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The Zapatista National Liberation Army: A Document Analysis of
Strategic Intent

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
in Political Science

by

Ronald Ray Carroll

Richard Ganzel, Ph.D., Dissertation Advisor

December 1997


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
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ABSTRACT

This study uses content analysis methodology to explore the communications of The Zapatista National Liberation Army following its uprising on January 1, 1994, in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas. The principal research question was concerned with the tone of the Zapatista communications and whether that tone could be associated with a clear strategic direction chosen by the rebels. The hypothesis presented for testing states that the Zapatistas had a clear notion of their strategic and tactical objectives, and that the language in their communications reflected that strategic preference.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

*"In Mexico, for the Indian people, if you want food, if you want schools,
if you want help...you must die or kill to take these..."*
Subcomandante Marcos of the EZLN, 1994

Background

January 1, 1994: San Cristóbal de las Casas, Las Margaritas, Ocosingo,
Altamirano, Chiapas, Mexico.

With the arrival of 2 *Muluc*, 7 *Kankin* of the Mayan Calendar, a previously unrecognized Indigenous military force quietly moved out of the southern Mexican tropical forests of the Lacandon. Led by a masked leader known only cryptically as *sub-comandante* Marcos, the Zapatistas forcefully occupied the seats of municipal government in five cities of Mexico's most southern state Chiapas. Holding its position only briefly, the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) nonetheless sent shock waves through the government halls and financial markets of Mexico City.

Almost two years later, with the struggle still unresolved, the small rebel band of the EZLN created a media show, riding from their jungle hideouts into a second round of negotiations with the Mexican government. In some respects, the events between January 1, 1994 and October 17, 1995, may mark a clear change in the style of Latin American guerrilla activities.

Unlike the bloody insurgent struggles of Peru, El Salvador, and

Guatemala, the Zapatista insurrection produced few battle casualties on either side and little physical destruction. While there was military occupation of the area by the Mexican Army following the original action by the Zapatistas, the conflict settled into a phase of "low intensity" with casualties from military confrontation non-existent. This has led some commentators (Harvey 1995) to portray the Zapatista uprising as a "war of position," seeking more to shift "the balance of forces in favour of popular and democratic movements" than a "war of movement," typical of the *foco* strategy, which has the intention to destroy the state, and which had become common in Latin America following Castro's 1959 success in Cuba.

Jorge Castañeda likewise argues that the Zapatistas represent something more akin to "armed reformism" than to the classical guerrilla movement (Castañeda 1995, p. 86). There is a clear link, he argues, between the uprising in Chiapas, its timing, and the calls for national reform which emanated from its communiqués and demands. All signaled something quite different from other guerrilla wars fought in Latin America. "At bottom," the Zapatista uprising "is eminently political." The EZLN combatants behind their ski-masks may or may not be heroic, "but they are not guerrillas" (Castañeda 1995, p. 86).

If not a guerrilla war in keeping with the Castro model, then what do the Zapatista insurgents represent? Before one can address this question, it is first necessary to have a general understanding of the political, economic and social environment of Chiapas, particularly the environment as it relates to the Indigenous campesino. It is from this environment that the Zapatistas emerged, with their ranks filled with

Indigenous people willing to sacrifice their lives for a cause.

EZLN Grievances and Demands

The political, economic and social environment of Chiapas provided fertile ground for the uprising of January 1, 1994, by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN). The Zapatistas grounded their actions in a widely published list of eight grievances.

Following the first formal meetings between the government's negotiating team, led by Manuel Camacho Solís, and the Zapatistas, led by Subcommander Marcos, the Zapatistas released a communiqué on March 1, 1994 addressed to the Mexican people. The rebels explained their violent actions in terms of the failure of government in particular and Mexican society in general to find solutions to the problems the Indigenous campesino had long suffered.

The grievances, along with their thirty-four negotiating demands provided both a concrete notion of the problems the rebels wished to solve, and insights into what the Zapatistas would consider as successful outcomes of their uprising. The published grievances include:

First: The hunger, misery and marginalization from which we have always suffered,

Second: The complete lack of land on which to work in order to survive,

Third: Repression, displacement, imprisonment, torture and murder as the government's response to the just demands of our people,

Fourth: The unbearable injustices and violations of our human

rights as impoverished Indigenous people and campesinos.

Fifth: The brutal exploitation we suffer in selling our products, in our workday, and in the buying of merchandise of basic necessity, (economic exploitation)

Sixth: The lack of indispensable services for the majority of the Indigenous population,

Seventh: The government's lies, deceit, promises and intrusion that have lasted over 60 years. The lack of liberty and democracy to decide our destinies,

Eighth: Constitutional laws have not been followed by those who govern this country; instead they make us, the Indigenous people and campesinos, pay for even the smallest mistake. They lay upon us the weight of a law that we did not make, and those who did are the first ones to violate it (Zapatista communiqué, March 1, 1994 published in *La Jornada*, Mexico City).

These grievance, along with the thirty-four demands of the rebels, are analyzed closely in Chapter II.

The Problem

While one-hundred or so rebels who gave their lives in combat during the initial hours of the Zapatista uprising on January 1, 1994 point to yet another Latin American Castro style insurrection, subsequent actions on the part of the indigenous guerrillas call attention to exceptional characteristics of the Zapatistas. Despite their lack of military victory, or the semblance of military credibility over the long haul, the rebels drew the Mexican government to the negotiating table. This fact alone suggests a break with Latin American revolutionary history. Negotiation positions for the guerrillas in both the cases of El

Salvador and Guatemala, for example, were developed only after horrendous cost in lives, social and economic disruption, and international intervention in long drawn out conflicts. In contrast, Chiapas and the EZLN present a unique scenario that deserves attention.

Questions arising from the actions of the Zapatistas include: How are we to understand the Mexican government's willingness to negotiate with a guerrilla movement which was without the military means to compel it to do so? Was it merely fortuitous circumstance or the strategic and tactical decisions made by the Zapatista leadership that brought the government, with its clearly superior military to the bargaining table? Do the tactics of the Zapatistas represent an evolving form of revolution in Latin America or is this simply another expression of indigenous or class discontent, which has a long history in the region? Are the Zapatistas' strategies generalizable to a larger Latin America, or do they find their roots and nourishment only in Mexican soil?

To date, there has been a clear preference on the part of the Zapatistas for the use of stagecraft and the global media instead of the more traditional guerrilla tactics of claymore-mines, AK 47s, sabotage and ambush long associated with guerrilla warfare in Latin America. Essays and communiqués, by both Subcomandante Marcos and the Indigenous Revolutionary Clandestine Committee—the General Command of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (CCRI-CG)—have argued their positions based more on universal morality than on specific ideological precepts. Symbols of thoughtful consultation, albeit always in the presence of powerful modern weaponry, served instantaneously to a

global audience through modern communication byways such as the Internet, have replaced the bloodshed of the battlefield and the fratricidal destruction of the campesino village so common in other Latin American venues since 1970. It appears that the guerrilla war as practiced by the Zapatistas is of different kind, using different tools and, presumably, aimed toward a different end.

The Strategies and Tactics of the EZLN

The inclination on the part of the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) to wage their struggle against the Mexican government with moral appeals and philosophical debate rather than hard ideology and the tactics of guerrilla warfare may indeed be a calculated move. As such, the tactics of the EZLN forces and their leadership mesh well with the reality in which the guerrillas find themselves, i.e., military and logistical inferiority. Many commentators on the events since January 1, 1994, in Chiapas have paid attention to this point. A typical observation notes that:

The Zapatistas have been able to use words more effectively than most armies use tanks and artillery. Their communiqués, signed by the enigmatic military leader Subcomandante Marcos (or 'Sup' as he likes to call himself), seem like they were written by a literature professor rather than the revolutionary idol of the moment (Wood 1995).

In an article entitled Netwar, published on the Internet, Wood elaborates further on the non-ideological and non-violent nature of this guerrilla war as practiced by the Zapatistas. Wood writes:

There are no long diatribes taken from Marx, Lenin, or Mao. Instead be prepared for citations from Cervantes, Garcia Lorca, Machado, or even the sonnets of Shakespeare - in the original

English, with spelling and punctuation perfectly correct. This has led some to speculate that Marcos is either hiding in a public library, or that he has a copy of the Complete Works tucked into his ammunition belt. This is no ordinary guerrilla movement. There have been no executions. No assassinations of political leaders. No assassinations of the caciques [landowning elite] who control rural Chiapas, the traditional enemies of the Indigenous Mayans who make up the Zapatista rank and file. They only 'fought' (with arms that is) for 12 days, after which they called upon the civil society of Mexico, and the world, to finish their battle for them (Wood 1995).

Subcomandante Marcos, the military commander of the EZLN, openly admits to the military impotence of his forces. "We are proud of many things about our army," he admits in an interview, "but our weaponry is not one of them (Preston 1995)." Even this admission of military weakness may demonstrate an understanding on the part of the EZLN of what Jeffrey Ryan argues is the *sine qua non* for the survival of guerrilla movements. "The key" to the survival of these movements "is the establishment of a broad-based coalition extending beyond the core of the revolutionary movement itself" (Ryan 1995, p. 41). This coalition, if established and maintained, serves to prevent or impede the marginalization of the revolutionary forces. If successful, the ruling regime is limited in its freedom of forceful action (in most cases military action) against the guerrillas. The power of the regime is therefore diminished. Ryan's argument raises the question of whether or not the EZLN are deliberately appealing to the *civil society* for support and have from the beginning. Or can it be argued that they are merely acting from a lack of alternatives (e.g., the lack of military capability to challenge the regime)?

If the strategic and tactical formula displayed by the Zapatista rebels were successful, it could form a new model for other marginalized groups who seek redress for long-standing grievances against the Mexican government, just as the strategy used by Castro and elaborated by Ché Guevara was touted for three decades following 1959 as the model for future guerrilla wars in Latin America. This adherence in the 60s and 70s to the Guevara/Debray theory of revolution gave evidence of the importance of precedent in guerrilla warfare strategies and tactics. In this regard, the Zapatistas may have presented an alternative. The Zapatista model suggests an initial quick strike—mostly symbolic—and falling back to a safe and defensible position. It includes a refusal to engage the coercive forces of the regime, while waiting for civil society to provide support for a negotiated settlement of grievances.

The question presents itself then: If such a model can be seen as presenting an alternative set of strategies, was this a conscious choice on the part of the Zapatistas? Were they moving deliberately in a new revolutionary direction? This leads us directly to the major research question explored in this project, namely:

Did the messages issued by the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) during the period of January 1, 1994, through August 31, 1995, demonstrate a clear tonal preference in favor of either 1) an appeal to force of arms, or, 2) an appeal to civil society to support a negotiated settlement of Zapatista demands?, Further, did the tonal preference of the Zapatista messages, if identified, suggest an overall Zapatista strategy for resolving their grievances against the Mexican government?

These questions, in turn, lead us to the hypothesis to be tested here that:


the Zapatistas planned to quickly transform their insurrection, following initial hostilities from a rebellion that relied on force to bring about the changes they sought to one that had as a identifiable strategy the negotiated settlement of their grievances. As a tactical part of their strategy the Zapatistas deliberately launched a coordinated appeal to Mexican civil society to bring pressure on the Mexican government to forestall any military solution to the rebellion, and to encourage the Mexican government to enter into negotiations with the rebels.

The Zapatista Rebellion Modeled

In order to determine if the hypothesis is valid and fits the facts of the rebellion itself, it would be helpful to look at a model of the process.

The model, depicted in Figure 1, delineates a strategy for the achievement of the rebels' goals. The model comprises a military component and a propaganda component. The military component is both limited in time and space and has a short-term tactical as well as strategic purpose. The propaganda component is much richer and has a long-term strategic purpose: the negotiated settlement of a substantial portion of the rebel demands.

Figure 1
Model of Rebellion



The military tactical component consists of a quick strike against a highly visible and accessible target. The immediate purpose is not to cause damage or loss of life, but to draw the widest possible attention (international attention if possible) to the event and its causes, as well as to possible consequences of the rebel action on the greater public. In short, the quick strike, made to look as military as possible, is more of a show than a military confrontation. It is a show meant to suggest a much worse scenario potentially to follow than is indeed in the rebels plans. The quick strike is carried out, taking full advantage of the media, and ends with a full withdrawal, with as few casualties as possible. The withdrawal is made to a safe and defensible area where government military pursuit will be difficult if not impossible, thus delaying any

further military action. It also gives the rebels an opportunity to take full advantage of the second aspect of the model, the propaganda component.

The propaganda component comes into play immediately upon the initiation of hostilities. Initially directed at the rebels' principal antagonist, the government, the message quickly broadens to an appeal for help to a much larger audience. The aid sought is the correction of long-standing and acute grievances as portrayed by the rebels in their opening statement. The appeals are not for military support, but for moral support and statements of solidarity with the rebels' cause and demands. The appeal seeks to draw as much support as possible to the rebel action and the justice of their action, which would provide moral justification for the initial military style action. Of more immediate importance is the tactical goal of enlisting the greater public's aid in blunting the government's military response. In addition, the initial appeals to civil society will provide the rebels view of the situation for use by those who would argue their cause for them outside of the combat arena. The initial communications from the rebels, according to this model, constantly reiterate the rebels desire for a peaceful solution to the conflict; i.e., a negotiated settlement. It is hard, the logic implies, to shoot at someone who is screaming for justice, but not shooting back at you. This model is consistent with Castañeda's notion of "armed reformism" and Harvey's "war of position" as summarized above. Both notions mix the force of arms with conciliatory language and, thus, help us understand the hybrid which the Zapatistas actions , at first blush, seem to be.

Why do it this way? If a group has spent money and countless

hours recruiting for an army and accumulating arms and tactical equipment for that army, why so quickly abandon the armed path? In the case of the Zapatistas, there are both practical and political reasons for this scenario. First, such a tactical approach would best serve rebels who have limited military capabilities. What is needed is good planning of the initial strike, a few modern weapons for show, a defensible fall-back position, and enough military credibility to instill the possibility of future military action. Second, it is a strategy that might appeal to large numbers of sympathizers who would otherwise be turned-off by violence and terror. This is especially true in modern times as the world, both its governments and people, seem to be weary of the many elongated violent struggles. The world has witnessed the terrible price paid in both human and economic terms of the rebel/government confrontations in Central America, the seemingly insoluble disputes between Israel and the Palestinians with their suicide bombers, the Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland with the terror by para-militaries, and the horrendous Muslim and the Military regime confrontations in Algeria with the massacres of entire villages, etc.

The support sought by the rebels was from people who recognize injustice but will not support a violent solution; attention would thus be directed at organizations which could bring pressure to bear on the government not to use the full weight of its military apparatus against the rebels. These also are people who would be in the best position to act as mediators of some form of negotiated settlement in the future.

There are political reasons for adopting these strategies as well. First, the rebels may not have as one of their established goals the

overthrow of the existing political or economic system. In fact, as the demands of the rebels strongly suggest, it is the system, albeit with modification, that they hope will be the source of their salvation. Second, if the rebels come from a disenfranchised group, which they most always do, they may be able in the future to claim some recognizable political ground within the existing system if their demands retain room for compromise and the violence they initiate is limited, and, therefore, understandable and forgivable in the future.

This description very nearly matches the broad outlines of the events surrounding the Zapatista uprising on January 1, 1994, and the events subsequent to that uprising within the period of this study. This, in turn, suggests that the major hypothesis fits well with what the Zapatista rebellion produced on the ground.

There are many factors worthy of attention related to the question of strategic positioning of the Zapatistas. We could look at the history of peasant rebellion, the distribution of political power in Mexico and its effects on marginalized groups, the Mexican Military's role in controlling other rebellions of this nature, the role of historical experiences and especially of the Mexican revolution. The list is almost without limit. A potentially fruitful area of study involves the continuous questions raised in Mexican society by the eleven percent of that nation's population which is indigenous. This issue is particularly relevant in this case due to the largely indigenous nature of the Zapatista rebellion itself and the self-proclaimed intent on the part of the rebels to help alleviate the long-standing social, economic and political ostracization of Chiapas' indigenous populations.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

"Somos producto de 500 años de luchas: primero contra la esclavitud, en la guerra de Independencia contra España encabezada por los insurgentes, después por evitar ser absorbidos por el expansionismo norteamericano, luego por promulgar nuestra Constitución y expulsar al Imperio Francés de nuestro suelo, después la dictadura porfirista nos negó la aplicación justa de leyes de Reforma y el pueblo se rebeló formando sus propios líderes, surgieron Villa y Zapata, hombres pobres como nosotros a los que se nos ha negado la preparación más elemental para así poder utilizarlos como carne de cañón y saquear las riquezas de nuestra patria sin importarles que estemos muriendo de hambre y enfermedades curables, sin importarles que no tengamos nada, absolutamente nada, ni un techo digno, ni tierra, ni trabajo, ni salud, ni alimentación, ni educación, sin tener derecho a elegir libre y democráticamente a nuestras autoridades, sin independencia de los extranjeros, sin paz ni justicia para nosotros y nuestros hijos."

Primera Declaración de la Selva Lacandona, 1994

This chapter presents a review of the literature that has the most relevance to the hypothesis to be tested. The first section contains a summary of the literature pertaining to the conceptualization of *Indianness*, ethnicity, and culture, as well as the role played by these concepts in the on-going indigenous struggle. The second section contains a summary of the literature related to indigenous rebellion, social, economic, and political marginalization, and the organizational response by various indigenous groups. The last section contains a review of the literature relating to the Zapatistas' role in Chiapas.

Introduction

For over five-hundred years, the native people of the Americas have endured catastrophe. With the arrival of the Europeans in the Fifteenth

Century, the indigenous people throughout the whole of the Western hemisphere suffered loss of their land, loss of their political autonomy and a drastic reduction in their numbers. The conquest by force of arms combined with devastating epidemics reduced the pre-Columbian population by nearly 95 percent. With the collapse of this population from an estimated high of 25 million to less than 1.3 million within a century, the native cultures were supplanted by that of the Europeans (Hart 1989, p. 21). Remnants of this once dominant culture have struggled to survive since.

Underlying Factors

The Indians

Mexico has long debated the fate of its Indigenous communities. The Zapatista rebellion of January 1, 1994, served to draw fresh attention to questions of Indian rights, the means by which these rights could be preserved and protected, and the existence of an Indigenous problem in Mexico.

The conceptualization of *Indianness* is important to this research. This is because the Zapatistas have insisted that their struggle is part of a larger struggle to obtain Indian rights in Mexico. Repeatedly, the communiqués of the Zapatista National Liberation Army made it clear that the Indian in Mexico would now speak for himself. More importantly, he would now speak in *one* Indian voice.

From the first days of the conflict, the rebels declared that “[w]e say also, once and for all, that we reject any proposals to take our voice and our words. Our voice began to sound centuries ago, and will never

again be silenced" (Zapatista Communiqué dated 1/11/94). One of the many Zapatista slogans in their communications was "Mexico, never again without us." This recognizes that the Indian had been historically isolated and disenfranchised from Mexican society, but implies that they wish to be treated as Mexican !

The emphasis on an indigenous identity by the Zapatistas as a central theme in their demands for what they call a "true peace with justice and dignity" (Communiqué dated 3/24/94), again promoted a lively discussion about the overall Indian question.

It also raised conceptual questions concerning how the Indian is to be defined. The question is, indeed, difficult. The concept of "Indian" encompasses multiple markers (i.e., race, ethnicity, culture, worldview, and history). Field has identified two predominant schools of thought as to who and what constitutes an Indian. To those who ascribe to the *cultural survival position*, interest in indigenous peoples has been by-and-large anthropological studies of a people seen as "precariously balanced on the precipice of cultural extinction" (Field 1994, p. 238). Indigenous people thought of in this way are principally objects of research, defined statistically and by various circumstances and markers. They are seen as discrete "only insofar as [they] remained 'uncontaminated,' and separated from the larger, dominant culture around them. The importance of "cultural traits or traditions" is paramount (Field 1994, p. 238). These ethnic and cultural markers constituted what is the *essence* of being Indian. A style of clothing, a language or dialect, a panoply of gods and religious symbols are seen as constituting an Indian.

But while largely anthropological attention to the indigenous

population of Mexico shed light on their "ways" and "beliefs," and the way in which the Indians contrasted with a greater Mexico, their cultural isolation produced a significant negative. "Being Indian" in modern Mexico is usually seen as a negation (Campbell 1993, p. 58)." The identity of the Indian in the minds of most Mexicans is strongly linked to "poverty, illiteracy, and lack of economic opportunity" (Campbell 1993, p.58). This negative interpretation of Indian culture and social structure no doubt prompted the Zapatista demand for the rights of indigenous people in Mexico to "be respected" and that the government and Mexican society recognize the importance of indigenous culture and traditions.

More recent work has challenged the exclusiveness of the anthropological perception. The new tendency is to see indigenous people as involved in a continual process of redefinition, defined by the balance between integration and isolation. Labeled as the *resistance school*, these studies focused on Indianness as a continuing struggle—its genesis grounded in the first European invasion of the new world (Field 1994). What it meant to be Indian in pre-conquest terms is forever lost, according to this argument. Of more importance is the indigenous people's ongoing political struggle, a struggle that must be recognized as Indian, having ways and means which are apart and often contrary to the dominant culture.

Peter Elsass argued that in a one-dimensional, homogenous modern world, the Indian people continue to be put under pressure to conform and assimilate. But to resist assimilation pressures is difficult, if not impossible, partly due to the Indian's inability to "demonstrate [the] necessary unity" to resist such an overwhelming force. The

Indigenous communities tended to diversify, especially in terms of language and culture, while "Indianness" as concept has emphasized homogeneity. Elsass argued:

On the contrary, they [Indigenous cultures] are made up of hundreds of different populations, each with its own specific historical and ethnic origin. In practice, the Indian organizations have divided up into many factions, some of which fight for an ideological principle, while others are more concrete and put more emphasis on land rights and autonomy. Indian populations constitute completely different social groups that cannot be reduced to one downtrodden people. Their struggles are not the same as class struggle (Elsass 1992, pp. 96-97).

Tom Barry (1995), writing specifically about the Zapatistas uprising, agrees. Barry argued that the "multidimensionality" of the indigenous people indicated that being "Indian" doesn't simply refer to a reservoir of some ancient past which is only preserved in isolation. "Indians" must also be defined in relationship to the larger macro-environment that surrounds them, one in which they compete in a dynamic, highly adaptable sense with the dominant society (Barry 1995, p. 180).

Thus, for writers like Elsass and Barry, the Indians do not constitute "a unified, distinct category." Their are cultures that are varied, multi-dimensional and fluid. Often, as is the case in Mexico, the essence that separate a *mestizo* from an *indigena* is neither clear nor constant (Barry 1995, p. 174). Depending on the setting, the economics, and the politics, the two notions blend together. Therefore, the multi-dimensional nature of indigenous culture presents problems of categorization; that is, indigenous culture cannot be categorized with conceptual rigor. The Indian turns out to be a shadow figure. He is easily

identified when dressed in native costume or speaking a native tongue, but becomes more obscure as he blends into a campesino or peasant setting or flows into the huge urban sea that is Mexico City.

Varese attempted to solve this problem by subordinating culture and ethnicity (the essence of the *indigena*) under an economics umbrella. Varese argues that:

Because, in essence, a style of civilization, a culture, a given ethnicity can be defined through the way in which the society has organized historically, and in the present, the utilization of use values and the definition and consignment of surpluses.... To the extent that an Indian ethnic group autonomously and collectively manages this aspect of its cultural life, its ideology and world-view, without allowing itself to be enslaved by the hegemony of the capitalist culture—that is, by the primacy of exchange value—it can be said that there is some cultural independence and, consequently, the potential for an autonomous decision with regard to plans for the future (Varese 1988, p. 73).

Varese believes that the Indian's only chance for survival, as an Indian, is through his separateness, or some special status. Otherwise, he becomes a part of the larger culture, a culture which he believes is largely defined by commerce and economic activity. Subsumed into the dominant culture in this way means that ethnicity becomes class, and the Indian becomes the peasant or campesino or part of the urban poor.

Thus, there are reasons to note the distinctions between the Indian and the dominant society (Schryer 1993, p. 203). From the earliest days of the conquest, for example, "Indian identity developed as the only way of coping with and manipulating the political world created by the Spanish conquerors" (Schryer 1993 p. 203). Land rights were often vested in Indian pueblos, a collective ownership. Thus, "ethnic enclaves"

came to be seen by both the powers and the local leadership as "Indian". Symbolic political gestures, often identified as upholding "Native rights", have waxed and waned ever since. There is a long history of mestizo politicians having built reputations by becoming defenders of Mexico's native peoples. President Lázaro Cárdenas in the 1930s and, forty years later, President Luis Echeverría are two examples of politicians who took advantage of "radical *indigenismo*" to build political power (Schryer 1993, p. 208). The Indian was important as Indian to all concerned, but not as peasant. The Indian heritage of Mexico was recognized and celebrated by all socio-economic levels of Mexican culture as an important aspect of the development of the nation, indeed as an integral part of the Mexican identity. The poor subsistence peasant or campesino did not enjoy the same overarching romantic history or the same attention.

Top-down recognition of the separateness of the Indian in Mexican culture, used for political purposes, also has its bottom-up component both in a negative and positive sense. In a negative sense, the Indian often is reluctant to self identify himself apart from the peasant. He knows well the attitudes of racism held by many in Mexican society who identify *Indian* ways, language, and culture as inferior. Political struggles involving the bottom of the socio-economic ladder are, therefore, often self defined as peasant (campesino) struggles rather than Indian struggles. An Indian leader, when asked why the Chiapas revolt "appeared more like a campesino rather than an Indian struggle" responded that:

Definitively because of the negation of indigenous culture. We are discounted and in discounting us they say that we are backward, inferior to the other society. For this reason, many brothers refuse

to tell the truth that they are Indians...(quoted in Katzenberger 1995 p 121.)

In contrast, some Indians have recently renewed their effort to gain recognition of the importance of indigenous culture, and to secure recognition of native rights and native ethnic uniqueness. As Miguel Bartolomé and Alicia Barabas point out, this emphasis on indigenous rights "is not a new phenomenon but the restructured expression of the long struggle that the indigenous ethnic groups have carried out" (Campbell 1993, p. xiv.). These struggles are not only for the survival of ethnic identity and political autonomy but "also for the right of cultural survival and development" (Campbell 1993, p. xiv). For these Indians, cultural and ethnic identity become important tools to seek political and economic recognition and advantage.

Culture and Worldview

The resistance school of Indian identification points to the important role played by culture in determining the distribution of political power. Culture is much more than dress and customs. It determines the way the world is viewed and how life should be lived. It is the principal determinant of institutions and how they work.

The concept of *political culture* gained a special recognition as a result of the work of Almond and Verba in the 1950s. Almond, et. al., argued that "[e]very political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action" (Chilcote 1981, p. 179). That is to say, there was a cultural predisposition to certain actions in particular political situations. Thus, the more we understand the culture, the more we will understand the political behavior of members of that culture.

The notion of individual behavior – as well as its embodiment in institutions – as embedded in culture has led some scholars to attempt to explain political development as a product of the evolution of culture. Inglehart, for example, has used cultural traits as a backdrop to his political-economic analysis of societies, arguing that "economic factors are politically important—but they are only part of the story" (Inglehart 1990, p. 15). Cultural "predispositions" are significant in the political development of any society; changes in attitudes therefore allow us to relate culture to development.

Chilton argued that political development is grounded in a particular culture (Chilton 1988, p. 14). What we would normally consider the foundations of society (its institutions, mores, laws, customs, roles, languages or lifestyles) are, upon closer examination, all ways and methods that members of a society relate to one another (Chilton 1988, p. 23). Political development comes about as a result of "a specific form of change in the political culture of a society" (Chilton 1988, p. 28). Cultural change causes political development. In the case of traditional societies or subsets of larger societies, for political and economic development to occur a transformation in their worldview must occur first.

Rostow theorized there were five stages of development, beginning with traditional values and culminating in an "age of high mass consumption" typical of the modern world (Chilcote 1981, p. 223). To move through these stages of development requires the destruction of the values of stage one – which involves the destruction of traditional societies. In Inglehart's view, "economic achievement...could emerge only

when the static orientation of traditional society was broken....”
(Inglehart 1990, p. 63).

A modern and powerful example of the theoretical view that traditional cultures are obstacles to political and economic development was played out in a real world political setting in Peru in 1990. The presidential race pitted Mario Vargas Llosa against Alberto Fujimori. The novelist Vargas Llosa campaigned on a platform of rapid development of modern economic and political institutions for Peru. In his view, one of the greatest impediments to the creation of a modern Peruvian state was the large number of traditional communities in Peru and their reluctance to move toward the modern values of individual achievement and the scientific perspective which relies on technology to increase production (Poole 1992 p.138). Vargas Llosa quickly gained notoriety as “one of Latin America’s leading advocates of ‘neo-liberal revolution’”(Poole 1992, p. 138). Vargas Llosa argued in his unsuccessful presidential bid that democracy was incompatible with traditional values and that “modernization is possible only with the sacrifice of the Indian cultures” (Poole and Rénique 1992 p. 140).

But to sacrifice culture logically means to sacrifice ethnic identity. So both ethnicity and culture become easily politicized as those asked by dominant cultural groups to sacrifice their identity resist. Thompson noted that the “almost universal acknowledgment of the ethnic factor is a recent phenomenon (Thompson 1989, p. 1).” Following the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960’s, academics pursued explanations for the failure of the American Negro to be assimilated into white culture. This, in turn, fostered widespread interest into humankind’s “‘ethnic nature’—the

propensity of individuals and groups to be organized and classified on the basis of race (i.e., physical or morphological characteristics) or ethnicity ("tribal," linguistic, national, religious, or other cultural characteristics)" (Thompson 1989, p. 1).

