendment (also known as the Volstead Act) on 10 October 1919, overriding the veto of President Woodrow Wilson. Alcohol prohibition came into effect on 17 January 1920. Prohibition of the most widely used and socially acceptable narcotic, acted as a boon for enterprising criminals in all major cities, resulting in high levels of violence and corruption as underworld figures fought, literally, for market share in the alcohol trade. Much like latter-day Mexico with regard to narcotics, prohibition undermined the legitimacy and effectiveness of the nation state, undercutting respect for law-and-order, while promoting corruption among agents of the state, from lowly police officers on the beat to high-level officials in city hall, resulting in the impotence of the state to enforce its sovereignty. As Behr states:

> With Prohibition, America was all set for a wild drinking spree that would last thirteen years, five months and nine days. It would transform the country's morals, alter American attitudes towards law enforcers, politicians and all those in authority, and herald a new mood of cynicism, along with an often justified conviction that the courts dispensed a form of two-tier justice geared to class, wealth and rank (1997: 95).

By the 1920s narcotics usage was viewed as a social taboo associated with undesirables such as socialists, anarchists and foreigners, leading the executive authorities to arrest addicts and non-licensed drug dealers with zeal. Indeed, in 1927 Congress created the predecessor of today's Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), in the form of the Prohibition Bureau. The efficiency of this new organisation was such that it gave birth to another element of the war on drugs, the prison-industrial complex: 'The Narcotics Division [of the Prohibition Bureau] confined so many opiate and cocaine addicts and peddlers that at the end of Fiscal Year 1928 almost one-third of all federal prisoners were drug law violators' (Liker in Mabry, 1989: 21). From the 1920s, US drug policy centred on criminalisation of the market and its client base, rather than medical treatment and harm reduction and by the 1930s, US drug enforcement agents took to operating within Mexican territory in order to collect intelligence about possible targets, without informing the Mexican authorities (Recio, 2002: 26).

The Mexican government's approach to the criminalisation of the drug market in the US was one of harm reduction vis-à-vis its own national sovereignty, given involvement from the early nineteenth century of the Mexican borderlands in the narcotics trade, together with repeated US military intervention into Mexican territory during the early 1900s. As Tullis comments: 'Mexico's drug problem is not illicit-drug consumption so much as it is the social costs imposed by two unfortunate conditions: US prohibitionism that drives prices up and Mexico's border status with the world's largest illegal drug market' (Tullis in Toro, 1995: ix-x). The Mexican government's need or desire to appease their northern neighbour in the 1910s and 1920s was such that while the US government had failed to press the main narcotics producers in the region at the time - Peru and Bolivia - into adopting prohibitionist policies, the Mexican authorities however obliged. Such actions need to be understood through the lens of the political scene at the time in US-Mexican relations and within the wider contemporary political picture: Mexican governments were eager to remove the threat of US direct invention given the on-going chaos of the Revolution. Against this backdrop, Mexico first adopted anti-narcotics laws in 1916 prohibiting the importation of opium into Mexico, even though the internal market for opium was small. The move represented an attempt to bring some level of security to the border region and avoid any pretext for US intervention against the newly established revolutionary government. While this measure may have produced some political goodwill towards the federal Mexican government on the part of Washington, the same could not be said for *caudillos* operating on the border. Indeed, Pancho Villa's activity in the frontier region (in particular his burning down of Columbus, New Mexico), led to General Pershing's punitive expedition into Mexican territory in 1916. Villa was not the only *caudillo* during the 1910s active in the northern border, which degenerated into private fiefdoms, allowing for the emergence of narcotics trade routes between Mexico and the US, alongside illegal arms trade activity in the opposite direction. Notable amongst these *caudillos* was Governor Cantú of Baja California.

As noted above, the role of narcotics within both the US and Mexican societies as evolved in line with the vested interests of the elite as a means of social control in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries along the social cleavages of race and class. Drug use became a social taboo with certain narcotics associated with particular racial and class groupings. As a consequence, narcotics use became increasingly socially unacceptable amongst the US elite. This combined and interweaved with irrational fears in the populace of the 'other', transmogrifying this fear on to drug addicts de-humanising them. It is not coincidental that this process of social control was placed on a national footing, rather than the previous patchwork approach in the aftermath of the US Civil War as the elite sought to maintain social control of the masses and/or other racial groupings – notably the Chinese in the west and the Black population in the south. For Mexico, the issue of narcotics use has centred on the influence of its northern neighbour in the border region and the need to remove a possible alternative source of political power to the authority of the central state administration. Consequently, the Mexican government's approach to the narcotics question has been one based on limiting US influence on its body politic in the aftermath of the 1846-1848 conflict. In the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, Mexico had little role in the drugs trade except as a minor transhipment country into the southern US. The Mexican elite during this period had little interest in combating narcotics use, though it prohibited the use of drugs to pacify US restrictionist interest groups and their government, together with a desire on the part of the Mexico City administration to gain greater control of the border region. The issue of narcotics became increasingly important within US-Mexican relations from the early twentieth century as it rose up the political agenda within Washington, having a knock-on effect on the Mexican polity.

However, trafficking in the US-Mexican borderlands was not a new occurrence. Smuggling along the border had its roots in the late sixteenth century, as local traders sought to work outside of the Viceroyalty of New Spain’s mercantilist policy. The history of trafficking in the borderland is therefore deep rooted in the social institutions of the region, a situation that pertains to the present day. Trafficking has witnessed a series of booms since the nineteenth century, firstly as a trade route for war material during the Texan War of Independence (1835-36), to the US-Mexican war (1846-1847), and the US Civil War (1861-65). Trade was not always northward though. While armaments flowed northward, cotton went south during the US Civil War. Armaments also passed into Mexico to provision rebel forces during the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century. In a new development, in 1924, the US Congress sought to control immigration across the border, giving rise to a new breed of *coyotes* (human traffickers) plying their trade. By the 1920s and 1930s, US-Mexican smugglers concentrated their efforts on smuggling alcohol, narcotics and people to the US, while importing into Mexico guns and white goods, though it should be noted that Mexico’s percentage of the narcotics market was minimal: ‘… Mexican participation in total US imports of opium was not higher than 15 percent. During the 1920s and 1930s, most opium entering the United States came from Italy, France, Asia and the Middle East’ (Toro, 1995: 10).

By 1923 the Mexican government prohibited the importation of all narcotics into the country, not just opium. Unlike the previous revolutionary government, President Alvaro Obregón sought to actively halt illegal border activity, making the radical decision to enforce a ‘dry’ zone fifty miles wide along the frontier. This represented an attempt to halt the development not only of narcotics trade routes, but also of vice tourism, though as Recio records:

> At the state level, the situation was somewhat different. During the [Mexican] Revolution strict laws were imposed regarding alcohol consumption and production. Conversely, by the 1920s laws had gradually become more permissive regarding alcohol purchases. This was probably due to the fact that state governments were in need of income and important taxes were collected for liquor production and consumption. The [US] consul in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, indicated that anti-alcohol laws were quite flexible and not enforced (2002: 32-33).

President Calles continued to attempt to pacify Mexico's northern neighbour by the introduction of border controls. First, in 1925 his administration signed and enforced an anti-smuggling treaty with the US government, though due to Washington's unwillingness to renew the treaty, it was only in force for a year. Second and most significantly, Calles cracked down on the internal narcotics market and production within Mexico by 1929. The legislation, nevertheless, did not hamper the trade, as noted by Toro:

> Law enforcement was thwarted from the beginning by the persistence of a lucrative trade for which the organizers could bribe officials and enforcers; at times the latter became active participants in the illegal business in a region where law and order were far from the rule (1995: 11).

By 1933, with the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the signing of the Cullen-Harrison Act and later the repeal of the eighteenth amendment, alcohol prohibition ended in the US. The effect on Mexico was mixed, for while alcohol could now move freely across the border, narcotics remained illegal. The US government's resolve in regard to narcotics prohibition seemed to strengthen in the 1930s. Indeed, upon Mexico's attempt to create a state monopoly in narcotics as part of an attempt to remove the illegal trade, the US government enforced an embargo on medical supplies to their southern neighbour. The proposal was consequently quickly halted.

The Second World War (1939-1945) offered some respite, as the US war effort required the growing of narcotics for medicinal and other purposes. Cannabis cultivation was encouraged to produce hemp for rope. Alongside the cannabis crop, opium poppy production also flourished to supply morphine as a pain relief treatment for frontline troops. President Calles proved willing to assist with the Allied war effort, even vis-à-vis the production of narcotics. For *traficantes* in the border region during the 1940s, their commodity changed. As a consequence of the Second World War, the *Bracero* programme was initiated, which allowed Mexicans to legally work within the US, *coyotes* consequently became obsolete until the programme was finally halted in 1965 (Salder in Bailey and Godson, 2000: 165). The *Bracero* programme also permitted the development of an unofficial network of safe houses for *coyotes* to later utilise, in addition to the creation of a social network within the US. During the 1940s through to the 1960s, the *traficantes* trade revolved around the movement of cannabis into the US and the smuggling of white goods and electronics to Mexico.

Between 1910 and 1940 Mexican involvement in narcotics production for recreational purposes remained limited, given that established trade routes from Europe and Asia still operated until the Second World War. During the initial post-bellum era of the 1940s, however, with civil war in China and much of Asia, with Europe in social and economic chaos as a result of total warfare across a global theatre, traditional trade routes for narcotics were broken, causing the drugs trade to create a new home in geographically well-positioned Mexico. This newfound importance within global trade routes lasted for a limited time. The economies of Europe and Asia recovered, and with this traditional underworld gangs, causing Mexico's share of the narcotics market to diminish - though, it continued to be a key transhipment point and producer of the bulky narcotic, marijuana (Toro, 1995: 12). To this backdrop, in 1948, the Mexican government started the joint *Procuraduría General de la Republica* (PGR) (Mexican Justice Department) - military counter-narcotics operation entitled '*La Gran Campaña'*, the first occasion that both police and military personnel were permanently assigned to this task. '*La Gran Campaña'* concentrated on the eradication of opium and cannabis crops *in situ* via burning fields. Its impact, however, appears to have been minimal: '… growers seemed to have had better intelligence networks than the military, it was not unusual for soldiers to discover that fields had been burned before being reached and that the owners had fled' (Toro, 1995: 13). Indeed, the eradication programme appears to have been primarily a case of the Mexican government attempting to show goodwill to their northern neighbour.

By the 1950s, narcotics began to concern US policymakers as heroin usage spread amongst the disenfranchised and marginalised urban Latino and black male population. The result was stricter legislation on narcotics use, enacted by the US Congress in Public Law 255 in 1951 and Public Law 728 in 1956. These not only legislated against heroin use, but also cocaine and cannabis, the approach of policymakers during this period being one of criminalisation. Little effort was made to understand the nature of the drug market, rather it was to simply punish individual users. In the post-Second World War era under the stewardship of Harry Anslinger, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), the lead agency on drug control, also sought to internationalise its operations, as Holden-Rhodes states: 'The FBN often used employees of other agencies sent agents abroad or paid foreigners to conduct intelligence operations. These steps were often undertaken without the knowledge or permission of the countries involved' (1994: 27-28).

Holden-Rhodes further notes: 'Independently, individual members of Congress, State Department officials, and even private citizens tried to chart a course for narcotic foreign policy. The creation of the FBN with Harry Anslinger as commissioner solved the problem for three decades' (1994: 29).

The 1960s saw a sea change in the scope, size and importance of the narcotics trade globally as recreational drug use soared and producers sought to meet demand:

> Drugs came to symbolize opposition to the government and to traditional mores. Social turmoil and discontent caused by the Vietnam War intensified the sense of alienation many young people felt toward the previous generation, which frowned on drug use other than alcohol and tobacco (Musto in Smith, 1992: 41).

As the market for recreational drugs increased, so Mexico's role as producer and exporter expanded. The greatest factor in Mexico's growing role in the narcotics trade resulted from the increased efforts of law enforcement elsewhere in the world, which caused a global displacing of drug production and trade routes from traditional sources to Mexico.

The latter half of the 1960s also saw the US experience considerable social unrest from the black civil rights movement, the student movement and anti-Vietnam war protesters. In the early 1960s, the Democratic Party had attempted to resolve the country's ills with even greater social spending arguing the progressive case that crime and criminals were a result of the society in which they inhabited, a position advanced by President Johnson's (LBJ) Katzenbach Commission. However, the white middle class felt besieged and LBJ's administration appeared out of touch with white America's concerns. In the elections of 1968, the Republican Party and candidate Richard Nixon ran on a ticket of 'law-and-order' at home alongside 'peace with honour' overseas. The Republicans, with help from the media, created a linkage between counter culture elements within society, the race riots, high crime rates and narcotics, in particular heroin and cannabis consumption (Baum, 1996: 2-13). Out of this conjuncture, drugs became an Orwellian code for the 'other' within US society, being viewed as a threat to 'right-thinking' Americans, what Nixon called 'his people'.

By the late 1960s, the relationship between US society and narcotics usage had moved one hundred and eighty degrees from the early nineteenth century, as the political class sought to use the 'war on drugs' as a discourse to gain capital, whilst simultaneously seeking to justify and normalise social control via the use of social cleavages such as race. The nature of social control has also evolved over time from social taboos in the nineteenth century to the present day use of state-sponsored law enforcement bureaucracies together with the development of a 'prison-industrial complex' to house drug offenders. Furthermore, the role of narcotics within US-Mexican relations has increased over time as the social construction of drug takers and narcotics themselves changed in the body politic of the US and subsequently Mexico. From the nineteenth century to the 1960s, a pattern of relations between the US and Mexico with regards to narcotics existed, in which the Mexican government saw its vested interests in the minimising of US influence in the border region.

The Contemporary Drugs War (1969 to the present day)

Against this backdrop, on 14 July 1969 Nixon declared the high level of usage of narcotics as a serious national threat and called for a federal led multi-agency response. The resultant hive of activity in the White House has had knock-on effects for the 'war on drugs', and US-Mexican relations, to the present day. One early response occurred in September 1969, when the US government instituted Operation Intercept, officially an attempt to block the trade of narcotics across the border. However, as Craig states: 'Intercept was in fact a classic example of economic blackmail' (Craig in Mabry, 1989: 28). This formed a critical moment in US-Mexican relations, in which Washington called Mexico's bluff vis-à-vis the counter-narcotics chess game. While the former sought to restrict the supply of narcotics to its population and stop importation across the border, the Mexican government had long enacted a policy of appeasement towards US anti-narcotics initiatives. However, Mexican federal authorities had had weak control over the northern states due to the historical legacy of *caudillismo*, combined with the large profit to be made from such lucrative cash crops, both for peasant growers and traffickers alike. US officials perceived Mexico's increased role in the provision of narcotics into the US market as an act of bad faith. This led to a closing of the border to legal and illegal trade, which elicited a sharp rise in counter-narcotics activity by the Mexican authorities and greater cooperation with their northern counterparts, commencing with a programme of eradication and interdiction, indicatively entitled 'Operation Cooperation'. Although this proved ineffectual, it marked an intensification in the 'war on drugs' in Mexico, along the following lines: '… when accelerated manual eradication efforts by the military proved inadequate, the Mexicans made a critical decision: with US, assistance they would launch an unprecedented aerial herbicide program code-named Operation Condor' (Craig in Mabry, 1989: 28)

The anti-narcotics initiative instigated by the Mexican and US authorities had three central planks. As Toro notes these; tended to overlap and involved the '… eradication of marijuana and opium poppy fields, interdiction of narcotics in transit (including cocaine), and dislocation of trafficking organizations' (1995: 18). Operation Condor registered as a complete success within the metrics of drug control, stemming the flow of narcotics crossing the border, while for the Mexican authorities it diminished the prospect of rural violence in northern states and kept the drug trafficking industry under control. Operation Condor it has been claimed, consequently represented: '… without a doubt the most successful in terms of the quantity of drugs destroyed - ever untaken by any country' (Toro, 1995; 17). Unsurprisingly, therefore, for Washington, Operation Condor became a blueprint of how aerial eradication programmes should operate in terms of bilateral and inter-agency cooperation, a blueprint that was later applied throughout the Andean region. Despite the successes, the narcotics trade in Mexico during the 1970s was down, but crucially, not knocked out, so that by the 1980s participants at all levels would learn from their mistakes and regain a foothold within the territory and body politic.

Regarding the US government, the 1969 pronouncement of President Nixon on the dangers of narcotics, resulted in a rapid burgeoning of anti-narcotics agencies within the Washington bureaucracy. Between 1969 and 1973, law enforcement agencies became involved in national security concerns in the form of narcotics, as Holden- Rhodes records:

> The perverse effects of linking drug enforcement and US security quickly became apparent, if not entirely understood. The same aides to President Nixon who were in charge of the war on drugs were also in charge of the Watergate fiasco in 1972. Their dual roles as drug warriors and Plumbers belied an underlying congruence of interests between 'drug enforcement' and 'national security' as defined by all the president's men (1994: 29).

The result was the creation of multiple entities under the umbrella of the White House's 'war on drugs', though the real motive was to boost the Nixon administration rather than to fight narcotic trafficking. One such organisation was the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence (ONNI), which was little more than a domestic spying ring using agents from other federal agencies for the benefit of the White House. The most important institution to be created during the Nixon presidency was the DEA. The DEA was established to be an over-arching super agency, with a key role in both enforcement and in the intelligence community. However, the DEA never fulfilled this aim, in part due to the corruption of the White House at the time and the resultant distrust within the US intelligence community that still pertains today (Holden-Rhodes, 1994: 31).

Upon the collapse of the Nixon administration due to the Watergate affair in 1974, Vice President Gerard Ford took control of the White House and sought to review federal drugs policy. The result was the 1975 White Paper on Drug Abuse, which acted as the basis for the 1976 Federal Drug Strategy. These documents underpin federal policy vis-à-vis the war on drugs to the present day:

> The White Paper … continued the conception of drug trafficking as a law enforcement and public health problem. While international aspects of drug control were not ignored, the effects of drug trafficking on foreign countries and on regional security in

> drug producing and transit areas received virtually no attention. Further, the White Paper established three tests for determining drug priority: the adverse consequences of the drug for the individual and society; the likelihood of physical or psychological dependence upon a drug; and, the size of the abusing group. The need for improved intelligence support in drug control efforts was also addressed in the White Paper. It cited a counter-productive competition within and among the law enforcement agencies and a lack of intelligence analytical capabilities as the main problems (Holden-Rhodes, 1994: 31-32).

This précis of the 1976 Federal Drug Strategy also proffers a summary of the annual National Drug Control Strategy papers ever since. In the latter half of the 1970s, the Mexican share of the drug market decreased due to Operation Condor, with production moving to the Andean region, while trafficking and processing concentrated in Colombia. In response to this shift, the late 1970s and early 1980s saw the formation of *La Empresa Coordinadora* in Colombia, which comprises a loose grouping of narcotics trafficking gangs that act in cooperation through a series of patron-client relationships. Drug cartels are not, technically cartels, as they control neither the market nor the price of the marketable product, narcotics, as noted by Holden-Rhodes: ‘The Colombian cocaine industry may not be a cartel, but it fulfills every other superlative people have used about it. It is the Third World’s first truly successful multinational. It is the most profitable business in the world’ (1994: 42).

The sheer level of profit made by enterprising Colombian narcotics traffickers, such as Carlos Lehder, Jorge Luis Ochoa and Pablo Escobar, resulted in the cocaine industry taking root within the country’s body politic. Cocaine trafficking and production has been and is, used by groupings as diverse as leftist guerrillas, right-wing paramilitaries and elements of the Colombian military, to increase their revenue streams to fund the on-going ‘dirty war’ that has had a devastating effect on the country. Narcotics entrepreneurs, for their part, were (and are) happy to form *ad hoc* alliances with any of the elements of the Colombian body politic, in order to maximise their profits. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the US drug market was flooded with *La Empresa* produced cocaine (Smith, 1992:12). The response of US politicians was not to engage in a rational debate and the advocating of harm reduction policies. Rather the clamour was for further criminalisation and marginalisation of users, hand in hand with the militarisation of the ‘war on drugs’ (Bagley, 1992: 129). The political rhetoric reached crescendo point with the amendment of the 1878 *Posse Comitatus* Act via the 1982 Defense Authorization Act, which enabled US military participation in counter-narcotics operations within US territory to support law enforcement.

The first involvement of the US military in the ‘war on drugs’ came in 1982 with Operation BAT, launched against the trafficking organisation of Carlos Ledher in the Bahamas (Mabry in Bagley and Walker, 1994: 43). At this initial stage, military participation consisted of the loan of equipment; it would not be until four years later that US military personnel would be actively involved in the ‘war on drugs’. The time delay was partly the result of hostility to the notion of military engagement in counter-narcotics operations and a conservative bureaucratic mind set. The approach of officials in the Department of Defense (DoD) has been described by Holden-Rhodes:

> Money, both for guns and measures to counter drugs, had been appropriated and action was expected. The military chose to seize upon the former and ignore the latter, just as it ignored at the same time- with studied determination, a presidential order to rebuild the nation’s special operations forces. Any deviation from Clausewitzian military style operations were dismissed out of hand (1994: 49-50).

US politicians throughout the 1980s grew increasingly frustrated with the military’s resistance to their entry into the war on drug, which led to them (and the President in particular), to seek other means to fight traffickers. This resulted in 1982 President Reagan formally introducing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) into the war on drugs via a executive order along with the formulation of the federal South Florida Task Force on Crime to counter traffickers using Caribbean trade routes. However, the US military still resisted involvement and it was not until 8 April 1986, with the signing by President Reagan of National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 221, that the military was forced to engage in a serious fashion. To this backdrop, the DoD, in particular the Navy and Coastguard service, began to act in cooperation with law enforcement agencies, which encouraged the flow of cocaine and other narcotics to shift to the overland route through Mexico, where counter-narcotics programmes were on the wane by the 1980s. The logical outcome was a significant increase in production and transportation: ‘The US government estimated that by the end of the decade Mexico was the principal supplier of marijuana, heroin and cocaine to the North American market, an estimate that the Mexican government never contested’ (Toro in Joyce and Malamud, 1997: 134).

The reasons behind the increasing role of Mexico in both the production and trafficking of narcotics was multi-faceted, as has been noted by Chabat:

> There are many factors that explain the revival of drug trafficking in Mexico in the early 1980s. Among them we can find an increase in the production of narcotics for climatic reasons (1984 was a year with high precipitation); a greater difficulty in the spraying of the drug plantations with herbicides (there were more cloudy days which obstructed the operation); great ingenuity on the part of peasants who learned to plant

> poppy in a very dispersed way; an increasing incapacity and poor administration in the Mexican bureaucracy in charge of the fight against drug trafficking; the resurgence of Colombia as a major producer of cocaine, which increased the importance of Mexico as a point of transit for drugs on the way to the United States; the deterioration of the Mexican economy, which made it more attractive for peasants to cultivate narcotics; the corruption of Mexican forces in charge of the antidrug campaign; and the deterioration of this campaign as a result of the bureaucratic inertia of the Mexican offices involved (Chabat in Bagley and Walker, 1995: 376-377).

The Mexican state consequently faced a combination of Colombian drug dealers and a new breed of Mexican *traficantes* who were willing to use any level of force necessary in order to gain profit maximisation. This was in contrast with previous Mexican *traficantes* that had operated within the PRI-dominated political system, who worked through a cost-benefit analysis of the relative profit against instability caused along the border. This, combined with the loss of PRI dominance to the PAN of governorships of northern Mexican states in the 1980s, created a spike in violence, which would turn into a plateau (Astorga, 2001).

In the political atmosphere of the US in the 1980s, meanwhile, the war on drugs rhetorical pressure from the Reagan administration towards the government of President Miguel de la Madrid increased markedly. The response from *Los Pinos* was one of appeasement, with the creation of new counter-narcotics programmes, which relied heavily on the military rather than law enforcement officials in the PGR, due to the level of corruption within the organisation: by the 1980s it had already been infiltrated by *traficantes*. US-Mexican relations in connection to the ‘war on drugs’ then reached a new nadir with the torture and murder of DEA agent Enrique ‘Kiki’ Camarena by traffickers in complicity with corrupt police officials in 1985. The US response was swift, as Chabat records: ‘On February 17, 1985, only ten days after the disappearance of Camarena, the American government implemented the so-called second Operation Intercept’ (Chabat in Bagley and Walker, 1994: 378). US retribution did not end with restrictions on border traffic; the DEA enacted Operation Legend, which sought to arrest and place before the courts all those involved in the torture and murder of Camarena and his Mexican pilot, Alfredo Zavala Avelar. To this end, in January 1986 the DEA kidnapped René Verguo Urguídez for his connection with Camarena’s torture and murder.

In 1990 the Camarena affair reared its head again, with another DEA kidnapping of a Mexican national, Dr. Humberto Alvárez Machain, an event that raised further concerns about Mexican sovereignty, though bilateral cooperation continued. Even so, the Camarena affair and its aftermath poisoned US-Mexican relations, but the DEA’s response: ‘… made

Mexican officials aware of the DEA's power not only in the United States but in Mexico as well' (Toro, 1995: 31). More widely, the Camarena affair brought into the public eye the covert operations and intelligence sharing between the US and Mexican governments. From the late 1980s onwards US-Mexican counter-narcotics activities consequently came under the political spotlight as never before.

In 1987, President de la Madrid followed his counterpart in stating that the 'war on drugs' was a matter of national security. The issue of narcotics corruption and trafficking began to be taken seriously at the highest echelons in Mexico, for the first time since Operation Condor. Meanwhile the US Congress responded to concerns over progress in the 'war on drugs', particularly in the Western Hemisphere, with the enactment of the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act. This had a corrosive effect on US-Mexican relations, as elsewhere in the hemisphere, through the introduction of a process of certification of individual countries' anti-narcotics programmes: '… the statute makes it clear that there is to be a definitive relationship between the provision of foreign assistance and positive performance on narcotics control' (Bewley-Taylor, 1999: 203). Over time both parties have been able to compartmentalise their relations by policy areas, in order to gain trust, topic by topic.

With the election, albeit controversial, of Carlos Salinas de Gortari in 1988 a new page in bilateral relations opened. Prior to Salinas, there appears to have been an understanding between *traficantes* and the Mexican federal government until the 1980s, as noted by Reuter and Ronfeldt:

> Everything is permissible in Mexico as long as it is Mexican. The activity must be done nationalistically, it must be useful to at least part of the ruling system of elites and institutions, and it must be independent of international connections. This appears to define the upper limits of toleration. The limits are apparently breached when the activity jeopardizes the revolutionary mystique and Mexico's image at home and abroad, embarrasses Mexican leaders in power, weakens central government or party control in some significant area, or gets subordinated to non-Mexican actors (1992: 100).

By the Salinas *sexeino* (1988-1994), however, the rise of more ambitious Mexican *traficantes* and the shift of Colombian cocaine to overland routes via Mexico, contributed to a weakening of this informal arrangement. The *traficantes* became unruly and a threat to the established order, both in northern border states and the political machine in Mexico City. The consequence for the people of Mexico was a resurgence in the level of violence conducted by *traficantes* towards both one another and elements of the state that attempted to tamper with their business. This counter-hegemonic force to the power of the PRI-controlled government was not an overnight occurrence, or of inorganic origin to Mexico. Rather, as Astorga (2001) expounds, it was an evolution of both political and capitalistic interests within Mexico, and in particular along the US-Mexican border region.

Astorga (2001) breaks this process of evolution into three main phrases. The first is the beginning of the twentieth century during the initial period of prohibition of narcotics within Mexico, due to both internal concerns and external pressure from the US. During this phrase, there appears to have been a direct linkage between the Mexican political class and narcotics trafficking with low levels of violence. The second era came in 1947, with the transformation of the Mexican approach with regards to narcotics, as departmental responsibility shifted from the Department of Health to the PGR. This organisational change brought with it a shift of emphasis from harm reduction to the criminalisation of the drug trade and the involvement of the Federal Security Directorate (DFS) in the ‘drugs war’. From its inception, the DFS was heavily involved in the *traficante* business, often acting as an unofficial link between the political class and *traficante* gangs. The third phrase, for Astorga, began in the late 1980s with the political weakness of the government party, the PRI, in northern border states, combined with a rise in the strength of drug *traficantes* as smaller groupings became conglomerated into four major cartels: the Tijuana, the Juarez, the Sinaloa and the Gulf. Each cartel controlled (and controls) their own trafficking routes into the US, or *plazas*. Faced by the rising power of *narcotraficantes*, the Salinas administration sought to counter this, particularly the threat of *traficante* infiltration of the Mexican justice system. The ‘war on drugs’ consequently became concentrated around the lead agency, the PGR. Though the Mexican military remained involved in the fight against drugs, it took a secondary role to the PGR, as Reuter and Ronfeldt note:

> The PGR had overall responsibility for eradication and interdiction, as well as for the detention and prosecution of producers and traffickers. The PGR controlled the large air fleet (more than 100 helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft), but army officers often accompanied pilots to help spot fields (1992: 108).

Furthermore, the Salinas administration reformed the national security system in an attempt to root out narco-corruption.

This began with the reformulation of the Mexican intelligence services from the *Dirección General de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional* (DGISN) into the *Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional* (CISEN). The DGISN grew out of the DFS in the aftermath of the Camarena affair in 1985. The Salinas era reforms were part of a wider restructing programme, as the new CISEN organisation officially reported to the *Secretaría* *de Gobernación*. In reality, however, it answered directly to the President via the new Office of Coordination of the Presidency, or *Coordinación de la Presidencia*. This was effectively a national security council in all but name, with chairs for all the main players within the Mexican security apparatus: SEDENA, Marina, PGR and the Foreign Affairs Department (SRE). Henceforth, *Gobernación* was sidelined in the production and analysis of national security intelligence, as the President centralised national security functions in *Los Pinos*. Likewise, the PGR was restructured with the creation of separate branches within the organisation to deal with the 'war on drugs', entitled the Office of the Assistant Attorney General for the Investigation and Combat of Drug-Trafficking (Reuter and Ronfeldt, 1992: 113). Alongside this, another entity was formed to aid interagency cooperation, the *Coordinación General por la Investigación y Combate del Narcotráfico*. The creation of these bodies within the PGR, was an attempt, much like the reconfiguration of the country's national security apparatus, to delimit and at very least, compartmentalise the threat of narcotics related corruption: it failed. Indeed, corruption reached new levels with the President's brother and the country's drug czar being implicated.

Meanwhile, in the late 1980s the US saw a crack cocaine boom in the retail drug market and alongside it, a rise in associated violence and crime.[41] The increase in narcotics-fueled violence resulted in moral panic and the 'Just Say No' campaign of Nancy Reagan, the First Lady. Amazingly in this political environment, President Reagan cut funding for the 'war on drugs', while the Senate simultaneously attempted to increase the military's role (Bagley in Mabry, 1989: 47). The Senate bill failed. In 1989, though, the geo-political reality of the Cold War ended, with consequences for the 'war on drugs', as Bewley-Taylor records:

> In mid-September 1989 Secretary of Defense Cheney signaled the end of Pentagon resistance to involvement with the anti-drug campaign in the Western Hemisphere. Influenced by the dramatic changes under way in the Soviet Union and the resulting uncertain future for the US military in a post-Cold War world, Cheney declared that 'detecting and countering the production and trafficking of illegal drugs is a high-priority national security mission for the Pentagon'' (1991:191).

Isenburg is blunt in his view of why the military moved so swiftly to the 'war on drugs' in the post-Cold War era, stating that:

> As the 'evil empire' crumbled, the Pentagon faced its greatest fear: being without an enemy. Given increased calls to cut the military personnel and budgets and to reinvest promised peace dividends domestically, a new rationale had to be found to justify the Pentagon's existence. The search for enemies was on. Drug trafficking became a

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[41] Crack cocaine or freebase cocaine are the street names for methylbenzoylecgonine, produced via the chemical conversion of cocaine hydrochloride (powder cocaine) and baking soda.

> bipartisan national security threat with Colombian drug lords replacing Soviet commissars as Satan incarnate (1992: 44).

During the 1990s with new President George Bush Snr. (elected in 1988) no re-formulation of the 'war on drugs' was deemed necessary. Indeed, the process of militarisation continued in the region, although the Bush Snr. administration did seek to enlarge and modify the military's role with the signing of a new NSDD in August 1989. This put forward a programme of expansion of aid, notably military aid, to the Andean region, while also creating new rules of engagement for the US military in the fight against narcotics (Carpenter, 2003: 37). This programme, entitled the Andean Initiative was announced in September 1989 and was seen in the US as a political response to the assassination of Colombian presidential candidate, Luis Carlos Galán on 18 August 1989. Though the Initiative was established prior to the assassination, it provided a convenient pretext for the anti-drugs programme. This new push for action on narcotics, led to the invasion of Panama in 1990 in order to remove from power General Manuel Noriega, a drug trafficker and former CIA operative.

The 'drugs war' became not only a convenient vehicle for publicity seeking politicians to 'piggy-back', it also proved useful to the US military-industrial complex, as Carpenter posits: 'Participation in the Andean Initiative also opened a way for the military and its defense industry allies to justify the procurement of questionable weapons systems' (2003: 45). Simultaneously, the Pentagon bureaucracy began emphasising the role of the military in combating narcotics via the engagement of low-intensity conflicts throughout the Andean region. This need for new security concerns to meet and utilise military capabilities combined with the right-wing rhetoric of politicians, who urged the US government to be tough on drug traffickers. The US military was perceived as an appropriate instrument, as Carpenter notes: 'Predictably, many drug warriors began to look to the military as a panacea for both the domestic and international campaigns. The term 'drug war' was fast becoming something more than an emotionally evocative metaphor' (2003: 34).

To this backdrop, the Andean Initiative took shape with the signing of the Declaration of Cartagena between the US, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, who purportedly entered into an alliance against the drug cartels. The South Americans, nevertheless, were more interested in economic aid than military assistance, as occurred in the 1960s under President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. In reality, the US supplied primarily military aid, with the outcome as Carpenter notes: 'For all its superficial solidarity, the Cartagena summit did not alter the fact that the US and its hemispheric neighbours continued to pursue competing agendas on the drug issue' (2003: 52).

The 1990s, however, did witness progress in the fight against the cartels. This became symbolised by the eventual killing of infamous kingpin, Pablo Escobar. Escobar's assassination, along with the deaths and imprisonment of other cartel members, saw a diminishing of the role of the Cali and Medellín cartels within the Colombian drug industry, as it increasingly fractured into a plethora of producers and traffickers. The increase in anti-narcotics programmes in the Andean region also saw traffickers (and to a lesser extent, producers) moving into Mexico. Like the 1960s with cannabis, the 1970s with heroin and the 1980s with the movement of cocaine trafficking through Mexico, the 1990s saw ever increasingly levels of trafficking and production of narcotics in the country. As noted, throughout the narcotics prohibition and eradication era, traffickers and producers alike have managed to be one step ahead of law enforcement agencies, both in tactics and strategies. The result was that by the 1990s, narcotics trafficking (and to a lesser extent production) had not only become a serious law-and-order issue for Mexico, but had become a major industry within the economies of several states. As Toro records:

> US drug policy in the 1980s invalidated the Mexican state's efforts to contain drug trafficking within tolerable limits, for both state and society, by causing exorbitant drug price rises in the US market. Those who benefited most from this change in relative prices, which succeeded in dissuading very few users, were the drug traffickers. The biggest loser is, and will continue to be, the Mexican state … (Toro in Joyce and Malamud, 1998: 142-143).

The election of William 'Bill' Clinton to the presidency in 1992, saw a continuation of the policy of militarisation in the context of the war on drugs, notably in the Andean region. As Carpenter notes: 'The lower-profile approach of the Clinton administration did not even mean that it was prepared to deemphasize the militarization of the war on drugs. In fact, the opposite was true; Washington slowly but inexorably escalated the emphasis on the military option' (2003: 53-54). Mexico was not immune from the militarisation of the war on drugs. Indeed, the country's own politicians sought to use the military in counter-narcotics long before US intervention in this regard. The 1990s consequently witnessed an increase in bilateral activity between the two neigbours' militaries and wider security apparatus. As Ledesma Arronte et al state:

> Mexico has attempted to complete all the resulting demands of this bi-national cooperation: from the creation of new anti-narcotic units; approving laws against organized crime, money laundering and the illegal traffic of chemical bases; the

> restructuring of State intelligence services and even the militarization of the fight against drugs (2000: 199).

Mexico is, however, plagued by high levels of corruption, from the police officer on the streets of Nuevo Laredo to the highest government officials, the most infamous case being that of Mexico's very own drugs czar, General Gutiérrez Rebello, who was found guilty of taking bribes from the Carrillo Fuentes organisation (or Juárez Cartel) in 1997. The matter was made even more embrassing by the words of the then US drug czar, General Barry McCaffery commenting on the appointment of General Gutiérrez Rebello: 'He has a reputation for impeccable integrity… He's a deadly serious guy' (quoted in Carpenter, 2003: 178).

The 1990s also saw a shift in the nature and scale of the trafficking of cocaine from Colombia. Where previously Mexican gangs had simply charged a fee of around US$ 1000 to US$2000 per kilogram, in the 1990s they began to request payment in kind instead. This was the consequence of two main factors. First with the US military from 1989 onwards taking a lead role in drug interdiction, the flow of drugs via the Caribbean Basin began to be stemmed via the input of greater resources and the development of the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF).[42] As a result, the narcotics cartels sought to find new trading routes via Mexico to the US drug market. Second, Mexican traffickers gained a foothold in the wholesale and retail market for cocaine in the US, increasing their profit margins by five to ten times (New York Times, 11 July 1997: A1, A10, A11).

Against this backdrop, the Salinas administration's (1988-1994) approach to relations with its northern neighbour in the 'war on drugs' appears to have been Janus faced. While, it encouraged greater cooperation between the two countries' security apparatus in order to politically justify the signing of a free trade agreement, elements of the government and military (even including the President's brother, Raúl Salinas de Gortari), maintained links with the Juárez Cartel. Indeed, there were even rumours of linkages between the Mexican President himself and the drug cartels (New York Times, 11 July 1997: A1, A10, A11).

American officials, nevertheless, played down the possibility of such high level corruption, in favour of highlighting cooperation amongst law enforcement agencies. Movement in this direction did occur. The Salinas government in 1990 permitted the establishment of a Tactical Analysis Team inside the US embassy to provide intelligence on drug traffickers to Mexican law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, the Mexicans allowed the DEA to carry arms and enjoy diplomatic immunity in 1990. In 1992, though, relations became strained. Reacting to a ruling from the US Supreme Court which authorised the kidnapping of foreign citizens in order to be charged in a US court, Salinas banned all DEA activity for twenty-four hours. Upping the ante, in 1993, the Salinas administration chose to decline US military assistance in favour of a policy of the 'Mexicanisation' of the drugs war:

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[42] Speech by Rear Admiral Jeff Hathway, Head of Joint Inter-Agency Task Force South at 'Charting New Approaches to Defense and Security Challenges in the Western Hemisphere' Conference, Coral Glabes, FL, 9-11 March 2005.

> Before 1992, Mexico was the largest recipient of US counternarcotics assistance, as it received about US$ 237 million between fiscal years 1975 and 1992….In early 1993, the Mexican government assumed nearly all the costs associated with the counternarcotics effort in Mexico. Since then, US assistance has sharply declined and, in fiscal year 1995, amounted to only US$ 2.6 million, most of which was for spare helicopter parts (GAO, 1996: 12).

Through this initiative, Mexican authorities shifted their emphasis from attempting to interdict drugs and diminish the flow of drugs, to a policy concentrating on detaining *traficante* kingpins. This paid greater importance to the political stability of Mexico and the government's control of its territory than reducing drug flows to the US market. While such a change in direction may have proved expedient for Carlos Salinas' administration, it nevertheless led to a decrease in drug seizures. As a result of this development, US-Mexican relations in the 'drugs war' during the early 1990s appeared more akin to a chess game rather than neighbours seeking mutual ends. This complex situation has been noted by Chabat, who posits that:

> It seems evident that there is an explicit will to give priority to the positive aspect of the US-Mexican relationship. The emphasis is placed in Mexican efforts to fight production and traffic, not on the effective diminution of the volume of drugs produced or entering the United States (Chabat in Bagley and Walker, 1994: 383).

The Salinas administration's final year ended on the same contradictory note as the rest of his *sexeino*. Mexico entered the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on 1 January 1994; the Zapatista uprising took affect in the southern state of Chiapas; while the assassination of PRI candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio later in the year shocked the nation.

The election of Colosio's replacement PRI candidate, Ernesto Zedillo, failed to bring a sea change in the Mexican government's approach to the 'war on drugs'. Like his predecessors, Zedillo declared narcotics a national threat and set about readjusting the security apparatus, removing corrupt elements. Despite the rhetoric, however, the level of profit in the narcotics trade was such that corruption remained endemic, as traffickers' traditional methodology of '*plato o plomo'* ('sliver or lead') proved effective.[43] As Academic Interviewee 2 notes:

> … I think you would have corruption whether it [the Mexican military] was less or more hierarchical. I think it has more to do with the power drug traffickers exert both monetary and physical. I think it is very difficult to resist when you are the potential victim … the threats or the rewards they can offer I think that can be true in any circumstance in a situation like Mexico's.[44]

Meanwhile, the US government became increasingly preoccupied by possible instability in Mexico, originating both from leftist guerrillas as well as narcotics related violence and corruption.[45]

US government concern led to the covert establishment of the Center for Anti-Narcotics Investigations, also known by its Spanish initials, CIAN. The CIAN consisted of approximately ninety young officers of the Mexican Army, trained by the CIA, as a special forces wing of the Mexican Army's Intelligence Section, *Seccion 2* (New York Times, 11 July 1997: A10).[46] The group's main role was surveillance, though occasionally it took a lead role in raids. Likewise, with reference to the Zapatista movement, the US military covertly formulated the 47th Company or CO47 (Jordan, 2001: 146).[47] In a parallel development, from late-1995, the US intelligence community's Linear Committee, which coordinated US law enforcement, intelligence agencies and military in the finding of weak linkages in the production and trafficking of cocaine (New York Times, 11 July 1997: A10).

In October 1995 Secretary of Defense William Perry became the first serving Secretary of Defense to go on an official visit to Mexico. His aim, it appears, was to bring the Mexican military's top brass 'on board' and persuade them to accept aid, which they were previously unwilling to do. This military assistance was intended to have a dual function: fighting the 'war on drugs', and to counter the Zapatista insurgency in Chiapas. With this in mind, a second bi-national meeting of officials was arranged for December 1995 in San Antonio, Texas and as a result of these talks, a formal agreement of understanding on future military transfers was signed, leading to US military assistance to Mexico mushrooming from virtually nil to US$62 million. Within months, Mexican troops began to be trained within US military educational institutions. Notably, Mexican personnel were set to Fort Bragg for special forces instruction (counter-insurgency) during the initial phrase of their training; they supplied the first troops of the GAFEs (*Grupo Aeromóvil de Fuerzas Especiales*). These comprise special forces set with the task of being the Mexican army's spearhead counter-narcotics force. Paradoxically, about a third of these soldiers would later be turned by the Gulf Cartel and form the backbone of the Zetas enforcement gang.

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[43] Recording failed, aide memoir notes: 'Drugs are not corrupting in themselves, any large cash producing industries corruptible'.Interview, NGO Official 2, 19 February 2004.

[44] Interviewed by author, 18 April 2005.

[45] 'The US-Mexican border is virtually undefended by the military forces … if there were instability in Mexico the requirements to defend the border would be extraordinary … The US' ability to project power elsewhere depends on a secure border with Canada, with Mexico, and in the Caribbean which is why Cuba is such a difficult issue … so the southern border is very important'. Interview, Academic Interviewee 1, 9 February 2004.

[46] This was unofficially confirmed by Federal Government Officials 6 and 9, 31 March 2004.

[47] This was unofficially confirmed by Federal Government Officials 6 and 9, 31 March 2004.

In 1996 the US military also gave the Mexican military 20 used and surplus UH-1H Huey helicopters for anti-narcotics missions. A further 53 UH-1H Hueys were supplied to the Mexican military in 1997. However, the aircraft were unable to fly at high attitude - precisely were opium is grown in the Sierra Madre mountain range. Eventually, the helicopters were grounded due to maintenance problems and the Mexican military returned the aircraft to the Americans in 1999 prior to the purchase of Russian helicopters, something the US military was unaware of until their display at the subsequent *El Grito*. Military Official 1 confirms this, stating: 'The Mexican military surprise us [the US military] all the time with where they get their equipment … back in the 1990s all kinds of Russian helicopters appeared that we didn't know where there … flown by Russian pilots not Mexican pilots [for *El Grito*]'.[48]

Alongside this military aid, in 1996 the US-Mexico High Level Contact Group for Drug Control was created in order to coordinate at a bi-national level law enforcement efforts in the fight against drugs. As the GAO report, Drug Control: counternarcotics efforts in Mexico states: 'At the conclusion of this meeting, the contact group issued a ten point joint communiqué that called for action, such as developing a joint counternarcotics cooperation, and implementing laws to criminalize the laundering of drug profits' (1996: 19). Despite considerable assistance and aid from Washington, the control of Mexican territory by *traficantes* grew. The extent of their power came to light in 1997, when Mexico's drug czar, Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, was charged with accepting bribes from Amado Carillo Fuentes. Indeed, Gutiérrez states in interviews that Carillo Fuentes had had up to three meetings with military top brass officials in order to negotiate a peaceful agreement to 'normalise' the narcotics trade (New York Times, 11 July 1997: A11). Carillo Fuentes died during plastic surgery 5 July 1997.

US officials private suspicions of high levels of corruption throughout the Mexican state apparatus were confirmed in the aftermath of Operation Casablanca, an anti-money laundering operation, in 1998, when levels of violence were fast approximating a small civil war.[49] One case in 1998 symbolised the escalating violence, the case of the torture and murder of Fermín Castro, his family and a neighbouring family in the town of Enseñada, Baja California listed in the New York Times:

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[48] Interviewed by author, 2 February 2004.

> Killed or wounded in the attack were Fremin Castro, 38, his wife and 2-year-old son, his brother-in-law, Francisco Flores Altamirano, 30, Mr. Flores's 52 year-old mother, his sister, his wife and five children aged 4 through 13, and a family of seven neighbors, including a pregnant teenager and a 1 year-old child (18 September 1988: A6).

To a backdrop of such high levels of bloodshed, the military top brass and *Los Pinos*, together with the US administration, maintained their faith in the continuing militarisation of the 'drugs war'. Confirmation of US policy came with the announcement of Plan Colombia in 2000. The Clinton administration was locking both the US military and regional governments into a continuation of the previous failed policies.

2000 proved a dramatic year with the election of President Vicente Fox, the first non-PRI president of Mexico for over seventy years. While this caused an earthquake in Mexican politics, civil-military relations remained good, as the military apparatus and top brass maintained their loyalty to the presidency rather than the PRI (Camp, 2005). This was in no small part due to the modernisation progress undertaken by the previous Zedillo administration. During the 2000 presidential election campaign, Vicente Fox and the PAN had argued in favour of the removal of the military from policing operations, most notably the war on drugs. As Astorga states:

> Among the first measures proposed by the new President and his transition team in regard to security and justice, the following have been mentioned: to regard drug trafficking as a matter of public order rather than national security; to withdraw the army from the fight against drugs; to abolish the PGR and its place establish the Office of Secretary for Security and Services to Justice; and to concentrate the police and the intelligence services in the latter Office, removing from the Department of Interior [*Gobernación*] control over the police corporations reporting to it (2001: 431).

Once in power the Fox administration, quickly undertook a *volte face* on this issue. Not only were existing military mobilisations maintained, the government sought to increase the depth and speed of militarisation. Within days of entering office, the new government appears to have come under pressure from Washington to maintain Zedillo's policy of militarisation. This rapid change of mind seems to have occurred in the aftermath of a bi-national High Level Contact Group meeting involving the US drug czar, General (ret.) Barry McCaffery in the US Embassy, when US officials put pressure on Mexican officials to at least maintain military involvement in the 'war on drugs'. This occurred alongside pressure from elements within the Mexican security apparatus, notably the head of the PFP, Rear Admiral Wilfrido Rebledo (Astorga, 2001). The 'war on drugs' (and with it the militarisation of civilian security services) intensified as President Fox appointed top brass into titular positions in the Attorney General's Office. Not only was General Marcial Rafael Macedo de la Concha the Attorney General, junior officers were also placed throughout the organisation. As Camp states:

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[49] 'Well its relative … depends what you are doing, depends on the commanders a lot of them … the military does have a reputation for being a little more honest than some of the police organisations. We also find that the military up to its ears in some of this stuff as, well … I am not sure you could make a good solid distinction between the two … the nature of their economy, their society, their culture, its very difficult for you to say'. Interview, Military Official 1, 12 February 2004.

> In 2003, 202 members of the armed forces were assigned to the attorney general. This collaboration has altered the pattern of civil-military relations in general and established a positive relationship in what has been a traditionally antagonistic relationship in previous administrations (2005: 262).

Indeed, the Fox administration sought to reform the security apparatus of the country in the face of continuing fears of corruption within the Mexican criminal justice system. Notable for accusations of corruption was the *Policia Judicial Federal* (PJF), the investigative arm of the Attorney General's Office. In response, the government abolished the organisation, screening its members prior to establishing its replacement, the *Agencia Federal de Investigaciones* (AFI), modelled on the FBI. Fox also sought to strengthen the PFP by the secondment of the Third Brigade of the Military Police into its ranks. These organisational adjustments aimed at stemming the tide of *narcotraficante* related corruption within the criminal justice system. Yet they also opened the military to corruption from the vast sums to be made by trafficking, as Camp notes:

> Analysts and military officers alike have been accurate in their assessment that such national security missions would expose the officer corps to higher levels of corruption. Between 1995 and 2000, nearly 150 officers were tried from crimes linked to drug trafficking. In the Navy, between 1993 and 2003, 7 officers were tried for similar crimes, including 3 captains (colonels). In the first three years of the Fox administration, only 12 individuals have been arrested for crimes related to drug trafficking (2005: 263).

The inclusion of the military in the 'war on drugs' led to an increase in internal intelligence and security to counter possible infiltration from *narcotraficante* gangs, including the phone tapping of officials. As mentioned, the PFP, which prior to being elected Fox had called to be disbanded, was reinforced and placed under the organisational remit of the new Department of Security and Services to Justice (*la Secretaría de Seguridad Publicía y Servicios a la Justicia* - SSP). The creation of the SSP installed another chair within the National Security Cabinet. The PFP under Fox were re-tasked to concentrate their efforts on countering the *narcotraficantes* in the US-Mexican border region. PFP deployment was consequently heavily biased towards the northern states under the leadership of General Francisco Arellano Noblecia. While civilian law enforcement became increasingly militarised in the fight against drugs, the military continued to pay a major role in its own right. Upon Fox's election, the Mexican navy sought to reform its organisational structures and posture of its forces, in notable juxtaposition to the SEDENA. The reforms of the Navy Organic Law introduced a new generation of top brass and with it a more open approach to civil-military and international cooperation (Camp, 2005). Academic Interviewee 2 comments on this:

> … There have been some significant changes … the Navy has been completely revamped and revised, and a number of Admirals have been retired if something like that had happen in any other military in Latin America, there would probably have been a military revolt. So … I think Mexico is very unique and the fact you could accomplish that with a junior Admiral taking over is quite extraordinary.[50]

Hence, the navy actively sought to engage with regional navies via international war games, involvement being authorised by presidential approval. Furthermore, under Fox the navy altered its posture from emphasising the protection of national territory from external threat, to focus on non-state actors, primarily *narcotraficantes* and 'terrorists'. In terms of US-Mexican relations, the navy has therefore acted as a spearhead for greater cooperation, as symbolised by the use of Mexican naval vessels as training camps for US mobile training teams in order to circumvent concerns about national sovereignty.[51] US officials perceive the Mexican navy at an organisational level as more transparent and easier to work with than their SEDENA counterparts (Camp, 2005).[52] US officials thus find it easier to identify with the Mexican navy than SEDENA, which is perceived as secretive (which fuels suspicion), top-heavy and ineffectual as a fighting force.[53] Bilateral relations between the US defence establishment and SEDENA has increased markedly since the mid-1990s, following President Zedillo's pronouncement of the Azteca directive (the return of a continual anti-narcotics campaign) and the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, with the resultant internationalisation of the low-intensity conflict in the southern state. As Military Official 1 notes:

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[50] Interviewed by author, 18 April 2005.

[51] Recording failed, aide memoir notes: '[Interviewee] goes to Mexico and Guatemala to train military, both navy and army'. Interview, Academic Interviewee 5, 19 April 2005.
'The navies do do [sic] stuff together … well, maybe its closer to our coastguard … they have found ways of working together and do on both coasts very effectively … the beauty of that is that it is over the horizon by in large, its not terribly visible … that's not something you can do with the army and the air force that are part of Defensa'. Interview, Military Official 1, 12 February 2004.

[52] '… You have got to make a distinction between Defensa and Marina, what you able to do with Marina hundreds of miles out at seas … the navy is far more flexible, they want to interact not only with the US but also with other countries … Defensa are very conservative and hasn't changed a great deal …'. Interview, Military Official 1, 12 February 2004.

> '… When the Zapatistas had just come on the scene and the Mexican army was not having an easy time … in the south of Mexico … the Mexicans looked to us [the US military] to see if we could help them and [General] Sullivan made quite an effort to help them and that was really appreciated and the relationship between these two [Generals] was extremely solid that facilitated some things happening, that do not happen before in our relationship …'. [54]

Faced with this unexpected challenge, from the mid-1990s, the US military began to train the GAFEs (Special Forces) in order to create a new quick response force to counter *narcotraficantes*. GAFE units were subsequently distributed throughout Mexico, though predominately in the Northern states and Chiapas. Furthermore, the US military helped SEDENA establish an electronic war capability and strategy, in order to counter the perceived threat from the Zapatista movement.[55]

While initially, the counternarcotics and the counter-insurgency missions may appear incongruous, they utilise many of the same materiel and tactics, though to different ends. As Camp states:

> The continuous use of large numbers of troops and officers in day-to-day operations permits the armed forces to practice anti-guerrillas techniques as their anti-drug strategy. The intertwining of drugs and guerrillas, especially elsewhere in South America, is central to new definitions of national security. In fact, although he did not intertwine them, Mexico's secretary of national defense considered violent guerrillas [namely the EPR] to be the other major national security threat under Fox (2005: 112).