In comparative research an interest in ethnic groups within a larger society has been designed principally to understand the "conditions that foster or prevent the integration of ethnic groups into their environing societies" (Schermerhorn 1970, p.14). Integration is seen as an ongoing "process whereby units or elements of a society are brought into an active and coordinated compliance with the ongoing activities and objectives of the dominant group in that society" (Schermerhorn 1970, p.14).

The initial emphasis on integration later gave way to an emphasis on ethnic isolation and resistance to integration. Rothschild saw ethnicity as a tool of conflict. He described "ethnicity and ethnic," as concepts connecting the collective memories by which the group defines itself with "their place and fate in the political and socioeconomic structures of their state and society" (Rothschild 1981, p. 9). The connection between the "who we are" and the "place we occupy" in the larger society often create an environment in which the group's identity was "readily politicized" (Rothschild 1981, p.1).

Rothschild explains that "the tilt" or "(im)balance toward politicized ethnicity" in the modern world resulted from the "increasing pace of modernization and increased levels of modernity in different countries" (Rothschild 1981, p.3). As noted above, ethnicity became another tool by which to wage the battle over traditional vs. modern

values and behaviors. Rothschild put it this way:

politicization of ethnicity...stresses, ideologizes, reifies, modifies, and sometimes virtually re-creates the putatively distinctive and unique cultural heritages of the ethnic groups that it mobilizes—precisely at the historical moment when these groups are being thoroughly penetrated by the universal culture of science and technology (Rothschild 1981, p. 3).

Likewise, Guidieri and Pellizzi (1988) saw the threats to the traditional way of life and the traditional identity as the impetus for a new interest in ethnic identity and uniqueness (Guidieri and Pellizzi 1988, p. 7). It was the process of homogenization of markets, of ideologies, of people, that was generating and motivating "the new need for ethnic autonomy, and even, in many cases, the actual sense of ethnic identity on which the latter is predicated (Guidieri and Pellizzi 1988, p. 8)."

From the perspective of Rothschild, Guidieri and Pellizzi, then the state itself, harnessed as it is to the process of modernization, has been driving a resurgence of ethnicity and, in some cases, the very fact of ethnicity as an issue. Ethnicity in this light is political-ethnicity. It is an object of political struggle, mobilizing money, party and ideology in the quest for a fair share of national resources. Rothschild concluded that:

Today the engine of ethnic conflict is no longer this or that primordial cultural commitment per se...rather, it is the perceived ethnic inequalities and inequities in access to, and possession of, economic, educational, political, administrative, and social resources (Rothschild 1981, p. 39).

The Indigenous Voice in World Politics, by Franke Wilmer, illustrates the global nature of the question of ethnic and cultural resistance to

assimilation, isolation, or destruction in the name of modernity. The United Nations' 1993 recognition of various indigenous appeals, provided Wilmer with the backdrop for his analysis.

Wilmer characterizes the politics of Indigenous activism as "a classic struggle between the least powerful (indigenous groups) and the most powerful (industrialized nations) over normative issues, played out in international forums" (Wilmer 1993, p. 32). The normative character of the argument was essentially a result of the inequality of power. Lacking any sustainable means to forcefully make their demands heard or heeded, indigenous people have had little choice but to appeal to moral persuasion.

Wilmer pointed out that the demise of the colonial model which has been replaced by the "principle of self-determination" and the subsequent rise of non-Western members in the U.N. "reflect a transformation of the normative basis of the international political community" (Wilmer 1993, pp. 188-89). This new recognition, or, at least acquiescence, to alternative views of life and a willingness to accept a wider range of participatory input have served to open debate on old issues of great concern to traditional peoples. These groups, who "had never necessarily accepted their excluded status," have met with unheard of responsiveness at the international level. It is a responsiveness that made possible a discussion and to some extent a renegotiation "in legal terms of the political boundaries of the international moral community" (Wilmer 1993, p. 189). As is discussed below, it was the potential for "renegotiation of political boundaries" that played a prominent role in the Zapatistas demands and negotiating position.

Precipitating Factors

Indianness and Rebellion in Chiapas

Culture, ethnic identity, and symbols of modernity clashed graphically in the fall of 1992 in Chiapas. Gathering in the old colonial capital of San Cristóbal de las Casas, a large number of indigenous Chiapanecos, there to celebrate the five-hundredth anniversary of indigenous resistance to European values, made their new found political voice heard. Thousands of peasants in multiple ethnic dress, speaking in a babel of Indian dialects, filled the streets of the city and displayed their rage at the white-dominated social structure.

One symbol of that domination which caught their attention (and subsequently was the object of their wrath) was the statue of the Spanish conquistador, Diego de Mazazriegos. The stone likeness of the Spanish conquering hero was unceremoniously pulled by the Mayan demonstrators from its pedestal and dragged through the streets, ironically, much like the rebellious Indians of Diego's day had been dragged by the Spaniard overlords in what became colonial New Spain (Collier 1994, p. 18; Hernandez 1994).

This event in San Cristóbal de las Casas, as rich in symbolism as in fact, reminded many observers that there was a thin veneer of order covering the day-to-day political and social reality in Chiapas. Tensions such as in San Cristóbal have historically gone unheeded until they break through and spill out in bloody social chaos. Acts of indigenous rebellion have run a continuous thread through the historic fabric of Chiapas, Mexico (Russell 1995, p. 1).

The causes, like the events themselves, repeat. The historian John Mason Hart lists as one of the principal factors responsible for a decade of conflict in Mexico (1910-1920) the maltreatment and marginalization of the peasant class (Hart 1989, pp. 9-10). Hart describes the *campesinaje* of Mexico as they were displaced by land ownership policies that created large estates, many owned by foreign interests, which adopted an export agriculture market orientation which tended to make the peasantry superfluous. The lack of industrial development to absorb the migrants from the countryside to the urban areas exacerbated the situation. These migrating former campesinos at the turn of the twentieth century soon filled the ranks of Zapata's Morelos fighters and Villa's Division of the North, both which played crucial roles in the 1910 revolution, shaping its eventual outcome and consequences for Mexico (Hart, p.51).

Many of the factors affecting the rural campesino, that Hart describes, in pre-revolutionary Mexico, are evident in contemporary Chiapas. Ethnic and racial conflict, land disputes, increasing rural populations unable to find a means of sustenance, political marginalization, electoral manipulation and legal suppression which were widespread in the later years of the Porfiriato (1870-1910), were all factors also contributing to the January 1, 1994 uprising in Chiapas.

The reforms following the Mexican Revolution, which to a degree sought to alleviate the conditions just described, never made their way to southern Mexico (Collier 1994, p. 28). The causal sparks that had served to ignite the 1910 revolution were never extinguished in Mexico's most southern regions. "The fuel of Mexico's agrarian revolution, the landless and exploited peasantry," writes historian Thomas Benjamin, "in

Chiapas and the southern regions generally was too divided, controlled, and isolated to burn down the old order" (Benjamin 1989, p. 92). It is this old order that still attracts anger and violence, as the Zapatistas illustrate.

Some scholars and commentators place the Zapatistas clearly within the historical tradition of indigenous resistance to colonial domination. Ward Churchill has argued that the rebellion has been "ongoing without real interruption since the first conquistador set foot in this hemisphere more than five hundred years ago," and that the Zapatistas have attempted to "reclaim their own tradition (Katzenberger 1995, p. 143). That tradition, of course, is Mayan. It is significant to note here that "virtually the entire composition of the EZLN is Mayan" (Katzenberger 1995, p. 143). Moreover, the Zapatistas and their methods of organizing and fighting are "consciously and unequivocally Mayan at every level..."(Katzenberger 1995, p. 146). As such, for Churchill, the Zapatistas have had more to do with the indigenous struggle than with the struggle of the Left or any ideology. The Zapatista struggle in its present incarnation represents Mayas who "have been fighting back with every means at their disposal for the past 350 years" (Katzenberger 1995, p. 147). For him, the rebellion should be read "in terms of the protracted armed struggles" that are common around the world (Katzenberger 1995, p. 152).

Mexico's Modernization & Regional Exploitation

The underlying and historical source of indigenous discontent, however, needs to be complemented by more immediate and potentially precipitating events in order for a revolution of this type to emerge. At the national level, there were two important events negatively impacting the Chiapas campesino resulting from policy changes. The first was the reform of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution. This reform from Mexico City suddenly and drastically altered decades of land reform goals in rural Mexico. The second policy reform perceived as equally threatening by the indigenous population of Chiapas was the withdrawal of economic subsidies to the peasant small producers.

The Salinas government intended by these actions to create a market-driven economy for the country (Collier 1994, p. 85; Russell 1995, p. 16). The reforms to Article 27 in the eyes of the campesino farmer, however, dashed any hope for having his own land while the market measures for Mexico's agricultural sector were perceived as threatening to the indigenous peasant's immediate survival.

As Hart explained, Article 27 of the Querétaro Constitution of 1917, "promised land reform and the final resolution of 'the agrarian problem,'" (Hart 1989, p. 329). Article 27 did something else as well. It established the "supremacy of the national government over the *patria chica* of the campesinos" (Hart, p. 329). From 1917 onward, it would be the national government that would effect agrarian reform. It was Mexico City's prerogative as to which great landed estates would be broken up and redistributed to small ejidos and small farmers. The effect on the campesino was to tie his future, his hopes and aspirations for land, to

the central government (Hart, p. 331).

Arguing from a position that Mexico must modernize its agrarian sector, the reform minded Salinas government rewrote the agrarian reform section of the Mexican Constitution and its congressional majority ratified the changes. Agrarian reform, which had "shaped the government's relationship to the peasantry for half a century" (Collier 1994, p 45) thus came to an abrupt end. As Sub-Commandante Marcos noted, it was the straw that broke the camel's back. Marcos spoke of the perceived consequences of the government's actions:

[they] really screwed us, now that they destroyed Article 27, for which Zapata and Revolution fought. Salinas de Gortari arrived on the scene with lackeys, and his groups, and in a flash they destroyed it. We and our families have been sold down the river, or you could say that they stole our pants and sold them. What can we do? We did everything legal that we could so far as elections and organizations were concerned, and to no avail (Collier 1994, p. 45).

The resentment that was engendered by suddenly dashing the hopes of the campesinos, many of whom had worked for years petitioning for land within a bureaucratic system, became obvious (Collier 1994, p. 47). As a result, protest marches increased, land takeovers and clashes between peasants and ranchers accelerated and every action took on a more violent tone (Collier 1994, pp. 46-47). Adding to pressure brought about by constitutional land reform was the passage of The North American Free Trade Agreement treaty between Canada, Mexico and the United States (NAFTA). Seemingly a world apart from the lives of the Chiapas campesino, NAFTA nonetheless was viewed by the rural peasant as a direct and immediate threat.

Russell argues that, as seen from the their perspective, NAFTA would have several effects on the campesino, all negative. Foremost, was the "fear [that] they [would] be overwhelmed by food imports form the United States, depriving them of their source of livelihood" (Russell 1995, p. 16). Additionally, there was the issue of communal land rights. The constitutional protections afforded to *ejido* lands, removed by the new reforms of the Salinas government, posed a "grave danger to Native land rights" (Katzenberger 1995, p. 184). The removal of such constitutional protections, combined with the market threats posed by NAFTA, would now throw open the possibility of indigenous lands being purchased by outsiders. Unaccustomed to dealing in such a market, it was widely perceived that the native peoples would be particularly susceptible to being cheated and left destitute. As EZLN put it:

Changes put in place are foreigners' plans and ideas that will once again lead us into slavery. NAFTA will not benefit us campesinos of Mexico, because we lack the machinery we need to be competitive. The Mexican government lets itself get easily carried away by foreign governments (EZLN communiqué, *La Jornada*, 2/16/94).

The fear of most campesinos that NAFTA would overwhelm them was further exacerbated by profound changes in government subsidy and support programs. National government credit and price support programs for growers of corn, beans and coffee were drastically curtailed or abandoned altogether (Harvey 1995, pp. 40-49). The economic decisions of the Salinas government subordinated the peasant sector to the macroeconomic goals of "reduction of inflation via wage and price controls, privatization of state enterprises and trade liberalization" (Harvey, p. 45). Under the NAFTA protocols, the free market was to

govern prices and production levels, and, ultimately for the campesino, his ability to survive as a campesino and small producer. The perceived abandonment by the government of the campesino producer in favor of a free-market future for Mexico "has badly shaken the peasantry," as the campesinos see themselves as, more than ever, written out of Mexico's future (Barry 1995, p. 233). According to one interviewee:

For us campesinos, the problem is that we are just beginning to understand all the implications of free trade and having to compete against U.S. farmers. We don't know why it has to be this way, but it probably means the end to our communities (Margarito Sánchez of Tuxtepec, Veracruz, February 1994; quoted in Barry, p. 65).

Noam Chomsky, a leading spokesperson for the American Left, has argued that the Zapatista rebellion must be seen in the international context of a "new economic order" of which the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and similar international economic treaties signal a intensifying fight between the have and have-nots" (Katzenberger 1995, p. 176). Citing Pilar Valdes, a Mexican columnist, Chomsky argues that while the Indian peasant was the most aggrieved by government policies, "[a]nyone who has the opportunity to be in contact with the millions of Mexicans who live in extreme poverty knows that we are living with a time bomb"...(Ibid.). Chomsky concludes that the "protest of Indian peasants in Chiapas gives only a bare glimpse of time bombs waiting to explode, not only in Mexico", but elsewhere in the world (Katzenberger 1995, p. 182).

Harvey also has argued that the Zapatista rebellion resulted from the perceived threat posed by the economic model implemented by the

Salinas government (Harvey 1995, p. 39). A combination of modernizing production policies and sweeping land reform—both designed to bring land-use in line with market demands—served to put the small land holder (as well as those who aspired to land) under extreme pressure. These contemporary policy changes overlaid a twenty year period of increased campesino organization in the region. The experience of the majority of these organizations in dealing with government programs had been largely a negative one which "contributed to a weakening of legalistic strategies and the radicalization of discontent" (Harvey 1995, p. 40).

As Harvey has explained, the threats poised by the Salinas land and market reforms combined with demographic factors to produce the climate for protest in Chiapas. The state had endured a large influx of migrants (over 100,000 between 1950 and 1970) to the region. More migrants, mostly poor and displaced from other regions, produced more demands for land. These demands for land (at the same time that land was being concentrated in the hands of large producers of coffee, cattle and other crops) provided an impetus for campesino and indigenous organization. A discussion of indigenous organizational activities in recent decades is provided below.

Indigenous Marginalization

The marginalization of the Indians in Chiapas is a continuous and profound wellspring of rebellious motivation. This was captured in the testimony of a Mayan Indian at a National Indigenous Conference when he succinctly pointed out that "[in] Chiapas, the owners of the fincas treat the Indians worse than they treat their animals. Chiapas is one

great finca in which we Indians are less important than the cows" (Mayor 1994, p. 6). Philip Russell describes the feudal nature of Chiapas this way:

There has traditionally existed an enormous gulf between landowner and worker. In the nineteenth century, the landed elite began coffee production.... Its members relied on the seasonal migration of Indigenous people from the highlands to these plantations to provide labor for harvest.

In the 1960s and 1970s, land barons and politicians encouraged Indians from the highlands to become sharecroppers as logging roads were opened in eastern Chiapas. These sharecroppers were forced to live in lean-tos to prevent them from establishing legal residency and claiming land under the land reform law. Land, which was cleared by the sharecroppers, would often be appropriated for raising cattle, forcing the sharecroppers to move on and clear additional land (Russell 1995, pp. 12-13).

The exploitation of Indians by the dominant class in Chiapas has resulted in ethnic tensions made even more intense by the lack of mixing between the races. The mixture of the races, known as mestizaje, long a staple of assimilation in Mexico generally, has not been the norm in Chiapas. "Indian and non-Indians have occupied separate domains" (Russell 1995, p. 1). The latter have little regard for the former (Tuma 1965, p. 112). The Indian has always been considered the lower caste by not only the elites but by the poor mestizo as well, "making it almost impossible for the Indian majority [in the Chiapas highlands] to improve its status" (Barry 1995, p. 181).

In a meeting convened in Tuxtla Gutiérrez by President Salinas, shortly after the Zapatista uprising, normally passive campesinos forcefully voiced their complaints to the president. They complained of

the never-ending persecution of the campesino under current laws which make him a criminal for merely organizing and protesting. They complained of the lack of change which was always promised but never forthcoming. They complained of how the local political bosses and strongmen, the *caciques*, were protected by the government's police and army and political organizations. But most poignantly they voiced an appeal for respect and dignity. Carlos Fuentes (1996) writes that:

Protests against these abuses have fallen on deaf ears. "I sent you a letter and have received no answer," says the Chamula Indian Domingo López Ángel to the president before describing in detail how the governments of Chiapas have protected the local caciques, the political bosses. In Chiapas we must reform laws, attitudes, behavior, and the mechanisms by which institutions relate to our people," adds Nazar Morales. "There must be respect for our ways of working and the structure of our organizations" (Fuentes 1996, pp. 90-91).

There is no better indicator of the pervasive racism suffered by the indigenous populations in Chiapas, than the activities and purpose of the so-called *guardas blancas*, white guards. These *pistoleros* or private gunmen are hired and maintained by ranchers to illegally take land, often from ejidal holdings then hold it by means of disappearances, jailing, killings and intimidations of peasants (Hernandez 1994, p. 7). As late as 1971, a sign on the Ocosingo chapter of the Lion's Club read "In the Law of the Jungle it is willed/that Indians and blackbirds must be killed" (Russell 1995, p. 3). The former governor of Chiapas, Patrocinio González Garrido, 1988-1993 "referred to Indians as the FBI (*fuerza bruta indígena*—brute Indian force)" (Russell 1995, p. 3). González Garrido, noted for his hard-line attitudes toward the Indigenous populations

while governor (Russell 1995, p. 11), was Salinas' Interior minister at the time of the Zapatista armed rebellion and was dismissed from that post shortly afterwards.

The negative consequences of these pervasive racial attitudes in Chiapas were summed up in a pastoral letter by Samuel Ruiz, bishop of San Cristóbal and a long-time fighter for better treatment of the state's Indigenous populations. Ruiz wrote in August of 1993:

Indigenous people are humiliated and tricked. They are forced to vote for the PRI. Officials are imposed on them against their will. They are not permitted to organize. There is repression in both the city and the countryside. The police and the army control them. Their authorities are corrupt. There is illiteracy, poor schooling, and a lack of electricity, drinking water, and sanitation facilities. There are also irresponsible teachers and excessive school fees. The only health services they receive are birth control and abortion (Russell 1995, p. 3).

The natural result of these attitudes (typified by a hatred for the Indians) combined with the ability to create, maintain and use private armies for the extra-judicial exercise of power over the by-and-large impoverished Indigenous population) is predictable. These attacks have served to provide a sense of solidarity and a "collective identity as victims of the abuse by the wealthy" (Hernandez 1994, p. 8). Their misery, moreover, has been expanded by the general physical conditions in which this population live. Chiapas has the second highest concentration of Indians in Mexico (Mayor 1994, p. 9). Government data for 1990 indicated that with a state population of 3.5 million, almost a quarter of the population (885,605) is Ch'ol, Lacandón, Tzeltal, Tzotzil, Tojolabal, and Zoque Indians (Katzenberger 1995, p. 33). Chiapas is also one of the

poorest states, sharing the distinction with its southern neighbors of Oaxaca and Guerrero (which also contain sizable indigenous populations). Carlos Fuentes (1996) writes that the conditions are such in Chiapas that there "could hardly be a more predictable recipe for a social explosion" (Fuentes, p. 87).

Social and Physical Conditions in Contemporary Chiapas

A large majority of the population in Chiapas live under conditions of extreme poverty. According to government statistics, 40 percent of Chiapanecos receive less than the daily minimum wage, which is roughly equivalent to \$3.00 U.S. Nineteen percent receive no income at all (Katzenberger 1995, p.33). As expected, the poverty of income often translates into deplorable living conditions. An estimated 35 percent of all homes in Chiapas are without electricity or minimum drainage and sanitation, and over half of the dwellings have earthen floors (Katzenberger 1995, p. 33). This figure goes much higher in the more remote parts of the state, such as the highlands and jungle areas of the Selva Lacandona.

Educational levels are abysmal. Sixty-two percent of the Chiapas population, 15 years and older, holds less than a primary education and thirty percent are illiterate. This figure climbs to forty-nine percent of the population in the Los Altos and jungle areas (the locus for the Zapatista rebellion). Seventy percent of the mostly-monolingual Indians in this area have not finished primary school (Russell 1995, p.33). Among women in this segment, the illiteracy rate soars to sixty-three percent (Russell 1995, p. 128).

A study prepared by the institute for European-Latin American

Studies summarizes the misery that is endemic to Chiapas.

Chiapas has the lowest levels of electricity in the country (66.7%). Only 58% of the houses have running water when the national average is 79%...The state's population is only 4% of the nation, but constitutes 25% of all the disputes between campesinos and landlords in the country, disputes which often are violent (Mayor 1994, p. 9).

The social picture of Chiapas is summarized in Table 1 below:

Table 1
Social Indicators in Chiapas

<u>Social Indicators in Chiapas</u>	Percent of population	Ranking among the 31 Mexican states*
Illiterates older than 15	30.12	1
Population older than 15 who have not finished primary school	62.08	1
Population lacking toilets and sewage	42.66	5
Population lacking electricity	34.92	1
Population lacking running water	42.09	4
Population living in overcrowded housing	74.07	1
Population living in houses with dirt floors	50.90	2
Population living in communities of less than 5,000	66.56	3
Population making less than twice minimum wage	80.08	1

chart 1: • 1= worst Source: Russell, 1995, p. 17

Paradoxically, for all the state's poverty at the individual level, Chiapas cannot be considered a poor state. As Thomas Benjamin (1989) has pointed out:

Chiapas is rich, in fact—rich in fertile farmlands, pastures, and forests: in coffee, cattle, cacao, and petroleum; and in productive enterprises owned by a few families. Yet most Chiapanecos remain very poor despite the wealth of the land, the reforms of the Mexican Revolution, and the modernization policies of successive state and federal governments. Natural plenty, of course, does not necessarily create social plenty. Modernization and reform need not lead to progress for all. That is the paradox of Chiapas, a rich land of poor people (Benjamin, 1989 p. xiii).

As a rich land, Chiapas provides high levels of strategic resources to interest of Mexico. Up to sixty percent of the hydroelectric power for the nation comes from Chiapas, as does "21 percent of Mexico's oil and 47 percent of its natural gas" (Russell 1995, p. 12). Chiapas too provides a large share of Mexico's export agriculture. Producing over half of the National coffee crop, the state sends a full 60 percent of this crop out of the country, bringing in return vital foreign exchange (Harvey 1995, p. 43). A rich land providing its bounty for only a few in the state, leaving many to live in conditions that threaten their survival provides the backdrop for the organizational development of the campesino and sets the stage for the Zapatista action of January 1, 1994.

Campesino Organizational Development in Chiapas

The results of the political, economic, and social pressures on the campesino in Chiapas have pushed the indigenous sector towards greater levels of organization and mobilization in an effort to alleviate the perceived threats and the reality of extreme hardships endured by

campesino and indigenous communities.

The recent historical trail that eventually led to the Zapatista uprising of January 1, 1994, can partially be traced to a gathering in 1974, in Chiapas. The Chiapas governor at the behest of President Echeverría asked Bishop Samuel Ruiz in San Cristóbal de Las Casas to “organize an Indigenous Congress commemorating the birth of Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, the sixteenth-century champion of Indian rights” (Collier 1994, p. 61). Observers argue that at this event the radical peasant movement was born (Collier 1994; Harvey 1995; Hernandez 1994).

The conference as organized by Ruiz had two intentions. The first was to provide the Catholic Church a forum to “give voice” to the impoverished conditions under which the Indians of the diocese in San Cristóbal de Las Casas lived. On the national government’s part, it was a way to try and rebuild the Echeverría government’s popular image in the wake of the deadly repression of the student movement in 1968. President Luis Echeverría had been President Díaz Ordaz’s Secretary of the Interior on the “Night of Tlatelolco,” October 2, 1968, when over 200 student protesters were shot and killed by Mexican authorities. In 1974, the wound had not healed. This “deep trench” in the words of Fuentes still “divides the contemporary conscience of Mexico” (Fuentes 1996, p. 76).

The Catholic Church took to the task enthusiastically. It used its extensive “evangelical networks” (Collier 1994, p. 62), throughout the highlands and jungles of Chiapas to quickly organize districts to be represented in the Congress. These districts corresponded to the various

Indigenous language groups in the area: the Chol, Tojolabal, Tzeltal, and Tzotzil.

Part of the explanation for such zeal on the part of the local Catholic Church is grounded in Liberation Theology, a doctrine embraced by Bishop Samuel Ruiz. A product of decades of ferment within the global Catholic Church, several tenets aimed at liberating the Church from its ties to power elites and committing it to a broad social agenda were endorsed in the Medellín Bishops Conference held in that city in 1968. Liberation Theology provided a new "rationale for a new generation of pastoral work" (Berryman 1994, p. 11). That new rationale revolved around the notion that priests and catholic catechists would facilitate the organization of the poor, becoming not only spiritual but also political teammates with the poor in their struggles. The goal was to provide a means whereby marginalized people could "liberate themselves" from their miserable physical conditions. The strategy was to foster community solidarity in an effort to create a more just world (Berryman 1994 p.11). One of the tactics involved the training of peasant leaders to not only to become "delegates of the word," but also to provide local leaders for the "liberation process".

The Indigenous Congress, as proposed, was "unprecedented" in all of the history of Chiapas. It also fit like a hand in a glove with the goals of Liberation Theologists (Collier 1994, p. 62). For the first time, there was to be a gathering of Indians for the purpose of discussing Indian solutions for Indian problems, not, as had been typical in the past, "for the government to tell the Indians what to do" (Collier 1994, p. 62). The recognition of this point is crucial to appreciating the growth of peasant

and Indigenous movements in Chiapas that followed in the wake of the conference in 1974. As Collier wrote:

The Indigenous Congress of 1974...was a grass roots convention for Indians and by Indians and offered a chance for Indigenous people to voice their own solutions to the problems that confronted them. Unlike the government-sponsored peasant and Indigenous organizations, which are organized from the top down, the congress provided a model of bottom-up organizing upon which independent peasant organizations subsequently drew (Collier 1994, p. 63).

The Congress had a diverse group of Indigenous people represented. These included "587 Tzeltal, 330 Tzotziles, 152 Tojolobales, and 161 Choles, representing 327 communities" (Harvey 1995, p. 57). The issues voiced by the participants of the Indigenous Congress are important to note for the purposes of this study in particular. The list of issues is to a great degree identical to those proclaimed by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation in their first declaration of war against the Mexican government on January 1, 1994.

From the 1974 Indigenous Congress came the following statement:

On land: We have problems with ranchers who invade our lands...We need land, we don't have enough of it, so we have to rent it, or go away to work. The lands we have been given are infertile. We need to be taught our rights under the Agrarian Laws.

On health: Doctors are concentrated in the cities and never attend in the countryside...The programs of public health are not realistic...We are sold bad out-of-date medicine that is useless...Merchants are making a business out of selling false medicine, or by selling [government] medicines that are supposed to be free.

On services: We pay taxes, but we don't receive even basic services

such as running water.

On food: We all suffer from malnutrition and poverty, because of lack of land.

On education: The education system is very poor and does not serve to improve our communities.

On work: We are paid very unfair salaries and are forced to work from sunrise to sunset.

On commerce: Peasants and Indians work hard but are always exploited. We have to sell our products cheap, but whatever we buy is expensive. For us, merchants and middlemen are like a plague of locusts.

On malnutrition: Our suffering is due to lack of nutrition, poverty, and lack of land (Collier 1994, pp. 63-64).

The indigenous voices speaking out against their marginalization from Mexican society carried over from the Congress. Organizing efforts that had encouraged the delegations to come to the Indigenous Congress, can be (to a great extent) attributed to the work of the Catholic catechists. These efforts continued as the delegates returned to the highlands and the Chiapas countryside. A base for popular participation by the indigenous communities in the political environment of the state had been created.

Collier argued that the "1974 Indigenous Congress had two important consequences for peasant and Indigenous organizing in Chiapas" (Collier 1994, p. 66). First, an awareness of the shared problems among all of the Indigenous populations of the area, Populations that diverged across ethnic and language lines were informed of these commonalties communicated by the various returning delegates

from the Congress. The second consequence was that non-Indian organizers and technicians learned that it was possible to bring these various indigenous groups together and organize them to take concerted and forceful action on their own behalf (Collier 1994, p. 66).

While outside influences have certainly influenced the development of some of these organization, the locals have formed their own "network of campesino[s]" to press the government for land and the end to repressive tactics (Harvey 1995, p. 61). The lack of solutions to such problems provided the impetus for growth of these organizations, as well as the "radicalization of young campesinos" which pushed many of them to support the armed uprising option (Harvey 1995, p. 62).

Land: There Is Never Enough

Besides the organizational activities of Liberation Theology Priests and Bishop Samuel Ruiz, there was another factor which facilitated cohesion among the Eastern Chiapas indigenous communities. That was the struggle for land and the title to it (Hernandez 1994, p. 9). Chiapas is overwhelmingly an agricultural state. Over 50 percent of the working population earns an income from agricultural related activities, (farming, cattle, forestry, fishing and hunting) (Russell 1995, p. 128). The existence of wide-spread poverty in Chiapas, combined with the state's agriculture nature, combined to produce a constant clamor among the peasants for land redistribution. As has often been pointed out, "[t]he raison d'être of most peasant movements throughout Latin America is the acquisition and retention of land" (Wickham-Crowley 1992, p. 136) . Chiapas was no exception.