The involvement of the Mexican military in counternarcotics operations is at the behest of the President. Mexican military officers would prefer not to be involved, as they wish to preserve the positive public reputation of the military (Camp, 2005). Officers fear that as a result of *'plato o plomo'*, and the vast sums involved in trafficking, the good name of the military could come under question. Military involvement is due to the civilian authorities' inability to cope with the infiltration and strength of the organised drug gangs, rather than a desire for greater operational scope. The military are consequently caught in a dilemma through their entry into the 'war on drugs': while it opens them to the possibility of corruption, if they had shunned involvement they would have been corrupted by proxy, leading eventually to a 'narco-democracy' (Jordan, 2001). Corruption within the military peaked during the mid-to-late 1990s with the infiltration by the Juarez cartel. Logically, however, the threat of corruption is ever present and can escalate at any moment.

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[53] No recording for security reasons, aide memoir notes: 'SEDENA – a backward organisation … raw material of SEDENA is weak … equal to many Latin American militaries. Distrust in terms of counternarcotics, distrust of Mexican army numbers of fields of drugs [cleared] … see military as fairly uncorrupted'. Interview, Federal Government Officials 6 and 9, 31 March 2004.

[54] Interviewed by author, 12 February 2004.

[55] '… We [the US military] opened up our whole armed forces to media relationship training and how to do public affairs and all that kind of stuff, we opened ALL, everything we do to the Mexicans, to take a look and see what they wanted to take from it …'. Interview, Military Official 1, 12 February 2004.

The most important impact of the *narcotraficantes* has been the extreme levels of violence conducted by the drug cartels' *sicarios* (hitmen), combined with the militarisation of the narco gangs, referred to by Mexican media as 'narco-soliders'. This is a reference to their core membership being ex-Mexican Special Forces (GAFEs) or Guatemalan Special Forces (*Kabiles*). The drug gangs have also developed their own training camps within their respective '*plazas*'. These facilities exist in at least six locations and instruct both army deserters and US teenagers in combat training and target practice. They are seen as a mercenary accoutrement by the repective cartels and even have mobile training units akin to the US military. The first such camp was established by Osiel Cardenas Guillén in 2001, the kingpin of the Gulf Cartel at the time. From the beginning of the 2000s, *narcotraficantes* began to use force, not only to protect and expand their position in the drug *plazas* to the US, but also to exact extortion payments from businesses within their sphere of influence. This created an atmosphere of fear and a wall of silence, behind which the cartels could operate in border towns, thus reducing the effective sovereignty of the Mexican state: the police, both state and local, were systemically bribed or killed by the cartels, or alternatively left their posts (The Times, 1 September 2008: 2).

The Fox administration's response to this escalating narco-violence was to intensify the military's role in the fight against trafficking gangs. As in previous administrations, the civilian law enforcement bodies became increasingly infiltrated by the cartels, even after re-structuring. Indeed, in 2003 the Mexican Attorney General Rafael Macedo disestablished the FEADs, as the Army raided eleven of the thirty-one state offices operated by the organisation under susicipion of corruption. Seven FEAD agents in Tijuana were even charged with trafficking, extortion and kidnapping. Likewise, state and local departments suffered from high levels of corruption and intimidation, particularly in border towns. This reached a crescendo in the summer of 2005 in Nuevo Laredo, where in June the police chief of the town, Alejandro Dominguez, was shot dead in an ambush by *Los Zetas*, the enforcement arm of the Gulf Cartel. The result was the federalisation of policing in the town, as the military together with the PFP (itself already militarised) took control of the town's police service as part of 'Operation Safe Mexico' (Freeman, 2006). Undeterred, the *narcotraficantes* continued their programme of violence in the border town with the murder of the replacement police chief, Omar Pimental, in July 2005. The example of Nuevo Laredo and the violent actions of *Los Zetas* was (and indeed is) not the exception, but rather the rule, as similar acts of violence afflict all border towns, from Tijuana to Matamoros.

Drug violence saw a notable increase post 2001, not a result of the election of Vicente Fox, but the escape in a prison laundry van of the head of the Sinaloa Cartel, Joaqúin 'El Chapo' ('Shorty') Guzmán. While the Fox administration in the early 2000s concentrated its efforts on the Arellano Felix Organisation (AFO), also known as the Tijuana Cartel, managing to kill one brother and arresting another in 2002, this led to a relative decline in the power and sphere of influence of this organisation in relation to the Sinaloa Cartel. The result was growing confidence within the Sinaloa Cartel, also known as *'La Alizana de Sangre'*. Against this backdrop, the cartel sought to extend its operations to the border town of Nuevo Laredo, in competition with the Gulf Cartel. The resultant competition was predictably violent. The Gulf Cartel's enforcement unit, *Los Zetas* and the Sinaloa Cartel's *sicarios*, *Los Negros* fought open battles in the streets of Nuevo Laredo. Simultaneously, *Los Zetas* sought to exterminate the much smaller *traficante* gangs in Nuevo Laredo, *Los Chacos* and *Los Tejas*. The willingness to use violence, even towards innocents, saw *Los Zetas* prevail in a war of attrition during the Fox *sexeino*.

This realignment produced a reaction from the state. The military changed its focus towards the Gulf Cartel, and particularly the instability caused by the *Los Zetas*, as the AFO threat comparatively diminished. In March 2003, as had occurred to the Arellano Felix brothers and 'El Chapo' before him, the Mexican state caught up with Osiel Cardenas. Cardenas found himself in federal jail, though under lax conditions, which allowed him to continue his operations from his cell. As this incongruous situation suggests, for all the efforts of the Mexican government, drug related violence along with the flow of associated narcotics continued unabated. As Freeman states: 'The arrests of Arellano and Cardenas, rather than halting the flow of drugs, merely altered the balance of power among cartels and opened a Pandora's Box of violence' (2006: 3). To compound matters, while in jail Cardenas gained the acquaintance of the imprisoned Arellano, allegedly formulating a pact between the two cartels on opposite sides of the US-Mexican border. This was a case of 'my enemy's enemy is my friend', for both the Tijuana and Gulf Cartels sought to infringe upon the market of the Sinaloa Cartel, resulting in the murder of 'El Chapo's' brother.

A tit-for-tat series of violent attacks commenced, both inside the federal jail system and outside. Once again, the federal authorities reacted against the current threat to stability, which in January 2005 was the *de facto* Arellano-Cardenas controlled La Palma prison. The response to this show of strength by the federal government was the torture and killing of six penal system workers, the handy work of *Los Zetas* (Freeman, 2006). Violence continued in 2005, with the battle for Nuevo Laredo amongst the Gulf Cartel and Sinaloa Cartel, as previously stated. The US response to this extreme level of violence in Nuevo Laredo was to close its consulate in the town. Events in Nuevo Laredo made little impact on the US polity except in those communities on the doorstep of the gangland violence. Behind the scenes, however, state level authorities became increasingly concerned about the *narcotraficante* threat to the citizens of the region, although officials sought to downplay the violence in public. As State Government Official 1 confirmed: '… Drug lord fights … those are the issues that concern to us … the Zetas, the ex-Mexican commandos … caused problems along the border'.[56]

The question this prompts is: why do US federal authorities adopt this stance vis-à-vis drug-related violence in Nuevo Laredo and elsewhere along the Mexican border? The reasoning behind this relaxed, at worst complacent, attitude has multiple possible causations. One thesis is that the downplaying of *narcotraficante* violence is simply a manifestation of a bureaucratic desire not to highlight on the palpable failure of the 'drug war' and the related instability of the US-Mexican border region, as well as the continued prevalence of drugs within both societies. This inertia reflects an element of bureaucratic self-preservation, and justification for Congressional appropriations and political influence within individual bureaucracies and the wider government.[57]

An alternative explanation for official virtual silence on the violence in the border region is that US officials do not wish to exacerbate regional instability by aggravating Mexican authorities or inflaming nationalistic sensibilities on both side of the border. A third argument holds that wider geopolitical concerns determine the position of the US government: US officials maintain a rhetorical low profile in relation to drug related violence in the border region in order to preserve the geopolitical status quo. In practice, this leads to a preference for posting US military personnel overseas rather than along the border. Another possible thesis behind the apparent reticence of officials to constructively act during the Fox *sexeino*, may simply be an inability of the White House administration (namely President Bush and Vice-President Cheney) to forgive the Fox administration, both for its decision to exit from the Rio Treaty and lack of support for the Iraq War. This may appear petty, but the US President and Vice-President were, apparently, enraged by the actions of the Fox administration.

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[56] Interviewed by author, 24 March 2005.

[57] General Hill, CINC of SOUTHCOM at 'Hemispheric Strategic Objectives for the Next Decade' Conference, 17-19 March 2004, memoir aide notes: 'Armed forces part of the solution instead of the problem … transformation of armed forces to co-operate with law enforcement to meet transnational threats of narcoterrorism'.

In all probability a combination of these explanations apply to varying degrees within the different bureaucracies of both governments. In the long-term view of US-Mexican security relations, institutional inter- and intra-relations are key to the formulation in accordance with their own identities and subsequent interests. However, vis-à-vis the Bush-Fox relationship, personal chemistry appears to have been central to determining the warp and weft of bilateral ties.[58]

Washington's approach, whatever the reasoning, appears in hindsight to have cut off the US government's nose to spite its face, as drug related violence has accelerated simultaneously with the influence of *Los Zetas* spreading north as far as the Greater Dallas conurbation. As a result, approximately twenty high school children have died overdosing on 'cheese' heroin, a cheap and heavily cut version of the drug. Furthermore, Mexican cartels increasingly appear to be moving into the US retail drug market. The cartels have also managed to circumvent US border controls, by producing the bulky narcotic, marijuana, in the US itself. Additionally, some cartels are operating large-scale crystal meth laboratories within the US in remote farms and outbuildings, as the precursor chemicals are freely available on the open market. The continuing 'war on drugs' and the high levels of ingenuity of *traficantes*, together with a willingness to use violence undermine law-and-order, and consequently the sovereignty of both countries. Indeed, in the dying days of the Fox *sexeino*, the administration even put forward legislation to decriminalise personal drug consumption, although these plans were shelved by the Mexican Congress.[59] Beyond the Fox administration, the drugs war continues to de-stabilise Mexico and corruption continues to weaken the institutions of the country to combat the threat.

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[58] Telephone interview recording was not possible. Aide memoir notes: 'US-Mexican relations [have] moved on, the shadow cast by the Iraqi Security Council vote has passed in the interest of the relationship, same for Mexico as other countries, but at same time there was a feeling of betrayal', NGO Official 7, 3 May 2005.
'… I would say the US, I would say President Bush, I think he personalised the relationship so much and placed so much stock on the friendship, you have to remember this is a person who opened up his house and the White House to President Fox … you know he really did feel disappointed and perhaps betrayed …'. Interview, NGO Official 9, 16 February 2004.

[59] Notable members of the Fox administration supported 'Amsterdam style' drug laws.

With Felipe Calderón's contested election in 2006, he sought to continue a tradition amongst Mexican presidents to restructure the country's security apparatus, alongside declarations related to the national security threat from narcotics *traficantes*. Furthermore, Calderón's victory confirmed the political dominance of the PAN relative to the PRI. As previously stated, the political shift towards the PAN and its apparent unwillingness to be corrupted by the drug cartels akin to the PRI, is likely to heighten narcotics-related violence as *traficantes* attempt to enforce their will. Indeed, the fact the Calderón came to power on a campaign that emphasised the need to curb the influence of *traficantes* and to bring about a reduction in the level of violence besetting the country, ironically appears to have encouraged an upsurge in violence. The crisis in Mexico even warranted the leader article in The Times:

> The police seem powerless – or unwilling – to act, since many themselves are instigating the violence or carrying out kidnappings on behalf of gangs that have suborned them. And those that resist meet spectacular deaths …. In all, 2700 people have been killed this year in drug-related violence, a rise of 50 per cent in a year. Barely 5 per cent of crimes are solved (1 September 2008: 1).

Calderón's approach to the war on drugs has shifted from that of Fox, attempting to flood areas of instability with police and military personnel as shown in Operation Safe Mexico. The administration sought not to simply attack kingpins but rather cartels' networks:

> *El gobierno federal no tiene como objective central detener a los grandes capos que dirigen los cárteles de la droga que actúan en el país, sino desarticular sus estructuras operativas y financieras, revelaron fucionarios que participan en el gabinete de seguridad nacional. En ese contexto, la estrategia está encaminada a obtener información sensible de sus operaciones financieras y enlaces para la recepción y trasiego de enervantes, hasta volver inoperantes sus organizaciones.*[60]

Calderón also appears more willing than previous Mexican leaders, to cooperate with US government policymakers and bureaucracy in a frank and open fashion. Indeed, the President has already castigated the low level of US government support to Mexico in public, while the Mexican Attorney, General Eduardo Medina Mora, has criticised Washington's lack of action on gun control and demand-side programmes. This out-spoken behaviour is remarkable from Mexican officials, especially of such high rank, given the country's historic diplomatic support for the notion of non-intervention and national sovereignty. As Miller Llana states: 'Mexican presidents have long complained of US policies that they say make it difficult to cut off the weapons trade, but the Calderón government has been the most vocal critic, many say'.[61] Additionally, Calderón has relied heavily on the use of the military in the 'war on drugs', due to the continued infiltration of the criminal justice system. This process of militarisation has led to critics warning that Calderón's no-nonsense approach will result in 'Colombianisation'. Such notions are given an element of credence with Mexico's signing of a US$1.4 billion programme of assistance with the US government, called the Merida Initiative, which critics have labelled 'Plan Mexico'. Unlike Plan Colombia, however, the central emphasis of Plan Mexico is on the professionalisation and resourcing of law enforcement agencies in Mexico and the US, rather than funding military operations or units. As the Joint Statement on the Merida Initiative: A New Paradigm for Security Cooperation states: 'The Merida Initiative will build on specific activities that aim 1) bolster Mexican domestic enforcement efforts 2) bolster US domestic enforcement efforts; and 3) expand bilateral and regional cooperation that addresses transnational crime' (US Department of State, October 2007).

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[60] Méndez, A. and Castillo, G. (5 September 2007), 'El gobierno apuesta a desarticular los cárteles, no a detener a capos del narco', La Jornada, accessed at: http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2007/09/05/index.php?section=politica&article=014n1pol

Plan Mexico aims to achieve the ultimate prize for the Mexican state, namely creating a professional law enforcement agency that values its duty to the country over bribes and kickbacks. Faced with this threat, members of the Calderón administration have recently come under direct attack from *traficante* hitmen. Yet Calderón appears to have the political will to continue his fight against the cartels. *Traficantes* are consequently engaged in a *de facto* low-intensity conflict with the Mexican state. The policies of the Calderón administration therefore seem to have only exacerbated matters, for as the Mexican state attacks one cartel, another cartel simply takes over. Castillo Garcia expounds on the wave of violence in Mexico under the Calderón administration:

> *La aparente reducción en el consume de cocaína en Estados Unidos, pero sobre todo la recomposición de los liderazgos en el cártel del Golfo y la defensa de las zonas de influencia de cada capo ante la invasión de sus territorios por parte de sus rivales en el negocio de la droga, es lo que ha generado la creciente ola de violencia en el mayor parte del país, generado más de 700 homicidios dolosos relacionados con el crimen organizado, sostienen funcionarios del gabinete de Seguridad.*[62]

The level of violence is unlikely to diminish during the Calderón *sexenio*, as the President appears firm in his commitment to the militarization of the drugs war.

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[61] Miller Llana, S. (19 July 2007), 'US guns arm Mexico's drug wars', Christian Science Monitor, accessed at: http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0719/p01s01-woam.html

[62] Castillo Garcia, G. (21 April 2007), 'Disputas territoriales entre cárteles rivales generan violencia en el país', La Jornada, accessed at: http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2007/04/21/index.php?section=polticia&article=009n1pol

Conclusion

In conclusion, the ‘drugs war’ continues to play a crucial role in US-Mexican bilateral security relations. Indeed, the US-Mexican borderlands have in recent times become a key battleground in the ‘war on drugs’, a ‘war’ that is unwinnable in the long term. A social constructivist analysis of the US and Mexican governments’ approaches to this ‘war’ provides valuable insights, not only into the interests at hand in relation to the specifics of the ‘war on drugs’ but also their wider relationship. The US approach, has changed with the zeitgeist of the nation at a particular conjuncture and the interests of the political class. This is not to argue in favour of a single causal relationship, rather that there is a multiplicity of interests in constant flux. While some authors may hold that there is a causal relationship between, say, the domestic political interests of the Republican Party in the late 1960s and the ‘war on drugs’, others argue in favour of a causal link between the neo-imperial desires of the US capitalist class and the ‘war on drugs’ (Baum, 1997; Carpenter, 2003). It seems more accurate to argue that the ‘war on drugs’, from a US perspective, has multiple threads of embedded interests within its formulation through to the present day. These ebb and flow in relative importance over time within a thread of common interests in the continuation of the ‘war on drugs’ as facts on the ground change.

A notable period when social actors’ participation coincided with such malodorous effect was at the end of the Cold War. The late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a fusion of the political and capitalist class interests in the maintenance of military expenditure, combined with grassroots political pressure on the political class to act in the face of a crack cocaine epidemic within US inner cities suffering from economic recession. These preferences coincided around the notion of the ‘war on drugs’, which became an Orwellian code for racial and class-based prejudice. Such prejudice was an expression of fear of crime, perceived threats to economic well-being and/or the ‘other’, enhanced by the linking of race and class with narcotics use by the restrictionist lobby. During the late 1980s and early 1990s members of the political class from all perspectives sought to use the ‘war on drugs’ as rhetorical fodder, endorsing increasingly harsh measures of criminalisation and enforcement. This example indicates that interests from different sectors of the US polity have, and do, coincide to enable the continuation of the ‘war on drugs’, though it should be noted that the social construction of the ‘war’ is not static. As differing interests come to the fore, so the nature of the ‘war on drugs’ evolves, however, the ‘war’ has not always followed a path of an ever-increasing progress of criminalisation and militarisation in accordance with the rhetoric of restrictionist absolutism. For example, in the 1920s there were limited attempts by the US government to provide narcotics harm reduction programmes.

In practice, since the end of the Cold War era the ‘war on drugs’, both in US domestic and foreign policies, has followed an increasingly regressive approach of criminalisation and securitisation, coinciding with embedded self-interests within the political system and government bureaucracy. These interests are served by the rhetoric of a ‘drugs war’ to enact specific strategies in reaction to proscribed prohibition. Social constructivism argues that the prohibition of drugs is not solely a prohibition enforced for the betterment of society and individuals - the enactment and enforcement of prohibition of narcotics, in reality, occurs for multiple underlying interests that in turn seek to enforce the ‘war on drugs’.

With reference to the latter day formulation of US policy, the capitalist class interests fused with suburban white middle class concerns over the perceived threat from poor blacks in US inner cities. In consequence, the nature of the enforcement of prohibition has had an effect on the social constructs of race and class along with urban and rural identities, and in turn on the interests of the political and capitalist class in relation to the zeitgeist of the country. Consequently, the ‘war on drugs’, is a conflict that has no conceivable ending due to its self-perpetuating nature.

Similarly, Mexican drugs policy is socially constructed via a prism of multiple interests and numerous social actors. Clearly, it is heavily shaped by the northern neighbour, not only as the US is the globe’s largest narcotics market, but also via the influence of Washington policymakers and the restrictionist lobby. The political and capitalist classes within Mexico, unlike the US, have attempted, historically, to co-opt narcotics production in an effort to delimit instability. As a result, Mexican cooperation in the ‘drugs war’ over time has largely been in name alone, concentrating on appeasing its northern neighbour. Although, on occasion personal moral dislike of narcotics has led presidents to enact genuine counter-narcotics programmes. Up until the 1980s, the interests of the political and capitalist classes did not coincide with a ‘war on drugs’, however by the end of the decade, the PRI’s political machine lost its hold on the northern states. This coincided with the rise a new breed of *traficante* that were more willing to use violent means as the US and its allies effectively stemmed the flow of drugs via traditional routes (Astorga, 2001). The emergence of these new social actors has led the Mexican business and political elite to forge greater ties with Washington. The interests and identities of Mexican social actors evolved primarily with reference to internal political considerations rather than solely the appeasement of Washington policymakers. The Mexican state in the post-PRI era has based its policy of opposing the growing power of *traficantes* on two main factors. First, there is the impact of a growing internal drug market, as Mexico became flooded with drugs heading to the US as *traficantes* began to be paid in kind for transshipment, with the resultant human consequences. Second, the extreme level of violence used by the enforcement gangs is disproportionate and deliberately so, in order to create an aura of fear. Consequently, mass gunfights, bombings and the severing of people's heads have become common place. The extreme level of violence, both in terms of frequency and intensity, has led to a questioning of the legitimacy of the Mexican state in its primary role to defend the realm and its citizenry. Latterly the elite's interests have coincided with Washington, in the continuing militarisation of the 'war on drugs'. Yet the level of violence does not appear to be dissipating, for as the tactics and strategy of the prohibitionist state evolves, so in turn do those of drug cartels:

> … With 1400 drug-related murders so far this year, and many towns and cities are under a virtual curfew. Several police departments have resigned en masse in terror, and three police commanders have fled to the United States requesting asylum. President Calderón is claiming signs of progress, but it looks like the whole nation is unraveling, turning feral, descending into lawlessness.[63]

This apparently negative social constructivism analysis of the 'drugs war', does however allow for the development of a resolution or, at least, a mitigation of the drugs problem. Social constructivism theoretically permits the use of social actor's agency in the reformulation of their identities and interests. However, in the case of the humanisation of drugs policy, the reform required needs to occur largely, though not exclusively, within the US polity. This is not only due to the sole hyper-power status of its government and military, but also because US narcotics demand is central to a resolution of the 'drugs war'. Attempts to humanise the 'drugs war' are daunting, as at its core lay the transformation of US elite interests and identity as embodied within the political discourse of the country. Such a project may appear impossible, there is an alternative, if the political will existed to socially construct it. The insecurity caused by *narcotraficantes* and their associated violence appears to be affecting the elite and middle classes, as well as the long suffering working class. Throughout August 2008, mass gatherings occurred in different areas of Mexico to protest against the extreme level of violent crime organised by a single issue pressure group – Iluminemos Mexico.[64] The engagement of civil society simultaneously demonstrates the depth of the problem in Mexico, as well as reason for hope, for it is only with the joint endeavour of the Mexican state and civil society that progress can be made to confront the issue. While Mexican society may be able to alleviate the level of violence, however, without an end to the global ‘war on drugs’, extreme bloodletting in Mexico, as elsewhere in the hemisphere, will persist.

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[63] Grant, R. (4 June 2008), 'Mexico's War on Drugs: Journey into a lawless land', The Independent, accessed at: http://www.independent.co.uk

[64] BBC News (31 August 2008), 'Mass anti-crime rallies in Mexico', accessed at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7590272.stm; also see Iluminemos Mexico at: http://www.iluminemosmexico.org.mx

V

THE WAR ON TERROR AND US-MEXICAN RELATIONS

Introduction

This chapter addresses the effects of the 9/11 terror attacks and the subsequent paradigm shift amongst US policymakers, in particular the formulation of the Bush Doctrine and the concept of ‘effective sovereignty’ in the Western Hemisphere. It examines this issue via the lens of US-Mexican relations, in order to shed light both on bilateral relations and wider hemispheric relations using social constructivist analysis.

The first section considers the historical evolution of the parallel ideological programmes of Islamic radicalism and neo-conservatism in the aftermath of political events during the 1960s and 1970s to provide a general overview of the initial consequences of the tragic events of 11 September 2001 for the Western Hemisphere and in particular the US-Mexican relationship. The second section looks in depth at the paradigm shift amongst US policymakers, examining the nature of the change in US foreign policy at a theoretical level in relation to the wider world and hemispheric security. It examines the role of neo-conservatism in the reformulation of US foreign policy under President George W. Bush and the consequences for the Western Hemisphere as the US military refocused its organisational make-up to meet new threats from non-state actors. This is followed by an examination of the practical effects of this theoretical and rhetorical paradigm shift within US policymaking circles upon US-Mexican bilateral security relations post-11 September 2001, a period marked by bureaucratic upheaval with the US government due to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and NORTHCOM, alongside Mexican bureaucratic conservatism and sovereignty concerns.

The conclusion considers the evolution of the ‘war on terror’ post-2001 vis-à-vis the US and its foreign policy towards Mexico through a social constructivist analysis. The aim is to provide a theoretical model which explains the evolution of US-Mexican bilateral security relations allowing for a historical grounding of relations and theoretical opening for the humanisation and demilitarisation of bilateral security relations through the agency of social actors.

The Origins of the ‘War on Terror’

The ‘war on terror’ like the phrase ‘war on terrorism’ does not make sense linguistically or logically, as is often noted. One cannot have a war against a method of violence. However, the notion of the ‘war on terror’ is understood in this thesis as a political label used by the US government to justify their geo-political outlook and foreign policy. The ‘war on terror’ does not seek to define a terrorist, for as Ronald Regan noted, one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. Rather the Bush administration has sought to polarise the international community in a Manichean struggle between ‘good’ and ‘evil’. Rodman expounds on the concept of the ‘war on terror’: ‘We say ‘war on terrorism’, but at heart of the problem is not terrorism as such – terror is a weapon – but an ideologically-driven assault not only against the United States, but against the West’ (2007: 2).

The origins of the ‘war on terror’ lie in the interweaving of two parallel political ideologies which over time and via the cataclysm of the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 culminated in the establishment of the global ‘war on terror’. These two ideologies were neo-conservatism and Islamic fundamentalism. Both ideologies were rooted in a belief that liberal democracy, as exemplified in the US, was a corrupting force on human society and would inevitably lay the seeds of its own destruction through the promotion of selfish individual desires and wants at the expense of societal needs and identification.

For the Islamic fundamentalists their concerns focused on the neo-imperialist role of the US within the Middle East. Islamic fundamentalism’s intellectual roots lie in the work of Sayed Qutb (hanged in 1966 by President Nasser of Egypt), who had visited the US in the 1950s to study its educational system, only to formulate an Islamic critique of liberal democracy which is the foundation of Islamic radicalism to the present day (Burke, 2007: 33, 47, 53). Qutb expounded that liberal democracy and the social mores it exported to the Middle East were corrupting traditional values. Qutb argued for the development of an Islamic alternative in which scientific knowledge would sit parallel to an Islamic system of governance. Such a revolution in government would only be possible via the use of violence to shock people into the realisation of their corrupt practices and bring them towards an Islamic society (Bonney, 2004:215-223). Early attempts at terror throughout the Middle East failed to bring about an Islamic revolution in the 1960s, though, one Islamic revolution succeeded in Iran (1979). For Islamic radicals the failure of the masses to rise up against corrupt regimes meant one thing: that the people themselves had been corrupted. In the case of Egypt, a hot bed of radicalism in the 1970s, these radical elements coalesced around Islamic Jihad, a forerunner of the present day al-Qaeda.

Islamic Jihad sought to free Muslims from the hold of the corruption and debasement, as they believed, present in secular regimes in the region (Burke, 2007: 47). Islamic fundamentalists argued that in response these societies needed to be shocked out of their wayward thinking via violence in order to create a new righteous Islamic society. This line of reasoning created a justification for unlimited, spectacular violent acts. For Islamic fundamentalists, imbued with this outlook, any means was and is valid: their motives represent the will of God and therefore are righteous.

This nihilistic approach led to bloodletting, as the Islamic Jihad movement and its brother organisations operated through the Middle East region, in particular Algeria and Egypt. Eventually amid infiltration from government forces, the self-extinguishing of these terror groups occurred, as they began to murder one another. By the beginning of the 1980s Islamic Jihad had failed in its aim of spreading Islamic revolution and under the ideological guidance of Ayman Al-Zawahiri moved their efforts to Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 1981 Soviet invasion of the country (Burke, 2007: 72-86).

During this key period of the 1980s, Islamic fundamentalists re-invented themselves both in terms of strategic ideology and practical tactics. Ideologically, the remaining elements under the leadership of Al-Zawahiri sought to use the Afghani conflict as a case study for the removal of a secular power from an Islamic country in order to bring about the desired revolutionary spread through the Muslim world. Tactically, Islamic Jihad was in the 1980s an element of the broader *mujahedeen*, or Afghan Arab movement, which included nationalistic elements as well as Islamic radicals (Bonney, 2004: 324-335).

The Islamic Jihad’s progress in Afghanistan during the 1980s mirrored that of the neo-conservative elements of the Reagan administration, who established the CIA Operation Cyclone to aid the *mujahedeen* fight against the Soviets. It should be noted that CIA operatives concentrated their efforts on the more nationalistic elements of the *mujahedeen* due to the antipathy of the Islamic radicals to the Americans. This convergence of interests between Islamic radicals and neo-conservatism ceased with the coming to power of Mikhal Gorbachev in 1985 and the eventual withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989. Nevertheless it was during the Afghani conflict that Osama Bin Laden co-created together with co-founder, Abdullah Azzam, the model of the terrorist movement today called al-Qaeda, with the establishment of Maktab al-Khidamat, an organisation to provide funding and logistics to *mujahedeen* (Burke, 2007: 72-86).

With the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Islamic radicals split. Some sought to spread radicalism throughout the Muslim world; others strove to impose Islamic fundamentalist views upon the peoples of Afghanistan. During the 1990s, Islamic radicals had become *ad hoc* groupings of various terror movements, each with their own aims and objectives, although connected by a central idea of Islamic fundamentalism.

In the aftermath of the first Iraq war in 1990, Osama Bin Laden went into exile in Sudan in opposition to the presence of US forces on Saudi territory. At this juncture Bin Laden joined Zawahiri's organisation, Islamic Jihad, resulting in the marriage of Bin Laden's economic means and Zawahiri's ideology to give birth to al-Qaeda (Burke, 2007: 143-178). This new grouping under the titular head of Bin Laden and the spiritual leadership of Zawahiri, sought a new strategy in which to create their Islamic revolution. Instead of just targeting corrupted regimes in the Middle East, they widened their aims to the perceived source of this corrupting influence of secularism and liberalism, the United States. This would eventually lead to the bombing of the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 and ultimately the tragic events of 11 September 2001.

The neo-conservatism movement had its roots in the perceived failure of liberal democracy under LBJ's Great Society in the 1960s. Neo-conservatives regarded liberal reforms as awakening the selfish wants and desires of the individual at the expense of wider society. Liberal policies during the 1960s and 1970s, they maintained, led to the collapse of confidence in the US as a nation, as well as a rise of societal ills, such as drug abuse, racial violence and family breakdown. In terms of foreign policy, liberalism allegedly contributed to withdrawal from Vietnam and a diminution of US authority globally in an era of nuclear stand-off. The solution, as neo-conservatives envisioned, was (and is) the formulation of two parallel 'myths': the myth of nation and the myth of religion. The myth of religion is seen by neo-conservatives as a 'noble lie', a necessary means for the inculcation of social mores that would allow for the suppression of internalised individual desires in favour of wider societal needs. Religion would act as a controlling agent to promote internal cohesion within the US. The role of the elite was to actively promote religion publicly, while in private (perhaps!) to be fully aware that it remained a myth enacted for the common good rather than a perceived truth (Strauss, 1959).

Similarly, neo-conservatives believed that only through the promotion of the "myth" of nation could the US regain its prestige overseas and commonality of purpose. This meant that the American nation could be seen, not as an equal nation state amongst a community of fellow nation states, but rather as a unique experiment in Jeffersonian democracy, a beacon of light in an otherwise dark world. Neo-conservatives argued that the role of the US should be as an advocate of democracy within the wider world. Dorrien defines neo-conservatism as: 'An intellectual movement originated by former leftists that promotes militant anticommunism, capitalist economics, a minimal welfare state, the rule of traditional elites, and a return to traditional cultural values' (2004:14).

In the context of the Cold War, this meant the demonisation of the Soviet Union as a concentration of 'evil' in the world. It was the duty of the US, as the righteous democratic exemplar, to slay this 'evil'. Such perceptions were not only directed at the Soviet Union itself. Neo-conservatives also perceived the USSR as the guiding light behind such evils as terrorism and leftist national liberation movements. It was during the Reagan administration (1980-1988) that neo-conservative influence first attracted popular attention with the introduction of US National Security Decision Directive Number 32 (NSDD 32). The aims of this executive order were: 'To contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world, to increase the costs of Soviet support and use of proxy, terrorist, and subversive forces'.[65] Policy towards the Soviet Union thus metamorphosed from one of containment to aggressive militarisation and proxy wars, notably in Central America. The neo-conservatives' growing influence in national security circles corresponded with a diminution of the influence of the pragmatic realist school and its exponent, Henry Kissinger. Such a transformation of fortunes within national security circles for the neo-conservatives had been long fought for and planned through a combination of heavy lobbying via organisations such as the 'Committee on Present Danger' and the 'Committee for the Free World', as well as the placing of supporters in key positions within the bureaucracy. Though President Reagan was initially hesitant towards neo-conservative policies on entering the White House he eventually warmed to their arguments leading to the signing of NSDD32 in May 1982. On this development Ehrman states:

> In the 1980s…the neo-conservatives were able to pursue the institutionalization of Wilsonian and democratic goals within the government's foreign policy establishment. With a friendly president who was predisposed toward such as a view, and figures such as Abrams, Kirkpatrick, and Kampelman sprinkled around the administration, the situation was radically different from Ford-Kissinger years (1995: 162).

This had consequences for Latin America, as Landau notes:

> … In 1981, the United States' Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, pronounced Central America 'the most important place in the world'. For her, the region symbolized a larger struggle, between the evil empire, the Soviet Union, seen as the backer of all the 'terrorist, guerrilla movements' in Central America, and the forces of 'democracy', embodied in the very fabric of US policy, as well as by 'our friends' in the Third World (1993: 2).

Consequently, the US overtly and covertly supported 'anti-communist' forces in the hemisphere, in fear of the 'evil empire's' influence spreading to the Rio Bravo. Despite their successes, by 1985 neo-conservative influence within the national security community and the White House began to wane. Ambassador Kirkpatrick left the administration, in November 1986. The Iran-Contra scandal began to take hold within Beltway politics. In Moscow Mikhail Gorbachev came to power (1985) and introduced significant reforms. This led to question marks regarding the hard line neo-conservative rhetoric concerning the Soviet Union for Gorbachev's reforms seemed at odds with the neo-conservative world view of Manichaean struggle.

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[65] NSDD 32, accessed at: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-032.htm

With the end of the Cold War neo-conservative thinkers receded within the broad conservative movement of the Republican Party, as did the journal, *National Interest* under Irving Kristol. According to Ehrman: 'The end of the Cold War forced neo-conservative foreign policy writers to face a question they had not seen in forty years: what should be the focus of American efforts abroad?' (1995:180). The result was neo-conservatives like Kirkpatrick and Robert W. Tucker arguing forcefully in favour of a continuing outwardly focused political programme in order to spread the 'light' of democratic governance - though only by providing the US as an exemplar rather than embarking on a conquest of lands to embed democracy.

Other neo-conservatives like Charles Krauthammer and Norman Podhoretz, continued to maintain an argument for an activist foreign policy in favour of democratic principles, even if that meant acting unilaterally. With the end of the Soviet 'threat' neo-conservatives divided into two camps: 'realists' and 'Wilsonian idealists'. Simultaneously, as Dorrien states; it appeared that its political influence was on the wane:

> Neo-conservatism faded in the 1990s for three reasons: it was identified with bygone debates, it was out of power, and to a considerable degree it merged with the mainstream of American conservatism. The movement's twin icons, Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz, reasoned that neo-conservatism had faded by succeeding. The neocons had joined and changed American conservatism, making it possible for their children to call themselves, simply, conservatives (2004:15).

The election of George HW Bush in 1988 eventually led to the isolation of neo-conservatives to academia and the realm of Washington DC think-tanks. After initial flirtations with interventionist policies in the post-Operation Desert Storm era, spurred on by notions of the creation of a 'New World Order', President Bush quickly ditched such hyperbole in favour of a more traditionalist 'realist' foreign policy. While Irving Kristol concurred with the President, his son, William Kristol, along with a new generation of neo-conservatives did not.

The new young generation of neo-conservatism, however, maintained their desire to promote an interventionist foreign policy in order to export democracy globally. As Dorrien noted:

> To those who joined the neo-conservative cause in the 1990s, neo-conservatism had little to do with debates over bureaucratic collectivism, or radical chic. They were not liberals who had been 'mugged by reality' as Irving Kristol described the first neocons, for the new neocons had never been progressives of any kind. To them, neo-conservatism was the form of mainstream American conservatism that stood for growth, intervention, unilateralism, optimism and the universality of the American idea (2004: 17).

During the 1990s the 'young Turks' of neo-conservatism sought to establish political connections with the religious conservative wing of the Republican Party. For the religious faithful, the neo-conservatives offered a route to the advocating of social conservatism. Religious conservatives offered neo-conservatives a political base.

Through a clever manipulation of the twin pillars of neo-conservatism, the myth of nation and of religion, by 2000 they had regained much influence within the Republican Party. With the swearing in of President George W. Bush, neo-conservatives regained political power, populating the administration from Vice-President Dick Cheney downward. When campaigning for the presidency and in his initial period in office, President G.W. Bush had emulated his father's pragmatic foreign policy, discounting an interventionist, nation-building approach. The events of 11 September 2001 spawned a recasting of US foreign policy as the mental landscape of the President and policymakers in general shattered. To paraphrase Prime Minister Tony Blair's speech to the Labour Party conference in 2001: it was during this recasting of the kaleidoscope that neo-conservatives regained control of US foreign policy, leading to the eventual invasion of both Afghanistan and Iraq.

President Bush's response to 9/11 in his address to the nation had clear neo-conservative overtones:

> Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in series of deliberate and deadly terrorist attacks …. America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining. Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature … America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time. None of us will ever forget this day. Yet, we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in the world ….[66]

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[66] (2001, accessed at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.htm)

Thus the debate within the US polity was framed within a neo-conservative inspired Machichaean struggle between the ‘righteous’ US government and the ‘evil doers’. This has had deep ramifications for both the domestic political agenda and foreign affairs, notably relations with Mexico, throughout the duration of the Bush administration. As Falkenrath states:

> It is hard to imagine from afar the impact that the 9/11 attacks had on the American psyche and on American politics. The United States had never been attacked in that way before, and unlike European countries had no experience with devastation, at home, in modern times …. These events, therefore, had a profound psychological impact on the American people and American leaders and, in particular, on President Bush, who had been in office only 8 months and really had not yet found his footing-he had not yet figured out what the purpose of his Administration was going to be. Suddenly, the attacks of 9/11 gave him a purpose that he didn’t have before. 9/11 has been by far the single most important formative experience for the Bush Presidency (Falkenrath in Hamilton, 2006: 189).

From a Latin American perspective the events of 11 September 2001 garnered a mixed response. While Latin American leftists noted the date and the events of 11 September 1973 in Chile, when Pincohet’s *coup d’état* occurred with US government blessing and assistance, the governments of the hemisphere uniformly offered their condolences to Washington (McSherry, 2005). *Los Pinos* advocated an extraordinary session of the OAS General Assembly in order to discuss and enact the organisation’s response in the hemisphere, having only just announced its desire to leave the Rio Treaty. As a result, Latin American countries chose in a more symbolic than practical act to enact the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistant, commonly known as the Rio Treaty. There was one notable absentee, Mexico. President Fox had, on 7 September 2001, stated his desire to withdraw from the Rio Treaty, stating that it was not a suitable diplomatic vehicle for the non-state threats facing the Western Hemisphere in the twenty-first century. Mexico’s attempt to create a security architecture vanguard backfired. Vicente Fox’s timing could not have been worse, for Mexico’s failure to diplomatically support its neighbour in its time of need alienated the Bush administration. As Bondi notes:

> The invocation of the treaty gave a new lease of life to a regional instrument that had been largely latent. To boot, Brazil- a critic of the treaty- jointly with Argentina and Chile led the charge in invoking the pact in response to 11 September, thereby making Mexico’s isolation even more embarrassing. Thus, the Fox administration found itself in the awkward position of being forced to join a chorus whose musical score Mexico had just announced it would no longer sing from (2004: 48).

In the initial period of the Bush administration the relationship with Mexico and Fox's government had been cordial. Both presidents styled themselves as cowboys; they also felt a certain commonality, being former state governors in their respective countries. Furthermore, the Bush administration was eager to embrace Fox, the first non-PRI president in over seventy years, and to politically support this radical move towards democratisation.[67]

The Fox administration for its part, wished to open a new chapter in relations with its neighbour. Additionally, Fox wished to pursue a more active foreign policy within the region, increasing Mexico's profile in hemispheric organisations and diplomacy. Key elements of this new activist foreign policy included the lobbying and gaining of a temporary seat in the UN Security Council and the decision to exit from the Rio Treaty, advocating more flexible and politically based hemispheric security architecture. On this scenario Bondi opines that:

> In its attempt to break with its isolationist past, Mexico enlisted support from the international community to help the country through its transition to democracy, and to anchor it to the evolving security debate in the post- 11 September 2001 environment. This help was sought both to ameliorate the human rights situation in the country and to define Mexico's new security perimeter. Both approaches were quite unprecedented. In turn, they stimulated a heightened participation of civil society in foreign policy decisions and the life of the country, and Mexico's growing influence as a credible partner in international actions (2004: ix).

In the aftermath of 11 September 2001 and Mexico's departure from the Rio Treaty, relations gradually soured. President Bush clearly took personal offence at the actions of the Fox administration. This had a knock-on effect within the wider relationship between the two countries, as the political impetus towards greater cooperation eased. As NGO Official 10 confirmed: '… after 9/11 their relationship plummeted, it became very sour, very difficult. What had been a very warm friendship was extremely strained …'. [68] Thus, the events of 11 September 2001 and its aftermath led to a cooling in US-Mexican ties after an initial period of conviviality, not only at the personal level between the presidents, but also their governments as their national interests diverged.

As Washington became increasingly concerned about the terrorist threat from a global perspective the need to gain Mexican cooperation increased. As occurred during the Second World War and the Rainbow Strategy, the US sought to eliminate any perceived threat within the hemisphere in order to focus political and military energies elsewhere in the world (Mallof, 1953). With the Bush administration's attentions increasingly centred outside the hemisphere, the initial burst of energy placed in attempting to strengthen US-Mexican relations faded. As NGO Official 10 states:

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[67] '… When President Bush was inaugurated in January 2001 initially … they were very, very close buddies or they projected that impression …'. Interview, NGO Official 10, 16 February 2004.

[68] Interviewed by author, 16 February 2004.

> … I think you could say relations between the Fox and the Bush administrations have gone through already three phrases … when President Bush was inaugurated in January 2001, initially … initially they were very, very close buddies or they were both projecting that impression, you know, they would visit one another and I think Fox was the first foreign leader President Bush visited. And then after 9/11 their relationship plummeted it became very sour, very difficult, what had been a very warm friendship was extremely strained but more recently they are back … they are in a third stage which is neither like the first or the second but somewhere in between but closer to the first.[69]

Diplomatically at least, Mexico showed a level of insensitivity, appearing aloof in the light of the events of 11 September 2001, damaging the bureaucratic inter-connections between the two neighbouring countries. While in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001, the Mexican government, at both federal and state level, was eager to assist the US government in its counter-terror mission, the process of deepening institutional linkages was not aided by US perceived loss of face with regard to Mexico’s decision over the Rio Treaty. This was only made worse by Mexico’s later opposition to the Iraq war and its failure to vote in favour of a second UN Security Council resolution in early 2003. Such a worsening in the political relationship between the two administrations appears to have resulted from a failure on the part of the Fox government to fully comprehend the magnitude of the events of 9/11 on the psyche of the US polity.

Post-9/11 2001 Strategic Paradigm Shift with US Policymaking Community

The events of 11 September 2001 disorientated the US zeitgeist like no other single incident since the attacks on Pearl Harbor. While the populace lost its perceived innocence to foreign affairs and the threat(s) of non-state actors within a state-based international system, neo-conservatives and their allies were able to capitalise on events resulting in a misuse of religiosity and God to provide comfort to the unknown. President Bush followed this path, as a born-again Christian, perceiving a Machichaean struggle between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ rather than recognising a complex unfolding transformation of the nature of international relations. He followed his emotions and religious belief, choosing to whet the appetite of the public with notions of revenge against the ‘evil doers’ (Tremblay, 2004: 18-19).

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[69] Interviewed by author, 16 February 2004.

Domestically, the shock of 11 September 2001 offered US policymakers almost *carte blanche* to formulate a counter-terror strategy. In this initial period Congress offered the Bush administration little to no resistance. Valentine noted:

> Even Democrats climbed on the war wagon, and four days later, on 15 September 2001, Congress, save for one glorious dissenter, gave Bush $40 billion and the authority to use 'all necessary and appropriate force' against those allegedly involved (or could be said to have been involved) in then uninvestigated and as yet unexplained terrorist attacks (2003: 5).

The following month Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, otherwise known as the USA PATRIOT Act [sic]. This legislation received little or no scrutiny from the legislative branch, as Chang notes:

> The House vote was 356-to-66, and the Senate vote was 98-to-1. Along the way, the Republican House leadership, in an unusual display of force, jettisoned an anti-terrorism bill the House Judiciary Committee had unanimously approved and that would have addressed a number of civil liberties concerns. This hastily drafted, complex and far-reaching bill spans 342 pages. Yet it has passed with virtually no public hearing or debate and is accompanied by neither a conference nor a committee report. On 26 October, a triumphant President George W. Bush signed the USA PATRIOT Act into law (2001: 14).

The USA PATRIOT Act increased the level of government surveillance of the citizenry to the bizarre extent of allowing authorities to find out an individual's library records. The Act also provided for the curtailment of immigrants/ non-citizens' rights to *habeas corpus*. It created a new criminal offence of 'domestic terrorism' under Section 802. Through a broad reading, this could lead to federal law enforcement agents investigating and reconnoitring civil society organisations opposed to government policies. This is not merely the product of an over-imaginative mind, but rather a concern born of the history of the COINTELPRO operation within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the 1960s (Churchill and Vander Wall, 2002). The draconian measures illustrate that the legislative branch had politically collapsed in the face of a populace urging them to 'do something' to combat the terror threat, hand in hand with the concerns of the President and his entourage.

On the 20 September 2001, during a joint address to both houses of Congress, President Bush proposed the establishment of the Office of Homeland Security under the directorship of Tom Ridge. His reasoning held that:

> Our nation has been put on notice: We are not immune from attack. We will take defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans. Today, dozens of federal departments and agencies, as well as state and local governments, have responsibilities

> affecting homeland security. These effects must be coordinated at the highest level. So tonight I announce the creation of a Cabinet-level position reporting directly to me- the Office of Homeland Security.[70]

On 8 October 2001, President Bush signed the Executive Order Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council. This new Office of Homeland Security was created to promote greater cooperation and intelligence sharing between federal, state and local levels of government in preparation, response and recovery from possible terror attack. The new body answered directly to the President with no legislative oversight, and with the signing of the Homeland Security Act on 25 November 2002, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was founded, bringing together disparate agencies and functions relating to homeland security into one entity. Furthermore, it was not until 7 January 2003 that the House Select Committee on Homeland Security was formulated to provide democratic oversight.

With the creation of the DHS, the panic of the initial aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks took institutional form. A near constant heightened sense of threat amongst the public helped produce a corrosive merging of civil and military functions: the *Posse Comitatus* Act resulted in institutional creep into realms previously the preserve of the military (Wilson, 2002: 19-24). Civil-military relations in the post-11 September era entered a period of flux. Lawmakers sought to utilise military expenditure within the country in order to protect the border and/or infrastructure. The military, (as in the 1980s with regard to the war on drugs), were hesitant. The military did not want to be dragged into internal security operations because they feared both a backlash and operational overstretch. This debate was brought into sharp relief with the establishment of US Northern Command within the global areas of responsibility framework of the US military system. On this development Guttieri commented that:

> After [11 September 2001], the Bush administration began using a new, more proactive sounding term: homeland *security*. The Pentagon, however, treated this new term not as a replacement for, but as separate from, homeland defense. A seemingly simple matter of semantics reveals a great deal about US civil-military relations.[71]

Prior to 9/11, the military remit was largely confined to external missions and the defence of the border from attack. However, in the post-9/11 era, strong political pressure had arisen to involve the military i.e. federalised military, in new internal security missions. Indeed, the *Posse Comitatus* Act is not a watertight law preventing the use of all military personnel from operating within the US. The Act concerns the use of federalised military personnel by local law enforcement as active agents in their law and order function. It does not cover State-controlled National Guard, the use of federalised military personnel within the US as authorised by federal officials or Congress, or indeed, the provision of military equipment and assistance to local law enforcement agencies. Thus the use of National Guard after 9/11 to protect airports and other strategic sites, such as Wall Street are in accordance with the *Posse Comitatus* Act. The federalised military, however, has managed to keep away from actively engaging in internal security missions. This has been possible via the conceptual difference made between 'homeland defence' and 'homeland security' by the Department of Defense (DoD). As Bowman notes:

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[70] (2001, accessed at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html)

[71] (August 2003, accessed at: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/aug03/ homeland.asp)

> The Department of Defense makes a distinction between 'homeland security' and 'homeland defense' in defining its mission responsibilities. Homeland security is defined as: a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United State, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism and minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks.
> Homeland defense is defined as: the military protection of United States territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression. It also includes routine, steady state activities designed to deter aggressors and to prepare US military forces for action if deterrence fails (2003: 1).

The establishment of a division between these two concepts has enabled the DoD to maintain its focus on overseas missions, notably Afghanistan and Iraq. It enabled the military to resist the drain on resources that would occur from a blurring of missions with the DHS. Indeed, the military had, even before 9/11, resisted the inclusion of an internal security mission within their remit. This was due to the Cold War era strategy of maintaining force capabilities at such a level that the US would be able to fight two medium sized conflicts simultaneously and to succeed in both. During the Cold War, little attention or resources were solely dedicated to homeland security, with the exemption of specialist National Guard units in chemical, biological and nuclear attack.

The military's fear was that resources which were, or could be perceived to be, set aside for homeland defence could be considered by their political masters as excess to requirement or that those resources could not have multiple purposes. As Davis states: 'As a result, the Army has preferred living with periodic strains of competing demands at home and abroad' (Davis in Davis and Shapiro, 2003: 64). Tensions therefore constantly arise between fulfilling the military's role as guardian of the American spheres of influence and fighting wars across the globe, maintaining bases on virtually every continent, whilst also being called upon by their political leadership to fight the war on drugs, seal the Mexican border or guard airports and similar facilities across the US. The military has traditionally attempted to address this conundrum by delimiting its responsibilities in homeland security in favour of civil authorities in order to avoid a loss of operational focus and overstretch of personnel and resources.

Institutionally the situation changed in 2001 with the publication of the Quadrennial Defense Review Report, which sought to reorganise and re-mission the DoD (DoD, 2001). The primary concern of the DoD is now homeland security, at least theoretically. Furthermore, the DoD was restructured into a leaner, more focused organisation. It is no longer orientated towards fighting and winning two medium-sized conflicts, but aims to follow a win-hold-win strategy, as Guttieri states:

> For all its wealth, the Pentagon lacks the resources to achieve the goal of victory in two simultaneous medium regional conflicts (MRC) abroad. Recognizing this, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) shifted to an approach based on capabilities rather than threat. This strategy calls on the military to fight overlapping conflicts, in a win-hold-win approach rather than simultaneous victory. From the perspective of the Pentagon, the homeland constitutes a third MRC.[72]

To face these new challenges the decision was made in October 2002 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to re-organise the global area of responsibility commander-in-command system and created a new command to encompass, the continental US, Alaska, Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, Canada and Mexico. The new command brought together the pre-existing North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the newly formed USNORTHCOM Command Center, which aims to provide a command and control function at times of emergency together with a liaison role between federal, state and local authorities in order to execute their mission of ‘homeland defense’ and on request assistance. Outside of the Command Center, NORTHCOM is made up of a series of Joint Task Forces, the most relevant to US-Mexican relations being the Joint Task Force-North. Previously named Joint Task Force-Six, the task force (largely made up of reservists), has an anti-narcotics mission to assist law enforcement agencies with surveillance and reconnaissance along the US-Mexican border.

NORTHCOM, due to its mission and operational functions, possesses a small cadre of full time staff based at its headquarters at Peterson Air Field Base, Colorado Springs, CO., while the majority of NORTHCOM personnel is made up of National Guard and Reservist forces. As stated in Chapter Three, the organisation has had a difficult birth, having been created at a time of bureaucratic and political flux within the US governmental system and polity in general. Its command have had to readjust its territorial coverage due to bureaucratic friction from its sister organisation, SOUTHCOM, which covers Latin America and the Caribbean (except Mexico). In May 2006, SOUTHCOM regained operational responsibility for all the Caribbean islands. NORTHCOM also continues to refine its mission and operational practices as it beds in as an institution and cultivates its relationships with different elements of the DoD bureaucracy, wider US government departments and foreign governments. Regarding the latter dimension, NORTHCOM's growth pains are not confined to within the US governmental system. The issues of the Mexican government as a security partner and the establishment of greater cooperation with the secretive Mexican military are key concerns. This is particularly important given the continued problem of drug violence in the border region, high levels of illegal migration combined with the desire to secure trading routes between the two countries – all of which are deemed critical to US strategic interests.

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[72] (August 2003, accessed at: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/aug03/homeland.asp)

Overall on the domestic front the US government has transformed itself in the aftermath of 9/11, creating a new almost Orwellian Department of Homeland Security, institutionalising the panic towards Islamic fundamentalist terrorism via the traffic light alert system and increasing the power of the state vis-à-vis individual citizens. The use of military personnel, often National Guards, in the defence of airports and strategic installations and the creation of a new command structure created opportunities for the militarisation of the internal security mission, which the US military has thus far resisted. With the creation of a climate of fear in the country the Bush administration has gained greater licence to operate in foreign affairs under the grandiose title of a 'war on terror'. On this point Sorkin has posited that:

> What makes the new war on terror more singular - more sinister - is that the consequence of unsettling fear, shadowy demonized foe, hyper-technology of ubiquitous reach, and the communal power of the corporate state, has truly globalised the condition of fear. If every space is susceptible to attack and every person a potential attacker, then the only recourse is to watch everyone and fortify everyplace. If every communication is potentially a fragment of capacity, then all must be recorded. Walking the streets nowadays, with troops at the subway entrance, barricades around buildings, cameras staring from lamp-posts, metal detector and card swipes at the office door, cops profuse, newsstands bill boarding alerts from every cover, involuntary anxiety at the sight of handbags and kerchiefs, it feels- more and more- like the battle for freedom is being lost (2008: xvii).