Land, however, takes on an added dimension in Chiapas. "In order

to fully understand the Indigenous people's struggle for land," writes Neyra P. Alvarado Solís, "it is fundamental to consider the mystical relationships that Indigenous societies establish with it" (Katzenberger 1995, p. 127). Alvarado Solís' argument recognizes a very simple truth: that for the agrarian cultures land is life. Land is their being, celebrated in the daily rituals of survival that are part of the campesino existence. Therefore, any threat, no matter the source, either to the land they live on, or to their right to possess and work it, is viewed as a threat to their communal existence, and thus their right to life.

Ironically, it is the policies of the Mexican government which have exacerbated, if not created, the land problem in Chiapas. They did so first by encouraging of large migrations of people to Eastern Chiapas beginning during the Presidency of Luis Echeverría, and later by taking large amounts of land for the creation of extensive dam and biosphere protection projects.

The policies of President Luis Echeverría administration (1970-1976) supported agrarian land reform. They also attempted to appease peasant unrest in many other parts of Mexico by encouraging migration to eastern Chiapas (Collier 1994, p. 42). Peasants migrated to Chiapas from the neighboring states of Tabasco and Campeche, and also from Quintana Roo, Yucatán, Veracruz, Puebla, Guerrero, Morelos, and Oaxaca (Collier 1994, p. 43). The migration of campesinos seeking land in Chiapas combined with high birth rates to yield a growth rate 5.4% annually, compared with 2.15% nationally; this increased instability in the region (Katzenberger 1995, p. 1330).

Large public works projects initiated by the national Mexican

government in Chiapas also played a role. The Angostura dam project, begun in 1969, was one of three massive hydro-electrification projects that required major relocation of peasant communities in the state. More often than not, these relocations put pressure on surrounding existing communities to absorb displaced populations and, thus, instigated violent protests. In Venustiano Carranza one such clash was so violent it required the Mexican army to quell (Collier 1994, p. 49).

Government programs which set aside large tracts of the Selva Lacandona to protect the rain forest also stirred animosity among the Indigenous populations in and around the jungle. The government set aside over 300 thousand hectares of jungle land in the southern stretches of the lush rain forest for the Montes Azul biosphere. This one action on the part of the national government necessitated the relocation of some 8,000 people representing twenty-six communities already living within the designated boundaries of the reserve (Collier 1994, p. 49). As with the case of the dam relocations, not all relocations went peacefully. Some communities such as Guanal, resisted with both peaceful and violent protests (Collier 1994, p. 50).

NGOs and Other Players in Chiapas

As noted, the role of the Catholic Church in organizing the peasant was important, as the 1974 Indigenous Congress "proved to be a catalyst for grassroots organizing in the Altos and Selva (Harvey 1995, p. 58). But there were limits to the effectiveness of organizations built on church doctrine. The religious undertone often prevented a more widespread cohesion among the campesino social sector. Religious disputes often took precedence over political and economic ones and

sometimes led to the expulsion of some indigenous community members (Hernandez 1994, p. 7).

Other political advisors came to the highlands in the 1970s and began to work with local leaders to mobilize the campesino communities as well (Harvey 1995, p. 58). These organizing efforts operating in Chiapas from the 1970s evolved around one of three themes (Collier 1994, p. 69).

The first theme was land. Typical of this type of organization was the Emiliano Zapata Peasant Organization (OCEZ), located in and around the central Grijalval River valley town of Venustiano Carranza. Conflict had long been a rampart between ranchers and peasants in this area due in part to pressures on available land. They were intensified by the government's Angostura dam relocations. The OCEZ displayed a "mistrust of all political parties and electoral struggles, distancing themselves from opposition left parties..."(Harvey 1995, p. 61). The OCEZ preferred direct action and confrontation with state institutions to gain their ends (Hernandez 1994, p. 8).

The second theme was typified by the Central Independiente de Obreros Agrícolas y Campesinos (CIOAC). Organized outside Chiapas, it sent in 1975, organizers to work Chiapas in 1977. CIOAC promoted the idea that the peasants were part of a rural proletariat. Therefore, organizing these rural workers into unions was a way to confront the "notoriously underpaid and mistreated" peasant problem by invoking federal labor laws (Collier 1994, p. 70). The CIOAC also "sought to link the union struggle to the electoral and programmatic activities of the old Communist Party, and later to its successor, the Unified Socialist Party"

(Hernandez 1994, p. 8). Its focus was on using existing Mexican institutions and laws to bring about reform in the rural areas.

The third theme which focused organizational activities concerned the idea of government credits for the small producers (Collier 1994, p. 70). The pursuit of credits for rural campesinos initially drew support from the Popular Politics (PP) and a Maoist ideologically oriented student movement centered in Mexico City (Collier 1994, p.70). Developing out of the 1968 student movement, and led by Adolfo Orive Berlinguer, an economic professor at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, the PP put students into Chiapas as early as 1977. Some of the student activists eventually made their way from their urban bases to the remote cites to work in "impoverished frontier communities" (Harvey 1995, p. 58). Seeking "to apply the Maoist 'mass line' to Mexico in a non-violent struggle for socialism," the PP provided the model for other groups such as the Línea Proletaria (LP), which particularly operated in Indigenous communities in Chiapas (Harvey 1995, p. 59).

It was this last theme of organizational efforts that enjoyed the most success (Collier 1994, p. 72). Although there was on-going friction between those favoring a more centralized and hierarchical leadership style (especially among those who a trained for and attended the 1974 Congress in San Cristóbal de las Casas), and members of the LP (who attempted to introduce more grass-root strategies to the Indigenous communities), membership increased throughout the 1980s.

Asambleas chicas, small assemblies of six or seven members who discussed community problems and forwarded recommendations to the larger community assembly were revived by efforts of the LP (Harvey 1995,

p. 59). As Harvey noted:

A second strategy was to create horizontal links between the members of each community, rather than simply between the leaders or delegates. Drawing on their Maoist training [the LP activist] they promoted contacts and exchanges between different communities at a grassroots level. Through a method known as 'de las masas a las masas', commissions were sent to inform other communities of the threat of eviction from their land. This was painstaking work, involving treks of several days to reach distant settlements (Harvey 1995, p. 59).

These strategies would later appear prominently in Zapatista operational tactics and negotiation postures.

In 1980, the Unión de Uniones Ejidales y Grupos Campesinos Solidarios de Chiapas (UU), which had originally formed around the issue of joint cooperative coffee marketing, provided the first and largest such combined effort. The UU formed to represent what had previously been three smaller unions and at its greatest strength represented "12 000 mainly Indigenous families from 180 communities in 11 municipalities" (Harvey 1995, p. 60). As a demonstration of the organizational capacity of the UU, in October 1981 over 3000 members of the UU staged a march in Tuxtla Gutiérrez, the capital of Chiapas, to demand the cancellation of eviction orders (Harvey 1995, p. 60).

Despite all the factors that mitigated against the forming of successful campesino organizations—poverty, racism, lack of communication and transportation resources, language barriers, little influence on government and private leaders, open and often violent repression at the hands of rancher financed *guardas blancas*—these "organizations demonstrated an increasing capacity to respond to

crises...suggesting the cohesive strength of inter-community relations gradually built up over a period of 20 years” (Harvey 1995, p. 60).

Optional Strategies for Rebellion

The Fruits of Marginalization: The Zapatistas

The development of campesino and Indigenous organizations and the process of combining smaller organizations into larger and larger structures provided, in part, the environment for the emergence of the Zapatistas in Chiapas. As described by the Zapatistas themselves, the January 1, 1994, early morning assault on San Cristóbal de las Casas and the other towns in Chiapas came about only after a long arduous process of organization and planning. Collier (1994) notes that.

...[a]ccording to Major Mario of the EZLN, the clandestine Zapatista army had its inception on November 16, 1983, when six idealists from Mexico's north arrived to join forces with dissident peasants and Indians in a movement that immediately went underground to begin military and political organizing (Collier, p. 81).

The detail and attention to planning by which the rebellion was carried out has led some to argue that it is the patience of building an organization that sets the Zapatistas apart from many, if not all, guerrilla movements in Central America and Mexico. Churchill, representing such a view, writes:

Zapatistas are not foquistas [in the manner of Che Guevara]; they do not advocate founding a small nucleus of armed fighters with the expectation of growing in the course of confrontations with the state. They appear to have followed a strategy of the “cold accumulation of forces,” which was previously used by the Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA) in

Guatemala. ORPA, which is now part of the National Revolutionary Unity of Guatemala (URNG) was founded in 1972...and "spent long years of silent work"...developing a guerrilla organization, one which was also made up largely of [Maya] (Churchill in Katzenberger 1995, p. 145).

Harvey likewise notes the surprise and astonishment, by even those familiar with the region, at "the remarkably sophisticated organization which had evidently been prepared over several years (Harvey 1995, p. 39). Harvey notes that "[u]nlike its precursors, the EZLN is not a small band of rebels hoping to attract support by rising up in arms, this movement already had a mass base when it made its appearance (Harvey 1995, p. 39)."

That base was largely among the Mayan indigenous communities of the region. Churchill seizes on this fact by pointing out that:

the Mayan tradition represents an undeviating and unextinguished refusal of Indigenous peoples to abdicate their inherent rights to organize themselves socially, culturally, and spiritually, to develop and maintain their own forms of economy, to regulate and govern themselves, and control the resources within their territories; in a word, the assertion of national sovereignty (Churchill in Katzenberger, 1995, p. 148).

Harvey, like Churchill, points out that the lack of say on the part of the indigenous communities in their affairs led them on a path from frustration, to crisis, to rebellion. But in contrast to Churchill's stress on locality and sovereignty. As Harvey explains:

...[t]he rebellion in Chiapas is not reducible solely to local political conditions. It is a popular response to a series of rural reforms decided without the participation of representative *campesino* organizations. In short it is a rebellion against a new global

strategy of accumulation and against *salinismo* as a political discourse. Historically, it is part of a cycle of rural rebellions which have periodically revealed the crisis of legitimation of the Mexican state (Harvey 1995, p. 62).

Harvey therefore views the Zapatistas and their rebellion as taking two tracks simultaneously; one national and the other local. The national track serves both as an expression of fundamental problems throughout Mexico and as a basis for external support for the EZLN in the form of appeals to "civil society" (Harvey 1995, p. 63). The local track consisted of the real and immediate need for land reform as perceived by the campesinos and their willingness to take "direct action" to achieve this goal (Harvey 1995, p. 62).

Civil society, according to this view, provides a bridge between local and national issues. The failures of the government to implement land reform and responsive agricultural policies in Chiapas becomes abstracted to a wide range of failures associated with "salinismo" (Harvey 1995, p. 62). In a somewhat ironic appeal, one found the leader of a guerrilla movement calling for "the peaceful civic and popular movement 'to defeat us', to make armed action unnecessary" (Harvey 1995, p. 64).

Civic action to replace armed struggle was the appeal presented by the EZLN. But, as Harvey concluded, "there has to be a willingness to open up the political system and provide meaningful channels for political participation" (Harvey 1995, p. 70). The long established practices of electoral fraud, political assassination and the further marginalization of the campesino through government policy would have to be stopped in order to serve the needs of civil reform. And, as such, warned Harvey, some 350,000 people in Chiapas "will rightly conclude

that they have no stake in the political system and make their choices accordingly (Harvey 1995, p. 70)."

Opportunities to Link with Civil Society

The situation in Eastern Chiapas for the indigenous people was abject. In response, the people of that region in the early 70s began to discover new modes of organization and began to test the bonds of clientelism which had made Chiapas one of the most staunch allies of the ruling party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) since the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940). The Zapatistas certainly were an outgrowth of the environment that developed in Chiapas, but they were also an outgrowth of a larger Mexico, that is, an outgrowth of both Mexico's contemporary political policies, and the responses to those policies.

Thus, the Zapatista uprising, and the hypothesized selection by them of an appeal to Mexico's "civil society" for aid in alleviating the misery of the indigenous population in Chiapas, cannot be understood without taking into account Mexico's recent history; i.e., the turbulent period from 1968 to the outbreak of hostilities in Chiapas on January 1, 1994. This period is remembered for its cycles of economic boom-bust, natural calamities, new forms of social and political mobilization, and profound challenges to, what has been described by Mario Vargas Llosa as, the "perfect dictatorship" (Castañeda 1994, p. 191).

If the Zapatistas did attempt to enlist the aid of a greater Mexico (civil society), the indigenous rebels must have seen ways in which they could link-up with other disenchanting groups. They must have seen opportunities for collaboration in pursuit of a common goal. They must

have seen the opportunity for bringing about fundamental change for the Chiapaneco Indian tied to fundamental change in the politics of national Mexico. The logic on which such an appeal to Mexican civil society must rest is predicated on the notion that the peripheral agonies of Chiapas are symptomatic of a greater illness, an illness which will only respond to systemic treatment (Renner 1997, p. 24).

The Historical Setting: 1968 - 1994

The period in Mexican history from 1940 to 1968 has been called the "Mexican miracle" (Camín 1993, p. 199), essentially due to Mexico's consistent strong economic performance in those years. That economic miracle came to a politically portentous end on October 2, 1968, as elite units of the Mexican army and Mexico City police violently attacked student protesters in Mexico City (Camín 1993, p. 186). The large number of student deaths that day, as a result of the government's extreme measures to end the student protests at the Plaza of the Three Cultures in Tlatelolco, brought about a profound change for Mexico.

The "flowering of popular movements" in Mexico can be dated to the student protests and government violence in 1968 (Camp 1996, p. 143). The popular protests were the first "of the urban and modern" protests in Mexico (Camín 1993, p. 201). The ranks of the protesters were filled with the:

youthful elites of the cities, the students and newly graduated professionals who represented the incontrovertible proof that the agrarian, provincial, pro-PRI, and traditional Mexico was falling behind; the 1968 rebels were the sons and daughters of the middle class that had arisen in the previous three decades, the generation that would be called on...to take command of the industrial and cosmopolitan Mexico that was emerging (Camín 1993, p. 201).

As Camín further points out, "...the bases of legitimacy of the regime vis-à-vis a large sector of the middle class, the beneficiary of the system and source of administration cadres, were indelibly eroded" (Camín 1993, p. 187). The cycle of the Mexican miracle had been broken. Camín argues that October 2, 1968, was critical because it:

... was the starting point of a new crisis in Mexico: on that date, an interval began during which the country lost confidence in its present, ceased celebrating and consolidating its achievements and miracles, and began to confront daily, and for more than a decade, its own previously ignored insufficiencies, failures, and miseries. The crisis of 1968 was not a structural crisis that would place at risk the very survival of the nation, it was, above all, a political, moral, and psychological crisis, a crisis of values and principles, which shook up the triumphant schemes of the governing elite; it was the bloody announcement that the times had changed, without changing the means to confront them (Camín 1993, p. 201).

The student protests of 1968 had roots in events of ten years before. In 1958 and 1959, the PRI government had violently ended labor protests from railway and teachers unions, beating and jailing union leaders and protesters alike. In 1959, Castro marched triumphantly into the Cuban capital and claimed power, ousting a corrupt and unpopular government, and moving Cuba a giant step to the left. Again in Mexico, in 1964, medical interns, protesting low pay and mismanagement, were deflected by the government. Due to these failures on the part of the unions to bring change, the independent unions leaders themselves and the small political parties that supported them had to go underground (Gil 1992, p. 33). As a consequence of government pressure against protesters, and the radical atmosphere created by Castro's success in

Cuba, protests against corrupt government became more radical.

The protests by students in Mexico City grew quickly from clashes between rival high-school students to full blown protests including university students, school teachers, railroad workers, and other laborers. Some of these participants were still smarting from earlier failures to bring about improvements in wages and working conditions (Gil 1992, p. 35). Ranks of protesters grew to more than 300,000 on October 2, 1968, and they marched on October 2, 1968 to the Plaza of the Three Cultures. Waiting for them were elite troops of the Olympia Battalion. The resulting clash between protesters and the Federal Army left several hundred dead in the Plaza.

Hellman has attributed some of the anger that took to the streets to the governments extravagant expenditures associated with the Olympic Games to be held in Mexico City that year (Hellman 1994, p. 191). Hellman explains that:

The student movement expressed the anger and frustration of young Mexicans at the distorted priorities that had been set for Mexico by those in power. The expenditures of millions of pesos on the Olympics was only symptomatic of what the students regarded as the criminal mismanagement of the country's resources and the social injustice produced by the policies of the ruling elite (Hellman 1994, p. 191).

The government of Luis Echeverría (1970-1976), following the blood letting of Tlatelolco, spent most of its tenure in office trying to regain a sense of "normalcy" in Mexico. The process of reconciliation took many forms as Echeverría reached out to various levels of the Mexican society. The features of Echeverría's program of *apertura democrática* (democratic opening) are described by Hellman as having:

loosened state censorship of the press, [giving] more space to democratic tendencies within the state-controlled labor movement, permitt[ing] parallel, autonomous peasant and labor movements unaffiliated with the official party sectors to organize and strike, and strengthen[ing] ties between the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party—PRI) and the Socialist International...(Hellman 1994, p. 126).

Political features of Echeverría's program were accompanied by policy initiatives in the countryside which extended roads and rural electrification systems. Additionally, the President ordered measures intended to soften the blow of inflation, which was a worldwide phenomenon during this period, by "ordering rigid price controls of basic commodities (Meyer 1995, p. 672). In 1971, he released many of the student prisoners who had been held since 1968, to the surprise of many (Meyer 1995, p. 672). The causes were many, with economic factors playing a significant role. As described by Camín:

the per capita growth of production was null, the real wage fell below the levels it had reached in 1972, private investment shrank for the first time in five years, the deficit in the current account of the balance of payments was four times greater than that of 1971, the public sector deficit was seven times greater, and underemployment affected 45 percent of the economically active population (Camín 1993, p. 187).

Social violence, such as bank robberies, kidnappings of wealthy industrialists and political figures (including the father-in-law of the President), and the appearance of active guerrilla groups in Mexico City and the state of Guerrero, added to the uncertainties of the time (Meyer 1995, p. 672). Tensions were palpable and Mexico City was awash with "revolutionary rhetoric," which characterized the time (Meyer 1995, p.

674). For all of Echeverría's efforts, "[a]lienation had set in, and the roots went deep (Meyer 1995, p. 674). The economic roots of the alienation felt throughout the country, were joined by "ideological postures and social realities to produce an unparalleled crisis of confidence" in Mexico (Meyer 1995, p. 675).

The Financial Roller Coaster

The final months of the Echeverría administration produced several economic shocks for Mexicans. The first jolt came in September 1976, as the government announced the devaluation of the peso. The Mexican currency immediately lost 60 percent of its value, and, a short month later, the process was repeated. This time the peso gave up another 40 percent. The devaluation, prompted by a large balance of payments deficit, had been anticipated by the moneyed class of the country, who moved large sums of capital into safer and more stable off-shore accounts (some estimates run as high as \$6 billion) (Meyer 1995, p. 675).

The two decades following Echeverría's presidency proved equally as tumultuous. During the 1970s and 1980s, Mexico experienced a boom-bust cycle (largely a result of rising and falling oil revenues and inflation), extreme peso devaluations, and a severe foreign debt crisis. The financial turmoil of markets and individual despair created by such a drastic loss of currency value in the last months of Echeverría's watch were soon replaced by widespread and profound optimism. The presidency of José López Portillo (who took office in December 1976), brought with it the prospects of unlimited growth, growth made possible by the discovery of vast new oil reserves, mainly in the southern Tabasco-Campeche basin

(Weintraub 1990, p. 119). Camín maintains that:

The discovery of new hydrocarbon resources in the midst of the 1970s allowed those expectations to emerge: the proven reserves of the country increased from approximately 10 billion barrels of oil to more than 70 billion barrels in just a few years. PEMEX...was transformed in a few months into a net oil exporter of world rank...(Camín 1993, p. 209).

The political optimism created by the potential of Mexico's new found wealth was unbounded. Jorge Díaz Serrano, as head of PEMEX, portrayed the opportunities created by the discoveries before the Mexican Congress as nothing short of a new lease of life on Mexico. He predicted that oil would be "the great economic core that has been missing from the beginning of our history and whose absence has prevented the total consolidation of the nation..." (Camín 1993, p. 210). What oil, in such significant quantities and at the high prices which prevailed at the time, allowed was the belief that Mexico's economic and social problems could be remedied through government spending. The funds for such programs were to derived from direct oil revenue and from foreign capital loans secured by oil reserves and projected future oil revenues (Barry 1995, p. 40).

The oil windfall for Mexico prompted a debate within the government. First, as Weintraub points out:

The issues were not merely how much to produce for national use and how much for export...but also how these decisions would affect Mexican dependence on the United States. The issues...were partly technical—the durability of oil reserves at different levels of production and the impact of production and exports on the national economy and the balance of payments—and they were partly rooted in past national experience—whether excessive

exports to the United States would lead to even more economic integration than already existed (Weintraub 1992, p. 117).

Oil had long acted as a “[l]ightning rod for foreign interference” in Mexican national affairs, and policy makers debated the best mix of extraction, domestic consumption, and export. The “nationalist-conservationist” held sway toward the end of the Echeverría administration in 1976, but moderated as López Portillo’s administration took over the presidency. In 1980, production levels were set at 2.5 to 2.7 million barrels of crude per day (Weintraub 1992, p. 118). Under the rules set by the government, no more than 50 percent of oil produced for export (approximately 1.5 million barrels) was to be exported to any single country, and Mexico would not supply more than 20 percent of any country’s petroleum needs. This policy, meant to address dependency concerns, was directed at the U.S. (Weintraub 1992, p. 119).

The self-assurance brought on by the potential of oil wealth took many forms and was typified by both international and domestic attitudes. Internationally Mexico made a point of standing up to the its northern neighbor. For example, Mexico took foreign policy stances that appeared to run counter to the interests of the United States such as the recognition of the El Salvadorian guerrillas as a political force and the refusal to join the Americans in a boycott of the Moscow Olympic games (Meyer 1995, p. 681). At home government petro dollars fueled a largess that stretched to the far reaches of the national boundaries, and figured prominently in Mexico’s “development plans” (Weintraub 1990, p. 115). Huge public works projects, such as the Grijalva River dams in Chiapas, were intended to supply jobs to one of Mexico’s poorest regions (Russell

1995, p. 13), and assure central and northern Mexico the clean energy it needed for industrial expansion.

The potential provided by projected oil revenues also helped Mexico to address its growing reliance on imported food grains. In 1980 Portillo announced a major agricultural initiative designed to make Mexico self sufficient in the production of food by mid-decade (Meyer 1995, p. 681). The Sistema Alimentario Mexicano (SAM) was intended not only to improve agricultural output, but at the same time improve the lot of rural areas. But SAM, like many of the government programs supported by oil wealth, stood on shaky fiscal grounds (Barry 1995, p. 41). The program that guaranteed subsidies to farmers and made expensive inputs required by modern farming techniques available was built with World Bank loans of unprecedented amounts (the largest World Bank loan to date of \$325 million) (Meyer 1995, p. 681). The SAM program's vulnerability was demonstrated soon after it began to operate.

The precipitous drop in oil prices in 1981 and the ensuing debt crisis meant that the government could no longer afford the generous subsidies to grain farmers. In 1982 President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) closed the doors of the SAM program (Barry 1995, p. 41)

The oil miracle of the late 70s and the early 80s turned to the "oil nightmare" (Meyer 1995, p. 683). What had gone up, meaning oil prices with the Arab oil embargo in the 70s, and then the Iran-now came down in 1981. Oil prices, rather than continuing to rise, stabilized with the oil glut of the early 1980s, and the Portillo government's policies of historically "unparalleled spending" for government construction, public works, social welfare programs, and subsidies to farmers and consumers,

suddenly were in jeopardy. Deficit spending could no longer be maintained by oil, exports or foreign credits. As Weintraub maintains, "Mexico failed...to avoid the petrolization of the economy..." and, when world oil prices fell sharply in the early 80s, government policies built on the oil foundation "became untenable" (Weintraub 1992, p. 120).

Weintraub sums up those policies this way:

The economic reasons for the failure included the desire for rapid economic growth and job creation at a pace that turned out to be unsustainable; the undertaking of projects (including hectic expansion of investment in petroleum facilities) not carefully thought through, coupled with excessive government expenditures on what was essentially consumption; and an unforgivable failure to build in contingencies against adverse shocks to the economy (Weintraub 1992, p. 121).

The end of Portillo's term, in some respects, mimicked that of Echeverría. Again, the Mexicans found their peso over-valued, inflation had become a serious problem, and, like 1976, Mexican businessmen had begun to open foreign bank accounts and to invest abroad (Meyer 1995, p. 683). And again, like Echeverría in the final months of his presidency, Portillo shocked the nation. Without warning, the President nationalized the banks in September of 1982. The nationalization of the banks was intended to prevent the further exodus of Mexican capital out of the country. However well intended, the action created "Mexico's worst economic crisis of the twentieth century (Meyer 1995, p. 684).

Upon leaving office, Portillo pointed to his successes. Oil exports had increased dramatically, and industrial production had increased at an annual rate of 9 percent with a 5.5 percent increase in jobs. The value of farm production was also up as were the number of acres being

farmed. The president also noted important improvements in social programs including education, medical services to the general population, and the provision of basic services to many rural areas (Camín 1993, p. 214). The successes failed, however, to soften the impacts of the economic austerity measures that soon followed under Mexico's new president, Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988).

The Mexican economy of this period has been described by Beristain as chaotic:

The annual inflation rate hovered around 100 percent and appeared to be out of control.... the dollarization of the economy and speculation on the peso were becoming widespread, the financial system was near collapse, the public-sector deficit was at an all time high, and the country was forced into a virtual moratorium on its payments abroad. All of this of course was going on in a climate of great uncertainty and little confidence (Beristain 1990, p. 155).

In response to the financial difficulties in which the country found itself, Madrid "drastically reduced" government expenditures (Meyer 1995, p. 687). The President cut back on many programs, reduced government subsidies, sold unprofitable business and put a freeze on government employment ((Meyer 1995, p. 687). The uncertainty eased somewhat in 1983 and 1984, as Madrid's reforms seemed to be taking hold. The international banking community gave Mexico credit for dealing with its economic crisis and its huge foreign debt "more effectively than any other Latin American country" ((Meyer 1995, p. 688). Economic austerity, however, brought with it enormous social costs (Camín 1993, p. 227). The poor got poorer because of the severe inflation and currency devaluations, while the wealthy sheltered their wealth in off-shore

accounts.

Research concluded in December 1987 pointed out the paradox that six years of economic crisis had made Mexican society more egalitarian, in the sense that now Mexicans were 'more equal in their poverty.' The number of poor...had increased from 40 percent of the population to nearly 60 percent (Camín 1993, p. 228).

Inflation, along with a peso devaluation in February 1982, reduced the purchasing power of most Mexicans. The purchasing power of the "minimum wage had undergone a reduction of more than 40 percent" (Camín 1993, p. 228). In 1986, for example, in order for a worker drawing the minimum wage to buy a basic food basket he would have to toil for 85 hours (Camín 1993, p. 229). But for many, there was no work at all. In Mexico city at the end of 1983, "twenty-four of every hundred persons of working age did not have a job; by 1985, the situation had grown worse: 34 percent were unemployed" (Camín 1993, p. 229).

To service the debt, Mexico was spending enormous sums. The debt meanwhile had grown from "\$19 billion in 1976 to \$80 billion in 1982" (Camín 1993, p. 212).

Amidst the economic chaos a natural disaster struck. On September 19, 1985, Mexico City suffered an earthquake that measured 8 on the Richter Scale. The devastation to the city was horrendous: at least 8 thousand dead, many more injured, and damage estimated at \$4 billion (Meyer 1995, p. 688). The Mexico City earthquake, like the 1968 student killings in the Plaza of the Three Cultures, figuratively shook the whole country. The devastation and expense of the 1985 earthquake "not only made payments on the foreign debt impossible, but [also] presented dismal prospects for continued progress on the economic front" (Meyer

1995, p. 688).

The attention of the Mexican government focused on policies intended to salvage its international connections (Scire 1995, Chapter V). The 1980s in Mexico, labeled by some as the “lost decade”, were at the same time thought by others to signal the beginning of a new economic direction for the country (Golob 1996, p. 95). As Golob points out, during this period “Mexico made great strides...toward dismantling its bloated state sector and encouraging recovery through the efficient operation of free and open markets” (Golob 1996, p. 95). The economic crises of the early 1980s, and the responses to it, produced a series of actions intended to change Mexico’s economy in relation to the developing global market.

Outstanding among the structural and policy changes of the administrations of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88) and Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-94) were the first international debt-relief agreement under the so-called Brady Plan; the stabilization of inflation through a social pact; the privatization of nearly all viable state enterprises and the reprivatization of the banking system; and the liberalization of trade, investment, and agricultural policies, fortified by accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the realization of a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada (Golob 1996, pp. 95-6).

In short, these policies were “aimed at attracting foreign investment and promoting exports” (Balaam 1996, p. 244). They were policies meant to bring Mexico into line with neo-liberal economics which was rapidly becoming the international standard for national economic success.

In spite of the beginnings of a new direction for Mexico—which later produced what Golob calls the “second Mexican miracle (Golob

1996, p. 96), the last period of the Madrid presidency witnessed a worsening economic situation for Mexico: the peso collapsed, inflation soared, foreign debt climbed, and, worse of all to the man on the street, every thing needed for life became harder to obtain.