The 'war on terror' became institutionalised with the structures of the US government via an array of strategy papers, the most notable being: The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002); The National Defense Strategy of the United

States of America (March 2005) and The National Strategy of Homeland Security (July 2002). The National Security Strategy (2002) document expounds the position of the US administration in the ‘war’ on terrorism, and was drafted under the heavy neo-conservative influence. The strategy advances the ‘Bush Doctrine’ as US government policy. The Bush Doctrine states that Washington should use military power unilaterally and in a preventative sense, if required, to meet US vested interests and in the context of the neo-conservative notion of extending the sphere of democratic influence. On this question The National Security Strategy declares:

> Today, the US enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty…we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent (2002: 1).

The National Defense Strategy (2005) puts some flesh on the bones of the previous document stating that the key objectives are: ‘Secure the US from direct attack …. Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action …. Strengthen alliances and partnerships …. Establish favourable security conditions’ (2005: iv). To achieve these objectives, the paper argues that the US military needs to undergo a process of transformation from a conventional Cold War era standing military, to a highly flexible network centred joint force. This, it is posited, should include not only the three military branches but also embrace civilian agencies and allies, to counter and eliminate the threat posed by its enemies and to maintain US global military domination. As the National Defense Strategy states: ‘A reactive or defensive approach would not allow the United States to secure itself and preserve our way of life as a free and open society. Thus, the United States is committed to an active defense of the nation and its interests. This new approach is evident in the war on terrorism’ (2005: 1). In reality ‘active defense’ signifies offensive military operations on a global scale to counter the threat of non-state actors, such as the FARC or Al-Qaeda and the growing military might of the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The US military seeks to project this ‘active defense’ via dominance of the global commons (space, international airspace and waters, and cyberspace), alongside the development, and maintenance of, forward operating bases from the Horn of Africa, to Afghanistan, to Colombia:

> Our ability to operate in and from the global commons- space, international waters and airspace, and cyberspace- is important. It enables us to project power anywhere in the world from secure bases of operation. Our capacity to operate in and from the strategic commons is critical to the direct defense of the United States and its partners and

> provides a stabilizing influence in key regions (The National Defense Strategy, 2005: 13).

The Bush administration has followed the neo-conservative model both internally and externally. While at home encouraging religiosity and a climate of fear, in foreign policy the administration has expounded a policy of aggressive democratisation: all in the name of fighting a ‘war on terror’. The formulation of the ‘war on terror’ has been made possible by the convergence of a concatenation of political, economic and social interests interweaving both before and after 11 September 2001.

As the neo-conservatives gained political capital within the Republican Party through their alliance with the religious right both the neo-conservative political agenda and the political power of the religious wing of the party were strengthened. One result was the creation of the ‘culture wars’, in which the religious right have sought to malign secularism and the division between state and church, with the blessing of neo-conservatives. For their part, the neo-conservative’s rise in the Republican political machine coincided with a downturn in the military-industrial complex (or ‘gunbelt’) as the post-Cold War era saw the perceived collapse of the Soviet threat - the justification for its establishment and maintenance (Markusen et al, 1991). As a result, neo-conservative ambitions married with the interests of the ‘gunbelt’ lobby, creating vested interests in the continuation and expansion of American military power. This alignment is not as straightforward as that between the religious right and neo-conservatives; it is a more nuanced and layered relationship than a simple paralleling of vested interests. While the ‘gunbelt’ lobby and neo-conservatives are agreed on maintaining, if not increasing military spending, outside of this simple equation there may or may not be shared political ground. The consequences of such an alignment have had ramifications within the geo-political reality of the US, as the ‘gunbelt’ continued to prosper. This has re-drawn the political map of the US, alongside the associated economic shift and restructuring. On this development Markusen et al note:

> The rise of the gunbelt has been a major factor in the political realignment of the nation. As enclaves of defense-dependent activity have grown in the gunbelt, they have contributed to a notable geopolitical shift- more congressional seats in the South and West, and more Republicans and hawkish Democrats occupying those seats. We speculate that this has had a strong positive-feedback effect on military procurement per se, as certain congressional delegations push for the continuation of weapons programs that are essential to their local economies. In other words, the uneven geographical distribution of military business may have contributed to the boosting of military expenditures far beyond what purely strategic concerns called for (1991: 7).

Such a convergence of interests with the neo-conservatives only acted to exacerbate a pre-existing problem within US political economy, created initially via a Republican Congress under President Clinton in the 1990s and the pork barrel politics that followed. Latterly under President George W. Bush the 'gunbelt' has prospered under the justification of the war on terror and overseas conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq (Goldstein, 2004: 108-115).

The convergence of interests within the neo-conservatives and the US 'gunbelt' (with associated heavy public funding of research and development) has had an unintended consequence, which again has come to aid the neo-conservative agenda: an information technology revolution. From the early 1990s onward, this information technology revolution has in turn resulted in a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Within the military, information technology has come to be used as a 'force multiplier' via the use of satellite guided missiles, stealth technology and unmanned drones (Metz and Kievit, 1995).

RMA combined with the relatively small per capita expenditure on the military and the all-volunteer force unrepresentative of US society. This disconnection between the military and the citizenry it serves has created cleavages within the civil-military social contract such that the political elite can (and has) embarked on military actions with little concern for political backlash comparable with the Vietnam era. Consequently the US military deploys forces into two conflicts the other side of the globe and continues to maintain bases and operations globally, while the US populace and the Main Street economy appear to continue unabated with little regard to the cost (in blood and treasure) of military actions (Kennedy, 2008).[73]

Globally this has resulted firstly in the invasion of Afghanistan and the resultant capitulation of Taliban forces, then in power in Kabul, with their 'guests' al-Qaeda. The remaining elements of al-Qaeda and Taliban continue a low-intensity conflict with the NATO and UN-sponsored government of Afghanistan, while gaining a bolthole and supply route in the Federally Controlled Tribal Region of Pakistan. Secondly on 19 March 2003 President Bush commenced the so-called 'coalition of the willing': a second war against Iraq. In both cases low intensity conflict has ensued as al-Qaeda forces have returned to the tactics and methods used in the 1980s against the Soviets, while nationalists in both countries have joined the fight. The US military and its allies are engaged in a counter-insurgency mission alongside the 'nation building' mission. It is worthy of note for Latin America that lessons learned in the urban environment of Mosul or the poppy fields of Afghanistan will feed into

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[73] Though, the US Treasury continues to accrue a deficit as a result of the Iraq and Afghanistan military actions (Goldstein, 2004).

US military doctrine - with consequences for those countries sending troops to the US for training (Metz, 2007). The Latin American experience has fed into US military doctrine in the Middle East and Central Asia: ‘Indeed, members of the US intelligence community acknowledge that drug enforcement raids in Colombia during the 1990s serve as models for today’s counter-terror operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and the Philippines’ (Kenney, 2003: 187).

The ‘war on terror’ pursued by the Bush administration has resulted in the creation of an aggressive overly-idealistic foreign policy being implemented by a hyper-power which in some degree regards itself as outside the rule of international law, simultaneously utilising the rhetoric of being ‘a guardian of democracy’ (The National Security Strategy, 2002; The National Defense Strategy, 2005). Due to the on-going conflict in the Middle East and South Asia, the US military is today faced with overstretch of its personnel and a drain of resources to the conflict zones.[74] Consequently, the US military has been forced to scale down its activities, concentrating its efforts in the Western Hemisphere on the provision of military aid, training, and acting as a clearing house and facilitator for its allies in the region, in particular Colombia, the Central America and Mexico (SOUTHCOM, 2007). The ‘war on terror’ has also created another rationale, alongside the ‘war on drugs’, for Washington to invest in Latin American armed forces. During casual conversation amongst politicians and bureaucrats, the two rationales can converge: ‘narco-terrorism’ as code for sectional interests in the continuation of funding for Latin American militaries in the midst of budgetary pressures due to Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, as Gabelnick states:

> Having a new quasi-ideological theme to justify most security assistance is extremely convenient for the Bush administration. Policy objectives that could not have been pursued in the pre-11 September 2001 security environment can now be repackaged and sold as part of the counterterrorism effort (2002: 2).

For Latin America as a whole, the consequence of this political posturing from the Bush administration was a renewing of the DoD’s influence vis-à-vis the Department of State in bilateral military relations. This is particularly demonstrated via the increasing role of the regional commander in SOUTHCOM, with the command’s ambition to become a multi-agency clearing house for US agencies working within the hemisphere (USSOUTHCOM, 2007). This strategy aims to make the military the lead government agency in Latin America, in the process creating conflict with ambassadors who are titular heads of mission. This new SOUTHCOM interference, in the face of the perceived growth of non-state threats in the region, appears through the scaling up of counter-insurgency military groups within the host countries' US embassy. The approach appears to be a reversal of traditional British counter-insurgency strategy in which the military are secondary and support civilian authorities whom have the lead role (Taber {1965} 2002). The SOUTHCOM's approach appears to be that civilian authorities will aid military missions in the region (USSOUTHCOM, 2007).

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[74] ‘… There has been an impact … the military [is] only so large and the operations that we do in Iraq are involving a lot of our forces so we don’t have as many forces available to do counter-narcotics operations’. Interview, Military Official 2, 11 March 2004.

The 'war on terror' has aided the Bush administration and the DoD in creating new funding streams which in part sought to circumvent restrictions placed on existing channels (such as human rights conditions and other conditionality agreements) over the use of material aided to Latin American countries. Funding has also sought to extend DoD influence in relation to the Department of State (Withers et al, March 2008). These financial shifts are not the actions of a bureaucratic power grab; rather they represent a concerted effort on the part of the Bush administration to shift foreign policy implementation to the military or in cooperation with the military. The expansion of the role of SOUTHCOM in the command's strategy paper is not only a concern for the hemisphere, but the globe, for the SOUTHCOM's expanded role is, the Joint Chiefs hope, a pilot programme which will eventually be projected to all regional commands (National Defense Strategy, 2005; Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 2001). The US Joint Chiefs, together with their political masters, have reorganised SOUTHCOM in order to meet perceived/anticipated twenty-first century challenges, in which issues of economic globalisation and the Janus-faced state's legitimacy is continually questioned by non-state actors such as narcotics cartels, Marxist inspired guerrillas, peasant movements, and populist politicians. The resultant re-organisation of SOUTHCOM seeks to meet such threats to US interests and local Latin American elites via broadening and re-defining the nature of warfare mirroring the development of a fourth-generation of insurgency movement (Manwaring, 2007). The US military seeks to utilise the region's militaries in collaboration to mutual ends, with the SOUTHCOM as facilitator and to fulfil the dual function of providing a regional preponderance of force in order to strategically deny extra-hemispheric powers a foothold, while also seeking to maintain a form of democracy in the region (National Defense Strategy, 2005; Gills, Rocamora and Wilson, 1993).

The rhetorical justification for this development within SOUTHCOM relies on the 'war on terror'. Of particular note with reference to such rhetoric is the continuing civil war in Colombia; the effective sovereignty of tracks of Amazonian jungle; and the utilisation of the tri-border region of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina as a lawless haven in which Hezbollah and Hamas operatives are able to gain a foothold in the region in order to launder their finances and finance narcotics trading within the expatiate Lebanese community in the area.[75] Since Mexico lies within the area of responsibility of NORTHCOM, alongside the US continental landmass it is questionable whether this model offered by SOUTHCOM will be implemented in full, at least within the NORTHCOM area of responsibility. This is due to opposition from the military in the face of politicians' calls for the militarisation of the 'counter-terror' mission. However, the Bush administration has formulated the Merida Initiative in order to aid the Mexican military to professionalise and modernise in the face of narcotics violence, as noted previously (Cook, Rush and Seelke, 2008).

Mexico, as the neighbour of the US, is critical to the Western Hemispheric security strategy of the US government. [76] As NGO Official 1 notes on this matter: '… Mexico's stability is very important, it's the lynchpin of stability in a region that is often very unstabl[e] democracies …'.[77] As such, the Merida Initiative may provide an opportunity similar to that commenced under President Clinton in the late 1990s. It is significant that President Bush has waited until the departure of President Fox and the election of President Calderón to re-open high level diplomatic relations. With this in mind a discussion follows of the US-Mexican post-11 September 2001 relationship.

Post 11 September 2001 US-Mexican Relations

With the election of Vicente Fox in 2000, the relationship between the US and Mexico appeared to offer up the prospect of a new chapter. Indeed, as previously stated, relations between Fox and Bush were personally warm and the US and Mexican governments both seemed willing to deepen their bilateral ties. Such optimism soon proved unfounded. The Fox administration's approach to foreign relations, within the limitations of Mexican socio-political realities, not to mention the constitution, came unstuck in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. Mexico's push for a re-working of hemispheric security outside of the Cold War era Rio Treaty of 1947 in favour of a more loosely connected political association, on 12 September 2001 was viewed in Washington as a stab in the back against a country which had just suffered multiple terror attacks, rather than an attempt to renew the Cold War era security architecture against such non-state actor-based threats. Despite the negative perception, the

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[75] Participant observation at 'The Middle East Terrorist Connection in Latin America and the Caribbean Conference', Washington DC, 3 March 2004.

[76] '… The United States does not a more important relationship than that we have with Mexico …'. Interview, Federal Government Official 1, 4 March 2004.

[77] Interviewed by author, 12 February 2004.

Fox administration was eager to assist the US government in the practicalities of detouring planes in the immediate aftermath with the closure of US airspace. It also agreed to increase the screening of arrivals at Mexican airports and ports, as well as tightening border controls along Mexico's southern and northern borders (Pappalardo, 2004). In addition Fox and his then Foreign Secretary (Jorge Casteñada), remained as determined as ever to push forward with their attempts to deepen ties with the US in particular, as well as with Canada via a NAFTA-plus process. For the Mexican government security cooperation appeared to be the route through which to deepen trust and cooperation between the US and Mexican generally. The negotiation of a NAFTA-plus agreement became a central plank of the Fox administration's North American foreign policy: as *Los Pinos* came under pressure to increase economic growth domestically and prove the worth of the NAFTA treaty to the Mexican people, it also came under pressure externally from its northern neighbour to provide stability and a secure border. On this latter dimension Hristoulas opines that:

> [President Fox] repeatedly argued that as long as Mexico is a place where forty percent of the population makes less than two dollars a day, US borders will never be secure. The solution is either a migration agreement in which the US legally absorbs a substantial number of Mexican migrant workers or a North American social cohesion program similar to that in existence in the European Union or preferably both. Pushing this linkage idea even further Mexican officials have even gone so far as to argue that it is in the national security interests of the United States to legalize the 3.5 million undocumented Mexican workers because it is better to know who they actually are, given the context of homeland defence (Hristoulas in Andreas and Biersteker, 2003: 39-40).

On 4 November 2001 President Fox called for the development of a North American Security Policy to this end, only to find his proposal opposed in nearly all quarters, by the US and Canadian governments as well as the Mexican Senate. For their part, the Canadians rejected the notion of a NAFTA-plus agreement as it was perceived that it would dilute their security arrangements with the US, notably NORAD. Additionally, the Fox initiative opened up the political possibility of the Bush administration equating its northern border with the Mexican one. Canada's opposition to this multilateral approach came in sharp relief from the country's default diplomatic position of supporting multilateralism via the United Nations and NATO. The Canadian government did not want to jeopardise its strong bilateral military relations with the US in favour of a diluted version which would involve the Mexicans (Hristoulas in Andreas and Biersteker, 2003: 34-37).

In the case of the US government and the Mexican Senate, opposition to the initiative reflected long standing stereotyped political positions. The PRI-dominated Senate feared for

Mexico’s sovereignty and the doctrine of non-intervention, given the executive’s desire to promote multilateralism, providing a domestic block on any such initiative. The Senate, with the Fox administration’s blessing, ratified the Rome Statute of 1998, which established Mexico’s recognition of the International Criminal Court. The passing of the American Servicemembers’ [sic] Protection Act - ASPA on 1 July 2003 by the US Congress, which enacted limits on the military and economic aid to countries that refused to provide assurances not to prosecute its servicemen and women under the Rome Statute. This strengthened the hands of foreign policy traditionalists in Mexico, who continued to advocate the doctrine of non-intervention and national sovereignty.

In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, Washington retreated from its relatively open-minded approach to security concerns within North America, to a more nationalistic and unilateralist approach. The US government and its agencies initially concentrated their energies on the defence of the realm, when faced with possible further attacks from Al-Qaeda. This mindset resulted in a single-minded approach to relations with Mexico in the short to medium term, as Academic Interviewee 1 comments: ‘… [9/11] shifted US security policy fundamentally … it raises domestic security, homeland security to be number one priority and President Bush has really focused on the war on terror …’. [78] The Bush administration sought to emphasise border control and security with the screening of travellers both at the US border and arrivals at Mexican airports. While the Fox administration was eager to assist, it failed to gain any political capital from its cooperation with US policymakers. The Fox administration’s attempt to utilise the ‘war on terror’ in the US polity to their advantage through the advocating of a NAFTA-plus arrangement, consequently met with stony resistance from US officials more concerned with the Al-Qaeda threat than social justice and stability in Mexico (Hristoulas in Andreas and Biersteker, 2003: 26-45).

In the initial period of the post-11 September 2001 era of US-Mexican relations saw both newly elected Presidents having to cope with the attacks on the security architecture of North America and the foreign policies of the individual countries. Through a combination of political mismanagement by the Fox administration and sheer bad luck bilateral ties began to wane, though institutional ties continued in vital security areas such as counter-narcotics, border security and counter-terror.

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[78] Interviewed by author, 9 February 2004.

The issue of immigration and border control loomed high on the political agenda in Washington DC, as migrants became political scapegoats. They were even seen by some rightist populists, such as Lou Dobbs, as a fifth column working to undermine the economy and security of the United States. While these positions existed prior to 11 September 2001, the Bush administration seized the opportunity afforded by the resulting moral panic towards the 'other', such as immigrants, placing immigration control high on the legislative and executive agenda in the form of the USA PATRIOT Act and via Homeland Security Presidential Directive 2 entitled, 'Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies'. In effect, the 'war on terror' and the issue of border control became conflated via the notion of 'alien terrorists' (Jackson, 2005: 70-73).

Unsurprisingly, given the political environment, calls for the securing of the US-Mexican border, along with a renewal of the Clinton administration's policy of fencing the frontier in order to prevent illegal crossings, swiftly followed (Storrs, 2003: 8). Unlike the Clinton administration's policy which sought to fence only border crossings close or in urbanised areas, the US Congress now sought to extend this to the majority of the 2,000 mile length, with limited gaps policed by electronic surveillance. In parallel, the Bush administration floated the possibility of immigration reform, lobbying the Latino community in the US with his guest worker programme proposal. Indeed, the suggestion represented a partial result of pre-11 September 2001 Bush-Fox conversations and the acknowledgement on both sides of the need for a resolution to the continuing illegal and dangerous transit of humans across their border. The welfare of migrant Mexicans utilising routes into the US via desert regions were secondary.

Under pressure to act by the US electorate and public opinion the Bush administration has attempted to address the immigration problem via the guest worker programme and a US-Mexican Border Partnership Action Plan. These attempts at securing the border were allied to initiatives within Mexico to encourage inward investment in order to ease 'push' factors for migrants. However, in the face of political pressure from right-wing Republicans and the development of vigilante groups like the Minutemen, the Bush administration has failed to show the political will required to develop an integrated response to the immigration issues between the US and Mexico. The Mexican government, both under Fox and latterly, Calderón, are subject to an asymmetrical relationship in which they can only ameliorate the fringes of US border control policies (Biersteker in Andras and Biersteker, 2003: 154). The development of *La Guía del Migrante*, a guide for Mexicans attempting to cross into the US, along with the issuing of Mexican identity cards by Mexican consulates throughout the US to facilitate the wire transfer of remittances, are two such policies (SRE, 2005).

On the ground in border towns like San Diego, as elsewhere, the immigration issue has fed into racial politics with the 'war on terror' being used by local commanders of the US Border Patrol to operate in a highly aggressive and proactive fashion. In practice, this has meant the unofficial use of racial profiling; the questioning of commuters on mass transit about their legal status, and the use of heavy handed raids of private homes and businesses. This proactive approach has been a noticeable consequence of the linkage between national security and border control via the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, of which US Border Patrol is an element.[79] As NGO Official 5 states: 'The history of immigration is very tightly connected to how this country perceives itself who it believes should be a citizen and who is not'.[80] Radical profiling, over aggressive policing, and concerns over illegal immigration and families with mixed immigrant status, have only intensified in the context of the 'war on terror', the development of the Department of Homeland Security and the emphasis on border security.

While US officials are eager to exclude illegal migrants, they are equally keen to promote the continuing flow of goods across the US border in order to further globalisation and to promote economic growth. As a result a heavy emphasis has been placed on the ability to filter the passage of goods, while simultaneously excluding the movement of labour and contraband.[81] The smart border agreement between the US and Mexico of 21 March 2002 sought to set out a twenty-two point plan to this end. Rather than concentrating on the much needed institutional level bilateral inter-agency cooperation, the agreement concentrates on the issue of physical border security at a day-to-day level (Bondi, 2004: 89). Likewise, the Bush administration has continued its diplomatic efforts to bring about greater cooperation in North America on border security via the 2005 Security and Prosperity Partnership, while aims at promoting trade and the process of regionalism in the continent. Both initiatives aim to fulfil the objectives of the US government which, as the more powerful partner, is able to set terms of trade.

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[79] '… [The Border Patrol are] using the national security concerns as a pretext to … to conduct these operations in communities heavily populated by the Latino community of San Diego County and of other counties as well', Interview, NGO Official 5, 14 April 2005.

[80] Interviewed by author, 14 April 2005.

[81] '[The US and Mexico are] trying to secure the border now and at the same time making sure the border is free for the movement of people and goods across the border in the normal way to protect commerce and make sure commerce is not impeded …', Interview, Federal Government Official 2, 25 March 2004.

Indeed since conducting fieldwork issues pertaining to the US-Mexican border have further intensified. In 2006 the National Guard started patrolling the border region, while the erection of a new border wall has proceeded apace with the passing of the Secure Fence Act. In 2006 the Department of Homeland Security changed its policy towards migrants caught attempting to illegally cross the border. Rather than simply returning migrants to Mexico, individuals are now criminalised, serving their sentence before being returned to Mexico as ex-convicts. As with the drug war, the executive (and in particular the military and Department of Homeland Security) are increasingly besieged by requests for intervention and crackdowns on border security from populist politicians in the US Congress, as the Secure Fence Act (2006) illustrates. All the while, however, there is a failure on the part of the Bush administration and Capitol Hill to engage with Mexico rationally to find a solution to the question of illegal immigration. Under these circumstances, Mexico is powerless to intervene in the continuing regressive policies of the US government.

The social construction of the war on terror and its in-built chauvinism against 'evil-doers' and the binary logic of 'you're with us or against us' has had consequences for the nature and quality of democracy in the US. As Jackson states: 'There is a real danger that the 'war on terrorism' is expanding to become a 'war on dissent' or a 'war on politics'. Such a war, of course, can only result in the eventual death of participatory democracy, not in the destruction of terrorism' (2005:184). This is most notable in the case of the muting and dispersion of the anti-globalisation movement from its high water mark in Seattle 1999 to the post-11 September 2001 era in which a movement that appeared to be gaining political traction in US polity has dissolved into atomised groups and individuals cowered by the pervading social construct of the war on terror. Hence, discourse outside of the frames set by the political elite becomes criminalised or equated with the 'other' and 'terrorism', enabling both the freezing out of alternative schools of thought and deliberately constructing social norms which discourage open and/or alternative constructions.

Alongside the continuing issue of immigration in 2000 the Fox administration initiated a new foreign policy of multilateralism centred on respect for human rights and greater participation in international organisations. The results were mixed. The diplomatic relationship worsened as in 2002 Mexico gained its non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. This coincided with diplomatic arm twisting in relation to Iraq's supposed 'weapons of mass destruction' programme. While the Mexican government was eager to promote and renew the institutions of the United Nations (UN), its northern neighbour pursued virtually unilateral action in the hornet's nest of the Middle East. President

Fox's decision to engage with the UN Security Council after a twenty-year absence at a time of geopolitical crisis and US bullish militarism, consequently resulted in a lose-lose scenario in US-Mexican relations, as well as for the Fox administration domestically (Bondi, 2004). There had initially been debate amongst Mexican policymakers over whether it was sage to engage with the UN Security Council whilst acknowledging the importance of the US to Mexico's geopolitical strategy, with the multilateralism approach winning through with unintended consequences. The Fox administration had put Mexico forward for a seat on the Security Council in order to promote its foreign policy objectives of renewing UN institutions, increasing Mexico's and the Western Hemisphere's global profile (alongside Chile who also had a seat at the time), the promotion of human rights and democracy, in addition to the promoting a multi-polar geo-politics. Faced by a single-minded Bush administration with regard to the Iraq question, the Fox government (and in particular Mexico's representative to the UN, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser), were diplomatically pinned down by Washington's eagerness to go to war: Mexican and Chilean votes were key to providing the diplomatic cover for the removal of Saddam Hussein. Though Mexico attempted to find a compromise between the hard line views of the US and French governments via UN resolution 1441 (on 8 November 2002), the US and British attempted to push for a second resolution. On 5 February 2003, Secretary of State, Colin Powell delivered a presentation to the UN Security Council informing them of the 'weapons of mass destruction programme' in Iraq. China and France, along with the two Latin American countries on the Security Council remained unimpressed. Diplomatic tempers consequently frayed:

> The opening salvo was delivered shortly on the heels of Powell's presentation, when a US diplomat reportedly declared that nobody cared about what Mexico thought. This diplomatic faux pas prompted US Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman to deny any knowledge of the comment during a press conference with Mexican and German journalists. In the same breath, however, Grossman warned that 'Mexico as a Council member now has global responsibilities and ought to take a global view of this terrorist threat'. To those Mexicans who, in the aftermath of Al-Qaeda's attacks on the US, had been willing to accommodate US concerns and risk a public backlash by implementing anti-terrorism measures to protect their shared border, Grossman's exhortation seemed unfair and patronizing (Bondi, 2004: 15).

By 13 March 2003, the US *fait accompli* occurred as tanks rolled across the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. Mexico's failure to reach a diplomatic solution and Fox's relative silence compared to the Chilean protests against the US adventure in Iraq, demonstrated a failure to provide a leadership role for Latin America. The venturing of the Mexican government into UN politics therefore backfired both domestically and in its relationship with the US. The controversy led to resignation of Foreign Secretary Jorge Casteñada (January 2003) and the Mexican Representative to the UN, Aguilar Zinser (November 2003). Indicatively, when leaving office Aguilar Zinser could not help himself, stating: 'The United States isn't interested in a relationship of equals with Mexico, but rather in a close relationship of convenience and subordination' (Bondi, 2004: 21).

Parallel with the long running UN centred friction, other issues of a global and hemispheric nature have affected US-Mexican relations post-11 September 2001. These include the growing importance of human rights (at least rhetorically), immigration and the changing definition of 'national security' in the region. The Fox administration's, (particularly Foreign Secretary Jorge Castañeda's), push on human rights was seen as an attempt to wipe clean the political slate of PRI-sponsored state violence (particularly in the 1960s and 1970s during the dirty war against leftist guerrilla movements following the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre). More relevantly for US-Mexican relations Fox hoped to use human rights as a means of both improving Mexico's image overseas and increasing the country's role in multilateralism via the UN. To this end, the Mexican government signed an agreement with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights then presided over by ex-Irish President, Mary Robinson. The agreement sought to embed human rights practices within Mexican official systems via the development of an Office for Human Rights and Democracy. Surprisingly for an issue concerning the internal workings of the state and its relationship with the citizenry, this entity was placed in the Foreign Affairs Secretariat (SRE) rather than *Gobernación*.

The Fox administration also sought to ratify other rather obscure UN human right treaties: The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Woman and The Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearances. While laudable, the aim in ratifying these agreements appeared to follow previous Mexican government policies, viz. attempting to garner international political capital rather than a genuine concern for child soldiers, the disappeared or women's rights.

Nevertheless, the opening of the UNHCHR office in Mexico and the publishing of *Diagnóstico sobre la Situación de los Derechos Humanos en México* in 2003 represented a substantial initiative in light of traditional approaches to sovereignty and non-intervention.

With reference to US-Mexican security relations, the Fox administration's promotion of human rights within Mexican civil society brought into question the civil-military settlement of the PRI era. This had provided Mexico with a political system in which the military had not interfered in civilian affairs since the 1940s, in exchange the military operated autonomously, including the administration of their own parallel justice system (Camp, 2005: 264-268). The UNHCHR Report openly questioned this arrangement within the process of democratisation, due to the impunity it afforded to the Mexican military from civilian criminal proceedings.

Furthermore, in November 2001 National Archives relating to the dirty war of the 1960s and 1970s had been opened, and a special prosecutor's office to find justice for the victims of state-sponsored-violence during this era created (Camp, 2005: 265-266). Such unaccustomed openness towards human rights violations by the military and the intelligence services remained, however, limited to the Cold War era. Latter day human rights abuses by the Mexican security apparatus have continued with impunity regardless of the Fox administration's good intentions; this continued impunity is corrosive to the democratisation of the society as a whole as well as the maintenance of stable and democratic civil-military relations (Paterson, 2008). In this regard, Military Official 1 states:

> Yes there are probably … human rights issues because of the Mexican military justice system … well, the Mexican justice system [and] for the whole society for that matter … it's like the old adage don't ask the question unless you can live with the answer. Don't ask the question unless we are really willing to make an effort to fix this thing … there is not much we can do about it, so let's not get into that OK ….[82]

The issue of human rights has historically created friction between the respective governments as the US Congress sought to impose end-user conditionality to US supplied military material and training, which in turn heightened Mexican concerns over their sovereignty (Isacson et al, 2007). With the Mexican government's decision to sign the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2000), the passing by the US Congress of the ASPA (2003), together with the Nethercutt Amendment of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (2005), sanctions have been self-imposed by Capitol Hill on military aid to Mexico. The ASPA (2003) enforced sanctions on the IMET, FMF and EDA funding streams, while the Nethercutt Amendment cut ESF funding from Mexico and other countries that have signed the Rome Statute while not also signing an Article 98 Agreement to give US citizens immunity from proceedings at the International Criminal Court. While the intent was to delimit the possibility of vexatious litigation of prominent US personnel and politicians, it has had the unintended consequence of cutting funding streams to Mexico and other signees.

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[82] Interviewed by author, 12 February 2004.

This has affected US national interests in the region, as the US military's assistance programmes are hampered, which diminishes their influence vis-à-vis Latin American and other signee's armed forces. As DeShazo states:

> The Mexican army and navy are undergoing a dynamic process of change, evolving into more professional and transparent institutions under increased civilian control. The loss of IMET for Mexico at this important moment is especially inopportune, closing the door on potential relations with institutions that have a direct effect on [US] borders and [US] security (2006: 3).

Domestically this state of affairs has created friction between DoD and State Department officials towards Capitol Hill. Interviewees were eager to voice their frustrations towards Capitol Hill for pressurising their respective departments to act on issues such as terrorism and/or drugs, while tying their hands in this manner.[83]

As noted, the White House has attempted to by-pass the ASPA (2003) through the creation of new funding streams under the rationale of counter-terrorism, as well as the concentration of bilateral military funding streams operating via the DoD rather than the State Department (Isacson et al, 2007; Withers et al, 2008). Regarding Mexico, the Bush administration has sought military assistance for their southern neighbour under the rationale of the war on drugs and the threat of growing instability within the border region (Freeman, 2006).

With the election of Felipe Calderón in 2006 to the Presidency, US-Mexican relations entered a new chapter. The Bush-Calderón relationship, in terms of security issues, has focused on the continuing war on drugs and the destabilising effect of the power and money of narcotics kingpins upon the sovereignty of the Mexican state. While Washington has become bogged down in two low intensity conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Calderón administration is faced its own internal low intensity conflict, as drug gangs fight amongst each other and with state authorities for *de facto* control over the frontier region and the drug producing areas of the Sierra Madre mountain range. Within this context, the Calderón administration has not been shy in putting its point across to the Bush administration, especially in regard of the continued transfer of small arms from the southern states of the US. In echoes of past history, the US appears to be fuelling violence in Mexico through this trade, a result of the failure of political will to regulate the arms trade due to the political weight of the gun lobby, coalesced around the National Rifle Association (Weinberg, 2008). Calderón has also been forthright in his views about immigration and the treatment of Mexican citizens in the US, showing a greater level of political self-confidence than the Fox administration.[84]

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[83] Author: 'Do the several US government agencies and departments work to the same ends?
NGO Official 1: 'Well, not always and they don't always tell each other what they are doing … [it was] a contributing factor to 9/11 … we weren't able to apprehend them as a result so obviously better cooperation is something that we are going to have to work on'. Interview, 12 February 2004.
Federal Government Official 4 sarcastically notes of DoD and State Department relations: 'Great, couldn't be better!'Interview, 11 March 2004.

Bilateral relations under Bush and Calderón have also shifted as a result of a new personal relationship. Military links between the two neighbours have traditionally run parallel to relations generally. Throughout the 'war on terror' the relationship has concentrated on the border region and the covert intelligence services. Overt military aid has, until the Merida Initiative, not played a major role in ties between the two neigbours since the Clinton presidency; however, there has been some limited training either in US institutions or via mobile training teams. The question remains whether the Merida Initiative will simply stoke the fires of narco-violence or enable the Mexican authorities to regain control over the territory of the country and re-enforce their legitimacy among the citizenry.

Conclusion

At first glance it may appear that the 'war on terror', as constructed by President Bush and his neo-conservative bedfellows, is little more than a continuation of the pre-existing 'war on drugs'. Such an analysis, while partially true, would belie the cultural and political significance of the 'war on terror' discourse which pervades US society. The initial outburst of grief and calls for revenge have been transmogrified and institutionalised in such a fashion as to both aid and embolden those elements of the US government and polity in favour of an imperialistic foreign policy, albeit through the rhetoric of democratic expansionism. In practical terms, such a foreign policy agenda is made possible as a result of changing civil-military relations in the post-Cold War era. The RMA, via the expanded use of computing technology, hand in hand with the military's increasingly unrepresentative recruitment from US society and its diminution relative to the size of the economy, enables Washington to conduct foreign policy and military missions with relatively little recourse to US citizens. A grouping of intellectuals and policymakers with little to no military experience, never mind combat experience, are therefore better able to engage the US military's might in the service of theoretical models with scant regard for local particularities or nuances, in favour of grandiose notions of democratisation by military occupation.

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[84] (Herrera Beltran, C. (28 April 2007), 'Calderón: la migracion, 'fenómeno natural'; insta al Capitolo a lograr reforma en el tema', La Jornada, accessed at: http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2007/04/08/index.php?section=007n1pol;
Olivares Alonso, E. (28 April 2007), 'Aumentarán decesos de migrantes por la militarización de la frontera: experta', La Jornada, accessed at:
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2007/04/28/index.php?section=politica&article=006n1pol).

While for the Middle East and South Asia the results have been dramatic and bloody, there have also been consequences for the Western Hemisphere, even though the coalescing of military capability and political will has not resulted in tank divisions rolling across the Rio Grande. The establishment of the Department Homeland Security, with its traffic light system never lowering below elevated status, alongside continuing media coverage of lax border security and Mexican illegal migration, has in the popular consciousness fed notions of 'otherness', 'terrorism' and 'migrants'.[85] The result has been a cultural and institutionally endorsed de-humanisation of migrants, particularly those of non-white complexion. Such a social construction of migrants is not an accident of social discourse, but rather a proactive interweaving of interests and perceived identities within the political class that frames and expounds political discourse. On this issue Jackson posits that:

> The 'war on terrorism', like other kinds of violence, is not a natural or normal response to objective conditions or events; nor is it simply an inevitable response to the actions of others. It is rather, a totalising discourse which has been deliberately, and in some senses, artificially, created to make people who would otherwise be circumscribed by normal social codes of non-violence, tolerance and human rights, complicit or even willing participants in a massive project of counter-terrorist violence. It is a political and social construction, an edifice built on language and discursive practice (2005: 181).

Concerns over the level of migration in the US are not based on rational thought but rather the constructs of the elite: the issue of immigration within the context of the on-going 'war on terror' has been used by the political and economic elite to their advantage as a means of justification for social control of both migrants and the working poor in the context of economic globalisation and the hollowing out of the state.

The social construct also encourages emphasis on the state functions of policing and military expenditure in both defending the border and imposing social control. While simultaneously providing the context and political vehicle to hollow out the functions of the state via the provision of corporate welfare and the decline of programmes of social up lift (Manwaring, 2007; Chomsky, 1994; Chomsky, 1997: 83-188). Such policies that within a rational political discourse would be seen by the polity as regressive and unacceptable in the ferment of the social construct of the ‘war on terror’ are perceived as necessary to ‘defend the homeland’.

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[85] Chronology of Homeland Security Advisory System available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editioral_0844.htm

Indeed, the social construction of the ‘war on terror’, with its in-built chauvinism against ‘evil-doers’ and the binary logic of ‘you are with us or against us’, has had consequences for the nature of (and quality of) democracy in the US, as Jackson notes: ‘There is a real danger that the ‘war on terrorism’ is expanding to become a ‘war on dissent’ or a ‘war on politics’. Such a war, of course, can only result in the eventual death of participatory democracy, not in the destruction of terrorism’ (2005:184). This is most notable in the case of the muting and dispersion of the anti-globalisation movement from its high watermark in 1999 and the ‘Battle of Seattle’, to the post-11 September 2001 era, in which a movement that appeared to be gaining political traction in the US polity has dissolved into atomised groups and individuals cowered by the pervading social construct of the ‘war on terror’. In this environment, discourse outside the frames set by the political elite becomes equated with the ‘other’ and ‘terrorism’, both freezing out alternative schools of thought and deliberately constructing social institutions which discourage open and/or alternative social constructs.

The Mexican government, locked into an asymmetrical relationship with the US, is unable to counter the political and moral panic, which results in it barking its disapproval from the sidelines. Yet it is only through the rational engagement of Mexico, together with the US and Canada, that a socially just and practical solution or series of solutions can be found. This is highly unlikely within the continued context of the ‘war on terror’. Nevertheless, a policy of engagement by Mexico with its northern neighbour is not merely desirable but essential, given the *de facto* marriage of socio-economic interests. Yet the Calderón government appears to be partially using the conceptualisation of the ‘war on terror’ for its own ends, namely the provision of assistance to Mexico, in the form of the Merida Initiative, to combat the narcotics ‘kingpins’. Recent events appear to provide evidence of the terroristic behaviour of *narcotraficantes*: *‘Es un acto terrorista que apunta al crimen organizado, dizo el gobernador de Michoacán, Leonel Godoy, sobre las tres granadas lanzadas a la plaza de la capital estatal durante los festejos del Grito de la Independencia’*.[86]

The linking of the ‘war on drugs’ and ‘terrorism’ is not a novel political construct. It was used by politicians and policymakers in the 1980s with reference to the Central

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[86] La Jornada Online (16 September 2008), accessed at: http://www.jornada.unam.mx

American wars and the involvement of Cuba. Indeed, it is employed today with reference to (and justification of) the on-going Colombian civil war and US aid programme to the government forces. While the Calderón administration may not wish to start a conflict on the scale of the Colombian civil war, any combining of these two constructs for political or strategic advantage may engender negative outcomes. The US military is all too eager to cooperate with the Mexican authorities in the process of militarising the 'war on drugs' via use of the rhetoric on the 'war on terror'. It is only Mexico's historical and cultural distrust of their northern neighbour that prevents greater US intervention. Such distrust of the US government is exemplified by Carlos Fazio:

> *Estados Unidos no da cheques en blanco. La naturaleza policiaco-militar del Plan México y su enfoque contrainsurgente se mantienen. ... El Plan México se vendió como un plan de 'asistencia' militar para tres años (2008-2010). Pero adquirirá carácter permanente. Igual ocurrió en Colombia. El asunto es más grave porque aquí ha sido incorporado de facto a 'Norteamerica' como nueva dimensión geográfica, con su reminiscencia nazi de 'espacio vital'. México forma parte del 'perímetro de seguridad' de EU y su está monitoreado por el Comando Norte. Poco a poco el Pentágono ha ido cerrando el 'tercer vínculo' de la relación bilateral: el militar. Este aspecto, que tener que ver con la 'integración profunda' de México a Estados Unidos, los 'corredores del TLCAN', la militarización de la frontera y la migración indocumentado como sinónimo de terrorismo.*[87]

The 'war on terror' has had a marked effect on the US-Mexico relationship, mostly via the socio-political consequences of the transformation of the US itself. The nature of the 'war on terror' as a social construct seeking to frame and so narrow alternative or contradictory modalities of thought via notions of warped nationalism and democracy paradoxically provides in its very nature an element of hope. This is not to state that the 'war on terror' as a social construct is able to, or is constructed for, the purpose of the self-actualisation of the citizenry. Rather the bankrupt nature of the social construct, due to its failure to answer the ideological challenge of Islamic radicalism, the strategic concerns of terrorism within the globalised world community, will in time allow for a revisiting of the theoretical and strategic make up of US foreign policy and the dominant political discourse. Indeed in its very nature as a social construct, the concept of the 'war on terror' is fluid as social actors' identities and interests shift, a point that has been noted by Jackson: 'If a campaign of violence like the 'war on terrorism' can be socially and politically constructed, it can also be deconstructed' (2005: 188).

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[87] La Jornada (30 June 2008), accessed at: http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2008/06/30/index.php?section=opinion&article=023a1pol

The ‘war on terror’ and the post-11 September 2001 era may provide us with the high water mark of neo-conservatism and Islamic radicalism. There is a corresponding need to construct a more clear headed and rational intellectual basis to ideologically counter and strategically deny Islamic terror cells, whilst preserving and encouraging a pluralist democratic culture both domestically and internationally and in the process increasing the strategic and diplomatic synergy between Western Hemispheric countries.

VI
CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

This thesis has sought to develop new insights into the general study of civil-military relations and the particular US-Mexican bilateral ties, through the use of social constructivist analysis. Social constructivism allows for the intellectual renewal of civil-military relations in order to meet the challenges confronting the state in the twenty-first century. The key issues facing not only US-Mexican security links, but the wider topic of civil-military relations, were set out in the theoretical chapter. These were pinpointed as: (i) the changing nature of the state and 'anarchy' in the international system; (ii) the changing nature of what constitutes a 'military' and 'civilian' social actor; and (iii) the evolution of the conceptualisation of '(in)security'. Occurring within the context of globalisation, neo-liberal economics and the geopolitical *realpolitik* of US hegemony within the Western Hemisphere, these questions have been addressed throughout the thesis in order to analyse them vis-à-vis the different facets of the US-Mexican security relationship. As Federal Government Official 9 noted, ties between these neighbours can be broken down into historical, political and structural/functional elements.[88] The thesis has accordingly been organised along these lines, with chapters focusing on the historical background, regional security architecture, the 'war on drugs' and the 'war on terror', in order to provide a rounded overview of contemporary US-Mexican relations.

Theoretical Overview

The theoretical model used is central to the thesis, providing the cornerstone to the empirical chapters and underpins the doctorate as a whole. The dissertation sought to examine the *problematique* of civil-military relations theory and the nature of the state within the international arena, via a social constructivist analysis. In an attempt to rejuvenate civil-military relations theory, the thesis sought to utilise social constructivism to enable the development of a conceptual model for the understanding and explanation of the role of the military within the state in the twenty-first century. The dissertation not only aimed to examine the challenges facing civil-military relations, but also to renew its realist/neo-realist framework and to create an arguably more complete conceptualisation of security studies.

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[88] Interviewed by author, note in aide memoir (tape recording was not permitted for security reasons), 31 March 2004.

Such a theoretical re-examination is based on the explicit understanding of the constructed nature of international relations and its rules and norms. Indeed, it has been argued that the interpretation of the state and the international system as being socially constructed enables a re-conceptualisation of civil-military and bilateral security issues in a more humane fashion. It achieves this by placing the individual as referent object at the centre of the discourse of (in)security in the twenty-first century. This re-conceptualisation of civil society, the state and the international system, creates a more flexible and fruitful model for the examination of civil-military relations and bilateral ties. The theoretical reconstituting of the nature of both the international arena and state, moves beyond the concept of the state as a unitary social actor, to a theoretical position that acknowledges that the different elements within the bureaucratic structure of the state may act as individual social actors as well as in concert. Differing entities and individuals may enter into contradiction with each other as a consequence of divergent identities and interests within the governmental system. In this light, military and civilian groupings within the state should be viewed as multi-faceted social constructs and actors who possess an internal and external identity, which coalesce to form the ‘institutional mind’. An appreciation of such competing pressures allows for the theoretical acknowledgement of social actors as having identities and interests both internally and externally to the state. Such a re-examination of the notion of the state and its military and civilian components, enables a more fruitful understanding of civil-military relations and bilateral ties in the twenty-first century, particularly in the Western Hemisphere. The thesis utilises the conceptualisation of (in)security which enables the humanisation of security studies within a backdrop of a state dominated international system, and a renewal of civil-military relations theory to meet the challenges facing the state in the twenty-first century.

A historical survey of bilateral relations between the US and Mexico is key to this empirical study, as it provides for a temporal analysis of ties between these two countries. This combination of social constructivism and historical institutionalism permits a fully round comprehension study of the nature of US-Mexican bilateral security relations.

Historical Overview

The historical overview forms a critical element within the dissertation. It serves to contextualise the theoretical methodology employed, as well as to provide an understanding of the complexities of the Mexican-US relationship; a social constructivist analysis of their bilateral relationship would be incomplete without an element of temporal analysis. However, social constructivism itself is a conceptualisation of social reality which is isolated from the notion of time as a key variable within social reality. Therefore, the theoretical model of historical institutionalism is used to bridge this gap and to create a more rounded analysis. The use of historical institutionalism dovetails with social constructivism, enabling the acknowledgement of the causal and cumulative relations between variables over time, to effect social actors' identities and interests. Indeed, historical institutionalism recognises that events are not singular, nor stationary, in relation to time and/or place. Rather, they comprise social processes, the result of social actors' complex array of identities and interests, which continue to have resonance and evolve over time. Such an approach proffers a more accurate explanation of historical events via the provision of social, political, economic and cultural contextualisation within its time and place. Indeed, historical institutionalism suggests that any significant political outcome in US-Mexican relations is best understood as a combination of both rules and norms (institutions), together with individual actor interest maximisation. Thus, like social constructivism, historical institutionalism sees agency and structure as equally relevant variables in the explanation of social acts.

Social constructivism proffers this thesis with an understanding of agency and structure's relationship as being one of duality. It also provides a theoretical model for interpreting social actor interests, identities and societal rules and norms in a mutually reinforcing and embedded social process. Historical institutionalism brings to social constructivism an ability to comprehend how multiple causal variables interact over time, shaping political outcomes in the ever evolving process of US-Mexican relations. It does this without being wed to any particular methodology or grandiose political model. Instead, it offers an explanation of historical events within the context of the social processes of which they are a part, rather than wishing to provide any predictive utility. This is a result of historical institutionalism's desire, like social constructivist analysis, to allow for social actor agency. Consequently, the central tenets of historical institutionalism dovetail with those of social constructivism in terms of their understanding of social reality and the role of political science. Historical institutionalism's key role is that it enables the examination and explanation of social processes over time.

With this in mind, let us now consider the central issues within US-Mexican bilateral relations. Major events in US-Mexican history, such as the annexation of Texas in 1844, the US occupation (1846-1848), leading to the loss of half Mexico's territory, through to the overt and covert involvement of the US government in the Mexican civil war (1910-1920), indicate certain consistencies. On the part of the US government, it is a legacy of interference in Mexican domestic politics that has resulted in deep-seated resentment and a strong belief in the doctrines of national sovereignty and non-intervention within the Mexican polity. Alongside the cultural resentment, which has become an undercurrent within Mexican national identity, this historical legacy comprises a critical element shaping the evolution of civil-military relations. The development of the state in which the US and Mexican militaries are situated, has played a key role. Both countries have evolved from colonies to independent democracies. For the US, the heavy emphasis on material and cultural expansion within the hemisphere, accompanied by a cultural superiority complex vis-à-vis non-whites, as formulated in the Monroe Doctrine, viewed the development of the US empire as the 'natural' order. This coincided with the birth of the US military as a near totally white institution (with the exception of indigenous pathfinders/guides), situated in a colonial white society which formed its identity and served its interests. From its inception the US military sought to meet the interests of American colonists, first in independence from the British and second, in the expansionist desires of colonial agriculture and demographic growth. By the nineteenth century, the ever-expanding US border encountered that of Mexico for first time.

Mexico's evolution from colonial possession to independent state is marked for being a gradual process, as the Spanish crown's influence in New Spain waned and competition between liberals and conservatives took shape, as the ideas of the French Revolution and the consequences of the Napoleonic Wars took effect throughout Latin America. As a result, the Mexican military's roots lie not in a home-grown militia fighting in defence of a mono-ethnic colonial gentry. Rather, the armed forces grew out of the imperial Spanish military, supplemented by *mestizos* and eventually indigenous peoples. Indeed, Mexico's War of Independence was a conflict between different elements of the same former motherland's army. In consequence, some aspects of the imperial Spanish military settlement in New Spain continued to pertain within the new independent state. One notable example of this is the colonial Spanish ethos of *fuero militar*.[89] This produced an officer corps more interested in its own promotion and status within the organisation than serving the Mexican state (De Palo, 1997). Such a mentality has echoes to the present day, with the continuing issue of the autonomy afforded the armed forces, both institutionally from the civilian executive and the military's privileged legal position, provoking associated accusations of impunity. This colonial legacy has also helped to create a culture of exceptionalism and autonomy, to differing degrees, throughout the Spanish speaking Americas – a mindset antithetical to the US military's cultural evolution and experiences.

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[89] Defined as 'corporate privileges and right of soldiers to trial by military jurisdiction' (De Palo, 1997: 244).

As the US expanded to the borders of Mexico in the nineteenth century, contact between both countries intensified, including bilateral military relations. Indeed, to the present day the US government has maintained a close interest in the internal workings of the political machinery of its southern neighbour and its military apparatus. The converse is also true. The Mexican state has long distrusted its northern neighbour, some would say with good reason, which has produced an uneasy relationship. Mexico's approach to the US has over time followed a familiar pattern of adhering to two main pillars: (i) to attempt to deny US influence in the domestic affairs of the country, while also; (ii) attempting to maintain peaceable links. Mexican policymakers have had to manage these central pillars of foreign policy within the context of the ebb and flow of domestic politics and the heavy asymmetry in power relations between the two nation states. Since 1848 the complex series of interwoven web of social networks between the two neighbours have reflexively evolved. This pattern is mirrored throughout the empirical chapters of the thesis, illustrating the importance of a historical perspective to achieve a rounded understanding of present-day interactions. With this in mind, let us now consider the regional dimension of US-Mexican relations.

Western Hemispheric Security Relations

The thesis examines the hegemonic nature of the US within the Western Hemisphere, not only with regard to Mexico, highlighting the behaviour of social actors over time in the development of regional organised security architecture. Particular reference is given to the notion of 'national security' as a diplomatic lever in the region to militarise political and socio-economic problems from the Cold War era to the present. From the establishment of the First International American Conference in 1889, later to take shape as the Pan American Union, the US government has sought to act according to the ethos of the Monroe Doctrine. It sought to treat the Western Hemisphere as its sphere of influence, promoting its interests politically and economically free of extra-hemispheric rivals. This has evolved to meet the threats and challenges facing the US and its allies over time, from the development of FDR's Good Neighbour Policy and Rainbow Strategy during the Second World War era to the Cold War era and the establishment of the OAS, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (also known as the Rio Treaty) and the conceptualisation of 'national security'.

Throughout this swathe of history, US interests and identity vis-à-vis the wider region have remained in the main constant in the face of ever-changing tactics. A key policy during the Cold War in the Western Hemisphere (which still has consequences in latter day Latin America), was the development of the ideology of 'national security'. Hand in hand with the militaries of the region, this provided justification for instigating *golpes de estado*, with the attendent repression of leftists, students and workers movements. The US aided and abetted Latin American military dictatorships in the creation of an organised repression machine in which the elimination of 'subversives' was a matter of 'national security', leading to joint torture chambers and international cooperation in disappearances under the umbrella of Operation Condor (McSherry, 2005). The 'long night' of the generals scarred civil-military relations in the region, emboldening praetorian elements inside the military. It later diminished civilian influence in the armed forces within the political structure of the state during the post-Cold War era, in the context of the embedding of democracy in societies through the hemisphere.[90]

Mexico stands as an exception to this general rule, having managed to maintain civilian control over the military since the 1940s. These differing histories between the countries of the region has coloured the latter-day debate over the development of a new security architecture to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. The US government has sought to define 'national security' in a militaristic fashion, giving emphasis to the role of the armed forces in the defence of the realm and the interests of the state of which it is part. This notion of 'national security' and, indeed, strategic policy towards the hemisphere, is expounded by the US government in National Security Policy Directive 32, which sets out a transformation of strategic and military policy in the region away from concentrating largely on counternarcotics to a kaleidoscope view of 'threats', while placing counterterrorism as its central concern. [91] It contends that via a multi-layered approach to the hemisphere, looking at democracy, trade and security, the US and its allies can meet their strategic goal of curtailing terrorism and attaining socio-political stability south of the Rio Grande. For the US government, central to achieving this is the tactic of 'effective sovereignty', a re-working of the Peruvian economist De Soto's work vis-à-vis the state and Sendero's challenge to its legitimacy. 'Effective sovereignty' is, in theory, a call for Latin American countries to enforce their sovereignty and to provide their citizenry with the common goods required to bring law and order together with development. However, given the weakness of many central civilian government bureaucracies, it is in reality a justification for the militarisation of areas of territory in the hemisphere with limited or no governmental presence. Indeed, the concept of 'effective sovereignty' was formulated with special reference to FARC-controlled areas of Colombia, and as such, it provides an ideological justification for continuing low intensity conflict within the Andean region and expanding the role of the military elsewhere in the continent, simply changing the pretext from 'narcotics' to 'terrorism'. In so doing, the policy seeks to re-engineer the neo-realist underpinning of US strategic thinking to meet regional challenges.