The apparent inability of the government to manage the economic and social crisis in Mexico was underscored by the government's weak response to the earthquake. While thousands suffered in the city, the government, in the words of Alma Guillermoprieto, "appeared merely corrupt and inept" (Guillermoprieto 1995, p. 59). In response, thousands of Mexicans took matters into their own hands, and "for days students, housewives, bureaucrats, and workers helped pull babies and bodies out of the rubble" (Castañeda 1994, p. 224). Mexico City had an urban movement prior to the earthquake, but the disaster, and the apparent failure of the government to manage it, "unleashed a combination of anger, organizational drive, and desire to act independently of the overpowering Mexican state that shook Mexico City almost as much as the earthquake (Castañeda 1994, p. 224). This desire for independent action carried on long after the effects of the earthquake began to fade in memory. The urban groups, who had cared for the homeless, and the millions out of work or hurt, "survived into the 1990s" and would be the target of appeals to make common cause with the Zapatistas (Castañeda 1994, p. 224).

The New Mexican Political Mix

Cárdenas, along with Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, had led a fight within the PRI party in 1986, for democratic reforms. Calling themselves the Democratic Current, Cárdenas and Muñoz Ledo severely and consistently

criticized the PRI structure. Both men were stripped of their party memberships for their efforts (Camp 1996, pp. 174-75). As a result, along with other PRI defectors, Cárdenas and Muñoz Ledo “formed the Democratic Front for National Reconstruction (FDN)” (Camp 1996, pp. 174-75). Cárdenas shortly, thereafter, became a bonified presidential contender for the presidency of Mexico, and challenged the PRI candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari.

Grassroots movements, especially in the urban areas, were around prior to 1985 (“the earliest and best-known being the Coordinadora Nacional del Movimiento Urbano Popular (Coordinating Committee of the Urban Popular Movement—CONAMUP, founded in 1981...” (Carr 1993, p. 86), but, groups dedicated to earthquake relief brought a new intensity to the movements. The new intensity also brought results:

The activities of the Coordinadora Unica de Damnificados (Coordination Body of Earthquake Victims—CUD),...and later the Neighborhoods Assembly—founded in 1987 and linked to the spectacularly effective work of the hooded and masked “Superbarrio Gómez,” a Superman with class consciousness—have become symbols of the rebirth of civil society (Carr 1993, p. 86).

The *coorinadoras*, especially the CONAMUP, became “loose associations” which served to create “centers of resistance” to government austerity policies (Gil 1992, p. 54). They rallied disparate groups around this single theme. They centered much of their activity on consumption needs defined geographically (that is, in neighborhoods or regions), and especially as defined by urban women (Gil 1992, p. 54).

Other groups, including those who represented labor unions (notably the Coordinadora Nacional Trabajadores de la Educación

(National Coordinating Body of Educational Workers—CNTE) also began to mount challenges to the “corporatist style and practice of the PRI and its affiliated mass organizations...” (Carr 1993, p. 86). These new labor coordinadoras began to form in the federal district a “powerful site of mass resistance to the corrupt leadership of Mexico’s largest (750,000 strong) trade union, the Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación (National Union of Educational Workers—SNTE)” (Carr 1993, p. 86).

The urban civil movements had their counterparts in the countryside. The Coordinadora Nacional “Plan de Ayala” (National Plan of Ayala Coordinating Body—CNPA) was launched, at the encouragement of Mateo Zapata (the son of the peasant revolutionary) in 1979 (Carr 1993, p. 86). The CNPA was “a novel effort at peasant organization (Clark 1995, p. 14). The CNPA acted as an umbrella organization, welcoming member organizations to join in an concerted effort based on peasant needs. The CNPA “instituted a more horizontal organizational structure that preserved the ideological autonomy of each member organization and implemented a decision making process based on democracy and grassroots influence over organizational policy (Clark 1995, p. 14). The importance of the CNPA comes from its pluralistic organizational style. In direct contrast to the centralized and pyramidal structure of the National Peasant Confederation (CNC), the long-time peasant affiliate of the PRI, the CNPA reflected the changing effects of grassroots organization in Mexico during this period.

In a later wave, indigenous peoples also found means of expression through the National Coordinating Body of Indian Peoples and the

Emiliano Zapata Union of Comuneros. The indigenous grass roots association have overcome obstacles of language differences, political marginalization, and severe financial limitations to present a more unified front on indigenous issues. The first international meeting of these groups, held in October of 1991 in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala was a good example. The meeting "drew far greater crowds and attracted many more delegations from around the hemisphere than expected" (Castañeda 1994, p. 232-33). The growing international indigenous movement is important, according to Castañeda, not only because of the force for change that such groups bring to politics but, also, because they represent "the awakening of the region to the incomplete nature of its nationhood, and of the growing awareness of the racial and ethnic exclusion or discrimination in the hemisphere" (Castañeda 1994, p. 233).

The NGO phenomenon reached across a broad spectrum of other interests. Grass root organizations have developed in Latin America concerned both with women's and human rights and with environmental issues. The strong growth and influence of the NGOs has tested the notion of politics as usual in Mexico. As just discussed, while these grass root organizations have challenged Mexico's corporatist style of government, they have also tested and impacted the agenda and the top-down organizational methods of the traditional Left. Carr describes it this way:

The coordinadoras and the urban popular movements, concerned more with the politics of reproduction and consumption than with the more traditional "classist" issues of production, certainly opened up fertile terrain for struggle, but they also posed major challenges to the forces of the more traditional Left" (Carr 1993, p. 86-7).

The NGOs constitute, for Castañeda, “a new strain of Latin American left, though they do not all belong to it,” and they are “an increasingly important component of the left and of the expression of popular movements” (Castañeda 1994, p. 234). The 1988 presidential elections in Mexico provided a case in point. Many NGOs had previously shunned involvement in political parties. The 1988 elections changed that. “The major breakthrough here occurred in the mobilizations that preceded the 1988 elections,” writes Carr, “when thousands of social movements moved from isolated civic protests to a national civic insurrection in support of the Cárdenas candidacy” (1993 p. 96). As Castañeda put it, these movements and the praise many Mexicans gave them were “a harbinger of a new earthquake beginning to shake Mexico City” (Castañeda 1994, p. 225). At least in Mexico City, the PRI’s hold on political power was to be tested by the “political effervescence coalescing around left-wing presidential candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas that culminated in the July 8, 1988, presidential election, which Cárdenas won overwhelmingly—two to one—in Mexico City” (Castañeda 1994, p. 225).

The result of the social movements actively entering the electoral process was impressive. Cárdenas and his Center-Left coalition mounted the strongest challenge in 60 years to the Presidential and Congressional dominance of the PRI. Taking advantage of existing electoral laws, the Democratic Current (a political offshoot from within the governing party) evolved into an “independent center-left political force (Camín 1993, p. 241). This force attracted many of Mexico’s marginal parties into a electoral coalition known as the National Democratic Front (FDN). The

center-left coalition, with Cárdenas as its presidential candidate, offered a platform that:

focused on the need to reverse the process of impoverishment of the majority, to reduce the speed of the dismantling of the parastate apparatus and the opening of the economy to the external sector, and to give priority to the need for renewing economic growth over payment of the external debt (Camín 1993, p. 241).

Nationwide Cárdenas was credited with 31.29 percent of the vote, and with majority in Mexico City (Carr 1993, p. 91). Some argue that it was only through a massive fraud campaign that the PRI and Carlos Salinas were able to hold on to the presidency (Hellman 1994, p. 127). But, regardless of the outcome in 1988, NGOs and social movements had made a strong political statement. After 1988, social movements would not only lobby the existing power structure for urban services, housing, land, and the like, but would also seek to change the holders of power through political organization and the ballot box.

As Gil points out:

The emerging understanding of Mexico's 1988 election results forces us to reexamine John J. Johnson's concept of emerging middle sectors because evidence suggests that people who rallied to Cárdenas may have come from those groups" (Gil 1992, p. 51).

The "middle sector" in Mexico is comprised of a broad spectrum of interests. At one extreme are poorly paid white-collar employees of the government, and at the other extreme are some wealthy proprietors and well educated intellectuals and professionals (Gil 1992, p. 51). This middle sector is difficult to define exactly because of its "highly fluid" nature, and its "widely disparate" interests (Gil 1992, p. 52). One feature

which does give the middle sector coherence, however, is that these disparate groups can come together around the common theme of political and governmental reform (Gil 1992, p. 52). Gil writes that:

One of the clearest examples of the postearthquake invigoration of the opposition, across ideological lines, may be seen in the Foro Nacional para el Sugragio Efectivo. It was organized in August 1986 by the most important opposition parties at the time (the PAN, PSUM, PRT, and PMT), in response to 'the fraudulent elections in Chihuahua, Durango and Oaxaca' (Gil 1992, p. 53).

Two of the principals goals of this coalition were to replace the PRI controlled electoral agency, and to reinvigorate the national legislature, which had given up too much power to the office of the Mexican presidency (Gil 1992, p. 54). The earlier development of grassroots movements which challenged the PRI controlled government were therefore now being joined by political parties willing to set aside their ideological and partisan differences for the common goal of weakening the stranglehold of the PRI.

National events and Chiapas

National events from 1968 to 1994 affected Chiapas like the rest of Mexico. Given the degree to which Chiapas is an agricultural state (58 percent of the general population, and 88 percent of the indigenous population is involved in agriculture), national farm policies played a large role in the state. In response to a crisis in the levels of agriculture production in Mexico during the late 60s, the national government poured large sums into agriculture. The support, however, mainly benefited agrobusiness (Barry 1995, p. 30) with a view to agroexports that could generate foreign exchange (coffee, cotton, etc.) and producers

of grain crops which could feed the growing urban populations. At the same time that the emphasis was placed on large agriculture operations (requiring mechanization, hybrid grains, and expensive irrigation and fertilizer inputs), the government was encouraging the opening of public lands to cattle ranching (Barry 1995, p. 30).

The opening of eastern Chiapas to peasant settlement beginning with the Echeverría administration (1970-1976), along with the encouragement of land consolidation for cattle ranching proved to be a volatile mix in Chiapas. Chiapas became both a dumping ground for peasants seeking land and the “main source of beef for central Mexico” (Barry 1995, p. 160). The result was that large ranchers consolidated and expanded holdings (many opened up by small farmers as *milpa*—“traditional corn field, characterized by shifting production and diversified cultivation”) and pushed the small producer deeper into the jungle (Barry 1995, p. 292). As noted above, population pressures in the region were exacerbated by the aggressive hydroelectric projects and dams that came to Chiapas as a result of government spending of the boom in oil revenues in the late 70s and early 80s. These forced the relocation of whole peasant communities. Many of the oil reserves discovered in the 70s were in the southern zone of Tabasco and Chiapas. The energy projects and the search for and discovery of new oil resources in the region produced a new situation:

What has changed for peasants—as a consequence of Mexico’s energy development—is the dramatic growth of nonagricultural work and the increasing integration of peasant economies into national and international markets (Collier 1994, p. 90).

Nonagricultural work, along with a de-emphasis by the central

government on programs for subsistence agriculture during the oil boom years, combined to change the peasant communities in significant ways. First, they lost population as many families migrated to urban areas (and oil fields) looking for work. Second, the indigenous and peasant communities felt the impact of government-sponsored road building projects into areas which had previously been isolated and mostly inaccessible by vehicle at least part of each year (Collier 1994, p. 94). Finally, returning migrant workers—usually younger men—brought with them new attitudes towards community leadership. Their money brought with it a sense of power to influence community decisions (Collier 1994, pp. 94-106).

The burgeoning growth of organizations at the peasant level in Chiapas, and the festering sources of conflict between peasants and ranchers produced an atmosphere ripe for violence. Adding to the mix was the drastic downturn that followed the financial crisis of the early 80s. Programs which were directed at agriculture were curtailed drastically. But, writes Renner:

The cut-backs in social programs did not affect all agricultural sectors equally.. Most of the remaining farm credit went to cattle ranchers; small commercial and subsistence farmers were the biggest losers, and many were compelled to abandon their land. by 1990, 87 percent of agricultural producers in Chiapas had no access at all to government credit. Falling world market prices for coffee worsened the agricultural picture and Salinas exacerbated the effects of that problem by dismantling INMECAFE, the Mexican Coffee Institute, which had guaranteed markets for small Chiapanecan coffee growers (Renner 1997, p. 20)

New government programs irritated, rather than relieved, the

problem. The National Solidarity Program (PRONASOL) was designed by the Salinas government to provide relief to the poor, while at the same time working to "shore up" the PRI's patronage system (Renner 1997, p. 21). PRONASOL failed to win broad support in Chiapas partly because of the partisan way in which it was applied. Opponents of the local *caciques* (political bosses most often associated with the PRI) were denied PRONASOL financial aid while loyalist received aid (Renner 1997, p. 21). And, as if to rub salt in the wound, Governor Patrocinio Gonzáles Garrido used federal social welfare funds transferred to the state to build prisons. This effort to alleviate the fears of ranchers and other non-indigenous farming groups who were increasingly worried that indigenous land take-overs and associated violence would increase was meant to intimidate local activists.

Zapatistas' call to Civil Society

The Zapatistas' forceful actions were made possible by the increase in peasant organization in the state. The Zapatistas, according to some, represent dissatisfaction with the more peaceful, and often coopted, protests by peasant organizations. The Zapatista phenomena in Chiapas represents a "deep disillusion with both the national state and the independent peasant organizations" (Collier 1994, p. 78). While many peasant organizations have largely broken with corporatist organizations such as the powerful National Peasant Confederation "there is a terrible political invisibility of the true peasant movements" (Camin 1993, p. 258). It is this invisibility in the political process that makes such groups unable to press effectively for and negotiate their demands. The Zapatistas argue that isolated civil movements are easily absorbed or

controlled by the old forces of clientelism, and this argument forms an important part of their justification for taking forceful action.

I believe, above all, that the Zapatistas have rendered judgment against the fundamental tactic of two decades of independent organizing—that of seeking change through legal channels. Time and again, the national state has shown its capacity to exercise the law as a tool for power, selectively and illegitimately, to thwart the revindication of indigenous, peasant, and worker demands (Collier 1994, p. 78).

To support his contention, Collier documents the numerous instances where independent organizations have been violently repressed at the hands of national or state judicial and police forces. “During a six month period between July and December 1982,” he writes “independent organizers and the groups they represented in Chiapas experienced five assassinations, violent evictions from two ranches, the destruction of an entire peasant town, and fifty-nine kidnappings (Collier 1994, p. 78).

The political violence, which has been so characteristic of Chiapas, is not restricted to southern Mexico. At the national level, the reorganization of the Left has been subjected to the same type of attacks. Carr notes that political violence and “repression continues to weaken the Left; fifty of the party’s members have been killed and more than five hundred injured in the short period since the PRD was formed [1987] (Carr 1993, p. 93). Hellman believes that pervasive political violence, which is a nation-wide phenomena, calls into serious question any movement in Mexico toward a more democratic society. As regards independent organizations and their role in bringing about change, Hellman writes that “[t]o the extent that these movements remain outside of the co-optive grip of the official party, repression has been

used more often than co-optation to impose social control (Hellman 1994, p. 127).

It seems clear that the Zapatistas have concurred with these scholars that the emergence of strong and dedicated grass root movements has not led to a more open and democratic Mexico (Hellman 1994, p. 127). For the Zapatistas, they certainly have not led to the resolution of their stated grievances and demands. That explains their willingness to undertake violent action to gain national attention. But the vast mobilization of urban, rural, and indigenous organizations holds promise that they together can hold in check official violence.

Summary

Section one of the review of the literature focused on the conceptualization of *indianness*, culture, and ethnicity. The literature strongly suggests that Indian populations are varied and multi-dimensional, making it difficult to conceptualize them, and, especially difficult to label them universally as one downtrodden people. One trait, however, does seem to unite indigenous people globally. That trait is the clash between traditional cultures and the forces of modernization and global capitalism. It is along this fault line that the clashes between minority indigenous communities and the modern state generally can be found.

The second section focused on the literature which dealt with the Chiapas case. The Zapatista organization, comprised mostly of an indigenous force, appeared reflect the complex realities of the changing population of Chiapas. In recent history, the increased awareness on the

part of indigenous people of their shared situation has produced greater levels of campesino and indigenous mobilization and organization. The third section has documented the struggle of the Mexican state after 1968 to recover legitimacy, its dramatic policy shifts in the 1970s and 1980s, and domestic reactions. This section reveals the proliferation of NGOs and some progress toward creation of a vibrant civil society with which the Zapatistas could carry on a dialogue. Taken together, this portrait provides convincing evidence that the Zapatista appeal to civil society is by no means utopian. However, it also reveals that they remain wary of their desertion by those with different goals as well as wary of co-optation.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH PROCEDURES

"...it is a fundamental fact of human communication that language is used to convey knowledge and to understand the knowledge conveyed by others. Therefore, one task of content analysis is to achieve...understanding of linguistic data and to draw inferences on the basis of this understanding."

Klaus Krippendorff (1980)

Introduction

The purpose of this investigation is to identify the principal strategy used by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation in their rebellion begun on January 1, 1994, against the Mexican government. This chapter presents the research questions, the research strategies, the methodology utilized in this study, and the research design.

Research Question

This study seeks to answer the following question:

1. Did the messages issued by the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) during the period of January 1, 1994, through August 31, 1995, demonstrate a clear tonal preference in favor of either 1) an appeal to force of arms, or 2) an appeal to civil society to support a negotiated settlement of Zapatista demands?, Did the tonal preference of the Zapatista messages, if identified, suggest an overall Zapatista strategy for resolving their grievances against the Mexican government?

Research Strategy

The following research strategy was used to address the research question:

Message Tone/Strategic Intent. Message tonal preference and strategic intent were established through a reading of Zapatista documents and the identification of the presence or absence of particular themes. The message tonal preference was determined through a machine coding of certain descriptors which were assumed to indicate a tonal preference for the document. The subjective reading analysis was used to verify the machine based quantitative analysis of selected word and phrase frequencies as indicators of intent and tone.

Methodology

Content analysis provided the research methodology for the research question of this study. Content analysis is a set of procedures used in drawing systematic inferences from and about textual materials. This section discusses content analysis both as a method and its application to this study. The section reviews content analysis in general terms, provides a definition, and delineates its research purpose, noting the advantages of the method, as well as concerns associated with its reliability and validity.

Content Analysis

Faced by all researchers of political phenomenon is the problem of observing and measuring the attitudes and values of political actors. Because it is not possible to make direct measurements of these attitudes and values, we are forced to draw our inferences from indicators (Blanton, 1996, pp. 29-30). In many cases, these indicators are the written artifacts produced by the people themselves, or are

secondary evaluations and commentaries about the actions or words of the primary source.

The data for this study was derived from such documents. These documents came in various forms, were directed to multiple audiences, and were intended to accomplish a wide-range of purposes. Thus, the type of data collected for this study required a method of systemization. Content analysis provided this method.

As Holsti (1969) notes, content analysis is “a multipurpose research method developed specifically for investigating any problem in which the content of communication serves as the basis for inference (Holsti 1969, p. 2).” The selection of content analysis as a method for data analysis was based on this versatility and its fit to the research goals of this study.

Definition

Content analysis has been defined as “statistical semantics of political discourse (Kaplan, 1943, p. 230);” as “a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication (Berelson, 1952, p. 18);” as “the scientific analysis of communications messages (Barcus cited in Krippendorff, 1980, p. 8),” and as “any technique for making inference by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages (Holsti, 1969, p. 14).” More recently, Robert Philip Weber (1990), defined content analysis in terms of range of application and its purposes, which include efforts to:

- 1) disclose international differences in communication content;
- 2) compare media or “levels” of communication;
- 3) audit communication content against objectives;

- 4) code open-ended questions in surveys;
- 5) identify the intentions and other characteristics of the communicator;
- 6) determine the psychological state of persons or groups;
- 7) detect the existence of propaganda;
- 8) describe attitudinal and behavioral responses to communications;
- 9) reflect cultural patterns of groups, institutions, or societies;
- 10) reveal the focus of individual, group, institutional, or societal attention;
- 11) describe trends in communication content (p. 9).

Of the above, number five, "identify the intentions and other characteristics of the communicator," provides the focus for this study.

Advantages

Content analysis offers several research advantages. First, "content analysis is an unobtrusive technique (Krippendorff, 1980, p. 29). The source of data is unaffected by the research method. Content analysis is nonreactive and runs no risk of influencing the data by interaction with the source of that data such as may be the case with research that relies on experiments, interviews or questionnaires (Krippendorff, 1980, p. 29). Second, content analysis allows for the use of unstructured material. Data can be presented in many forms, as is the case in this study. Third, content analysis is not time constrained; therefore, it can be applied to documents without regard to their age. Fourth, where documents are of contemporary origin, content analysis can be combined with other indicators such as survey research, statistical analysis or event data to provide multiple sources of verification for inferences.

Concerns

As a method of analysis in social science, content analysis is required to address the norms of social science inquiry. Among such norms the question of objectivity, systemization, and generality are of key importance. These norms require that the rules of discovery be clearly stated and that procedures portrayed by such rules must be closely followed. Likewise, the content and the categorization of data are expected to conform to a systematic format which can be replicated. Finally, the comparisons and inferences which flow from the data are only important to the extent that they "have theoretical relevance (Krippendorff, 1980, p. 5)", i.e., they relate directly to the question under study, which itself arises from theoretical concerns.

Blanton pointed out, that in "content analysis it is extremely important to devise categories that reflect the theoretical and conceptual elements of the phenomenon being examined (Blanton 1996, p. 29)." Blanton's admonition, however, points to a vexing and ever present problem associated with content analysis. It is a problem created by the data set, the written word. Questions of reliability and validity, which apply to all scientific methodologies, are of particular concern here, due to the nature of written communication; that is, communication which is often vague, intentionally deceptive and susceptible to multiple and whimsical interpretations.

It is important to keep in mind that written speech is never merely a statement of fact. More often it is an argument of belief, an appeal for tangible action or a justification of position. Additionally, written communication also strips the communication of the meaning implied by

mood, situation, or context which limits the ability to determine meaning.

Given the argumentative, abstract and subjective nature of all symbolic human communication, we are still required to recognize that it remains the essential focus of much objective research in the social sciences. Content analysis as a method displays a soft underbelly. John Wilson exposed it for all to see when he stated:

The first thing to say, perhaps, is that just as there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as 'the' meaning of a word, so there is no such thing as 'the' concept of a thing. When we talk, in a kind of shorthand, about 'the' meaning of a word, we refer to those significant elements in all the many and various usages of the word which make the word comprehensible, to the area of agreement amongst users of the word. In the same way when we talk of 'the' concept of a thing, we are often referring in an abbreviated way to all the different concepts of that thing which individual people have, and to the extent to which these concepts coincide. Thus we can talk about 'the' concept of justice entertained by the ancient Romans; but also we can talk about your concept of justice, or my concept, or Cicero's concept, just as we often say 'His idea of justice is so-and-so'. We must not, in any case, imagine that 'the' concept of a thing is a separate entity on its own (Wilson 1963, p. 54).

Concept, meaning and fact all coincide in the individual. That individual can be either the source, the receiver or the investigator of the message. In each locus, the concept and its meaning vary according to factors too numerous to identify let alone isolate and quantify. The nature of the data goes to the heart of reliability and validity questions demanded by the scientific method of inquiry.

Reliability

The reliability of data used for inference has two facets. First, does the same researcher code data similarly?, i.e., produce the same results over time. Second, would different researchers code data similarly? These are consistency issues and, according to Weber are to be considered as minimum standard[s] for content analysis (Weber 1990, p. 17).

Additionally, considerations of accuracy, "which refer to the extent to which the classification of text corresponds to a standard or norm (Weber 1990, p. 17)," make the reliability of any content analysis study dependent on a demonstrable connection of language, classification scheme and observable political action (Weber 1990, p. 28). Thus, the exactness to which the researcher constructs his categorical units and codes those units is of particular importance.

Validity

A content analysis variable is valid to the extent that it measures the construct the investigator intends it to measure (Weber 1990, p. 15)." As such, validity can take several forms. The easiest to achieve is face validity; demonstrated by "the correspondence between [the] investigator's definitions of concepts and...the categories that classified them (Weber 1990, p. 18)." A stronger and more desirable form, external validity, indicates the research has sought validation for inferences from external or additional sources. These sources include statistical analysis, interviews, survey research or factual events.

Conclusion

Methodology eventually carries us to a conclusion, in this case, an interpretation of the relationship established between textual ideas and

the empirical world of politics. Weber reminded us that at this juncture empirical fact gives way to subjective interpretation and inference when he noted:

Given that differing, perhaps antithetical theoretical frameworks can be used to interpret these texts, what should we conclude? First, a variety of interpretations usually will be available and the investigator must choose. It is inappropriate to pursue a fruitless quest in search of the 'true' or the 'valid' interpretation...it is not the validity of an interpretation per se that is at issue, but rather the salience of an interpretation given one or another theory. Second, just as it is true that quantitative data do not speak for themselves...so is it true that texts do not speak for themselves either. The investigator must do the speaking and the language of that speech is the language of theory (Weber 1990, pp. 79-80).

Research Design

According to Krippendorff (1980) the logic of content analysis has three natural components. These components are design, execution and report. Design, the first step, is itself comprised of a series of steps which include 1) creating a theoretical framework, 2) searching for data, 3) searching for collaborative data (event data), 4) devising plans for sampling, 5) establishing coding devices, and, 6) deciding on standards (Weber 1990, p. 170).

This section provides a description of the following; the data framework, the data sources utilized, the type of document samples collected, the document measures used, the coding schemes, and the document scoring.


Data Framework

The data collected for this study include the documents that represented the position of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation and its organization spokesmen, i.e., the statements and communiqués of the *Comite Clandestino Revolucionario Indigena-Comandancia General* (CCRI-CG), as well as the committee's military commander, known by the *nom de guerre* Subcomandante Marcos.

Over the data category four chronological segments were imposed which provided a second framework dimension; these were designated as time segments t_1 , t_2 , t_3 , t_4 . The chronological separation of data provided a means to assess and report on message consistency and to note contextual influences by the comparison of event data to the message/response framework. Additionally, the chronological delimiters helped to establish a logical sampling order and number.

Time segments t_1 (January 1, 1994 to March 31, 1994), t_2 (June 1, 1994 to August 31, 1994), and t_3 (January 1, 1995 to March 31, 1995) were selected due to the fact that each time segment was initiated by the issuance of a major statement by the Zapatista National Liberation Army. These documents were labeled by the Zapatistas as Declarations. Time segment t_4 (June 1, 1995 to August 31, 1995) was selected to mirror time segment t_2 . Each time segment covers three month periods. Figure 3 graphically represents the time segments which served as parameters for this study.

Figure 2
Data Framework: Time Periods



Message Data

This section provides a description of the message document sources, the message document types used in this study, the measures used to evaluate the documents, the coding scheme for isolating measure indicators, and the scoring procedures utilized.

Message Sources

Message documents of The Zapatista National Liberation Army were downloaded electronically from sources accessed through Internet and the University of Texas' Latin American Network Information Center (UT LANIC). The UT LANIC system offered access to a list serve identified as Chiapas95. The Chiapas95 archives contained a wide variety of

documents related to the Zapatista uprising. Of particular interest were the original Zapatista National Liberation Army communiqués and Declarations as well as many original *La Jornada*, *El Financero*, *La Reforma* and *Proceso* articles and commentaries.

Additional documents were obtained from the Institute for Global Communication databases known as PeaceNet. PeaceNet contained two database sites considered germane to this study. The first was a list serve designated as reg.mexico and the second list.chiapas.

Message Document Type

The Zapatista National Liberation Army released a variety of documents. These documents include declarations, communiqués, letters, essays, interviews, editorials and reports. Of the documents issued by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation only declarations and communiqués were used for this study.

The special appeal of the declarations and communiqués for the purposes of this study was the fact that they were consistently directed to the larger audience of the civil society, both Mexican and global, and were consistently published by the Mexican daily newspaper, *La Jornada*. The assumption was made that consistency of publication, both in terms of source and commitment, provided interested individuals assured access to the arguments presented by these documents. Moreover, since the broad civil society was designated as the response category, these message documents meshed well with the intentions and parameters of the study.

Message Document Measures

Documents issued by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation , were analyzed to determine message tone. Message tone signified a discernible preference for one of two messages i.e. 1) the call to arms, an argument for the use of force to obtain political power and gain, and 2) the appeals to the civil society, a moral, rational political argument, for support of a negotiated settlement of Zapatista demands. This thematic analysis helped to identify and isolate the intended appeal of the message documents. The first theme, the call to arms, was designated as C1. The call to the civil society in support of a negotiated settlement was designated as C3.


Figure 3
Data Framework: Time Periods with Themes

<p>Time t₁ : 1st Declaration (Beginning 1.1.94; ending 3.31.94)</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">Message</p> <hr/> <p>Theme C 1 (Call to arms)</p> <p>Theme C 3 (Call to Civil Society)</p>
<p>Time t₂ : 2nd Declaration (Beginning 6.1.94; ending 8.31.94)</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">Message</p> <hr/> <p>Theme C 1 (Call to arms)</p> <p>Theme C 3 (Call to Civil Society)</p>
<p>Time t₃ : 3rd Declaration (Beginning 1.1.95; ending 3.31.95)</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">Message</p> <hr/> <p>Theme C 1 (Call to arms)</p> <p>Theme C 3 (Call to Civil Society)</p>
<p>Time t₄ : 4th Declaration (Beginning 1.1.96; ending 8.31.95)</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">Message</p> <hr/> <p>Theme C 1 (Call to arms)</p> <p>Theme C 3 (Call to Civil Society)</p>

Coding Scheme for Message Documents


The task of isolating each theme in the message documents was achieved by identifying descriptors used by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation to express 1) their expected goals, and 2) the methods by which they expected to achieve their goals. In the first sub-category, goals, the two themes, the call to arms (C1) and the call to the civil society (C3), were contrasted by identifying those messages that emphasized a goal of overthrowing the Mexican government and those messages that emphasized the goal of a peaceful political reform of the society through negotiated settlement of Zapatista demands. In the second sub-category, methods, the two themes, the call to arms (C1) and the call to the civil society (C3), were contrasted by identifying those messages that emphasized force as the method of change and those messages that emphasized political discourse as the method of change. (see Figure 4 & 5).

Figure 4
Coding Scheme for Message Documents: A



In order to establish a means to quantify each sub-category, a reading of the documents was conducted to identify phrases and passages which appeared to fit one of the two agents of change, force or political discourse. From this initial reading, individual words assumed to reflect a symbolic representation of either force or political discourse were identified. In the case of force as the method of change, words such as war, fight, combat, soldiers, and attack were identified for the purposes of this study to represent language appealing to force. For political discourse emphasized as the method of change, words such as dialogue, civil society, compromise, agenda, delegation, and meeting served to identify an appeal to a peaceful transformation of the political society. (see Figure 5 for coding scheme for message documents)

Figure 5
Coding Scheme for Message Documents: B



Message Document Mechanical Scoring


Scoring the individual message documents and establishing the overall tone of that document was accomplished mechanically. Each document was assigned a unique index code and imported to a computer database program. The document was segmented by paragraph and an individual record created. The document record was coded according to the date of the document, the language in which it was collected from the list serve (Spanish or English), the document type, the principal author, and the document addressee. The code identifiers allow for quick and precise grouping of document segments by any combination of assigned database categories, time parameters, or any other search parameters desired.

The score for any one document record was based on a Boolean search (yes = 1; no = 0) for one of the several code words identified as

indicators of theme. If a document record contained the word "attack," it received a "1" for that category as an indicator of aggression or force. However, if the search for the word "negotiate," an indicator of a peaceful resolution, turned up negative in the same record a "0" was assigned to that category.

Each document record was searched for 8 categories of words reflecting goals and methods for each of the two themes, the call to arms (C1), and the call to the civil society (C3). From this analysis a cumulative machine total was derived for each of the two themes with a ratio established between the call to arms (C1), and the call to the civil society (C3) for each document (see Figure 6).

Figure 6
Message Document Scoring



It should be noted that the research goal was only to determine a general tone of the message documents. By emphasizing tone, rather than attempting to identify and place any one document into an exact

category, this study attempted to reconcile the precision of quantification (number of thematic expressions) with the nuance of political language.

Subjective Evaluation and Verification of Document C1/C3 Language Preference

In addition to the machine coding and analysis of C1/C3 preferences in all selected time segments of Zapatista documents, each document was read and subjectively evaluated for overall tone of the document. Each Zapatista document was assigned a number between “-1” and “1” to convey one of 5 subjective document classifications. A negative numerical (“-1”) classification indicated a C1 document. A positive numerical (“1”) indicated a C3 document. A negative numerical fraction (“-.5”) indicated a inclination toward a C1 stance but with a considerable amount of conciliatory language. A positive numerical fraction (“.5”) indicated an inclination toward a C3 stance but with a considerable amount of belligerent language in the document. A (“0”) classification indicated a mixed message with no clear preference of language determined in the document.

Figure 7 presents the subjective evaluation classification scheme, which draws attention to incongruities between machine coded ratios and subjective readings.

Figure 7
Document Subjective Classification Scheme for C1/C3

-1	-.5	0	.5	1
C1	mod	Mixed	mod	C3

Consistency of Message

Additionally, Zapatista documents were tested for consistency of message over the four time segments (t_1-t_4) and for consistency with respect to a variety of conditions surrounding the publication of each document.

The consistency over time variable was tested with a comparison of the quantity of documents in each of the time segments (t_1-t_4) which exhibited a preference for C1 or C3 language. This was a numerical count and percentage determination, and was a simple extension of the message preference ratios presented in the previous section.

The consistency over conditions was tested by a comparison of document preference against the contemporary events surrounding the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas at the time of publication of each document. Contemporary events were assumed to be a significant influencing variable for the statements of the Zapatistas. The conditions at the time of document publication were classified in one of four categories:

Category I: Extremely hostile i.e., either the Zapatistas were under military attack by the Mexican army or considered themselves under the immediate threat of such an attack, or the Zapatistas were themselves militarily active and attacking either the Mexican military or other targets.

Category II: Situation tense i.e., no engagements or open military hostilities between the EZLN and the Mexican military, but no established cease-fire or truce in place recognized by both parties. This category also included so-called "Red Alerts" called by the Zapatistas, or

Mexican Army maneuvers in Zapatista territory reported by third parties.

Category III: Situation stable i.e., a discussion on-going between the Mexican government and the Zapatistas with the intention of establishing a cease-fire or truce. It was assumed for this category that verbal positioning in anticipation of formal talks could be hostile in tone, but did not constitute either hostile action, or a tensing of the environment.

Category IV: Accepted truce conditions by both sides i.e., both sides actively involved in negotiations with conditions of a mutually agreed truce prevailing.

One of the four conditions above were assigned to the publication dates of each of the reviewed Zapatista documents in all of the four research time segments. Determination of the appropriate category was made by a qualitative reading of event data (newspaper and third party accounts) and a content analysis of Zapatista communiqués themselves seeking their own assessment of conditions.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF DATA

"Those who bear swords aren't the only ones who lose blood or who shine with the fleeting light of military glory. They aren't the only ones who should have a voice in designating the leaders of the government of a people who want democracy; this right to choose belongs to every citizen who has fought in the press or in the courts. It belongs to every citizen who identifies with the ideals of the Revolution and who has fought against the despotism that has ignored our laws. Tyranny isn't eliminated just by fighting on the battlefield; dictatorships and empires are also overthrown by launching cries of freedom and terrible threats against those who are executing the people. . . Historical events have shown us that the destruction of tyranny and the overthrow of all bad government are the work of ideas together with the sword. It is therefore an absurdity, an aberration, an outrageous despotism to deny the people the right to elect their government. The people's sovereignty is formed by all those people in society who are conscious of their rights and who, be they civilians or armed, love freedom and justice and who work for the good of the country."

*Second Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle
Original. Aguascalientes, 1914*

Introduction

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section provides an analysis of the thirty-four negotiating demands presented by the Zapatista National Liberation Army to the Mexican government. The second section presents the results of the content analysis of Zapatista documents. The purpose of this investigation was to identify the principal strategy the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) used in their rebellion of January 1, 1994, against the Mexican government.

The results reported in this chapter are based on data obtained from a content analysis of Zapatista communiqués released to the Mexican popular press and freely circulated from January 1, 1994 to August 31, 1995. The communiqués were the official communications of

the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) and its organization spokesmen, i.e., the statements and communiqués of the *Comite Clandestino Revolucionario Indigena-Comandancia General* (CCRI-CG) and, the committee's military commander known by the *nom de guerre* of Subcomandante Marcos.

An Analysis of Zapatista Goals Represented as Negotiating Demands

The Zapatista demands as presented as points of negotiation to representative of the Mexican government expanded on the Zapatistas' general grievances and identified concrete remedial steps that they expected to result from the talks. The Zapatista demands were examined in order to provide a sense of the overall goals of the rebellion, and as an aid in evaluating the strategic intent of the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN).

The thirty-four negotiating demands were classified into four categories. First, each demand was classified based on its institutional implications, i.e., the political, economic and social institutions of the state and the society to be most impacted. Second, the geographic scope of the demand was established based on whether the proposed change affected a national, regional/state or local area. Third, the demand was classified on the basis of whether the change called for was short-term or long-term. No effort was made to precisely determine each category; this is because a general understanding of temporal negotiating expectations on the part of the Zapatistas is sufficient for the hypothesis explored. Fourth, each demand was classified by the group most likely to be affected by positive responses to the demand—the Mexican society, the Indigenous community, or the forces of the EZLN. Table 2 below

graphically displays this classification scheme.

Table 2
Zapatista Demand Classification Scheme

A. Institutional segment	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Political 2. Economic 3. Social
B. Spacial distributional impact	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. National 2. Regional of state 3. Local or sub-state
C. Time frame	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Immediate 2. Short-term 3. Long-term
D. Principal beneficiary	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Mexican society 2. indigenous/peasant 3. EZLN

The text (English version) of each of the thirty-four Zapatista demands and the classification based on the four categories just described is shown in Table 3 below.

Table 3
Zapatista Demand Classification

Demand #	A	B	C	D
“First: We demand that free and democratic elections be convened with equal rights and obligations for all political organizations that struggle for power, with true freedom to chooses one proposal or another, and respect for the will of the majority...”	1	1	2	1
“Second: To ensure that there are truly free and democratic elections, it is necessary for the head of the federal executive and occupants of state executive offices who reached their positions of power through electoral fraud, to resign. Their legitimacy does not come from the respect for the will of the majority, but rather from its usurpation. Consequently, the formation of a transitional government is necessary...”	1	1	1	1
Third: The recognition of the Zapatista National Liberation Army as a belligerent force, and of its troops as authentic combatants and the application of all international treaties regulating armed conflicts.	1	1	1	3
Fourth: A new pact between Mexican Federation members to do away with centralism and allow regions, Indigenous communities, and townships to govern themselves with political, economic and cultural autonomy.	1	1	2	1
Fifth: General elections for the whole state of Chiapas and the legal recognition of all the political forces in the state.	1	2	2	2

Sixth: As a producer of electricity and petroleum, the state of Chiapas pays tribute to the nation and receives nothing in return. Our communities have no electric energy and the economic bleeding, a product of oil exports and internal sale, brings no benefits to the Chiapaneco people. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that all Chiapaneco communities receive electric energy and that a percentage of the income earned from the commercialization of Chiapaneco petroleum be applied to industrial, agricultural, commercial and social infrastructure projects for the benefit of all Chiapanecos.	2	2	2	2
Seventh: The revision of the North American Free Trade Agreement signed with Canada and the United States, since in its present form it does not take into account the Indigenous population, and it sentences them to death because it does not include any labor qualifications whatsoever.	2	1	2	2
Eighth: Article 27 of the Magna Carta [a reference to the Mexican Constitution] should respect the original spirit of Emiliano Zapata: Land is for the indigenous people and campesinos who work it, not for latifundistas. We want the large tracts of land that are in the hands of ranchers, national and foreign wealthy land-owners, and other people who occupy a lot of land and are not campesinos, to be passed over to the hands of the people who have absolutely no land, as it is set out in our Revolutionary Agrarian Law. The redistribution of lands should include agricultural machinery, fertilizers, insecticides, credits, technical assistance, improved seeds, cattle, and fair prices for our products such as coffee, corn and beans. The land that is redistributed should be of good quality, and it must be accessible by roads, public transport, and have adequate irrigation systems. Campesinos who already have land also have the right to receive the support mentioned above to facilitate their work and improve production. New ejidos and communities should be formed. The Salinista reform to Article 27 of the Constitution should be annulled and the right to the land should be put back into our Magna Carta.	1	1	2	2

Ninth: We want hospitals to be built in all of the municipal seats, and that they have specialized doctors and sufficient medicine to attend to all patients, and rural clinics in the ejidos and communities, with training and fair salaries for health representatives. Already-existing hospitals in the area should be rehabilitated as soon as possible and have complete surgical services. Clinics should be built in large communities, which have sufficient doctors and medicine to more closely attend to the needs of the people.	3	2	2	2
Tenth: That indigenous people be guaranteed the right to true information about what happens on local, regional, state, national and international levels, through an indigenous radio station that is directed and managed by Indians.	3	3	2	2
Eleventh: We demand that housing be built in all rural communities in Mexico and be provided with all necessary services, such as: light, potable water, roads, sewage systems, telephones, public transportation, etc. And also that they have the advantages of the city, such as televisions, stoves, refrigerators, washing machines, etc. The communities should have recreational centers for the healthy diversion of residents: sports and culture that dignify the human condition of Indians.	3	1	3	1
Twelfth: We want an end to illiteracy in indigenous communities. For this we need better elementary and secondary schools in our communities, which have free teaching materials and teachers with university degrees who are at the service of the people and not just there to defend the interests of the wealthy. In municipal seats there should be free elementary, secondary, and preparatory schools. The government should provide uniforms, shoes, food and all study materials for free. Centrally located communities that are far away from the municipal seat of the respective townships should have boarding secondary schools. Education should be completely free, from preschool through university, and it should be available to all Mexicans regardless of race, creed, age, sex or political affiliation.	3	1	3	2
Thirteenth: That the languages of all of the ethnicities be official and that their teaching in primary, secondary and preparatory schools and at the university level be mandatory.	3	1	3	2

Fourteenth: That our rights and dignity as indigenous peoples be respected and that our culture and tradition be recognized.	3	1	2	2
Fifteenth: We do not want to be subject to the discrimination and scorn which we, the Indians, have always suffered.	3	2	2	2
Sixteenth: As the indigenous people that we are, we demand that we be allowed to govern ourselves autonomously, because we no longer want to be subject to the will of national and foreign powers.	1	1	2	2
Seventeenth: That justice be administered by the indigenous communities themselves according to their customs and traditions, without intervention from illegitimate and corrupt governments.	1	1	2	2
Eighteenth: We want to always have dignified jobs with fair salaries for all workers, both in the countryside and in the cities of the Mexican Republic, so that our brothers and sisters are not forced to resort to bad things such as drug trafficking, delinquency and prostitution in order to survive. The Federal Labor Law should be applied to rural and urban workers with bonuses, loans, vacations, and the true right to strike.	2	1	2	1
Nineteenth: We demand fair prices for our products of the fields. For this we need to have free access to a market to buy and sell without being subject to the coyotes who exploit us.	2	1	1	2
Twentieth: That the plundering of the riches of our Mexico and above all Chiapas, one of the Republic's richest states, but one in which hunger and misery grow every day, cease.	2	2	1	1
Twenty-first: We want all debts, whether they be credits or loans and taxes with high interest rates, to be canceled, as these cannot be paid back due to the poverty of the Mexican people.	2	1	1	1
Twenty-second: We want an end to hunger and malnutrition, because they alone have caused the death of thousands of our brothers and sisters both in the countryside and in the city. In every rural community there should be cooperative stores supported economically by the federal, state and municipal governments, and the prices in these stores should be fair. Moreover, there should also be transport vehicles, owned by the cooperatives, for the transport of merchandise. Moreover, the government should send free food for all children under 14 years old.	3	1	1	1

Twenty-third: We ask for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and unjustly imprisoned poor people in all the jails of Mexico and Chiapas.	1	1	1	1
Twenty-fourth: We ask that the Federal Army and Judicial and Public-Safety Police no longer enter rural zones, as they will only intimidate, evict, rob, repress and bomb campesinos who are organizing to defend their rights. Because of this, our people are tired of the presence of soldiers and Public-Safety and Judicial forces, because they are so abusive and repressive. That the Mexican government return the Pilatus planes, used to bombard our people, to the Swiss government. The refund money should be channeled to programs to improve the life of rural and urban workers. We also ask that the government of the United States of North America take back its helicopters, as they are being used to repress Mexicans.	1	1	1	1
Twenty-fifth: The indigenous campesinos took up arms because they have nothing but their humble shacks. When the Federal Army bombarded the civilian populations, it destroyed these humble homes and all of their few belongings. For this reason we ask and demand that the federal government compensate families that have suffered material losses due to air raids and actions by federal troops. We also demand indemnity for widows and orphans of the war, both civilians and Zapatistas.	2	3	1	2
Twenty-sixth: We indigenous campesinos want to live in peace and tranquillity and want to be allowed to live according to our rights to freedom and a dignified life.	3	1	1	2
Twenty-seventh: That the penal code of the state of Chiapas be eliminated, as it does not allow us to organize, except with arms, because legal and peaceful struggles are repressed and punished.	1	2	1	2
Twenty-eighth: We ask and demand an end to the expulsion of Indians from their communities by the caciques who are supported by the state. We demand a guarantee that all expelled people may return freely and voluntarily to their lands of origin and that they be compensated for their lost goods.	1	2	1	2
Twenty-ninth: indigenous Campesino Women's Petition.	3	1	2	2

Thirtieth: We demand that Patrocinio González Blanco Garrido, Absalón Castellanos Domínguez and Elmar Setzer M. be tried politically for crimes against the indigenous people of Chiapas.	1	3	2	3
Thirty-first: We demand that the lives of all EZLN members be respected and a guarantee that there will be no penal process or any repressive action brought against any EZLN members, combatants, sympathizers or collaborators.	1	3	1	3
Thirty-second: That all organizations and commissions for the defense of human rights be independent or non-governmental, because government human rights organizations only hide the arbitrary actions of the government.	1	1	1	1
Thirty-third: That a National Commission for Peace with Justice and Dignity be formed, composed primarily of people who are not in the government or any political party. And that this National Commission for Peace with Justice and Dignity oversee the fulfillment and implementation of the accords that the EZLN and the government arrive at.	1	1	1	3
Thirty-fourth: That the humanitarian aid for the victims of the conflict be channeled through authentic representatives from indigenous communities.	3	3	1	2

Based on the analysis above, it was apparent that the rebels viewed their cause as principally political and national in scope. Forty-seven percent of the rebels demands were addressed to the structure or functioning of the Mexican political institutions and 65% of all demands are national in their geographic consequence. Additionally, the Zapatistas demanded quick solutions to their grievances. They insisted on immediate or short-term responses an overwhelming 91% of their demands. The principal beneficiaries of these solutions, according to the Zapatistas, should be the indigenous people (56%), but many benefits demanded changes at the national level to accrue to the larger Mexican society (32%). Table 4 summarizes the classification of Zapatista demands by number in each category and the percentages they represent.

Table 4
Zapatista Demand Score

A. Institutional segment			
	1. Political	<u>16</u>	<u>47%</u>
	2. Economic	7	21%
	3. Social	11	32%
B. Spatial distributional impact			
	1. National	<u>22</u>	<u>65%</u>
	2. Regional of state	7	21%
	3. Local or sub-state	5	14%
C. Time frame			
	1. Immediate	<u>16</u>	<u>47%</u>
	2. Short-term	15	44%
	3. Long-term	3	09%
D. Principal beneficiary			
	1. Mexican society	11	32%
	2. indigenous/peasant	<u>19</u>	<u>56%</u>
	3. EZLN	4	12%

Institutional Targets of EZLN Demands

The next step involved isolating and classifying the specific changes demanded by the Zapatistas according to the three broad dimensions discussed above—that is, into political, economic, or social changes. These changes also were categorized as to whether they involved national, regional/Chiapas, or local government responses.

Political Demands

Forty seven percent of the 34 demands presented to Mexican government representatives in San Cristóbal de las Casas have been classified as political. The first political demand, national in its scope, called for free and democratic elections. The acceptance of this demand would require the ruling regime to acknowledge its illegitimacy. To facilitate the process leading to new elections, the Zapatistas in their second demand, also national in its scope, called for the immediate resignation of the government. They called in their fourth demand for the redistribution of political power from the center in Mexico City to the states and also to communities. Because they saw this devolution of power coming about as a result of a national decision by delegates or via a national referendum involving constitutional reform, this demand is classified as national. Obviously, its effects would be felt at all three levels.

They demanded that a number of additional changes be accepted by the national government: reinstatement of Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution in its original form (demand eight), which provided the commitment to continuous redistribution of lands when needed by the poor and by indigenous communities; recognition of the Zapatista

National Liberation Army "as a belligerent force" (demand three), which would also afford its members and those who might be taken prisoner some protections under international law; withdrawal of government troops from the combat zone (demand twenty-four); release of all political prisoners held anywhere in the country (demand twenty-three); granting full amnesty to both the EZLN leaders and all rank-and-file members (demand thirty-one); and finally the prosecution of two former governors of Chiapas as well as a former state official, each of whom was named, for alleged crimes against the indigenous peoples (demand thirty).

The Zapatistas made two additional demands involving cession of national powers. They called for independence from the national government of all human rights organizations in the country (demand thirty-two) and the establishment of a National Commission for Peace and Justice and Dignity (demand thirty-three), which would be empowered to oversee future negotiations as well as to oversee the implementation of government responses to Zapatista demands. Such a National Commission might operate even if the government, as certainly was highly unlikely, were to resign and make way for new elections because someone would have to serve as referee during the interim period of intense political campaigning.

Among the Zapatistas political demands directed at the governor and the state government in Chiapas were: new elections for all offices in the whole state of Chiapas (demand five); elimination of the existing state penal code (demand twenty-seven); the termination of the close and repressive relationship between the top officials of the state branch of

the ruling party (PRI) and the local *caciques* or political bosses who acted as their agents, often evicting indigenous campesinos from their communities or from land they had cleared and occupied (demand twenty-eight).

Two of the Zapatista political demands directed at the local level (demands sixteen and seventeen) include recognition of the political autonomy of indigenous communities and the right of these communities to govern themselves independently of national or state government intervention. They specifically demanded that this autonomy include indigenous judicial power. For convenience and to provide a visual sense of the predominance of national over regional and local demands, this classification is displayed in Table 5, titled Political Reform.

Table 5
Political Reforms

Political Reform (16 demands: 47%)			
Demand	National	Regional/State	Local/Sub-state
1.	...free and democratic elections...		
2.	resignation of current national and state government and appointment of transitional gov't.		
3.	The recognition of the Zapatista National Liberation Army as a belligerent force...		
4.	...do away with centralism and allow regions, indigenous communities, and townships to govern themselves...		
5.		...elections for the whole state of Chiapas...	
8.	reinstatement of Article 27 of the Magna Carta		
16.			indigenous people autonomy
17.			indigenous courts
23.	release of all political prisoners...		
24.	police and army to leave rural zones		
27.		That the penal code of the state of Chiapas be eliminated	
28.		...end to the expulsion of Indians from their communities by the caciques who are supported by the state.	

30.	...Patrocinio González Blanco Garrido, Absalón Castellanos Dominguez and Elmar Setzer M. be tried politically for crimes against indigenous people.
31.	amnesty for EZLN members
32.	human rights org. guaranteed independence
33.	That a National Commission for Peace with Justice and Dignity be formed...

Economic Demands

Twenty-one percent or 7 of the 34 demands have been classified as economic. The target of five of these demands is the national government, and the other two could be addressed to either the national or the Chiapas state government. Because one of the key political demands was for de-centralization, it seems appropriate to classify these remaining demands as regional. In contrast, the goals to be achieved via these demands would be felt most strongly at the local and state levels.

Listed first in priority among Zapatista demands is return of a fair share of the wealth generated in Chiapas back to the state (demand six) along with a halt to the "plundering of the riches" of the state and resource conservation (demand twenty, classified as regional). These demands include use of the state's hydroelectric power in electrification of rural communities and use of a percentage of petroleum revenues to build infrastructure in Chiapas. The Zapatistas demand major revisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (demand seven). Another major demand, which picks up the strategy of organizers from Mexico City who came to Chiapas earlier in the decade, is for application of the Federal Labor Law Code to both rural and urban workers in the province (demand eighteen). This would implement national minimum wage laws, provide for bonuses under specified circumstance, make loans available to workers, establish their right to vacations, and establish their right to strike. Speaking for all impoverished Mexicans who have suffered from currency devaluations, the Zapatistas demand total forgiveness of the debt of the poor, whether incurred through government credits, private loans, or unpaid taxes, all of which carry high interest rates because of

inflation and devaluations (demand twenty-one). Finally, they demand full compensation for the indigenous communities that were victimized in the military's response to the Zapatista uprising (demand twenty-five).

The Zapatistas, as noted above, demand a less exploitative and more managed utilization of the national resources of Chiapas (demand twenty). This demand seems to assume fulfillment of earlier demands, which would have democratized both state and local governments in Chiapas. It therefore implies that the demand is for a much larger and organized regional voice in the decision-making process. It is linked to the demand that the indigenous communities be allowed to market their products directly and cooperatively, rather than through the exploitative so-called "coyotes" who have controlled market access (demand nineteen), which can be satisfied at the state level under a reformed government. Table 6 presents these economic demands organized according to the level of government that they target.

Table 6
Economic Reforms

Economic Reform (7 demands: 21%)			
Demand	National	Regional/State	Local/Sub-state
6.	return to Chiapas of fair share of wealth generated by the state		
7.	revision of the North American Free Trade Agreement		
18.	The Federal Labor Law should be applied to rural as urban workers in Chiapas		

19.	We demand fair prices for our products via market access
20.	conservation of Chiapas natural resources for Mexico
21.	debt forgiveness
25.	restitution of indigenous campesinos war losses

Social Demands

Thirty-two percent or 11 of 34 demands have been classified as social. These Zapatista demands focus on dignity through national recognition of indigenous distinctiveness and the tools for indigenous modernization and fulfillment, on the national solidarity of indigenous and campesino needs and desires, on their inclusion in the implementation of programs, and finally on their welfare. The clear stress is on dignity, recognition, and rights.

The Zapatistas demand hospitals in all municipal seats (demand nine); housing with all services in rural communities throughout Mexico (demand eleven); education sufficient to end illiteracy (demand eleven); an end to hunger and malnutrition (demand twenty-two). They demand an end to racism (demand fifteen), to violation of the right of indigenous peoples to a tranquil and dignified life (demand twenty-six); and the recognition of distinctive indigenous women's rights and demands (demand twenty-nine). The Zapatistas demand mandatory indigenous language instruction through the university level (demand thirteen); establishment of an Indigenous radio station (demand ten); and recognition of various rights of Indigenous Women and their

organizations (twenty-nine).

This package of demands is both practical and sophisticated. Hospitals, housing, and food subsidies, as well as increase in education could provide the rebellion with quick and readily visible rewards to the communities which supported it. This study does not try to establish the salience of the other social demands to the indigenous or mestizo supporters of the Zapatistas. However, it should be recognized that Indigenous language instruction could only be provided by indigenous instructors, who would have to be hired by state or national governments. The same would be true of radio journalists. In both cases, tremendous opportunities for upward mobility would be available to those bilingual in Spanish and in a native tongue. This "affirmative action agenda" certainly would appeal to many of the activists discussed in the previous chapter. Even when articulated abstractly (end to racism, dignity as indigenous peoples), the demands required concrete policy and legal changes and substantial reallocations of government resources. The eleven social demands are displayed in Table 7.


Table 7
Social Reforms

Social Reform (11 demands: 32%)			
Demand	National	Regional/State	Local/Sub-state
9.		We want hospitals to be built in all of the municipal seats	
10.	indigenous radio station to guarantee access to information		
11.	...housing be built in all rural communities in Mexico and be provided with all necessary services		
12.	We want an end to illiteracy in indigenous communities.		
13.	mandatory indigenous language education at all levels		
14.	That our rights and dignity as indigenous peoples be respected and that our culture and tradition be recognized.		
15.	end to racism		
22.	We want an end to hunger and malnutrition.		
26.	indigenous rights to tranquil and dignified life		
29.	indigenous Campesino Women's Petition		
34.			That the humanitarian aid for the victims of the conflict be channeled through authentic representatives from indigenous communities.

Classification of the original 34 Zapatista demands into political, economic, and social demands directed at national, state, or local governments reveals a sophisticated understanding of local, state, national, and international realities. This sophistication is less obvious if one focuses on a few demands or does not relate them with attention to their mutual interrelationships. All this must have been thought through in advance, and then adjusted in response to changes in the Mexican and international situations. Subcommandante Marcos, or Marcos and a small set of similarly educated leaders, must have provided this coherence and its sophistication. That, however, is a subject of a journalist with unusual access to Marcos and other Zapatista leaders.

The classification and discussion of political, economic, and social demands, and of their targets, leads to the question of whether it is possible to model in a crude way the linkage between changes in Mexico and the formulation of strategic options by leadership cadre of the Zapatistas, it nevertheless is possible to present a general model of Zapatista strategy which links analysis of situation to articulation of demands, to the fact that these demands can be understood as interrelated clusters of political, economic, and social demands, and that the targets of these demands in most cases are national. The beneficiaries, in contrast, are the indigenous and the poor, scattered around Mexico. Ultimately, strategy cannot be divorced from analysis of possibilities in a given situation. Real options depend first of all on analyses of possibilities.

Figure 8
Linkage of Strategic Options to Situation



The EZLN Strategic Options

We cannot from this division of the Zapatista demands into political, economic, and social categories, and further classifying them according to whether their target was the nation, the state, or the indigenous community, establish definitely whether they expected to achieve their ultimate goal by force or by collaboration. Thus their strategic options remain open in Figure 8. However, this analysis of their 34 demands makes it abundantly clear that many of those demands were articulated in a way that was calculated to benefit other Mexicans in similar situations. They articulated demands of principle—local control, indigenous rights, local benefit from local resources, the democratization of society, economy, and polity—that are inclusive rather than exclusive.

They also articulate a vision of how, in pluralist societies, those at the bottom can participate in the process of their integration into the wider Mexican society as local decision-makers, teachers, marketers of local products, and so forth. Thus even though observers have remarked on the elegance of the Zapatista discourse, this item-by-item analysis of its content establishes its concrete practicality as well as its methodological reaching out toward a larger constituency.

Findings

The research question asked: Did the messages issued by the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) during the period of January 1, 1994, through August 31, 1995, demonstrate a clear tonal preference in favor of either 1) an appeal to force of arms, or, 2) an appeal to civil society to support a negotiated settlement of Zapatista demands. Did the tonal preference of the Zapatista messages, if identified, suggest an overall Zapatista strategy for resolving their grievances against the Mexican government?