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[90] See O'Donnell (1988) and Collier (1979).

[91] NSPD32 is, at the time of writing, classified by the US government. However, the broad outlines were described to the author by Federal Government Official 9, who played a key role in its formulation.

For their part, Latin American governments have sought to emphasis the internal socio-economic difficulties facing their populations as a result of the on-going processes of globalisation and the neo-liberal economic system, seeking to adjust their definition of 'national security' in order to justify the use of the nation's military in 'social labour' so as to attempt to alleviate the growing wealth gap.[92] This contrasting view of the conceptualisation of 'national security' has only intensified in the aftermath of the political shock and resultant paradigm shift of 11 September 2001. The US government has sought to aggressively push its agenda within the hemisphere in order to meet its economic interests through the promotion of neo-liberal orthodoxy and political stability, alongside strategic denial of use of the hemisphere to both terrorist organisations and extra-hemispheric state actors (notably Iran and China). The success of the US agenda has been limited by its political attention being concentrated on the Middle East and Central/South Asia: as a result, limited resources have been devoted to the Americas, reducing the global hegemon's influence.

In this context, counter-hegemonic social and political forces, from populist leftists such as Hugo Chávez, *narcotraficantes*, criminal groups, extra-hemispheric powers and terrorist organisations, have all sought to increase their foothold and influence in the region. The countries of Latin America have struggled to counter the threats posed by *narcotraficantes* and criminal delinquents of all kinds, largely due to the inability of weak central governments to provide common goods, such as social services and policing.

In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, Latin American nations coalesced around the Rio Treaty, declaring their solidarity with the US government – at least rhetorically. The notable exception proved to be the Mexican administration of Vicente Fox, due to the country's exiting the Rio Treaty the previous day. The Fox regime adopted this position in an attempt to re-energise and reformulate the security architecture of the hemisphere in order to meet perceived growing challenges from non-state actors. Mexico's decision also aimed to gain influence in Central America and the Caribbean sub-regions and promote Mexico's international stature. The Fox administration's hubris in the light of 11 September 2001 was interpreted in Washington as a political and personal affront in their moment of need, which was felt particularly strongly given the warm personal relationship between Bush and Fox pre-11 September 2001.

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[92] 'Social labour' is a military term for activities other than core competencies, e.g. humanitarian activities or provision of medical assistance to the populace.

Indeed, the events of 11 September 2001 undermined the ability to form a regional consensus on security matters. While the US sought to impose its world view on the hemisphere, countries in the region disagree amongst themselves. The result has been the formation of competing approaches to regional security. Three main blocs can be percieved: (i) the US government and its allies, largely Central American countries, notably Guatemala; (ii) Hugo Chávez together with Cuba, Ecuador and Bolivia working towards a joint counter-hegemonic Bolivarian Revolution; and (iii) those countries which seek an independent perspective vis-à-vis the US in order to promote their stature as leading regional power brokers (e.g. Mexico and Brazil). Within these groupings nuanced differences exist, though the aforementioned divisions provide a convenient assessment of varying continent-wide perspectives. In this context, the OAS, having been set the task of establishing common security aims and objectives, together with establishing a cooperative framework to enact hemispheric solidarity, has been left issuing mostly platitudes, rather than implementing practical measures. The resultant bilateral and sub-regional agreements and understandings have created a tapestry of security arrangements within the hemisphere, though it is not one built on mutual cooperation. Rather, single issue agreements with limited bilateral military interoperability and intelligence-sharing, critical to meeting the transnational threats of the twenty-first century, have been the norm. It should be noted that the hemisphere is currently divided not on *what* the challenges facing it are, but on *how* to meet these challenges.

This has created extra-diplomatic space for the major powers, essentially Mexico and Brazil, as they attempt to act as a bridge between the US and Latin America as a whole. While Brazil has sought to show political desire and even ambition via its participation in the peacekeeping mission in Haiti and strong ties to the US military establishment, Mexico under Vicente Fox and his Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda sought to break from the post-Second World War security architecture and construct new security structures for the region. Brazil's more cautious approach of *ad hoc* reform, aimed at establishing mechanisms for the building of trust and cooperation amongst the region's militaries, has proved more fruitful than

Mexico's more formalised though limited proposals: nearly all Latin American countries, for their own reasons, prefer a more *laissez faire* security architecture in which either individual sovereign states or sub-regions can devise arrangements reflecting their own perceived priorities. This is partly due to the real or perceived subordination of regional organisations to the US interests, which has led to the creation of informal relations and groupings for the promotion of hemispheric solidarity amongst Latin American countries in areas where the hegemon's interests are considered to conflict with their own. Indeed, it continues to be the case that the hemisphere's security architecture is a mixture of formal and informal structures centred on common interests in the fields of security and trade.

US-Mexican relations in the security arena, for example, are markedly more limited than Colombia's, which has extremely close ties with Washington. Since the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), bilateral cooperation between the US and Mexican security apparatus has increased significantly, as both parties seek to establish quicker and more secure border transit, while simultaneously attempting to control *narcotraficante* activity in the frontier region. These institutional connections, and in some cases personal relationships, have deepened with the emergence of the growing terror threat from al-Qaeda and the creation of the US Department of Homeland Security, which in turn reflects a preoccupation in Washington to prevent another attack on US soil similar to 11 September 2001. The predominance of the fear of terror inside the US polity has increased the interest among US policymakers in the development of closer ties with their security counterparts in Mexico. The development of a Northern Command within the Pentagon bureaucracy covering all of the North American continent, together with the formation of the concept 'homeland defense' denotes the importance of Mexico to US defence strategy - essentially as a buffer state to threats emanating from Latin America. Against this backdrop, although Washington may be eager to develop relations with their southern neighbours, the attitude of the Mexicans is more mixed. Traditionally, the Mexican state has viewed *norteamericanos* with suspicion, largely due to their institutional memory of the interference of the US government in the country since the nineteenth century. However, following the signing of NAFTA, bilateral military relations have increased amongst the respective top brass, resulting in a greater willingness on the part of Mexico to accept US military assistance. Unsurprisingly, there have been setbacks in the relationship, notably with the return of Huey helicopters due to their inoperability, and the provision of Knox class frigates to the Mexican navy that were found to be in need of re-fitting before they could be put into service. On the whole, nevertheless, US-Mexican military ties have increased and deepened from the pre-NAFTA era, as both elites come to share a greater commonality of security interests, as trade and immigration flows come to forge closer cultural ties through shared aspects of their identities on top of common economic interests. Central amongst these security concerns are the growing levels of *narcotraficante* violence within Mexico and the increased perception of the 'terror threat' from Islamic fundamentalists. Faced by a rapidly changing security environment of non-state actors able to virtually ignore state boundaries, official institutions in both countries have dramatically evolved to meet the demands placed on their respective states.

The 'War on Terror'

The events of 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington DC and Pennsylvania have had numerous consequences, both on the US polity, but also for global geo-politics, which in turn has affected US-Mexican bilateral relations. As noted, initially the attack adversely affected the relationship, for while other Latin American countries sought to show their diplomatic solidarity via the enacting of the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Mexico was notably absence due to their withdrawal from the defence agreement on 7 September 2001. Owning to a combination of hubris and bad luck, relations between the Bush and Fox administrations soured. While they later recovered to a degree, relations never returned to those of the pre-11 September 2001 era as long as Fox remained in office. Central to the diplomatic differences was a divergence in their respective identities and interests with the onset of the 'war on terror'. In the US the initial outburst of grief and calls for revenge have been transmogrified and institutionalised in such a fashion as to both aid and embolden those elements in Washington who favour an imperialistic foreign policy, albeit via the ideological lens of 'democratic expansionism', as posited by the neoconservatives. Regarding relations with Mexico, this has resulted in an overemphasis on militaristic solutions to the joint security challenges facing both nations. Accordingly, Washington policymakers have encouraged the Mexican military's infiltration of all elements of the country's security apparatus due to existing high levels of corruption within the latter.

Meanwhile, within the US, Congress and the White House used the moral panic arising from the terror attack to readjust the relationship between the state and the individual through the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act. This legislation, approved with little opposition or public debate on Capitol Hill, engendered a climate of distrust and fear and the promotion of powers for state agencies to counter perceived threats. These include the curtailment of non-citizens' rights to *habeas corpus* and the law enforcement agencies' increased powers to spy on civil society organisations. Such draconian measures have been supplemented by the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, which holds an overarching remit to coordinate civil defence efforts and to counter the terror threat. To this end, the organisation brought together disparate entities and functions relating to its mission into one agency. The near constant heightened sense of threat created amongst the populace, helped produce a corrosive merging of civil and military functions, as the *Posse Comitatus* Act came under political attack. It also encouraged institutional creep into realms previously the preserve of the military.

For their part, however, the military did not want to be dragged into internal security operations because they feared both a backlash and operational overstretch. To this backdrop, in October 2002, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reorganised the US military bureaucracy with creation of a new command, the Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). This combines the pre-existing North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the newly formed USNORTHCOM Command Center. From its formation in 2002, USNORTHCOM has suffered from bureaucratic growing pains, as the organisation has attempted to refine its mission and operational practices, cultivating its relations with different elements of the DoD bureaucracy and other federal government departments, state governments and foreign governments.

Logically, the issues of the Mexican government as a security partner and establishing greater cooperation with the secretive Mexican military, have been key concerns for USNORTHCOM, particularly given the continued problem of drug violence in the border region and high levels of illegal migration. This has heightened the desire to secure trading routes between the two countries - all of which are deemed critical to US strategic interests. Additionally, the ‘war on terror’ has given the Bush administration greater licence within foreign affairs, as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed the ‘war on terror’ has become institutionalised within the government bureaucracy, via the development of an array of strategy documents. Notable among these are: The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002), and The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (March 2005). The National Security Strategy (2002) document expounds the position of the US administration in the ‘war’ on terrorism, and was drafted under heavy neoconservative influence. It advances the ‘Bush Doctrine’ as official US government policy, which states that Washington should use military power, unilaterally if required, to meet US vested interests, while also highlighting the neoconservative notion of extending the sphere of democratic influence. The National Defense Strategy (2005), puts some flesh on the bones of the previous policy statement, stating that the key objectives are to: ‘Secure the US from direct attack … Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action … Strengthen alliances and partnerships … Establish favourable security conditions’ (2005: iv). The paper sets out a strategy of ‘active defense’, which signifies engagement in offensive military operations on a global scale to counter the threat of non-state actors and counter-hegemonic powers, such as the People’s Republic of China.

While on a global scale, the Bush administration has concentrated its foreign affairs efforts on the Middle East and South Asia, this has resulted in diminished resources available to provide US military aid and training to countries in the Western Hemisphere: to a certain degree the region has virtually fallen off the political radar of the White House. However, the ‘war on terror’ has also created another rationale, alongside the ‘war on drugs’, for Washington to invest in Latin American armed forces. Indeed, during the dialogues among politicians and bureaucrats, the two rationales can converge: ‘narco-terrorism’ has become code for sectional interests in the continuation of funding for Latin American militaries in the midst of budgetary pressures due to Iraq and Afghanistan. Accordingly, the Bush administration has formulated the Merida Initiative in order to professionalise and modernise the Mexican armed forces to meet the challenges from *narcotraficantes* rather than any Islamic fundamentalist threat. Indeed, US-Mexican security concerns have predominantly remained the same as prior to 11 September 2001; change has come in the increased willingness of the US administration to act unilaterally in its interests.

The most notable case of this with regard to US-Mexican relations has been the unseemly rush by Congress to enact the Secure Fence Act (2006), to construct a wall along the majority, but not all, of the frontier. The Mexican government, locked into an asymmetrical power relationship with the US, has been unable to counter the atmosphere of political and moral panic emanating from Washington, which results in it voicing its disapproval - ineffectively - from the sidelines. Nevertheless, a policy of engagement from Mexico vis-à-vis its northern neighbour is not merely desirable, but essential, given the *de facto* marriage of socio-economic interests. This said, the Calderón government appears to be partially using the conceptualisation of the ‘war on terror’ for its own ends, as seen via the development of the Merida Initiative to provide military assistance to Mexico to combat the growing instability flowing from narco-violence. The ‘war on drugs’ has long been a central tenet of US-Mexican security relations: from the initial prohibition of narcotics in the late nineteenth century through to the present day, the importance of the ‘war on drugs’ to relations between the two neighbours has only increased overtime.

The ‘War on Drugs’

So critical is the ‘war on drugs’ to US-Mexican security ties, that without an investigation of this element of the relationship between the two countries such a study would be incomplete. An analysis of the US and Mexican governments’ approaches to this ‘war’ provides valuable insights, not only into the motives at hand in relation to the specifics of the ‘war on drugs’, but also the wider relationship between the two neighbours. The US approach has changed with the zeitgeist of the nation at a particular conjuncture and reflecting evolving interests within the political class. This is not to argue in favour of a single causal relationship. Rather there is a multiplicity of interests in constant flux. While some authors may hold that there is a causal relationship between, say, domestic political motives of the Republican Party in the late 1960s and the ‘war on drugs’, others argue in favour of a causal link between the neo-imperial desires of the US capitalist class and the ‘war on drugs’. It seems more accurate to argue that the ‘war on drugs’, from a US perspective, has multiple threads of embedded interests within its formulation and continuation through to the present day. These ebb and flow in relative importance overtime, within a thread of common interest in the continuation of the ‘war on drugs’ and, clearly, as facts on the ground change. The motives from different sectors of the US polity have, and do, coincide to enable the continuation of the ‘war on drugs’. One must also be aware that the social construction of the ‘war on drugs’ is not static, but fluid. As a result, differing interests come to the fore and so the nature of the ‘war on drugs’ evolves. Significantly, the ‘war’ has not always followed a path of ever-increasing criminalisation and militarisation as the political class adheres to the rhetoric of restrictionist absolutism. Like the underlying interest that fuel the ‘war on drugs’, it ebbs and flows as all social constructs do. Consequently, as interests evolve so will the rhetoric and practice of the ‘war’.

Likewise, the social construction of the Mexican ‘war on drugs’ is subject to a melange of competing concerns from numerous social actors, heavily influenced by its northern neighbour, not only as the globe’s largest narcotics market, but also with reference to the influence of Washington policymakers and the restrictionist lobby. The political and capitalist classes within Mexico, unlike the US, have attempted, historically, to co-opt narcotics production in an effort to limit instability. As a result, Mexican cooperation in the ‘drugs war’ has largely been in name alone, concentrating on appeasing its northern neighbour. On occasion, personal moral dislike of narcotics has led certain presidents to enact genuine counter-narcotics programmes. Until the 1980s, the priorities of the political and capitalist classes did not coincide with a ‘war on drugs’. The 1980s, however, saw the rise of a new breed of *traficante*, more willing to use any means necessary to further their interests, coinciding with a waning of PRI political power in the northern border states over the illicit trade. As a result, the Mexican political and capitalist classes began to forge greater ties with Washington in order to control the *traficantes*' activities. The interests and identities of Mexican social actors consequently evolved with reference to internal political interests, rather than solely the appeasement of Washington policymakers.

The Mexican state in the post-PRI era bases its opposition to the growing power of *traficantes* on two main factors. First, a growing internal drug market, as Mexico became flooded with drugs heading to the US, leading to increasing narcotic abuse in what had previously been a transhipment country. Second, the extreme level of violence used by the enforcement gangs is disproportionate and deliberately so, in order to create an aura of fear. Consequently, mass gunfights, bombings and the severing of people's heads are common practice by the cartels. The very high level of violence, both in terms of its frequency and intensity, question the legitimacy of the Mexican state in its primary role to defend the realm and its citizenry. As a result, it is not surprising that the Calderón administration has sought to use the rhetoric of the 'war on terror' to gain greater cooperation and military assistance from the US government in order to combat this critical threat to its legitimacy.

Conclusion

The confluence of the 'war on drugs' and the 'war on terror' to meet the respective interests of the two neighbours, illustrates the socially constructed nature of these rationale. In the case of the US, both embody the elite's interest in the manipulation of political and economic power in the hands of the few and the resultant need for social control of the populace. Indeed, both rationales have become cornerstones of the embedding of neo-liberal socio-economic policies within the US, through the development of vested interests resultant upon the creation and maintenance of the privately-owned and operated military-industrial complex and prison-industrial complex. Parallel to this has been the 'hollowing out' of the state, as functions are privatised and/or underfunded. The 'wars' on drugs and terror provide the political and economic elite with convenient vehicles to inculcate fear and chauvinism within the citizenry, enhancing the ability to scapegoat the 'other' (Latin American migrant, inner city gangs and/or narcotics abusers) as being responsible for the consequences of economic globalisation, which has impacted disproportionately on the working poor and 'underclass'. An interweaving of the intellectual rationale for government policy and social constructs has coincided to meet the interests and identity of the US elite at the expense of, yet with the tacit support of, the poor.

From the Mexican perspective, the social constructions of the ‘wars’ on drugs and terror have evolved in accordance with the interests of the elite. Guided by a historical and cultural distrust of the US, Mexico has traditionally sought to limit the influence of its northern neighbour. Aware of the asymmetrical nature of the relationship, Mexico has had to balance a desire for national sovereignty and non-intervention with the over-bearing influence of the global hegemon to the north. Consequently, the Mexican government has sought to appease the powerful political lobbies within the US in order to limit interference in its territory. The ‘war on drugs’ is a case in point. The Mexican elites interests until the 1980s lay in the political stability of the northern frontier region, rather than the eradication of the *narcotraficantes*. This shifted only with the collapse of the political corporatism of the PRI and the strategic re-routing of the cocaine trade via Mexico, which gave birth to more ‘entrepreneurial’ and violent *traficantes*. The establishment of these new *narcotraficantes* within the socio-political realities of Mexico, characterised by high rates of unemployment as economic development failed to keep pace with demographic growth, and a highly bureaucratic and weak central government, resulted in extreme levels of violence and the questioning of the legitimacy of the state. This is not to posit that the *traficantes* wish to gain control of the reigns of power. Rather, through the prolonged and high intensity of violence, particularly in the frontier regions to the north and south, as well as the Sierra Madres, the Mexican state fails to fulfil a key *raison d’être* – law and order. The consequences are clear for all to see, as the Calderón administration struggles to uproot the power of the narcotics gangs through the militarisation of the policing function of the state. This in turn has married with the US social construct of the ‘war on terror’, as the Mexican elite seeks to justify further militarisation of the state and deepen cooperation with the US government in fighting the threat from the *narcotraficantes*.

Both in the case of the US and Mexico, the ‘war on terror’ can be viewed as a continuation of the preceding social construct of the ‘war on drugs’. Additionally, it represents a reformulation of the interests of the US (and in turn the Mexican elite) in meeting challenges to the neo-liberal Janus state by non-state social actors. It utilises pre-existing social cleavages to exacerbate a moral panic toward the ‘other’ in order to justify the re-examination of civil-military relations in both neighbours.

In the case of the US, the political elite have sought to promote the involvement of the military in the internal security mission, though the armed forces were initially reluctant given the parallel commitments to an imperialistic foreign policy. The construction of such policies has been facilitated by the distancing of the military as an institution from the wider society in which it is a constituent part and from the political discourse of the country. Through a combination of the RMA, computer technology, unrepresentative recruitment and diminution in the size of the military relative to the economy, the political and economic elite have become emboldened in the use of US military might overseas, which is justified via an over-simplistic rhetoric about ‘spreading democracy’.

Mexican civil-military relations, unlike the US, are centred on the use of the armed forces in the internal security mission. In the face of a combination of a weak central bureaucracy, slow economic growth relative to demographic growth, an increasing wealth differential, the activities of leftist guerrillas, high levels of delinquency and powerful and extremely violent *narcotraficantes* gangs, consecutive Mexican governments from the 1980s have sought to use the military to meet these multiple challenges. The armed forces position within Mexican society is a result of the aftermath of the revolutionary period in which the military became a central pillar of the state and is often the only vestige of the central bureaucracy in rural communities. The military has, in the post-revolutionary era, been perceived by the citizenry and politicians alike as guardians of the constitution and presidency: above reproach as an institution. The resultant use of the military by the political elite to meet challenges facing the state internally, is in large part due to the belief that the armed forces as an institution are incorruptible, and as such able to remedy the instability resulting from high levels of delinquency and *narcotraficante* violence. Logically, however, the Mexican military is like any other government institution and is susceptible to corruption. The military use a combination of its honour code and operational practices (that is, the rotating of military personnel prior to the development of familial, political or other ties can be made within the local community), to instil a culture of honesty. The use of the military within the Mexican context is seen as a means to an end. As such, the deployment of the armed forces is a sign of the worrisome situation in which the Calderón administration finds itself. Equally, *Los Pinos*’ lobbying for and acceptance of US military assistance, in the form of material, information technology and training from private contractors, should concern the Mexican polity. The Fox and Calderón governments have appeased the Bush administration through employing the rhetoric of ‘war’ and a policy of militarisation. However, they have failed to provide solutions to the underlying causes of the violence on both Mexican and US streets. The plying of more US weaponry, as well as the militarisation of policing in Mexico, is likely to breed further cycles of violence between the state and market-led *traficantes*.

This thesis has sought to provide the opening for a novel re-examination of civil-military relations, in order to promote the ‘humanisation’ of the armed forces and their use. The thesis uses social constructivist analysis to offer an alternative perspective regarding the nature of the state and, consequently, international relations that departs from the traditional approaches of realist/neo-realist security studies theorists. Through the use of the individual as the referent object of the state and of international relations, together with the acknowledgement of the social constructed nature of social reality, it is able to develop a conceptualisation of (in)security centred on the individual.

With reference to civil-military relations theory, the thesis has expounded an alternative approach to the Huntingtonian model, in order to cultivate theoretical discourse and enable a fuller and richer explanation of civilian and military social actors within the framework of the state and international relations. Through a deeper understanding of the social constructs of social actors within the state and its institutions, it is possible to move outside of the theoretical confines of realism/neo-realism, to enable greater scope for social actor agency, while acknowledging the inter-subjective relationship it has with structure. With the individual at the centre of the theoretical model, as well as the empowerment of the social actor, the thesis aims to establish the theoretical grounding for emancipatory politics, so as to promote greater understanding and cooperation among social actors within and without the state.

This could, if the political will existed, be a transformative social construction allowing for the formulation and practice of more humanistic, rational policies to counter the genuine threats from non-state and state actors facing the Western Hemisphere in the twenty-first century. This is not to posit that it is the reserve of the elite to reformulate the social constructs of the state. Within social constructivist analysis there exists the possibility for all social actors to bring, however small, an element of change via their social actions - whether they are institutions or individuals - change is possible.

Future Research Questions

While the thesis provides a critique of realism/neo-realism, it is not a theoretical model as such, as observed by Onuf (1998), one of the founders of social constructivist thinking. Although social constructivism is able to note the flaws of realist/neo-realist thought, as an overarching theory of the state and international relations it cannot be situated outside of the context of its particular case study as a generalised theory. Indeed, the question could be asked whether a generalised social constructivist theory of international relations and the state is possible, moving away from a critique in response to neo-realism, to an alternative fully-fledged theoretical alternative. Until the provision of such an epistemological grounding is provided for the use of social constructivism as an overarching theoretical model, there is a need to renew the empirical case study data and, subsequently, re-examine the analysis of US-Mexican bilateral security relations, given that social constructs are in a constant state of flux. The most critical future research question for the betterment of people's lives pertaining to this thesis, is how to transform the theoretical analysis of social constructivism into the socio-political reality of civil-military relations, and in turn, the social construct of the state. This is a challenge for all theorists using the social constructivist approach, who aim to bring about change in policy and the wider zeitgeist, as a means of emancipating individuals from the socially constructed state-centric reality that envelops them. The thesis concentrates on the US elite's and/or policymakers' perspective vis-à-vis their southern neighbour. In order to formulate a broader and more comprehensive analysis of both North American security architecture and the challenges it faces in the twenty-first century, further research is required into the Canadian and Mexican perspectives surrounding these issues. This thesis provides only a partial view of a much larger research project, in the developing field of the social constructivist analysis of civil-military relations, as well as in the elaboration and evaluation of comparative case studies relating to the security challenges facing the North American continent.

APPENDIX I: METHODOLOGY AND FIELDWORK

Introduction

This Appendix aims to set out the practical methodology and theoretical methodological basis of the thesis. The beginning of the Appendix sets out the theoretical philosophy behind the methodology of the project through the measured use of elements of grounded theory, constructivist hermeneutics and Weberian notions of ideal simplifications and idealised types. Once the theoretical cornerstone has been set, the Appendix moves forward to the more practical process of reflexivity within the project, questioning of the notion of objectivity within social science research. After contemplation of the philosophical element of the research, the Appendix considers the evolution of empirical research questions: in particular, the movement of the empirical research away from a study of the Zapatista National Liberation Army to a study of the US Department of Defense and its interaction with the Mexican military. The main element constitutes the practical process of fieldwork methodology. The practical element includes a study of the preparation for fieldwork, choice of data collection tactics, ethical considerations, political and personal bias, the actual process of data collection and lastly the process of data analysis.

Theoretical Basis of Methodology

The aim of this Appendix is to provide, on the one hand, a practical guide to the process of data collection and analysis, while on the other, to provide a meta-theoretical spine to the formation of a theoretical construct based on the empirical data. This meta-theory creates an ontological and epistemological cornerstone for the research process. As a result, the methodology Appendix emphasises the linkage between philosophical and empirical work, as Alvesson and Skoldberg posit: ‘Interplay between philosophical and empirical work marks high-quality social research’ (2000: 7). Key to the philosophical make up of this project was the concept of ‘usefulness’, in terms of both the methodological and theoretical nature of the endeavour. The concept of ‘usefulness’ is the key to the production of a theoretical basis of the research project. The aim of this theoretical framework is the creation of a basis for qualitative research of a reflexive nature, whilst avoiding the pitfalls of subjective indeterminacy. This theoretical framework allows for a combination between the interpretative nature of social science and for the existence of an objective social reality, outside the ‘life-world’ of this researcher or the subjects of this study. In order to create this framework, I have selectively picked out elements of grounded theory, the hermeneutical element of constructivism, Weber's notion of ideal types and interpretative sociology. Although these philosophies may conflict in their totalities, the elements selected create a useful theoretical grounding for the application, analysis and meta-theory of this research project. Each element of the philosophical make-up of the research plays a role in the overall creation of the whole thesis. Whilst the grounded theory provides a cornerstone for the process of data collection, the hermeneutic element of constructivism seeks to overcome the perceived objectivity of this theoretical model, adding an element of reflexivity in the context of an external reality. Constructivism gives a political contextualisation and democratisation of the meta-theory of the thesis. Each element of the theoretical basis is supported by its neighbouring element with which it shares the philosophical load. Furthermore, each philosophical element is used within a different yet connected element within the thesis, creating a whole greater than the sum of its parts.