The research question contained two parts; i.e., message tonal preference, and strategic intent. Message preference was determined through the identification of selected word descriptors in each Zapatista document which were proposed to indicate a tonal preference of the overall document. The sampled documents fell into one of four time segments designated hereafter as t_1 , t_2 , t_3 , and t_4 . The machine coding analysis of each Zapatista document was enhanced by a qualitative reading and evaluation of each document. The descriptors used for machine coding of message preference are listed in Appendix II.

Zapatista documents were analyzed to determine if there could be demonstrated a preference in each Zapatista document for one of two messages i.e., 1) the call to arms—an argument for the use of force to overthrow the existing regime and acquire political power. This message tonal preference was designated as a C1 preference. And, 2) the appeal to the whole of civil society—a moral, rational, and persuasive political argument for political, economic and social change as outlined in the 34 demands presented to the Mexican government by the Zapatistas. This message tonal preference was designated as a C3 preference.

The second part of the research question, i.e., identifying strategic intent, was determined by using the tonal preference analysis along with an evaluation of message consistency over time and condition.

Message Tonal Preference Data

Time Segment t₁ Data for Tonal Preference

Time segment t₁ covered the period from January 1, 1994 to March 31, 1994. There were 37 Zapatista documents reviewed within this time segment—1 declaration, and 36 communiqués. Table 8 below lists the Zapatista documents reviewed by their index code (index year., month, date, calendar year, number of document for that date, and document designation code), document numerical count, document content theme, the machine quantified occurrence of the C1 and C3 descriptors, and the ratio of C1/C3.

Table 8
t1 Document Ratio of C1/C3

docCode	No.	C1	C3	Ratio
1994				
94-01.01.94.1S/C/D	1	24	5	4.80
94-01.06.94.1E/C	2	37	12	3.08
94-01.11.94.1E/C	3	10	11	0.91
94-01.12.94.1E/C	4	7	5	1.40
94-01.12.94.2E/C	5	4	6	0.67
94-01.13.94.1E/C	6	6	3	2.00
94-01.13.94.2E/C	7	4	2	2.00
94-01.17.94.1E/C	8	4	4	1.00
94-01.18.94.1E/C	9	7	3	2.33
94-01.20.94.1E/C	10	1	10	0.10
94-01.20.94.2E/C	11	0	1	0.00
94-01.20.94.3E/C	12	1	7	0.14
94-01.20.94.4E/C	13	7	15	0.47
94-01.20.94.5E/C	14	8	14	0.57
94-01.29.94.1E/C	15	2	5	0.40
94-01.31.94.1E/C	16	10	16	0.63
94-01.31.94.2E/C	17	2	10	0.20
94-01.31.94.3E/C	18	4	3	1.33
January, Q1,'94	18	138	132	1.05
94-02.01.94.1E/C	1	3	2	1.50
94-02.13.94.1E/C	2	1	7	0.14
94-02.14.94.1E/C	3	10	0	10.00
94-02.15.94.1E/C	4	1	8	0.13
94-02.15.94.2E/C	5	2	2	1.00
94-02.16.94.1E/C	6	2	5	0.40
94-02.16.94.2E/C	7	4	5	0.80
94-02.16.94.3E/C	8	4	2	2.00
94-02.17.94.1E/C	9	1	0	1.00
94-02.20.94.1E/C	10	3	5	0.60
94-02.26.94.1E/C	11	3	5	0.60
February, Q1,'94	11	34	41	0.83
94-03.01.94.1E/C	1	11	21	0.52
94-03.01.94.2E/C	2	0	0	n/a
94-03.01.94.3E/C	3	2	6	0.33
94-03.15.94.1E/C	4	9	2	4.50
94-03.15.94.2E/C	5	1	7	0.14
94-03.15.94.4E/C	6	1	1	1.00
94-03.24.94.1E/C	7	12	11	1.09
94-03.24.94.2E/C	8	5	1	5.00
March, Q1,'94	8	41	49	0.84
Time segment t1 totals	37	213	222	0.96

The overall score for C1 for time segment t_1 was 213, and the overall score for C3 for time segment t_1 was 222. The ratio of C1/C3 descriptors in the Zapatista documents for time segment t_1 was 0.97.

The overall ratio for time segment t_1 reflected an almost perfect ratio balance of 1 to 1 (0.97) between C1 and C3 descriptors. The balanced final ratio obscured, however, the period's pronounced swings between the call to arms (C1) and the appeals to civil society to help bring about a negotiated settlement to the conflict (C3). Ratios of C1/C3 descriptors ranged from 10 to 1 (94-02.14.94.1E/C) in favor of armed conflict (C1) to 10 to 1 (94-01.20.94.1E/C) in favor of a dialogue and a negotiated settlement (C3).

Looking at the months individually for the time segment, January was the only period in time segment t_1 which favored the use of force of arms with a ratio of 1.05 of C1/C3 descriptors. In February and March, 1994, the ratio was inclined toward a peaceful settlement of Zapatista demands with a ratio of C1/C3 descriptors of 0.83 in February, and 0.84 in March.

At the document level only 5 documents out of the 37 reviewed clearly called for force of arms as the means of change with ratios of C1/C3 of 3.0 or above. Two of the 5 were within the first days of the rebellion during a period of intense armed hostilities between the Zapatistas and the Mexican military.

Often there were decidedly different themes portrayed from one document to the next. Note the two documents of March 15, 1994. Document 94-03.15.1E/C showed a ratio of 4.50 and document 94-03.15.2E/C a ratio of 0.14. The first contained a predominance of

aggressive language, and the second, was almost totally directed toward a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Even within individual documents, C1 and C3 descriptors were often equally present. Documents with equal or almost equal C1 and C3 descriptors were 94-01.11.1E/C (10/11); 94-01.17.1E/C (4/4); 94-02.15.1E/C (2/2); 94-02.16.2E/C (4/5); and 94-03.24.1E/C (12/11).

Excerpts From Zapatista communiqués in Time Segment t₁.

The First Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle (94-01.06.94.1E/C) established the earliest indication of a Zapatista-style struggle. While containing the traditional “Declaration of War” against the Mexican Army, it also provided indications that the EZLN was not a revolutionary army in the same style of other guerrilla insurgency groups in Latin America.

First, the EZLN based their declaration of war on existing constitutional grounds—on the constitutional law of the Mexican nation:

Para evitarlo y como nuestra última esperanza, después de haber intentado todo por poner en práctica la legalidad basada en nuestra Carta Magna, recurrimos a ella, nuestra Constitución, para aplicar el Artículo 39 Constitucional que a la letra dice:

The Zapatistas cite Article 39 of the Mexican Constitution, and argue that they have the right to rise up when their rights are being denied. They declare that “[l]a soberanía nacional reside esencial y originariamente en el pueblo”—i.e., national sovereignty resides in the people, and, the peoples’ sovereignty provides “el inalienable derecho de alterar o modificar la forma de su gobierno”—the inalienable right to modify the government.

It is the EZLN's call for modification of the government (rather than for its overthrow) that is possibly most significant in this initial period. Their rebellion, grounded in the Mexican Constitution, is identified by the EZLN as a "political-military" action. The phrase itself suggests the possible option for a peaceful, negotiated solution to the Zapatistas' grievances. More emphatically, in this communiqué, the EZLN declares the end of the passive Indian in Chiapas. They declare that their principal objective in declaring war on the government is:

to let all the people of Mexico and the world know the miserable conditions that millions of Mexicans, especially we the indigenous people, live in. With these actions that we began we also let people know our decision to fight for our elementary rights by the only way that the government authorities will allow: armed struggle.

The Zapatistas during this initial phase also make clear the specific target of their armed uprising. Their struggle is not for the overthrow of the Mexican Constitution and the structure of government, but for the replacement of sitting government which, they claim, denies democracy to all segments of Mexican society. As they say, the EZLN represent a hope for all of the country. The rebellion's goal is not political power, but rebellion in order to:

present the demand of liberty and political democracy, for which we call for the renunciation of the illegitimate government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari and the formation of a new government for a democratic transition, which would guarantee clean elections in all levels of the government. We repeat the life of our political and economical demands and around which we are trying to unite all of the people of Mexico and all independent organizations so that, by means of all of the different forms of struggle, a national revolutionary movement can begin where all of the forms of social

organization can have a place, and the betterment of Mexico can be set forth with honesty and patriotism.

Time Segment t₂ Data of Tonal Preference Data

Time segment t₂ covered the period from June 1, 1994 to August 31, 1994. There were 8 Zapatista documents reviewed within this time segment—1 declaration, and 7 communiqués. Table 9 below lists the Zapatista documents reviewed by their index code (index year., month, date, calendar year, number of document for that date, and document designation code), document numerical count, document content theme, the machine quantified occurrence of the C1 and C3 descriptors, and the ratio of C1/C3.

Table 9
t₂ Document Ratio of C1/C3

docCode	No.	C1	C3	Ratio
1994				
94-06.01.94.1E/C/D	1	32	47	0.68
94-06.03.94.1E/C	2	0	1	0.00
94-06.03.94.2E/C	3	0	6	0.00
94-06.10.94.1E/C	4	9	15	0.60
94-06.10.94.2E/C	5	18	48	0.38
June, '94	5	59	117	0.50
July, '94	0			
94-08.08.94.1S/C	1	33	41	0.80
94-08.15.94.1S/C	2	7	8	0.88
94-08.24.94.1S/C	3	6	17	0.35
August, '94	3	46	66	0.70
Time segment t ₂ totals	8	105	183	0.57

The overall score for C1 for time segment t_2 was 105, and the overall score for C3 for time segment t_2 was 183. The ratio of C1/C3 descriptors in the Zapatista documents for time segment t_2 was 0.57.

The overall ratio for time segment t_2 took a pronounced turn toward the C3 theme. The ratio of C1/C3 approached an 2 to 1 level of C3 descriptors in the Zapatista documents over C1 descriptors. There were also far fewer documents issued by the Zapatistas. Only 8 documents in t_2 compared to 37 in t_1 , with no official Zapatista communiqués or declarations issued for the month of July. While belligerent language existed in almost all the documents of this period, every document within the t_2 time segment exhibited a majority of C3 language.

June began with a major Declaration containing a large number of both C1 and C3 descriptors. While there was a majority of reconciliation language in document 94.06.01.94.1E/C/D (a score of 47), there was a significant level of belligerent language as well (a score of 32). By mid-June, however, the language was overwhelmingly C3. Document 94-06.10.94.2E/C, the last document issued by the Zapatistas for the month, showed a ratio of .38 in favor of C3 language.

In July there were no communiqués issued by the Zapatistas (due in part to the advent of the rainy season in the highland jungles of Chiapas which restricts movement in the area).

August repeated the pattern of June. August began with a slightly preference C3 document although with significant number of C1 descriptors present in the document—94-08.08.94.1S/C. By the last

communiqué of August, again the C3 language held sway. Document 94.08.24.94.1S/C showed a .35 ratio in favor of C3.

Excerpts From Zapatista communiqués in Time Segment t_2 .

Like time segment t_1 , time segment t_2 began with a Declaration from the Jungle (94-06.01.94.1E/C/D). Unlike the first declaration, however, which establishes the EZLN as a belligerent armed force, this declaration marked a clear road to the establishment of the EZLN as a viable political actor in Mexican politics. The language of the Declaration places the Zapatistas squarely within a national context. A setting were they are in common struggle for justice, liberty, democracy with all others deprived of these rights. After declaring that “[t]oday we say: We will not surrender!” the Zapatistas pay full recognition to all that struggle for the same rights in Mexican society as the rebels in Chiapas. The EZLN quote a famous passage from Mexico’s revolutionary past:

Those who bear swords aren’t the only ones who lose blood or who shine with the fleeting light of military glory. They aren’t the only ones who should have a voice in designating the leaders of the government of a people who want democracy; this right to choose belongs to every citizen who has fought in the press or in the courts. It belongs to every citizen who identifies with the ideals of the Revolution and who has fought against the despotism that has ignored our laws. Tyranny isn’t eliminated just by fighting on the battlefield; dictatorships and empires are also overthrown by launching cries of freedom and terrible threats against those who are executing the people. . . . Historical events have shown us that the destruction of tyranny and the overthrow of all bad government are the work of ideas together with the sword. It is therefore an absurdity, an aberration, an outrageous despotism to deny the people the right to elect their government. The people’s sovereignty is formed by all those people in society who are conscious of their

rights and who, be they civilians or armed, love freedom and justice and who work for the good of the country.

With this, the Zapatistas make clear that armed struggle, while in some cases justified and necessary, is not the only road to a true democratic Mexico. The Zapatistas also express the wish to place the political struggle in the hands of civil society. For the Zapatistas the civil society will be their savior. If not for the civil society's attention to the conflict between the EZLN and the Mexican Army, they argue, there would have been a massacre (meaning a massacre of the EZLN forces). But the Mexican Army was stopped by a more powerful institution in Mexican society:

a force superior to any political or military power imposed its will upon the parties involved in the conflict. Civil society assumed the duty of preserving our country. It showed its disapproval of the massacre....

Civil society imposed its will on the military forces of the state, but, according to the Declaration, it also "obligated us [the EZLN] to dialogue with the government." As the Zapatistas make clear in this Declaration "[t]here is no other path." The Declaration declares emphatically that if the other branches of Mexican government "permit themselves to be controlled by the Federal Executive...[i]f the legislature and the judges have no dignity, then others...will step forward." They hope it will.

In the Second Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle, the EZLN made clear they would provide the peaceful space necessary for negotiations to occur. The EZLN "order all of our regular and irregular forces...to obey the unilateral offensive cease-fire." The cease fire will continue "in order to permit civil society to organize, in whatever forms

they consider pertinent, toward the goal of achieving a transition to democracy in our country.”

The message at the beginning of this time segment is clear. There must be an attempt to transition to a full democracy in Mexico through peaceful means. The EZLN is willing to give up their arms only if civil society will assume their struggle for justice, liberty and democracy.

Time Segment t₃ Data of Tonal Preference Data

Time segment t₃ covered the period from January 1, 1995 to March 31, 1995. There were 18 Zapatista documents reviewed within this time segment—1 declaration, and 17 communiqués. Table 10 below lists the Zapatista documents reviewed by their index code (index year., month, date, calendar year, number of document for that date, and document designation code), document numerical count, document content theme, the machine quantified occurrence of the C1 and C3 descriptors, and the ratio of C1/C3.

Table 10
 t₃ Document Ratio of C1/C3

docCode	No.	C1	C3	Ratio
1995				
95-01.01.95.1S/C/D	1	29	42	0.69
95-01.01.95.1S/C	2	22	3	7.33
95-01.12.95.1S/C	3	2	4	0.50
95-01.14.95.1S/C	4	1	10	0.10
January '95	4	54	59	0.92
95-02.09.95.1S/C	1	14	8	1.75
95-02.09.95.2S/C	2	19	25	0.76
95-02.11.95.1S/C	3	6	1	6.00
95-02.12.95.1S/C	4	13	6	2.17
95-02.17.95.1S/C	5	10	21	0.48
95-02.20.95.1S/C	6	15	23	0.65
95-02.23.95.1S/C	7	2	10	0.20
95-02.24.95.1S/C	8	8	11	0.73
95-02.25.95.1S/C	9	4	2	2.00
95-02.27.95.1S/C	10	6	3	2.00
February '95	10	97	110	0.88
95-03.11.95.1S/C	1	2	15	0.13
95-03.12.95.1S/C	2	23	0	23.00
95-03.17.95.1S/C	3	46	13	3.54
95-03.24.95.1S/C	4	4	34	0.12
March '95	4	75	62	1.21
Time segment t3 total	18	226	231	0.98

The overall score for C1 for time segment t_3 was 226, and the overall score for C3 for time segment t_3 was 231. The ratio of C1/C3 descriptors in the Zapatista documents for time segment t_3 was 0.98.

The overall ratio for time segment t_3 repeated the pattern of t_1 . There was an almost perfect balance (.98) between C1 and C3 descriptors during the period. But again, like t_1 , there were significant swings in language contained in the communiqués. The ending balance belied the contradictions. Ratios ranged from 23 to 1 (95-03.12.95.1S/C) in favor of armed conflict (C1) to almost 10 to 1 (95-03.24.95.1S/C) in favor of a negotiated settlement (C3). The abrupt swing occurred within weeks.

Like t_1 , t_3 also displayed a month which demonstrated a slight preference for C1 language even though the period showed a slight advantage to C3 language. March ended with a ratio of 1.21 in favor of C1.

At the document level there were 7 documents favoring force of arms (C1) over negotiated settlement (C3). The 7 were scattered across the period with 1 in January (95-01.01.95.1S/C); 3 in February (95.02.09.95.1S/C, 95.02.11.95.1S/C, 95.02.12.95.1S/C, 95.02.27.95.1S/C); and 2 in March (95.03.12.95.1S/C, 95.03.17.95.1S/C). Like the Third Declaration, which begins time segment t_3 , many of the documents presented an ambivalence of language. C1 and C3 language were found to be in balance in at least 3 documents (95.01.01.95.1S/C/D, 95.02.09.95.2S/C, and 95.02.24.95.1S/C).

Excerpts From Zapatista communiqués in Time Segment t₃

In the Third Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle (95-01.01.95.1S/C/D), a declaration which marked the first year anniversary of the Zapatista rebellion, the EZLN recap their struggle, lament their role, and note their failures. They recognize in this document that their fight is to be a long one. Noting the failure to oust the PRI from its perch in the presidential palace in the elections of the previous August, the Third Declaration lamented that “[e]l proceso pre-electoral de agosto de 1994 trajo la esperanza, en amplios sectores del país, de que el tránsito a la democracia era posible por la vía electoral”—the pre-election process provided hope that a transition to democracy through the election process was possible, but, the hope was dashed with the actual election. “El 21 de agosto vino a terminar con las ilusiones de un cambio inmediato por la vía pacífica”—the August 21 elections brought to an end the illusions of a immediate peaceful road to change. The illusion of a peaceful road to change was destroyed with the normality of electoral fraud perpetrated by the PRI. As the Declaration notes, “el sistema de partido de Estado volvió a repetir el fraude de agosto imponiendo gobernadores, presidentes municipales y congresos locales”—the party-state system repeated the practice of fraud to place the PRI’s governors, municipal presidents and congressional representatives in power.

The Third Declaration was anything but a surrender, however. The Zapatistas declared once again that “nuestra lucha es nacional”—our struggle is national—and, that the Zapatistas would offer the country the only thing that they had to offer—their lives. “Los zapatistas estamos dispuestos a ofrendar lo único que tenemos, la vida, para exigir

democracia, libertad y justicia para todos los mexicanos”—The Zapatistas are willing to offer the only thing we have, life, in order to demand democracy, liberty and justice for all Mexicans.

The Zapatistas, in the third declaration, recognized the lack of progress achieved by civil society since the Second Declaration. They suggest that a place must be found for the Zapatistas in the political struggle. That place, however, is not a stand alone place, but a partnership. The equation, as they see it, is comprised of Cuahtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano plus the Convención Nacional Democrática (created in response to a call by the EZLN to civil society in August of 1994) plus the EZLN:

Este Movimiento para la Liberación Nacional luchará de común acuerdo, por todos los medios y en todos los niveles, por la instauración de un gobierno de transición, un nuevo constituyente, una nueva carta magna y la destrucción del sistema de partido de Estado. Llamamos a la Convención Nacional Democrática y al ciudadano Cuahtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano a encabezar este Movimiento para la Liberación Nacional, como frente amplio de oposición.

The Zapatistas were seeking a place for themselves in the political struggle, again ruling out the viability of forceful change. Rather than leaving the political process entirely up to civil society, however, they were now saying that they wanted a place at the political table.

Time Segment t₄ Data of Tonal Preference Data

Time segment t₄ covered the period from June 1, 1995 to August 31, 1995. There were 12 Zapatista documents reviewed within this time segment—all communiqués. Table 11 below lists the Zapatista documents reviewed by their index code (index year, month, date,

calendar year, number of document for that date, and document designation code), document numerical count, document content theme, the machine quantified occurrence of the C1 and C3 descriptors, and the ratio of C1/C3.

Table 11
t₄ Document Ratio of C1/C3

docCode	No.	C1	C3	Ratio
Time segment t ₄				
95-06.07.95.1S/C	1	6	25	0.24
95-06.08.95.1S/C	2	20	57	0.35
95-06.15.95.1S/C	3	1	9	0.11
95-06.30.95.1S/C	4	3	16	0.19
June, '95	4	30	107	0.28
95-07.14.95.1S/C	1	3	6	0.50
95-07.15.95.1S/C	2	3	4	0.75
95-07.18.95.1S/C	3	1	3	0.33
95-07.24.95.1S/C	4	8	34	0.24
July, '95	4	15	47	0.32
95-08.25.95.1S/C	1	17	31	0.55
95-08.25.95.2S/C	2	14	15	0.93
95-08.27.95.1S/C	3	6	14	0.43
95-08.28.95.1S/C	4	10	7	1.43
August, '95	4	47	67	0.70
Time segment t ₄ totals	12	92	221	0.42

The overall score for C1 for time segment t₄ was 92, and the overall score for C3 for time segment t₄ was 221. The ratio of C1/C3 descriptors in the Zapatista documents for time segment t₄ was 0.42.

Similar to time segment t₂ a year earlier, time segment t₄ displayed a strong ratio advantage for the C3 theme. The ratio of C1/C3 was better than a 2 to 1 level in favor of C3 language. This time segment produced fewer documents than time segment t₃ which began 1995; only 12

documents in t_4 compared to 18 in t_3 . The similarities between t_2 and t_4 extended to the fall off in the amount of C1 language. While belligerent language existed in almost all the documents of this period, every document within the t_4 time segment exhibited a majority of C3 language with the exception of the final document— 95-08.28.95.1S/C.

Of the three months in which documents were reviewed, June showed the highest ratio of C3 slanted documents with a 0.28 score. Unlike the July 1994 t_2 , the earlier month in which there were no communiqués, there were four communiqués issued by the Zapatistas in July 1995. Again, like June, the ratio was strongly in favor of C3 language—0.32. August had the only document in the time segment which favored C1 language and that raised the overall ratio for the month slightly to 0.70; a score still strongly slanted toward C3 language.

Excepts From Zapatista communiqués in Time Segment t_4 .

The most significant document of this period was issued by the EZLN on June 8, 1995. In this communiqué the Zapatistas call for a “Gran Consulta” at the national level. The Zapatistas once again recognize civil society’s role in “primero para detener la guerra”—first stopping the war—, and “después para propiciar el diálogo” —and then making possible negotiation. The Zapatistas again recognize the “poder y voz a esa fuerza social, civil y pacífica”—the will and voice of this social, civil and peaceful force.

It is the rational, persuasive appeal to a national civil society, acting through a national referendum, that the Zapatistas are seeking. They hope the voice of civil society again will serve to blunt the force of the Mexican government which has nullified the voice of the people in

the 1994 election. Likewise, the EZLN hopes that a referendum process will also serve to prod Mexican civil society into taking a leadership role for democratic change. The Zapatistas propose five questions for the referendum. Besides seeking to know whether the civil society thinks their demands are just, the Zapatistas ask “¿Debe el EZLN convertirse en una fuerza política independiente y nueva?”—Should the EZLN convert to a new political force? The Zapatistas, by seeking the direct input of the Mexican people, declare their willingness to *ask, listen, and obey*. The slogan developed from this idea was “leading by obeying.” The EZLN communiqué suggested repeated the notion that the Zapatistas were interested in constructing a new political forces in Mexico. It was a force, however, that was open to being constructed along lines suggested by the people as it developed. The Zapatistas admitted, in calling for the referendum, that they did not possess all the answers to Mexico’s ills, but, they refused to concede defeat and retire from the struggle for solutions. But, now, via direct input from civil society, their struggle would continue to move toward the direction of civil society, and with the Zapatistas looking to formally play politics if that was what civil society thought they should do.

Composite of t₁-t₄ of Tonal Preference Data

The Composite of t₁ through t₄ covered the entire research period from January 1, 1994 to August 31, 1995. There were 57 Zapatista documents falling within this time segment—3 declarations, and 54 communiqués. Table 12 below lists the quantitative occurrence of the C1 and C3 descriptors, and the ratio for each time segment.

Table 12
Time Segment Composite

Composite	No.	C1	C3	Ratio
Time segment t1 total	37	213	222	0.97
Time segment t2 total	8	105	183	0.57
Time segment t3 total	11	226	231	0.98
Time segment t4 total	12	92	221	0.42
Totals	57	636	857	0.74

The overall score for C1 descriptors over all time segments was 636 and for C3 descriptors the score was 857. The overall ratio of C1/C3 descriptors over all time segments was 0.74. The ratios ranged from 0.98 in t₃ to 0.42 in t₄.

Research Summary for Tonal Preference

There was 1 data manipulation in this section:

1) Determination of the ratio of C1/C3 message preference of all Zapatista official Declarations and communiqués for time periods t₁, t₂, t₃, and t₄.

Summary of Tonal Preference Data

Of the 57 documents (declarations and communiqués) analyzed for all time segments a total of 1493 descriptors were identified. Of the total 636 were C1 descriptors, and 857 were C3 descriptors. The overall ratio of C1/C3 descriptors for all time segments was 0.74. Time segment t₃ came closest to a perfect balance between descriptors (0.98) followed closely by time segment t₁ (0.97). The lowest ratio of C1/C3 descriptors was in time segment t₄ (0.42) followed closely by time segment t₂ (0.57).

The data suggested a similar pattern across time segments. Time

segments t_1 (0.97) and t_3 (.098) which represented the first 3 months of 1994 and 1995 respectively, were almost identical in the ratio of C1/C3 descriptors. Likewise, time segments t_2 (0.57) and t_4 (0.42), portrayed a close similarity, both representing the months of June through August in 1994 and 1995 respectively.

In all time segments C3 language in Zapatista documents was at a higher ratio than C1 language. The ratio of C1/C3 language in t_1 and t_3 approached a perfect balance of 1 to 1 suggesting a mixed message. In t_2 and in t_4 the ratio greatly favored C3 language or the language calling for dialogue to resolve the Zapatista demands. Overall, language which proposed and promoted a peaceful negotiated solution to Zapatista demands was found to be the overall preference for the sampled Zapatista documents with a ratio of C1/C3 at 0.74.

Strategic Intent

The second part of the research question was intended to establish Zapatistas strategic intent. The above analysis of message preference indicated that the language contained in the Zapatistas documents demonstrated a preference for negotiated settlement over a military solution to the Zapatistas stated demands. As reviewed above, C3 tonal preference enjoyed a constant advantage over C1 tonal preference in the communiqués of the Zapatistas. As a result of this finding, for the purposes of this study, negotiated settlement was assumed to be the Zapatistas strategy subject to verification by research.

In *Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary* strategy is defined as "...a plan, method, or series of maneuvers or stratagems for obtaining a specific goal or result (Webster 1994, p. 1404)." Based on this


definition, the question is whether “a plan, method, or series of maneuvers...for obtaining a specific goal or result.” could be inferred from the cumulative statements of the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN)?

Strategy and tactics were considered distinct for the purposes of this study. Strategy was viewed as an overall approach to achieving a goal—i.e., the satisfaction of Zapatista grievances and demands through negotiated settlement—while tactics represented the day-to-day statements which served both the strategic intent of the Zapatistas and, in turn, their stated goal. This study focused on strategy.

There were two approaches which could have been used to evaluate Zapatista strategic intent: 1) the Zapatista statements and wording of documents, and 2) the actions of the rebels. Actions fall into two broad categories. The first is primarily military, and concerns the question of Zapatista survival: i.e., Did the Zapatistas survive and, more importantly, deliberately avoid a military solution to their rebellion? The second concerns all other actions of the Zapatistas. For example: Were the Zapatistas pro-active in shaping the course of events which followed their rebellion?, and, Did these Zapatistas actions indicate their favoring a negotiated settlement vs. a military solution to their grievances?

The other inquiry category, i.e., the Zapatistas' words and statements, revolves around the question of message consistency: Were the statements of the Zapatistas consistent over time and condition and did those messages portray a strategic intent for the resolution of their demands? Figure 9 presents a graphic representation of strategy's relationship to the overall scheme for goal attainment.

Figure 9
Role of Strategy



For the purposes of this study it was hypothesized that negotiated settlement was the Zapatistas strategy for goal attainment intentionally used by the rebels—an assumption arguably supported by the findings from the Zapatista message preference data analysis.

Message Strategic Content Data

If the Zapatistas' overall strategy was intended to attain their demands through negotiated settlement brought about by a combination of the avoidance of military engagement and the solicitation of support from the Mexican society, their documents should have reflected not only a preponderance of the C3 type messages, but a consistency in the

message should be found under a variety of conditions over the duration of the research period. The following section presents data related to the consistency of the Zapatista messages over time and condition.

The consistency over time variable was tested with a comparison of the quantity of documents in each of the time segments (t_1 - t_4) which exhibited a preference for C1 or C3 language. This was a numerical count and percentage determination, and was a simple extension of the message preference ratios presented in the previous section.

The consistency over conditions variables was tested by a comparison of document preference against the contemporary events surrounding the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas at the time of publication for each document. Contemporary events were assumed to be a significant influencing variable of the statements of the Zapatistas. The condition categories were discussed in Chapter III.

Time Segment t_1 C1/C3 Numerical Preference over Time & Condition

In time segment t_1 , the Zapatista documents portrayed a numerical preference for C3 language in 19 out of 37 documents (51.35 percent) of their communiqués. During the same period, C1 language accounted for 14 of the 37 documents (37.83 percent). Documents in which the language was balanced accounted for 4 of the 37 documents (10.81 percent) of all t_1 communiqués.