The process of data collection has provided theoretical coverage through grounded theory, obtaining qualitative data in order to understand the social reality of the actors and their environments. It also allows the researcher to link method, data collection, the analysis of the data and related theory in a connected string, as Strauss and Corbin point out: 'The importance of this methodology is that it provides a sense of vision, where it is that the analyst wants to go with the research' (1998:8). The emphasis is on the production of inductive research, where the data allows for the emergence of theory and, in turn, a theory that is more likely to relate to the social environment of the social actors under investigation. In the words of Strauss and Corbin: 'Grounded theories, because they are drawn from data, are likely to offer insight, enhance understanding, and provide a meaningful guide to action' (1998: 12). Grounded theory, it should be noted is not simply an analysis of the collected data after the fact and the creation of a theoretical framework from these data. Rather it calls for constant data collection and theory generation in a reciprocal process - sharpening theoretical models as the empirical data ask questions of the theory. As theory changes with the empirical data the interview questions are revised reflecting the theoretical advancement made via data collection.

In this research project, grounded theory is being used as a practical tool in the application of data collection and analysis, its meta-theoretical grounding in turn provided by constructivism. This meta-theoretical grounding is required since if grounded theory were used in its totality throughout the research project it may result in a false conceptualisation of objectivity between the researcher and the object or subject of the social research. This is avoided with constructivism as a theoretical foundation.

Weber's concept of 'ideal simplifications' is used in order to understand structures and theories in pragmatic fashion as a meta-theoretical foundation for the use of a case study between the US and Mexican militaries within a wider linkage of civil-military relations and military-to-military ties. The use of idealised types should not be seen as an inductive understanding of external reality but steps to understanding a world of complexity in a simplified form. This may not be an ideal procedure to create understanding and explanation of the external reality but it is a more realistic methodology than through an objective mentality. This Weberian approach recognises the fundamental flaw of objectivity, the failure to recognise the subjectivity of the researcher him/herself. This said, Weber fails to make the final breakthrough towards reflexivity; thus this element of the meta-theory relies on constructivism to allow for the addition of reflexivity within the research process.

Through constructivism, the research material cannot be seen as mirroring the social reality or, indeed, a representation of the social reality. Rather, the research project is a form of mediated social knowledge that enables the researcher to understand external reality. In the interpretation of data, the subject's social reality is transformed via the researcher's mediating between the external reality and social actors. One is able to acknowledge the pertinence of the role of researcher and their bias and social life. The creation of a continuous process of reflexivity throughout the project, though, acts as a safeguard against the admission of bias or prejudice. Grounded theory provides reflexivity between theory and empirical data giving theoretical synergy with the hermeneutical element of constructivism. This marriage of a practical theory of research and the meta-theoretical creates a concise basis for reflexivity within this research project.

Reflexivity in the Research Project

The purpose of reflexivity is to allow the researcher to attain greater understanding of his/her position in relation to the subjects and body of the research, acknowledging subjectivity within the process. In other words, reflexivity allows for the recognition by the researcher of the existence of the subjective within the research processes. While no research can be completely objective, by acknowledging the element of subjectivity a more 'realistic' understanding may be gained of the topic and its subject. Reflexivity is a multi-dimensional approach requiring the noting and understanding of the multiple relations the researcher finds him/herself in during the process. It provides an epistological understanding of the researcher's position in the project. As Finlay states: 'We appreciate that research is co-constituted - a joint product of the participants, researcher and their relationship. We realize that meanings are negotiated within particular social contexts so that another researcher will unfold a different story' (Finlay, 2003: 5). Within the concept of reflexivity there remains contested ground over its methodology of reflexivity, in addition to the purpose of reflexivity within a political context. Namely, reflexivity comprises a combination of elements of combination of mutual collaboration reflection and social critique reflection. Using the mutual collaboration reflection method the social construction of data will be recognised, as Finlay posits: 'Here researchers, simultaneously participants in their own research, engage in cycles of mutual reflection and experience' (Finlay, 2003: 11).

In a practical sense, this involves a forthright discussion of the research relationship between the researcher and the subjects of research, as well as the role of this relationship in shaping outcomes. An element of critical reflection is included within the reflexivity element of the project. The process of critical reflection is a study of the power disequilibrium between the researcher and subject as well as between different subjects. Finlay describes researchers using this approach: 'They openly acknowledge tensions arising from different social positions, for instance, in relation to class, gender and race' (Finlay, 2003: 12). This combination of reflective processes marries in a consistent (yet pragmatic) fashion with the meta-theoretical foundation of the research.

The Evolution of Empirical Thesis

In practical terms the research started (in accordance with grounded theory) with the selection of an area of study followed by a study of present philosophy of social science and practical methods, leading to the eventual data collection and analysis. The research began in 2001 with a generalised theme for the thesis, based on a possible study of the Zapatista guerrilla movement of south-east Mexico. As a greater understanding of the issues surrounding the Zapatistas and their conflict with the Mexican authorities arose, the initial project shifted towards a study of the Mexican military and its role within the state. Over time this focus in turn shifted towards a thesis increasingly influenced by international relations theory, moving to a study of US-Mexican bilateral military relations. In practical terms, it became clear that an in-depth study of social movements in Chiapas would bring about logistical, linguistic and ethical concerns that appeared to be too great to overcome within the available time frame. Combined with these issues was the problem of thesis originality, which led to a change of focus, realigning the project towards the general issue of the place of the Mexican military within the Mexican state, linked to a study of the inter-relationship with its northern neighbour.

Although at first glance this shift in the research may appear as a move away from the initial project, rather it comprises an attempt to study Mexican and US relations from a different level of analysis and point of view, which, of late, is under-studied.

Preparation for Fieldwork

The research process began with an initial period of fieldwork preparation, with University and Faculty research methods classes completed during the initial phrase providing an underpinning of the philosophy of social science and research methods. This allowed for grounding on which to build a methodological and theoretical platform for the substantive mass of the research project. In deciding the methodological options for data collection there were two main factors to consider: (i) the theoretical suitability; and (ii) the practical suitability. Both these factors limit the possible methodologies for research. The majority of possible data collection methods were discounted due to their lack of theoretical suitably. Due to the nature of the study as a qualitative research project, the use of the quantitative experiment based methods was not applicable. After this initial elimination of possible data collection methods, the remaining possibilities included observation, survey and interview methods.

From the above list of possible data collection methods, the most ill-suited comprised the use of surveys. Note that the term survey in this regard refers to the use of fixed question self-completion questionnaires. While, theoretically speaking the use of surveys formed possibly suitable method, in practice, surveys remained unsuitable for research involving elite subjects. Why? The difficulty with the use of surveys is that the pool of subjects is too small to accommodate a survey. Since the absolute number of subjects is small, the usual low response rate to surveys would only create an even smaller sample group. As a result, the data collected could not be used in the formulation of generalised theory without questions about the validity of the data set.

Another possible data collection strategy involved observational methods. Observational methods, however, bring practical difficulties, as the subjects of the research are usually isolated in their institutions and atomised from other participants. The use of anthropological versions of observational methods, such as, participant observation linked to action research theory or, indeed, more quantitative structured observation, were consequently ill-suited. Observation, however, has some utility within this project through unobtrusive observation. Observation, nevertheless, was limited to a secondary method of data collection, e.g. the unobtrusive observation of conferences and meetings involving research subjects. Such observation is likely to be informal in nature, with notetaking being in the form of a narrative account of the events.

The final possible method of data collection proved to be the most suitable from a theoretical and practical standpoint: the use of interviews. Interviewing allowed the greatest possibilities for the maximising of data that could be collected from the limited sources available. The interviews were informal to some degree, taking a semi-structured format to allow maximum flexibility. It should be clear that in most cases, interviews were with lone individuals with only the occasional joint interviews. Focus groups did not take place, due to both the nature of the interviewees and the sensitive nature of the topic. Interviews are the main source of primary data employed in this project.

In conclusion to this section, while interviews form over ninety per cent of the primary data source, the remainder includes an element of observation from conferences in which research subject participate. This data collection process also interacted with the collection of secondary data during the initial phases of the project – an undertaking necessary to attain a full empirical understanding of the topic.

Ethical Considerations and Bias

In discussing the ethical considerations and the issue of protecting research subjects, I have decided to follow the example of Bailey (1996) by asking six key questions concerning any possible ethical considerations. The first, according to Bailey is: '…can the research that you are considering be done without deception?' (1996: 32). The clear response is that this research project has not involved any element of deception towards subjects in order to obtain data. At no point did this research project involved undercover observation of social actors. Bailey's second question is: '… how difficult will it be to keep promises of confidentiality?' (1996: 32). This issue is important for this study. Since data collection consisted to a significant degree on semi-structured elite interviews, in order to gain access while also allowing for the full openness of subject matter, confidentiality was vital to attaining the trust required. For this reason, I have decided to give all research participants anonymity. The third question put forward by Bailey in reference to ethical issues is: '…what are your chances of getting dirty hands while engaging in this research? Getting dirty hands refers to engaging in illegal behaviour or behaviour that is against your own moral standards during the course of the research' (1996: 33). Fieldwork for this dissertation involved no illegal behaviour or any actions that may be deemed morally questionable. Though the research included interviewing individuals whose actions, (albeit indirectly) may be questionable from my moral perspective, this did not involve getting 'my hands dirty'. Bailey's fourth question is: '…will your research give tacit approval to a setting or group that you consider to be unethical or illegal?' (1996: 33). At first this may appear to have no relevance, though a closer examination reveals a degree of relevance. Though the research did not involve the tacit approval of any illegal activity, it may, at face value appear to give tacit approval to those elite groupings with which the research project requires the researcher to associate. By participating in conferences, wholly or largely, attended by military personnel and associated agencies, may have provided tacit support to the US military and the other Latin American militaries in attendance. In practice, such a possibility of tacit support has been limited and consequently has had little effect on this thesis or the researcher. The fifth question Bailey posits is: '…what are the chances your research will harm anyone in the setting?' (1996: 33). It is clear that this research project will not physically damage any subjects involved in the research project. However, the research project could have brought harm to the reputation to and/or political capital of some of the subjects if the data they provided was not treated in a confidential and respectful fashion. So long as data is treated as confidential, no harm will come to the research participants. The possibility of unintended negative consequences on publishing the thesis remains open, yet minimised since interview data has been made anonymous via coding transcripts. Another question put forward by Bailey comprises: '…could the project cause you any harm?' (1996: 33). Whilst conducting the research project I have been mugged in the field. However, I believe this was a simple matter of chance while living in a major urban area rather than anything more sinister. Such threats exist wherever research projects are conducted and the threat level during fieldwork was no more or less than any other member of the public. There is, though, a limited risk to myself in terms of reputation. I may, through association with elements of the US and Latin American militaries gain an unwarranted reputation as tacitly agreeing with US government policy towards the Western Hemisphere. Simply because one studies topics traditionally dominated by right wing thinkers, it does not necessarily make oneself right wing! This reputation I feel would be unwarranted upon reading my work, which I believe is a balanced piece of social research.

At this point, it would be wise to acknowledge any personal or political bias, so that through a process of reflexivity any significant element of bias can be removed. It should noted, that the researcher considers himself a progressive leftist in terms of political labelling. As a consequence, I have come to this research project with my own pre-conceived ideas and notions. My understanding of the role of the military within Mexico is coloured by the suppression of civil society, especially the neo-Zapatista movement, as well as other indigenous communities elsewhere in the country. As a result, from the outset my view of the Mexican armed forces was mixed at best. Similarly, my opinion of the US military, initially, was one of negative connotations based on military inventions during the twentieth century, especially in relation to the Western Hemisphere. Consequently, I come to this topic, often seen as a right-wing domain of military personnel and military academics, from a worldview outside of the traditional perspective. This bias offers, I believe, both opportunities and difficulties. On the one hand, it may lead to a largely negative approach towards the topic and the research subjects involved; it may also enable the development of a more thorough leftist critique of US-Mexican bilateral military relations. This bias has been acknowledged through a process of reflexivity designed into the research methodology, at both a practical and meta-theoretical level.

Fieldwork Data Collection

Fieldwork took the form of two stages. The first consisted of six months in Washington DC and surrounding areas, conducting both interviews and the collection of archival and secondary data. After the completion this initial period, I returned to Liverpool in order to transcribe and partially analyse the data, prior to embarking on the second period of fieldwork in the southern US border states. Then the research data was analyzed and the research project written up in line with the theoretical basis of the practical collection of the data. The fieldwork should be seen as a process of recycling data until analysis results in the formulation of a generalised and grounded thesis.

The initial phase of fieldwork was spent in reconnoitering available data in the Library of Congress, contacting potential interviewees and assessing possible data collection from the National Security Archives of George Washington University. The next phase came was the formulation of a list of questions for interviews and the collection of secondary data from the Library of Congress, together with the collection of archival materials from the National Security Archive at Georgetown University. Once this was complete, the process of collecting interview data began. The period of collection and analysis of interview material involved a process of refining the empirical data into a generalised theory, which changed as more data was collected and analysed.

After this initial leg of fieldwork, a period was spend back in Liverpool fully transcribing data, beginning the process of writing up and dealing with administrative issues.

The final stage of the fieldwork continued the process of interview and observational data collection, this time over a wider geographical area of the US.

The main method of data collection was semi-structured interviews with members of the US policymaking community, conducted in order to gain an insight into US-Mexican bilateral military relations. The process of collecting interview data was spilt into five stages: the requesting of interviews; the organising of interviews and question scripts; the interview itself; the analysis of collected data; and finally possible issues over interviewees allowing the quoting of data in the final thesis. Some secondary interviewing did occur during the second phase of fieldwork, among previous telephone interviewees, in the hope of gaining more information through a face-to-face interview. The process of interviewing was split into these five stages as a matter of organisational clarity rather than as a narrative process. In reality, the process of interviewing involved a cycle of data collection, analysis, leading to further data collection and so forth. This procedure is in accordance with the theoretical basis of grounded theory. The initial stage of the interviewing process is the request stage. As Frankfort-Nachmis and Nachmias put it:

> … [a] cover letter must succeed in overcoming any resistance or prejudice the respondent may have against the survey. It should (1) identity the sponsoring organization or the persons conducting the study, (2) explain the purpose of the study, (3) tell why it is important that the respondent that the information provided will be held in strict confidence (1992: 256).

Each cover letter requesting an interview also included, if possible, a letter from my supervisor asking for the assistance of the possible future interviewee. Depending on the answer, if any, to the letter requesting an interview, the next stage was to draft a list of questions. To this end, a set list of questions centred on the issues of the thesis was devised. The use of a set list from the outset did not mean that each interview was standardised; rather it allowed maximum flexibility so that the interview would be more akin to a conversation, varying according to the specialism of the interviewee. The process of interview data collection did not comprise the collection of standardized data for quantitative analysis; instead, interviews became a point of social encounter, in which knowledge was constructed through the known social realities of the participants. As Holstein and Gubrium posit:

> … [i]f interviews are interpretively active, meaning-making occasions, interview data are unavoidably collaborative …. This means consciously and conscientiously attending to the interview process and its product in ways that are more sensitive to the social construction of knowledge. (1998: 114).

As a social construction of knowledge, the interviewing process moves away from the notion of a ‘neutral’ collection of data, towards what Holstein and Gubrium call: ‘…a site of, and occasion for, producing reportable knowledge itself’ (1998: 114). The social action of interviewing brings about the social creation of knowledge with both parties informing its production in the interviewing process. Thus the issue of confidentiality or rather secrecy in some limited fashion must be questioned. As Mitchell states: ‘Secrecy is never complete … secrecy can only be partial, incomplete. The perfectly concealed act, the occasion beyond defining, naming or symbolic representation of other sorts is outside sociological concern’ (1993: 6). Although secrecy cannot be total, a level of anonymity is often required especially in conducting elite interviews. Anonymity not only provides a comfort shield to enable interviewees to speak candidly and on occasion is a prerequisite to availability for an interview. The most obvious case is the interviewing of politicians and government officials who are accountable to the public and may be subject to political attack. In order to protect the interviewees and in some cases to obtain an interview, anonymity was given. Although at the beginning of each interview, interviewees were asked both whether they wished anonymity and the quoting of the resultant data in the thesis, the decision was made during the process of data collection to provide blanket anonymity to interviewees. This was the result of a notable unease amongst interview participants when raising the issue of secrecy and/or anonymity together with the presence of a dictaphone. Consequently, in order to put interviewees at ease and obtain a richer level of data, anonymity was provided to all participants, while retaining basic information on their official position. As Johnson and Joslyn note: ‘The goal of survey research is to measure accurately people’s attitudes, beliefs and behavior by asking them questions’ (1989: 160). The provision of anonymity to interviewees should be seen as a means to the production of more ‘useful’ data.

The researcher allowed the interviewee(s) to talk, in his/her own time and in their own order, allowing for the occasional prompt or probe. On occasion though the interviewee preferred to answer questions in a strict standardized form, this was largely due to inexperience on the part of the interviewee or due to time constraints. Even on these occasions where an interviewee wished to follow a strict regime of questions, flexibility was maintained, albeit in a limited fashion as interviewee often answered multiple questions in one answer or alternatively, the interviewee wished to only answer questions on their specialism. The interview schedule followed that set out by Robson:

> … [it] include[d] the following:
>
> - introductory comments (probably a verbatim script)

- list of topics headings and possibly key questions to ask under these headings
- set of associated prompts
- closing comments (1993: 237-238).

The process of telephoning interviewees proved a much more arduous affair and as a result it was viewed as a last resort. Data collection from telephone interviews was limited by both the time available and often the inclination of the subject. During the fieldwork, seven telephone interviews were conducted, with one failing from the outset. Two factors led to the failure of the telephone interview. The first occurred when the number given was an ex-directory military base number which was initially impossible to attain, as it was necessary to go through the base's directory service. This process was time consuming and often achieved no positive result. A more favourable outcome may have been achieved, if interviews could have occurred face-to-face, but this was not possible in some cases due to security concerns.

Another important matter in the limiting the 'usefulness' of telephone interviews, was that the interviewee, on occasion, felt no empathy or social compunction to answer questions put forward to them at any great length or indeed, at all. This may have been partly due to the lack of body language signals and the resultant relatively long pauses in telephone conversations due to the inability to measure the point of completion in speech of the interviewee, itself leading to a further lack of empathy. Open question interviews were difficult to conduct over the telephone with interviewees with whom the author had no previous contact. A more fruitful approach to telephone interviews was the use of closed questions with secondary related semi-open questions, or alternatively to use telephone interviews as a simple mopping up operation with interviewees you have previously interviewed face to face or via e-mail.

E-mail interviews, much like telephone interviews, had a limited purpose with the data collection being conducted three times during this research project and on these occasions as a result of travel restrictions and/or security fears (on the part of the interviewee). When thinking of e-mail interviewing a subject two questions were asked. Is there no other method of interviewing available? Second, is the interviewee willing to sit at a computer terminal for an extended period typing a response? Only if both questions are answered with a yes can this method be successful. It was, however, a useful and time efficient method to obtain official policy statements from government bureaucracy, rather than the personal beliefs or opinions of policymakers.

The collection of archival data centred on the collection of declassified papers from the National Security Archive at the George Washington University in Washington DC. This began with the e-mailing of the office of the National Security Archive in Foggy Bottom requesting access to archival material, resulting in the release of documentation on the internet site of the National Security Archive, which was subsequently downloaded. The declassified data available from government agencies on US-Mexican relations was very limited due to the sensitivity of the subject, and the decision was made that the data was not relevant to the dissertation. Even though both countries have Freedom of Information Acts, most data on US-Mexican relations continues to be shielded behind the loophole of 'national security' and data from the intelligence communities was and remains outside of the purview of these laws.

Another more useful method of data collection, though not anticipated was the participation in conferences, enabling an understanding of the zeitgeist of the policy community within the United States government and military with regard to Western Hemispheric affairs. Each conference allowed for an insight into particular aspects of the process of policy making and the related worldview of policy-makers towards their Latin neighbours. The first conference took place in the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, which was entitled: 'Perceptions and Misconceptions: how we see each other in the Mexico-US Relations'. Though this conference concentrated on the general relations between the two countries, it was notable for the keynote speech of Enrique Krauze, and a seminar held by Jesús Reyes Heroles (former Mexican ambassador to the US) and Jeffrey Davidow (former US ambassador to Mexico). Another enlightening conference was: 'The Middle East Terrorist Connection in Latin America and the Caribbean', held at the Durkin Senate Building. This conference was most notable for the seeming attempt to connect the Israeli-Arab conflict, the 'war on terror' and the 'war on drugs' in the Western Hemisphere. The conference attempted to link these three topics into a strong highly organized operational 'reality' for the purpose of gaining funding from Capitol Hill, whilst re-enforcing the notion of the 'war on terror' within the institutions of the US government. The most informative conference in relation to the project, proved to be one sponsored by the Department of Defense, Florida International University and the European Union entitled, 'Hemispheric Strategic Objectives for the Next Decade'. This conference provided an insight into the collective open discussion amongst state actors in the Western Hemisphere about the future of security architecture of the region. Key notables in attendance at the conference included General James T. Hill, Commander of USSOUTHCOM, Cresencio Arcos, Director of International Affairs at the Department of Homeland Security, Major General Carl H Freeman, Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board and Karl Buck, Latin American

Area Head, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. The conference concentrated on the nature of security issues in the Western Hemisphere in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 environment, in particular focusing on the role of non-state actors. The conference went on to suggest possible solutions on a regional and sub-regional level. Yet it was recognized by the mainly military participants that political will was required from all bodies to work to common ends – something which to date remains decidedly lacking.

Process of Data Analysis

On return to Liverpool, the next phase in the research process involved the transcribing of data prior to analysis. The main element of analysis occurred post-transcribing the interview data but a certain element of reflection took place in the field. For the sake of organizational clarity, though these accounts of reflexivity are included within the data analysis section of this Appendix. Once interview data were transcribed they were divided into one of five groupings in order to facilitate the analytical process and compare and contrast the data collected. These groupings are: non-governmental organisations; academics; federal government officials; state government officials; politicians and their advisors; and military personnel. The first grouping, the non-governmental organisations, while willing to accommodate the researcher, were under severe time restrictions. This grouping of interviewees tended to impart high quality data albeit either with a heavy emphasis on human rights or issues of trade, dependant on the ideological make-up of the organization. Academics, as a grouping, were very conscious of confidentiality issues i.e. the possibility of the relaying of interview data to third parties. Once this issue had been resolved to the satisfaction of the interviewee, information collected was again of high quality, regularly focusing on a more global geopolitical or theoretical level of analysis. The third grouping of interviewees was federal government officials, who while being amiable, offered little except the official US government position with little or no room for personal points of view or indeed insight into the government position. Most of these interviews were only useful in the sense that they provided an opportunity for the airing of official line. On occasion officials were open and willing to answer any questions asked, though they were keen to protect their own bureaucratic spheres of influence vis-à-vis other government departments. Politicians and their staffers were the most difficult both to pin down and to interview. Consequently, few were interviewed for this research project, however, those who agreed to participate greatly enhanced the understanding of civil-military relation and US-Mexican ties from the perspective of the federal and state legislatures. The last group of interviewees, were military officials (civilians) and officers, this collection of research subjects was difficult to initiate contact with due to security concerns. This meant that access to military barracks only occurred at those facilities possessing educational facilities *in situ*. This limited the possibility of face-to-face contact with some interviewees, leaving telephone and e-mail as the only possible methods of data collection available, the exception to this rule was Pentagon complex in Washington DC, to which I was able to gain access and interview officials. Military personnel as interviewees tended to be open on their views of general US politics, civil-military relations and their southern neighbour, though this grouping was cautious in relation to current affairs and their thoughts relating to the US president, as their commander-in-chief. In all, a cross section of institutions within the US government bureaucracy as well as political views within the wider society were obtained for this research to provide for the broadest overview of the policymaking and political class possible.

Limitations of the Research Project and Future Research

The main limitation of the research project is the uneven distribution of data within the context of a case study of bilateral military relations. The lack of data collection from the Mexican military's viewpoint (at least directly), results in only a partial view of US-Mexican bilateral military relations. This has been due to the sensitivity and complexity of this topic, combined with the traditional hermetic nature of the Mexican military establishment and its resistance to civilian interference: its perception of social research into its organisation. This meant that the interviewing of serving officials and/or personnel in the Mexican armed forces was at best unlikely. The isolation of the Mexican military is a deliberate policy by the top brass as they wish, it seems, to distance themselves from civil society in Mexico and internationally. The approach of the Mexican military is best summarised by a story told to the author by an academic interviewee. The academic had gone to the US Library of Congress to browse the collection of official Mexican military magazines to gain an insight into the mindset of the officer class. After one day studying the material, he returned the next day to continue his work. Only to find that overnight, the Mexican military attaché had personally withdrawn the magazines loaned to the Library of Congress. It seems that the Mexican military were happy to give the appearance of openness rather than genuine transparency. This story may or may not be apocryphal, but the central tenet holds, that the Mexican military is extremely suspicious of outsiders. This, it should be noted, may or may not be the view of individual officers in a personal capacity, however, it is an engrained institutionalised belief.

As a result of this and the researcher's limited Spanish, the decision was made to concentrate on US perspectives from the outset, with this thesis providing only an element within the wider jigsaw of US-Mexican bilateral security relations. The author had some attempted to contact, both via the phone and in person, the Mexican military attaché in Washington. These attempts fell on deaf ears as the author was stonewalled on both occasions. The author also asked at the US military establishments visited if there were any Mexican officers present and willing to be interviewed. Unfortunately, no Mexicans were present at the establishments at the time of the author's visit. However, the Mexican military is increasingly providing more general and organisational information on its website. Unfortunately, such information is limited to facts and figures, and offer little to no insight into the institutional culture or attitudes.

Further research is consequently required into both the wider North American security architecture to include both the Canadian as well as Mexican perspectives. The study of the Mexican armed forces would require a long-term investment in building personal relationships within the country's political elite and officer class, making such an enterprise unsuitable for this thesis given the time constraints. Indeed, in the present turmoil of drug violence, such an initiative would be distinctly dangerous. The provision of a Canadian perspective would enable a broader viewpoint of North American security architecture in the context of the signing and implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the 1990s and continuing calls for the further development of NAFTA using the example of the European experience. The study and analysis of these differing perspectives within the region remains a topic for future research.

Conclusion

The methodology employed in this thesis has dovetailed the research methods together with its theoretical underpinnings. The philosophy of the methodology used in the thesis constituted a combination of grounded theory, constructivist hermeneutics and Weberian notions of ideal simplifications and ideal type. This epistemological understanding of social science in the thesis provides for a theoretical bedrock to enable the social constructivist analysis of US-Mexican bilateral security relations. Consequently, the marriage of the practical and theoretical methodologies of the thesis has provided for a rounded research project.

APPENDIX II: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES AND PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION EVENTS

N.B. Locations of interviews have been redacted to preserve anonymity.

1. NGO Official 16, Interview by author, e-mail, 11 June 2001
2. NGO Official 12, Interview by author, 5 February 2004
3. NGO Official 11, Interview by author, 6 February 2004
4. Academic Interviewee 1, Interview by author, 9 February 2004
5. NGO Official 1, Interview by author, 12 February 2004
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