Table 13 presents a numerical count of C1 and C3 weighted documents for time segment t_1 , with the corresponding condition category assigned to each document. The document theme for each Zapatista communiqué was included.

Table 13
 t₁ Document Numerical Count & Condition Comparison

docCode	No.	C1	C3	Cond.	Document theme
Time segment t1					
94-01.01.94.1S/C/D	1	√		I	EZLN War Declaration
94-01.06.94.1E/C	2	√		I	EZLN Justification
94-01.11.94.1E/C	3		√	I	PFCRN/Willingness to dialogue
94-01.12.94.1E/C	4	√		I	EZLN Cease-Fire conditions
94-01.12.94.2E/C	5		√	II	Conditions cont.
94-01.13.94.1E/C	6	√		II	Gov't cease-fire violations cited
94-01.13.94.2E/C	7	√		I	Castellanos Dominquez capture
94-01.18.94.1E/C	9	√		II	"Who should ask for forgiveness?"
94-01.20.94.1E/C	10		√	III	Emphasis on dialogue
94-01.20.94.2E/C	11		√	III	Guns to dialogue
94-01.20.94.3E/C	12		√	III	Our only alternative; Appeal to Civil Society
94-01.20.94.4E/C	13		√	III	We will not take the country hostage
94-01.20.94.5E/C	14		√	II	Dialogue imminent
94-01.29.94.1E/C	15		√	III	EZLN is a political and military reality
94-01.31.94.1E/C	16		√	III	Marcos sarcasm
94-01.31.94.2E/C	17		√	III	Dialogue prologue maneuvers
94-01.31.94.3E/C	18	√		III	NGOs "Safety Belt"
January, Q1,'94	18	7	10		
94-02.01.94.1E/C	1	√		IV	Formal dialogue begins
94-02.13.94.1E/C	2		√	IV	PP delegates invited
94-02.14.94.1E/C	3	√		IV	War words open deaf ears
94-02.15.94.1E/C	4		√	IV	Other invitations
94-02.16.94.1E/C	6		√	IV	Marcos sarcasm
94-02.16.94.2E/C	7		√	IV	Grievance list
94-02.16.94.3E/C	8	√		IV	Rifles silent so words can be heard
94-02.17.94.1E/C	9	√		IV	Stop to evictions
94-02.20.94.1E/C	10		√	IV	Salute to NGOs
94-02.26.94.1E/C	11		√	IV	Democracy as org. strategy for EZLN
February, Q1,'94	11	4	6		

94-03.01.94.1E/C	1		√	IV	Demands presented
94-03.01.94.3E/C	3		√	IV	Report on dialogue
94-03.15.94.1E/C	4	√		IV	Verbal attack on gov't
94-03.15.94.2E/C	5		√	IV	Negotiations are not treaties
94-03.24.94.1E/C	7	√		II	Red Alert/Colosio assassination
94-03.24.94.2E/C	8	√		II	Red alert cont.
March, Q1,'94	8	3	3		
Time segment t1 total	37	14	19		

The conditions prevailing during time segment t_1 progressed from category I through category IV in almost a linear fashion. At the very end of the time segment tense conditions—category II—returned as indicated by the issuance of a “Red Alert” by the Zapatistas. Condition category I began the period and lasted until nearly the middle of January. This date marked the beginning of the rebellion and open military conflict prevailed for the first 2 weeks. The final 2 weeks of January witnessed a quick transition from a tense and unstable category II, through a determination of dialogue conditions by both parties, to a category III.

February began with the opening of dialogue between officials of the Mexican government and the Zapatistas. This dialogue prevailed until the final days of the period in March. A category II condition returned the last week of March 1994, due to the assassination of the PRI presidential candidate (Donaldo Colosio) and the issuance by the Zapatistas of a Red Alert in anticipation of blame for the assassination being placed on the Zapatistas by the government and its agents. Table 14 presents a summary of table 13 with the numerical count of C1 and C3 weighted documents displayed by condition category.

Table 14
 t_1 C1/C3 Document Cumulative Numerical Count by Condition Category

C1 message preference count by condition category

No. of C1 messages by	Condition category				Total
	I	II	III	IV	
t_1	4	4	1	5	14

C3 message preference count by condition category

No. of C3 messages by	Condition category				Total
	I	II	III	IV	
t_1	1	2	7	9	19

Time Segment t₂ Numerical Preference over Time & Condition

In time segment t₂, the Zapatista documents portrayed a numerical preference for C3 language in all 8 documents (100 percent). Table 15 presents a numerical count of C1 and C3 weighted documents for time segment t₂, with the corresponding condition category assigned to each document. The document theme for each Zapatista communiqué was included.

Table 15
t₂ Document Numerical Count with Condition Comparison

docCode	No.	C1	C3	Cond.	Document theme
Time segment t ₂					
94-06.01.94.1E/C/D	1		√	IV	Second Declaration
94-06.03.94.1E/C	2		√	IV	Denial of PROCUP affiliation
94-06.03.94.2E/C	3		√	IV	Report on consultation
94-06.10.94.1E/C	4		√	IV	Peace accords rejected
94-06.10.94.2E/C	5		√	IV	Point by point rejection of accords
June, '94	5	0	5		
July, '94	0				n/a
94-08.08.94.1S/C	1		√	IV	Marcos' address at CND
94-08.15.94.1S/C	2		√	IV	EZLN pre-election stand down
94-08.24.94.1S/C	3		√	IV	EZLN charges vote fraud
August, '94	3	0	3		
Time segment t ₂ total	8	0	8		

The conditions prevailing during time segment t_2 were consistently those of category IV. This period witnessed an extended consultation among Indigenous communities as to whether to accept the Mexican government's peace offers, accords which these communities and the Zapatistas finally rejected. Time segment t_2 also included the convening of the National Democratic Convention (CND by Spanish acronym) at Aguascalientes in Chiapas. This CND, called and administered by the Zapatistas, was portrayed in communiqués as a showcase of the rebels' desire to involve a broad segment of the Mexican civil society in their struggle. Table 16 presents a summary of table 15 with the numerical count of C1 and C3 weighted documents displayed by condition category.

Table 16
 t_2 C1/C3 Document Cumulative Numerical Count with Condition Category

<u>C1 Message Preference and Condition Comparison</u>					
No. of C1 messages	Condition category				Total
	I	II	III	IV	
t_2	0	0	0	0	0

<u>C3 Message Preference and Condition Comparison</u>					
No. of C3 messages	Condition category				Total
	I	II	III	IV	
t_2	0	0	0	8	8

Time Segment t₃ Numerical Preference over Time & Condition

In time segment t₃, the Zapatista documents displayed a numerical preference for C3 language in 10 of the 18 (55.56 percent) documents for the period. During the same period, C1 language accounted for 8 of the 18 (44.44 percent). There were no documents in which the language was balanced. Table 17 presents a numerical count of C1 and C3 weighted documents for time segment t₃, with the corresponding condition category assigned to each document. The document theme for each Zapatista communiqué was included.

Table 17
t₃ Document Numerical Count with Condition Comparison

docCode	No.	C1	C3	Cond.	Document theme
Time segment t ₃					
95-01.01.95.1S/C/D	1		√	III	Third Declaration/Call for National Movement
95-01.01.95.1S/C	2	√		III	First year salute to EZLN combatants
95-01.12.95.1S/C	3		√	III	New round of meetings with Govt. coming soon/Cease-fire declared
95-01.14.95.1S/C	4		√	IV	First meeting with Govt.
January '95	4	1	3		
95-02.09.95.1S/C	1	√		I	Reaction to Mexican military assault
95-02.09.95.2S/C	2		√	I	Mx military assault unfounded
95-02.11.95.1S/C	3	√		I	Call for Civil Society to help end "Dirty War"
95-02.12.95.1S/C	4	√		I	Military attack cont./"We want to dialogue"
95-02.17.95.1S/C	5		√	I	EZLN withdrawal to mountains/"We want political solution"
95-02.20.95.1S/C	6		√	I	Surviving the assault/Beber los orines/EZLN is unique among guerrillas
95-02.23.95.1S/C	7		√	I	Military attacks on Indigenous communities
95-02.24.95.1S/C	8		√	I	Who's in charge of govt.?
95-02.25.95.1S/C	9	√		I	Armies assault on communities continues
95-02.27.95.1S/C	10	√		I	Our only pay/no deserters
February '95	10	5	5		
95-03.11.95.1S/C	1		√	II	Law for dialogue
95-03.12.95.1S/C	2	√		II	The forgotten ones
95-03.17.95.1S/C	3	√		II	The country is ours
95-03.24.95.1S/C	4		√	III	Hope for a new dialogue
March '95	4	2	2		
Time segment t ₃ total	18	8	10		

The conditions prevailing during time segment t_3 were erratic. The time segment began with stable conditions with the Zapatistas making a call for a National Movement to support their demands to reform the Mexican political environment. Condition category III existed through the first two week of January 1995, during which a formal meeting between the Zapatistas and the Mexican government was held changing the situation to a condition category IV. Category IV, however, quickly reverted to condition category I on February 9, 1995, after a surprise military attack was launched by the Mexican military against the command of the Zapatistas. Conditions of category I and II prevailed for almost the entire remainder of the time segment. At the end of the period the conditions returned to condition category III with a statement by the Zapatistas that a new dialogue would soon begin and the Mexican government ostensibly abandoning its effort to militarily defeat the Zapatistas. Table 18 presents a summary of Table 17 with the numerical count of C1 and C3 weighted documents displayed by condition category.

Table 18
 t_3 C1/C3 Document Cumulative Numerical Count with Condition Category

<u>C1 Message Preference and Condition Comparison</u>					
No. of C1 messages	Condition category				Total
	I	II	III	IV	
t_3	5	2	1	0	8

<u>C3 Message Preference and Condition Comparison</u>					
No. of C3 messages	Condition category				Total
	I	II	III	IV	
t_3	5	1	3	1	10

Time Segment t_4 Numerical Preference over Time & Condition

In time segment t_4 , the Zapatista documents portrayed a numerical preference for C3 language in 11 of the 12 documents (92 percent) of the period. During the same period, C1 language accounted for only 1 of the 12 documents (08 percent). Table 19 presents a numerical count of C1 and C3 weighted documents for time segment t_4 , with the corresponding condition category assigned to each document. The document theme for each Zapatista communiqué was included.

Table 19
t₄ Document Numerical Count with Condition Comparison

docCode	No.	C1	C3	Cond.	Document theme
Time segment t ₄					
95-06.07.95.1S/C	1		√	IV	Negotiation for distension
95-06.08.95.1S/C	2		√	IV	National plebiscite call
95-06.15.95.1S/C	3		√	IV	Govt prisoner release
95-06.30.95.1S/C	4		√	IV	List of govt infractions
June, '95	4	0	4		
95-07.14.95.1S/C	1		√	IV	Beware of false Zapatistas
95-07.15.95.1S/C	2		√	IV	No EZLN connection with OCSS
95-07.18.95.1S/C	3		√	IV	Report on Consulta International
95-07.24.95.1S/C	4		√	IV	4th Mtg. at San Andrés report
July, '95	4	0	4		
95-08.25.95.1S/C	1		√	IV	National plebiscite completed
95-08.25.95.2S/C	2		√	IV	The word will win
95-08.27.95.1S/C	3		√	IV	The civic force
95-08.28.95.1S/C	4	√		IV	Neoliberalism: money against people
August, '95	4	1	3		
Time segment t ₄ totals	12	1	11		

The conditions prevailing during time segment t_4 were consistently those of category IV. Like the t_2 time segment, negotiations between the Mexican government and the Zapatistas continued throughout the period. Table 20 presents a summary of Table 19 with the numerical count of C1 and C3 weighted documents portrayed by condition category.

Table 20
 t_4 C1/C3 Document Cumulative Numerical Count by Condition Category

<u>C1 Message Preference and Condition Comparison</u>					
No. of C1 messages	Condition category				Total
	I	II	III	IV	
t_4	0	0	0	1	1

<u>C3 Message Preference and Condition Comparison</u>					
No. of C3 messages	Condition category				Total
	I	II	III	IV	
t_4	0	0	0	11	11

Table 21 presents a composite of all time segments for both a numerical count of C1/C3 preferenced Zapatista documents, and their percentages in each of the four time segments.

Table 21
 t_1 - t_4 Composite of Document Numerical & Percentage Count of C1 & C3 Preferenced Documents

<u>Composite</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>C1</u>	<u>C3</u>	<u>n/a</u>	<u>% C1</u>	<u>% C3</u>
Time segment t_1 total	37	14	19	4	39	51
Time segment t_2 total	08	00	08		0	100
Time segment t_3 total	18	08	10		44	56
Time segment t_4 total	12	01	11		8	92
Totals	75	23	48	4	22.75%	74.75%

Table 22 presents a comparison of the composite of all C1 message to the various condition categories.

Table 22
t₁-t₄ Composite of C1 Messages to Conditions

No. of C1 messages	Condition category				Total
	I	II	III	IV	
t1	4	4	1	5	14
t2	0	0	0	0	0
t3	5	2	1	0	8
t4	0	0	0	1	1
Total	9	6	2	6	23
	39%	26%	09%	26%	

Table 23 presents a comparison of the composite of all C3 message to the various condition categories.

Table 23
t₁-t₄ Composite of C3 Messages to Conditions

No. of C3 messages	Condition category				Total
	I	II	III	IV	
t1	1	2	7	9	19
t2	0	0	0	8	8
t3	5	1	3	1	10
t4	0	0	0	11	11
Total	6	3	10	29	48
	13%	06%	21%	61%	

Total above 100 percent due to rounding.

Subjective Evaluation and Verification of Document C1/C3 Language Preference

In addition to the machine coding and analysis of C1/C3 preferences in all selected time segments of Zapatista documents, each document was read and subjectively evaluated for overall message

preference of the document.

The reading and subjective evaluation was intended to draw attention to those documents in which there existed an obvious incongruity between the machine coded ratio and a subjective reading. The coding scheme for the subjective evaluation was reviewed in Chapter III. Table 24 presents the comparison of the machine analysis of C1/C3 ratios with the subjective evaluation of each document in time segment t_1 .

Table 24
 t₁ Document Ratio of C1/C3 Compared with Subjective Evaluation

docCode	No.	C1	C3	Ratio	Doc. Evaluation	Agree
1994						
94-01.01.94.1S/C/D	1	24	5	4.80	-1.	√
94-01.06.94.1E/C	2	37	12	3.08	-1.	√
94-01.11.94.1E/C	3	10	11	0.91	0	√
94-01.12.94.1E/C	4	7	5	1.40	-.5	√
94-01.12.94.2E/C	5	4	6	0.67	.5	√
94-01.13.94.1E/C	6	6	3	2.00	-1	√
94-01.13.94.2E/C	7	4	2	2.00	-1	√
94-01.18.94.1E/C	8	7	3	2.33	-1	√
94-01.20.94.1E/C	9	1	10	0.10	.5	√
94-01.20.94.2E/C	10	0	1	0.50	0	√
94-01.20.94.3E/C	11	1	7	0.14	.5	√
94-01.20.94.4E/C	12	7	15	0.47	.5	√
94-01.20.94.5E/C	13	8	14	0.57	-.5	-
94-01.29.94.1E/C	14	2	5	0.40	.5	√
94-01.31.94.1E/C	15	10	16	0.63	.5	√
94-01.31.94.2E/C	16	2	10	0.20	-.5	-
94-01.31.94.3E/C	17	4	3	1.33	.5	-
January, Q1,'94	17	134	128	1.05		
94-02.01.94.1E/C	1	3	2	1.50	0	√
94-02.13.94.1E/C	2	1	7	0.14	1	√
94-02.14.94.1E/C	3	10	0	10.00	-.5	√
94-02.15.94.1E/C	4	1	8	0.13	1	√
94-02.16.94.1E/C	5	2	5	0.40	0	√
94-02.16.94.2E/C	6	4	5	0.80	0	√
94-02.16.94.3E/C	7	4	2	2.00	-.5	√
94-02.17.94.1E/C	8	1	0		0	√
94-02.20.94.1E/C	9	3	5	0.60	.5	√
94-02.26.94.1E/C	10	3	5	0.60	.5	√
February, Q1,'94	10	32	37	0.86		
94-03.01.94.1E/C	1	11	21	0.52	.5	√
94-03.01.94.3E/C	2	2	6	0.33	1	√
94-03.15.94.1E/C	3	9	2	4.50	-1	√
94-03.15.94.2E/C	4	1	7	0.14	0	√
94-03.24.94.1E/C	5	12	11	1.09	-.5	√
94-03.24.94.2E/C	6	5	1	5.00	-1	√
March, Q1,'94	6	40	48	0.83		
Time segment t1 totals	33	206	213	0.97		30

There were 3 documents of the 33 which did not exhibit agreement between the machine coding of C1/C3 preference and the subjective evaluation of the message preference. Two of the three (94-01.20.94.5E/C and 94-01.31.94.2E/C) carried a C3 ratio preference but were subjectively evaluated as moderately C1 (-.5) preference. The third document (94-01.31.94.3E/C) carried a machine coded C1 ratio preference but was subjectively evaluated as moderately C3 (.5). Table 25 presents the comparison of the machine analysis of C1/C3 ratios with the subjective evaluation of each document in time segment t_2 .

Table 25
 t_2 Document Ratio of C1/C3 Compared with Subjective Evaluation

docCode	No.	C1	C3	Ratio	Doc. Evaluation	Agree
1994						
94-06.01.94.1E/C/D	1	32	47	0.68	.5	√
94-06.03.94.1E/C	2	0	1	00	0	√
94-06.03.94.2E/C	3	0	6	00	.5	√
94-06.10.94.1E/C	4	9	15	0.60	.5	√
94-06.10.94.2E/C	5	18	48	0.38	.5	√
June, '94	5	59	117	0.50		
July, '94	0					
94-08.08.94.1S/C	1	33	41	0.80	.5	√
94-08.15.94.1S/C	2	7	8	0.88	-.5	-
94-08.24.94.1S/C	3	6	17	0.35	-1	-
August, '94	3	46	66	0.70		
Time segment t_2 totals	8	105	183	0.57		6

There were 2 documents of the 8 which did not exhibit agreement between the machine coding of C1/C3 preference and the subjective evaluation of the message preference. The first document (94-

08.15.94.1S/C) carried a C3 ratio preference but were subjectively evaluated as moderately C1 (-.5) preference. The second document (94-08.24.94.1S/C) carried a machine coded C3 ratio preference but was subjectively evaluated as a strong C1 (-1). Table 26 presents the comparison of the machine analysis of C1/C3 ratios with the subjective evaluation of each document in time segment t₃.

Table 26
t₃ Document Ratio of C1/C3 Compared with Subjective Evaluation

docCode	No.	C1	C3	Ratio	Doc Evaluation	Agree
1995						
95-01.01.95.1S/C/D	1	29	42	0.69	1	√
95-01.01.95.1S/C	2	22	3	7.33	- 1	√
95-01.12.95.1S/C	3	2	4	0.50	.5	√
95-01.14.95.1S/C	4	1	10	0.10	.5	√
January '95	4	54	59	0.92		
95-02.09.95.1S/C	1	14	8	1.75	- 1	√
95-02.09.95.2S/C	2	19	25	0.76	0	√
95-02.11.95.1S/C	3	6	1	6.00	- 1	√
95-02.12.95.1S/C	4	13	6	2.17	-.5	√
95-02.17.95.1S/C	5	10	21	0.48	.5	√
95-02.20.95.1S/C	6	15	23	0.65	-.5	-
95-02.23.95.1S/C	7	2	10	0.20	.5	√
95-02.24.95.1S/C	8	8	11	0.73	.5	√
95-02.25.95.1S/C	9	4	2	2.00	- 1	√
95-02.27.95.1S/C	10	6	3	2.00	-.5	√
February '95	10	97	110	0.88		
95-03.11.95.1S/C	1	2	15	0.13	1	√
95-03.12.95.1S/C	2	23	0	23.00	- 1	√
95-03.17.95.1S/C	3	46	13	3.54	-.5	√
95-03.24.95.1S/C	4	4	34	0.12	1	√
March '95	4	75	62	1.21		
Time segment t3 totals	18	226	231	0.98		17

There was 1 document of the 18 which did not exhibit agreement between the machine coding of C1/C3 preference and the subjective evaluation of the message preference. The document (95-02.20.95.1S/C) carried a C3 ratio preference but was subjectively evaluated as moderately C1 (-.5) preference. Table 27 presents the comparison of the machine analysis of C1/C3 ratios with the subjective evaluation of each document in time segment t₄.

Table 27
t₄ Document Ratio of C1/C3 Compared with Subjective Evaluation

docCode	No.	C1	C3	Ratio	Doc Evaluation	Agree
Time segment t ₄						
95-06.07.95.1S/C	1	6	25	0.24	1	√
95-06.08.95.1S/C	2	20	57	0.35	1	√
95-06.15.95.1S/C	3	1	9	0.11	1	√
95-06.30.95.1S/C	4	3	16	0.19	0	√
June, '95	4	30	107	0.28		
95-07.14.95.1S/C	1	3	6	0.50	.5	√
95-07.15.95.1S/C	2	3	4	0.75	0	√
95-07.18.95.1S/C	3	1	3	0.33	1	√
95-07.24.95.1S/C	4	8	34	0.24	.5	√
July, '95	4	15	47	0.32		
95-08.25.95.1S/C	1	17	31	0.55	.5	√
95-08.25.95.2S/C	2	14	15	0.93	1	√
95-08.27.95.1S/C	3	6	14	0.43	0	√
95-08.28.95.1S/C	4	10	7	1.43	-.5	√
August, '95	4	47	67	0.70		
Time segment t ₄ totals	12	92	221	0.42		12

All reviewed documents exhibited agreement between the machine coding of C1/C3 preference and the subjective evaluation of the message preference in time segment t_4 . Table 28 presents the composite comparison of the machine analysis of C1/C3 ratios with the subjective evaluation of each document in time segment t_1-t_4 .

Table 28
 t_1-t_4 Composite Document Ratio of C1/C3 Compared with Subjective Evaluation

Composite	No.	C1/C3 ratio	Agreement No.	Agreement %
			Totals	
Time segment t1 total	33	.97	30	91
Time segment t2 total	08	.57	6	75
Time segment t3 total	18	.98	17	94
Time segment t4 total	12	.42	12	100
Totals	71	.735	65	90

The overall agreement between the machine coded C1/C3 ratios and the subjective evaluation was high. Sixty-five of the 71 documents (90 percent) reviewed found agreement between the two evaluating approaches.

Research Summary for Strategic Intent

There were 2 data manipulations in the strategic intent section:

1) Message preference consistency over time & conditions: A determination of consistency over time of either the C1, or C3 message preference in percentage of documents for each category, and a classification of conditions surrounding the publication of each of the Zapatista documents, and a comparison of C1 with C3 messages over all

time segments and condition categories (Tables 8-12).

2) Comparison of machine coding analysis to a subjective reading of research documents: A subjective evaluation of all C1/C3 message preferences in the research documents, and a comparison of machine analysis of C1/C3 ratios with the subjective evaluation of each document over the four research time segments.

Summary of Strategic Intent Data

All Zapatista documents in the four sampled time segments of this study were analyzed for message consistency over time and over categorized factual conditions which existed at the time of publication. Over the four time segments (t_1 - t_4) there were a total of 71 documents classified (four mixed message documents were not classified). Of the total, C1 documents accounted for 23 documents (22.75 percent) and C3 documents accounted for 48 documents (74.75 percent).

C1 message documents were spread over the four condition categories: 9 in category I (39 percent); 6 in category II (26 percent); 2 in category III (9 percent); and, 6 in category IV (26 percent).

C3 messages, likewise, were found in all condition categories: 6 in category I (13 percent); 3 in category II (6 percent); 10 in category III (21 percent); and, 29 in category IV (61 percent).

All Zapatista documents in the four sampled time segments of this study were also compared against a subjective evaluation of each document. Subjective scoring of the documents for the four time segments agreed with the machine coded C1/C3 ratios in 65 of the 71 documents (90 percent). The highest agreement percentage fell in time segment t_4 (100 percent), and the lowest in time segment t_2 (75 percent).

Summary of Data Relative to Questions of the Study

The research question had two parts. The first asked, Did the messages issued by the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) during the period of January 1, 1994, through August 31, 1995, demonstrate a clear tonal preference in favor of either 1) an appeal to force of arms, or, 2) an appeal to civil society to support a negotiated settlement of Zapatista demands? The results of the Zapatista document analysis for C1/C3 preference showed an overall C3 preference. In a composite of all time segments, the C3 message preference ratios held advantage with an overall score of 0.74 (Table 21).

The data also demonstrated a pattern of message preference existed between certain time segments. An almost perfect ratio of 1 to 1, i.e., C1 to C3, existed in both time segments t_1 and t_3 which began the years of 1994 and 1995 respectively. In the time segments of June through August of 1994 (t_2) and June through August 1995 (t_4) a ratio strongly favoring the C3 message preference (better than 2 to 1) was indicated by the data .

The second part of the research question asked: Did the tonal preference of the Zapatista messages, if identified, suggest an overall Zapatista strategy for resolving their grievances against the Mexican government?

The results of the Zapatista document analysis for strategy intent through a analysis of consistency of message over time and condition indicated that there was a strong numerical/percentage advantage across all time segments of C3 messages. Of the 75 documents in the study, 23 were designated as C1 or 22.75 percent, and 48 were designated as C3 or 74.75 percent (Table 21). When all documents were compared against

subjectively derived condition categories, the document analysis indicated that both C1 and C3 message preferences were found in all condition categories. C1 messages prevailed in condition categories I and II at 65 percent (Table 22), and C3 messages prevailed in condition categories III and IV at 82 percent (Table 23).

When all documents were compared for C1/C3 machine coded ratios against a subjective reading analysis the results produced a very high agreement percentage of 90 percent (Table 28).

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

"HOY DECIMOS ¡BASTA!...Nosotros, hombres y mujeres íntegros y libres, estamos conscientes de que la guerra que declaramos es una medida última pero justa. Los dictadores están aplicando una guerra genocida no declarada contra nuestros pueblos desde hace muchos años, por lo que pedimos tu participación decidida apoyando este plan del pueblo mexicano que lucha por trabajo, tierra, techo, alimentación, salud, educación, independencia, libertad, democracia, justicia y paz. Declaramos que no dejaremos de pelear hasta lograr el cumplimiento de estas demandas básicas de nuestro pueblo formando un gobierno de nuestro país libre y democrático."

*Excerpt from the First Declaration from the
Lacandon Jungle, January 1, 1994.*

"Social structure is of consequence because the unequal distribution of power, wealth, and prestige generates disparate interests among people differently situated in group hierarchies. Those who control the means of physical coercion and the means of producing wealth have power over those who do not. This power can involve control over ideas as well as material resources. When the poor and working classes rebel, it is not because they are intrinsically troublemakers. They rebel because they have limited alternative means to voice their views and press for change" (Eckstein 1989, p. 3).

Introduction

Carlos Fuentes called the year of 1994 in Mexico "the year of living dangerously" (Fuentes 1996, p. 86). In the waning days of 1993, the new year was anticipated at home and abroad with great expectations for the future. The high expectations were clearly demonstrated in the grand celebration hosted by the proud and popular Mexican president Carlos Salinas de Gortari. There, indeed, appeared much to celebrate. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) had finally passed in the United States Congress and was set to begin on January 1, 1994. Salinas had

been proclaimed in 1993 as *Time* magazine's International Newsmaker of the Year for Latin America (Oppenheimer, 1996, p. 6). Wall Street was advising its clients to buy into the Mexican phenomenon. Even Mexico's soccer team had qualified for the 1994 World Cup finals to be held in the United States (Oppenheimer, 1996, p. 11).

Soon, however, the revelry turned dark with the sobering announcement in the early morning hours of January 1, 1994, that a rag-tag indigenous armed force had occupied and sacked municipal buildings in five cities in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas. First-world aspirations for Mexico seemed in an instant to be dashed by the event (Oppenheimer, 1996, p. 6). Oppenheimer, a long-time journalist in Mexico, wrote of the time that:

A few days later, a Mexico City daily carried a cartoon showing Salinas in his tuxedo, sporting a big smile, raising a cup of champagne to celebrate the New Year—as a bullet coming from a window was about to break his glass in pieces. Other cartoonists evoked images of the 1959 Cuban revolution, when Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista had learned of Fidel Castro's guerrillas' advance on the city while celebrating the New Year at a lavish party in the presidential palace and had left the country immediately....The Zapatista rebellion had shattered Mexico's illusion of peace and stability. The party was over (p. 15).

As the first weeks of the rebellion unfolded, speculation ran rampant as to the nature of this new rebellion in southern Mexico. Considering the apparant similarity between the disrupted celebrations of Batista and Salinas, commentators and academics pondered whether the Zapatista Army of National Liberation represented yet another Castro-style *foco* movement spreading like a cancer throughout what had

appeared to that point a more-or-less tranquil Mexico.

As quickly as they had appeared, however, the Zapatistas displayed a fundamental difference from the bloody and protracted conflicts in El Salvador or Guatemala. The rebels offered only one short burst of gunfire. Their uprising lasted only a few days. Retreating into the jungle for refuge, the EZLN began a propaganda campaign, not for the violent overthrow of Mexico's governmental structure, but for the establishment of a dialogue with the purpose of making Mexico a true democracy with liberty and freedom for all its citizens.

Research Conclusions

We began this study by asking whether the communiqués issued by the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) during the period of January 1, 1994, through August 31, 1995, demonstrated a clear tonal preference in favor of either 1) an appeal to force of arms, or, 2) an appeal to civil society to support a negotiated settlement of Zapatista demands? Further, we were curious to know whether, if a tonal preference was established, did it suggest an overall Zapatista strategy for resolving their grievances against the Mexican government?

The analysis of the EZLN communiqués from the study period, as presented in Chapter IV, produced several results. First, the analysis demonstrated that the overall tone of the EZLN's communiqués was directed toward a political, and, therefore, peaceful solution to the demands made by the rebels. Almost 75 percent of the documents during the study period favored such a solution. Second, the analysis demonstrated a consistency of tone over both the duration of the study

period, and over the various political and military conditions surrounding the communiqués. We believe that this consistency suggests that the Zapatistas were following a specific and understood long-term strategy to bring about the solutions desired to their demands. This strategy, which consisted of a total commitment to negotiations over violence, held throughout the study period, in spite of several attempts by the Mexican government at a military solution (the February 1995, Operation Rainbow attempt to capture Subcommander Marcos being the best example).

Although this study looked at all of the declarations and communiqués during the study period (a total of 71 documents), the declarations issued by the Zapatistas best demonstrate the rebels consistent search for a peaceful negotiated, political solution to their demands. The First Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle, issued on the day the rebellion began, January 1, 1994, was a "Declaration of War." But, it was a strange declaration of war. The war it declares is not against the state, and it is not against the governmental form of Mexico. The declaration of war is against the Mexican Executive Branch of government—called the "usurper" of the people's democratic rights—and the justification rests on the Mexican Constitution itself, specifically on Article 39, which gives the people the right to rise up against an unjust government. Indeed, the Zapatistas do call for all in Mexico to join the insurgency, but it is not to help the EZLN acquire power. It is to help the indigenous people, represented symbolically by the EZLN, to acquire work, land, a roof, food, health, education, independence, liberty, democracy, justice, and, above all, peace. The Zapatistas end this plea

for a country free and democratic, a country just to all its people:

PUEBLO DE MÉXICO: Nosotros, hombres y mujeres integros y libres, estamos conscientes de que la guerra que declaramos es una medida última pero justa. Los dictadores están aplicando una guerra genocida no declarada contra nuestros pueblos desde hace muchos años, por lo que pedimos tu participación decidida apoyando este plan del pueblo mexicano que lucha por trabajo, tierra, techo, alimentación, salud, educación, independencia, libertad, democracia, justicia y paz. Declaramos que no dejaremos de pelear hasta lograr el cumplimiento de estas demandas básicas de nuestro pueblo formando un gobierno de nuestro país libre y democrático (excerpt from the First Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle, January 1, 1994).

The drama of the First Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle was followed, six months later, by the practicality of the Second Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle. On June 1, 1994, the EZLN made it clear that they wanted to begin constructing alliances with various components of civil society. The vehicle by which the Zapatistas hoped to forge such alliances was the National Democratic Convention (CDN). Sponsored by the Zapatistas in the jungle of Chiapas, the CDN was intended to bring together a broad spectrum of Mexican society in a common effort to exert civil society's power in constructing a more democratic Mexico. The Zapatistas, in calling such a risky convention while surrounded by the military forces of Mexico, clearly hoped that civil society would take a decisive role in curing Mexico's political ills. As they say in the Second Declaration "we call upon civil society to organize itself in order to direct the peaceful efforts towards democracy, freedom and justice. Democratic change is the only alternative to war" (excerpt from the Second Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle, June 1, 1994).

The message again was that, while war is the final alternative, a peaceful transition to a more democratic Mexico is worth the effort.

In the First Declaration, the Zapatistas called for the people to rise up against "the bad government," which the Zapatistas saw as being the primary obstacle to a democratic country. In the Second Declaration, the Zapatistas called for the Mexican people, through the vehicle of the National Democratic Convention, to form a force, civil and peaceful, to achieve the profound changes that were required for Mexican society. The Third Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle, January 1, 1995, took the next step. In this declaration, the Zapatistas recognize the failure of civil society to change Mexico. Citing election fraud, which explained the ability of the PRI to hold on to power in the elections of August 1994, the Zapatistas demonstrated their understanding of their leadership role in bringing about democratic change to Mexico. The Zapatistas declare that they will be a partner with civil society to move the country towards democracy. They will:

apoyará a la población civil en la tarea de restaurar la legalidad, el orden, la legitimidad y la soberanía nacionales, y en la lucha por la formación e instauración de un gobierno nacional de transición a la democracia...(excerpt from the Third Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle, January 1, 1995).

Throughout the study period, as the above discussion indicates, the Zapatistas sought dialogue over war; an expanded and inclusive democratic process over the continuation of a one-party dictatorship. The message contained in these Declarations was consistently directed toward dialogue and negotiation.

Update

On January 1, 1998, the Zapatista rebellion is four years old. Both the conditions that brought about the uprising, and the rebels themselves are, as of the conclusion of this study, still firmly in place in Chiapas. While formal negotiations have stalled (the Zedillo government refuses to submit to the Mexican Congress agreements reached earlier at San Andrés between the government negotiators and the EZLN), the peaceful search for a more democratic Mexico continues. For their part, the Zapatistas continue to wrap themselves in the images of mountain based guerrillas, defying the Mexican military to come and get them, but at the same time the Zapatistas continue to wage their style of war through words rather than guns. Refusing to go away or to be silenced, the EZLN continues to push its way back onto Mexico's political stage. With marches on Mexico City—the 1,111 Zapatista representatives march from Chiapas to the capital in September 1997—and the ever growing body of communiqués from Subcommander Marcos and his indigenous council, the Zapatistas make their presence felt in Mexico. The Zapatistas, in spite of their guerrilla image, continue to call for dialogue and negotiation to settle their grievances with the Mexican government—a trademark of this new kind of guerrilla army. And, after four years in the jungles of Chiapas, they still express optimism that they will prevail.

A political analysis of the contemporary situation

The EZLN, its military commander Subcomandante Marcos, and the Indigenous Revolutionary Clandestine Committee—the General Command of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (CCRI-CG), have

become a fixture on the Mexican political and social scene. Roderic Camp, in his latest edition of *Politics in Mexico* (1996), recognizes the Zapatistas importance. Scattered throughout Camp's book are references to the Zapatistas and to impacts that the rebels have had. Noting that political values in Mexico do not recognize the Indian as a separate group, Camp maintains that the Zapatista uprising may have changed this fundamental Mexican value (Camp 1996, p. 79). Likewise, Camp writes that:

Although drug corruption and its consequences will be the most intractable problem facing Mexico's leaders for the remainder of this century, the country's most immediate political issue refocusing attention on civil-military relations is the attack by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) on January 1, 1994, on army encampments in the highlands of Chiapas (Camp 1996, p. 130).

The implication is that Mexico must decide whether it intends to continue its past practice of using its military to suppress its own people.

The EZLN, according to Camp, also has had a significant impact on electoral reform. However, this impact has had an ironic aspect.

Camp writes:

The EZLN uprising influenced the pace of electoral change for the remainder of 1994, leading to more electoral reforms favorable to the opposition parties, and it also set the tone for this period as one of increasing political instability and violence, especially after the PRI presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio, was assassinated (Camp 1996, p. 145).

Public opinion in Mexico first was affected in a positive sense. Forty-two percent of urban Mexicans polled in February 1994, believed the EZLN

would lead to “important changes” for the country (Camp 1996, p. 178). However, following the March 1994 Colosio assassination, the violence generated a “‘fear’ factor” (Camp 1996, p. 79). The ironic result, in Camp’s view, was the easy victory of the PRI presidential candidate—Ernesto Zedillo—over the PAN and PRD rival candidates.

Camp also notes possible affects on the Mexican economy, and on Mexico’s relations with the United States, related to the rebellion in Chiapas. He writes that:

Perhaps the single most important threat to Mexico’s internal security, and that attracting the greatest attention from the United States government, was the uprising led by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN)...The presence of active guerrilla groups in Mexico not only creates significant national security concerns internally but, because of Mexico’s proximity to the United States, also raises grave concerns across the border (Camp 1996, p. 79).

The American concerns are not limited to new ways of emigrants fleeing from violence in Mexico, but reach into the economic sector. They fear the undermining of foreign investment, which would upset Mexico’s economic development plans (Camp 1996, p. 198).

As the above discussion of Camp’s observations about the impact of the EZLN and the rebellion in Chiapas suggests, the Zapatistas have played, and will continue to play a significant role in the future of Mexico. Of course, the Zapatistas do not operate in a vacuum, but play their hand in concert with or in opposition to other political actors. The Zapatistas position was outlined on August 8, 1997, the anniversary of Emiliano Zapata’s birth, in two communiqués. These communiqués provided an opportunity to gain insight into how the Zapatistas may

view the future of their political-military struggle. The communiqués established the Zapatistas' view of which political groups in Mexican society are seen as potential allies and which political groups are considered enemies at this time.

The first communiqué addresses the various political actors and the contemporary political environment, and establishes the Zapatistas attitude towards them. President Ernesto Zedillo is now the chief target of Zapatista wrath. The Zapatistas accuse Zedillo of placing a number of obstacles in the way of a peaceful settlement. The President isn't fulfilling his word; he continues to oversee a military buildup, especially in Indian regions; he applies constant pressure on those who challenge the system (the Zapatistas), while declaring that the conditions are conducive for peace; he argues that elections have replaced the need for arms, even though the electoral reforms have not taken hold in Indian regions; he refuses to change the economic model (NAFTA, privatization, economic liberalism, and Article 27 reform); he denies the existence of other rebel groups, such as the EPR, while attacking those suspected of belonging to the guerrilla group; he feigns compliance with the agreements made with the EZLN.

The Zapatistas continue to insist that the Governor of Chiapas, Ruiz Ferro, is illegitimate, and they hold him responsible for the extreme violence in some regions of the state. The elections and the electoral process in Chiapas continue to be unacceptable to the rebels. Elections, they argue, are only useful to the Indians when the political contest can be held under peaceful and equal conditions, which do not exist in Chiapas.

The EZLN views the victory of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas in the Mexico city mayoral elections in the summer of 1997 as the result of more equitable political conditions in the capital. Cárdenas' victory, they argue, represents a "No" to the sitting government of the PRI and their national agenda. The importance of Cárdenas for the rebels lies chiefly in the symbolism of the Cárdenas victory. It is proof that a citizen-driven "insurgency" can result in the achievement of democracy, liberty, and justice. In other words, profound and radical political, economic, and social changes can come to Mexico via peaceful means. Cárdenas' victory, in their analysis, came as a result of the pervasive force of civil society. The Zapatistas continue to be encouraged by this phenomena. Their argument, consistent with almost all past positions, is that peaceful change comes from below, not above. It is because of the growth of civil society and citizen movements that Mexico is moving toward political reform.

From the victories in Mexico City of Cárdenas and civil society, the Zapatistas turn once again on Carlos Salinas de Gortari. It is at Salinas' feet that the Zapatistas lay the blame for the neoliberal project which characterizes contemporary Mexico. The Zapatistas see the policies of Salinas contributing to the current crisis of the PRI and the Zedillo government. While they admit that the latest electoral defeats of the PRI do not mean the end of the "state-party" system in Mexico, they do see that the present crisis for the PRI is only the beginning.

The PRI is not the only political party to be chastised. The PRD and the PAN come under EZLN scrutiny as well. As for the PRD, the Zapatistas note its internal struggles between an old and new Left. They

see this as a struggle between a Old Left that wants to overpower the electorate with ideology and a New Left which is moving more to the center and looks to become a viable option to the other parties. The new PRD, troubles the Zapatistas because of its coalition results in statements favoring the pacification of Chiapas. As the Zapatistas view it, the PRD should be pushing the government to honor the agreements already made rather than weakening the base of the EZLN. As for the PAN, the Zapatistas briefly note revisions going on within the party moving the PAN more to the center. They see more change as necessary if the PAN is to present a political option to most Mexicans. Clearly, the PAN has not addressed most Zapatista demands.

The Zapatistas comment on the Federal Army, the Church, and International capital as well. As for the Mexican Army, the Zapatistas note that the army's involvement in drug trafficking has weakened its place in Mexican society and that the army, while still at the direction of the President, aspires to political power in its own right. Religious groups, both what the Zapatistas call the Reactionary Church (Roman Catholic), and the Evangelical Church are seen as using the conflict in Chiapas for their own purposes. The former in seeking power in the state, and the latter desiring the removal of Marcos from the country and the annihilation of the EZLN. Likewise, international capital wants the Zapatistas eliminated, according to the communiqué, because the Indians and their struggle are getting between capital's interest in exploiting the oil, uranium and timber reserves known to exist in Chiapas.

The second EZLN communiqué was a 10 point delineation of the

Zapatistas present position. The communiqué largely restates positions long held by the Zapatistas. First, they insist on a peaceful solution to their demands and that civil society renew its attention to their struggle. In this regard, they recommit themselves to "struggle without rest", and restate their hope that soldiers will soon not be needed and arms will be made useless because words will prevail. The Zapatistas once again refuse to become an institutional political force for, as they have long said, they do not desire power or responsibilities. As for who they see in power, it is some version of the organized left that must take the lead and assuming the responsibility to replace those now at the center, namely the PRI.

The Zapatistas further argue that it is not the EZLN that is standing in the way of a peaceful solution to the problems they brought to national attention almost four years previously. They insist that the Indians are the ones who are continuously harassed and assassinated, and that the "evil government" is both the block and the cause of conflict. Negotiations will only be effective, therefore, if previously negotiated agreements are fulfilled. If not, the Zapatistas refuse to continue the dialogue with the government. Finally, the Zapatistas set the stage for a public relations event. They declare that 1,111 Zapatistas will march to Mexico City in September 1997 in order to push the government into honoring their agreements with the Zapatistas, and to greet and thank leaders of the civil society for their continuous support of the Zapatista cause. They announce that representation of the EZLN will also be present to witness the birth of a new political force: the Zapatista Front of National Liberation (FZLN). This amounts to a bold

challenge to the government in Mexico City.

Taking the two communiqués together, it appears that the Zapatistas have not changed their position from the original. They seem to be riding their initial bet to its natural conclusion. That bet was that by placing their fate in the hands of civil society and the growth of civil movements, and not aligning themselves with narrowly organized political institutions (political parties, etc.) they will witness and participate in profound changes in the institutional structures and the leadership of the Mexican state. Reading the latest communiqués, one can conclude that the Zapatistas understand, better than most, that what they are out to achieve will not be accomplished by striking political deals.

The EZLN original refusal to be affiliated with one or another narrow political interest has not wavered. Its argument for non-alliance goes to the core of Mexico's problems. That core is not about power, but is about the moral conditions that prevail in the country, and stand in the way of consolidating a Mexican democracy. The pervasive level of political corruption and fraud which has characterized Mexican politics and the rule of the one-party state for decades is consistently called into question by the Zapatistas. The profound racism suffered by indigenous groups is no longer tolerated or ignored; the Zapatistas make sure of that. The slogan, which ends all EZLN communiqués "democracy, justice, liberty," is not merely an ideological call. These principles for an evolving Mexico come at a price. That price, for the Zapatistas, includes the development of trust in the political system, the rule of law, and the inclusion of all segments of Mexico's diverse society into the political

process. Part of the Zapatistas' staying power is that they appear to understand clearly the nature of the change they seek, and the depth of those changes which undercut all previous political power relationships. The Zapatistas and Subcommander Marcos appear to understand Sir Ernest Barker's admonition that:

Mere aggregations of men do not form a State: a contract issuing in an artificial unity maintained by artificial laws would be no sooner formed than broken. What is needed and what is everything, is the life-breath from on high—a common mind to pursue a common purpose of good life. Only in virtue of such a life-breath is a State real and vital: without it, it is but a Frankenstein doomed to destruction (Barker, 1959, p. 73).

The central thesis of the Zapatistas is that structural change will only occur in Mexico if a massive and organized civil society with “common mind to pursue a common purpose” takes control of Mexico's destiny. This thesis is predicated on the notion that armed struggle is the most costly and the least effective in the long term. That is not to say, however, that the Zapatistas rule out force. Force is always an option when all other roads are blocked. As Marcos makes clear in a recent interview in *La Jornada*, if dialogue does not bring about profound change in the structure of Mexican politics, “[i]t would practically mean the liquidation of the Government as a State, as a form of government...it would increase its inability to resolve problems without the use of force” (*La Jornada*, November 25, 1997).

Potential for a Zapatista Model

Since the appearance of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), other armed guerrilla groups have surfaced in Mexico. The most notable is the Army of Popular Revolution, known by the Spanish

acronym EPR. Appearing on the scene in the state of Guerrero in the summer of 1996, the EPR has carried out terrorist strikes in various locations across Mexico, resulting in a number of deaths. The question is whether new groups will take up the strategies and tactics of the EZLN and seek negotiation with the government following an initial burst of violence?

The EZLN have waged a battle, what has been called a "guerra de tinta" (war of ink) by some, for political reform in Mexico. This strategy, as noted throughout this study, is in marked contrast to the bloody and protracted struggles to overthrow the sitting regime in other Latin American countries.

Jorge G. Castañeda (1996) has offered an early comparative analysis between the EZLN and EPR. Castañeda sees the major difference as one of social context. He argues that the EZLN has a social base, while the EPR does not. Whereas the EPR is clandestine, launching what appear to be indiscriminate terrorist-type attacks against various and scattered targets, the EZLN is concentrated in a determined territory, has the support of a definable population, and has the ability to attract support from various sources. They therefore appear able to wage their conflict by other than violent methods. Castañeda calls Marcos and the EZLN with their social base "la guerrilla 'buena'" (the good guerrilla), and the EPR, with its lack of same, "la guerrilla 'mala'" (the bad guerrilla).

Castañeda goes on to question whether one can label the Zapatistas as guerrillas at all. He points out that with the exception of the first week of armed conflict between elements of the EZLN and the

Mexican military, there has not been one military-style action, not one shot fired by the EZLN at the Mexican military. Likewise, with the exception of one failed attempt to capture the leadership of the EZLN in February 1995, the Mexican government has more or less allowed the Zapatistas to maintain and even strengthen their image of representing the Indigenous communities of the Chiapas region. As such, the Mexican government has facilitated the appearance of the EZLN as a political force rather than a guerrilla movement.

The EPR, in contrast, lacking any supportive social base, continues to strike with force of arms. Castañeda sees little future for the EPR (Castañeda 1996, *El Proceso*). He argues that without a social base, and with little likelihood they will acquire one, the guerrilla group is not likely to pose a significant threat to the sitting government. The danger will come if the Mexican government overreacts to the EPR's threat with stepped up military and police activities of their own in the regions where the EPR operates, especially if these actions are heavy-handed against the locals. In this foco-oriented scenario, the government is likely to do the work of the EPR recruiters for them and drive into the arms of the guerrillas supporters that they do not now have.

An additional and important contrast exists between the EZLN and the EPR. The willingness on the part of the Zapatistas to emphasize reform of the existing system rather than to call for a new, revolutionary regime—which is the position of the EPR—has allowed a wide range of support to surface for the Zapatistas. Castañeda finds it difficult, however, to justify the intellectual support for the Zapatistas and not for the EPR. Both events are the same; that is, both are examples of armed

struggle against the existing order.

Since the appearance in Mexico of the Zapatistas in 1994 and of the EPR in 1996, other armed groups have surfaced. El Frente Armado de Liberación de los Pueblos Marginados de Guerrero (FALPMG) is the latest of these. FALPMG presents an apparent contradiction. They claim to be a "armed movement" but "peaceful" (*La Jornada*, 23 February 1997). Taking a page, it would appear, from the strategy book of the EZLN, FALPMG calls on the government of Ernesto Zedillo to honor the agreements they struck with the EZLN at San Andrés. These agreements reached by the Governments representatives and the EZLN in February of 1996, have failed to be implemented. The FALPMG commanders insist that dialogue is the way for change to come about, but, if dialogue is not productive, there must be an armed alternative.

Like the EZLN, FALPMG demands that political reform include fair and "clean" elections. They insist, as well, that the government return a portion of the wealth extracted from their region back to the local communities, again copying the EZLN. FALPMG insists that the arms it carries are a matter of last resort and self protection against the authorities who often "disappear" their members. This again is similar to arguments made by the EZLN, although the Zapatistas direct those charges at governors and state government.

Negotiations with guerrilla-type groups are certainly an embarrassing situation for a sitting government, but negotiations have their practical aspects as well. The negotiations with the Zapatista Army of National Liberation are a case in point. First, negotiations serve to freeze the event. While not quickly resolving the situation, the event is

not permitted to proceed either. Hostilities are for the most part ceased. Lives are not lost. In the case of the Zapatistas rebellion, battle casualties were confined to the first week. Talks about talks and actual negotiations took over from the initial hostilities and continue intermittently as of this writing. Second, governments have time to reason through the situation and to determine their strategy for resolving the situation to their advantage. Time and resources are on their side, as well as the preponderance of force if eventually needed. Force can be concentrated to deal with particularly challenges. The Mexican government in dealing with the Zapatista rebels have used all of these steps in an effort to isolate, undermine and harass the EZLN, while ostensibly carrying out serious negotiations with the rebels.

Third, negotiates can be used to the governments advantage to minimize, trivalize, alter or obfuscate the demands of the rebel groups. In the case of the EZLN demands (which were many and far reaching), the period of protracted negotiations has narrowed both the scope and the number those demands. Moreover, some demands have been converted from an initial appearance of being simple and just, to an appearance of complexity, with the prospects for solutions far-off and difficult. In other words, what appeared straightforward in the heat of battle and confrontation, after a period of reflection and negotiation and study, now appears convoluted. The rebel's statement of injustices which drive them to drastic action, over time, becomes less of a justification for resorting to violence (see, for example, Castañeda's criticism of fellow intellectuals for accepting that rebel claim). This provides a clear advantage for the government's negotiation position. The Zapatistas' demands concerning

indigenous rights have gone from simple statements calling for the preservation of customs and languages and an end to racist treatment of indigenous people to considerations of the constitutional implications of writing such guarantees into the Mexican constitution. The political debate of indigenous assimilation and/or separation and autonomy is fully raised again, thus, slowing or stopping the negotiation process between the government and the Zapatistas.

Final Observations

The pace of political change in Mexico provides many avenues for constructive research by social scientists. One path to constructive research concerns the relationships between acts of violence and the mobilization of dissent in partially rather than pervasively repressive societies. Another path concerns the manipulation, now facilitated by modern means of instantaneous and direct communication, of symbols which draw meaning from culturally embedded historical experiences. A third path concerns the difference between rebellion and dissent in relatively undifferentiated versus complex societies. This study closes with brief reflections on each of these inadequately understood sets of relationships.

Jeffrey Ryan focuses on the evaluation of the likelihood of success for armed revolts, noting that they must survive before they can focus on achieving intermediate or longer-term goals. This study records the obvious survival of the Zapatistas. It is possible that they may return to armed revolt. But the more important issue may be the use of violence as a means of communication in repressive societies. Castañeda has

developed a strong argument which condemns such violence and which also condemns intellectuals in Latin America who endorse the revolutionary path to power. Clearly, those are quite different actions. This study has shown the extreme reluctance, despite abundant provocations, of the Zapatistas to use force. But it also has recognized that when a regime is pervasively repressive of marginal elements in its society, but more manipulative than openly repressive in its relationships to other elements of that society, there are real barriers to effective communication. The Zapatistas, as Camp recognizes, have overcome the barrier of a Mexican cultural defense against recognition of distinctiveness of indigenous groups. The analysis of their various communiqués add the documentation of their skill in manipulating symbols from Mexican tradition such as the Land Reform Article from the Constitution of 1917, which of course embodies Mexican society's commitment to its indigenous (and to its rural poor more generally), and was in response to the earlier and much more violent efforts of Emilio Zapata. Violence cannot be a norm in democratic societies, but it may have a crucial role as the action which triggers the movement of societies further along the path of democracy.

Political scientists in particular have neglected the topic of political communication within all but a few countries. Perhaps that is because such communications involves so much country-specific content. This study has shown its vital importance in Mexico. We do not need to say more about the communications between the Zapatistas and those whose potential collaboration was sought from within Mexican civil society. But the content of those communications is important in a

substantive sense. American observers, for example, see NAFTA as a means of improving Mexican welfare by improving the efficiency of the Mexican economy. That certainly is a valid perspective, but it misses a very important part of the picture because its understanding of how change processes will work out in Mexico is so inadequate. In contrast, the Zapatista communications effectively reveal (perhaps unintended) very important negative consequences by linking NAFTA, changing Mexican government policies toward agriculture under Salinas, the destructive impact on Chiapas of the successive Mexican currency devaluations, the massive drain of revenues from Chiapas from projects sponsored by the Mexican government on behalf of beneficiaries in other parts of Mexico, and both paucity and the corrupt implementation of positive Mexican programs for the region. These may add up to an abstract cry for justice, but they are hardly abstract. Mexico (as well as social scientists and other observers abroad) now knows much more fully the situation of some of its citizens. One can only hope it can respond with something other than official violence and hope that other studies such as this can facilitate the understanding of injustice which makes positive responses more likely.

At the beginning of this research project an effort was made to link the Zapatistas to other guerrilla movements and to a body of comparative research on those movements. As research proceeded, differences became more salient than similarities. Reflecting on this research, it now seems clear that the path taken by the Zapatistas in Mexico is only partly explicable as a matter of choice and influenced by Marcos. The explanation may well lie instead in the fact that Mexico is a

highly complex society. Chiapas at first glance may be similar to the revolutionary situations of Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru or Cuba. And Chiapas may share many features with Guerrero. But it is quite unlike the urban metropolis of Mexico City, Mexico's central plateau, or Mexico's north and northwest. Within that complexity are thousands of organizations comprising its civil society. Many of them have been working for decades to democratize Mexican society. Some of them want to use neoliberal trade agreements, privatizations, and other innovations to lessen the control of the Mexican regime on society as well as to modernize it. The Zapatistas made the choice and stated it clearly in several initial declarations that they wanted to be part of Mexican society rather than separate and sovereign. Having made that choice, there was no alternative to a strategy appealing to solidarity with Mexican society. Since that probably is true for repressed or marginalized elements of other complex societies, the Mexican political situation may be more fruitfully analyzed within a framework which reflects complexity and gives causal prominence to such factors as race, language, and other differentiating traits.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

All Zapatista Documents 1994-1995				C1	C3	Ratio
docCode				x	y	
1994						
	Esp.	Eng.				
94-01.01.94.1E/C/D		✓				
94-01.01.94.1S/C/D	✓		✓	24	5	4.80
94-01.01.94.2E/C/E		✓				####
94-01.01.94.3E/I		✓				####
94-01.06.94.1E/C		✓	✓	37	12	3.08
94-01.06.94.1E/L		✓				####
94-01.11.94.1E/C		✓	✓	10	11	0.91
94-01.12.94.1E/C		✓	✓	7	5	1.40
94-01.12.94.2E/C		✓	✓	4	6	0.67
94-01.13.94.1E/C		✓	✓	6	3	2.00
94-01.13.94.2E/C		✓	✓	4	2	2.00
94-01.13.94.1E/L		✓				####
94-01.17.94.1E/C		✓	✓	4	4	1.00
94-01.18.94.1E/L		✓				####
94-01.18.94.1E/C		✓	✓	7	3	2.33
94-01.20.94.1E/C		✓	✓	1	10	0.10
94-01.20.94.2E/C		✓	✓	0	1	0.00
94-01.20.94.3E/C		✓	✓	1	7	0.14
94-01.20.94.4E/C		✓	✓	7	15	0.47
94-01.20.94.5E/C		✓	✓	8	14	0.57
94-01.26.94.1E/A		✓				####
94-01.27.94.1E/E		✓				####
94-01.29.94.1E/C		✓	✓	2	5	0.40
94-01.31.94.1E/C		✓	✓	10	16	0.63
94-01.31.94.2E/C		✓	✓	2	10	0.20
94-01.31.94.3E/C		✓	✓	4	3	1.33
January, Q1,'94	26	18		138	132	1.05
94-02.01.94.1E/C		✓	✓	3	2	1.50
94-02.01.94.1E/L		✓				####
94-02.02.94.1E/L		✓				####
94-02.02.94.2E/L		✓				####
94-02.02.94.3E/L		✓				####
94-02.03.94.1E/I		✓				####
94-02.04.94.1E/I		✓				####
94-02.06.94.1E/L		✓				####
94-02.08.94.1E/L		✓				####
94-02.08.94.2E/L		✓				####
94-02.08.94.3E/L		✓				####
94-02.08.94.4E/L		✓				####
94-02.08.94.5E/L		✓				####

94-02.08.94.6E/L	✓				####	
94-02.08.94.7E/L	✓				####	
94-02.11.94.1E/L	✓				####	
94-02.13.94.1E/C	✓	✓	1	7	0.14	
94-02.14.94.1E/C	✓	✓	10	0	####	
94-02.15.94.1E/C	✓	✓	1	8	0.13	
94-02.15.94.2E/C	✓	✓	2	2	1.00	
94-02.16.94.1E/C	✓	✓	2	5	0.40	
94-02.16.94.2E/C	✓	✓	4	5	0.80	
94-02.16.94.3E/C	✓	✓	4	2	2.00	
94-02.17.94.1E/C	✓	✓	1	0	####	
94-02.20.94.1E/C	✓	✓	3	5	0.60	
94-02.21.94.1E/I	✓				####	
94-02.21.94.1E/N	✓				####	
94-02.22.94.1E/N	✓				####	
94-02.23.94.1E/N	✓				####	
94-02.23.94.1E/I	✓				####	
94-02.24.94.1E/N	✓				####	
94-02.24.94.1E/I	✓				####	
94-02.25.94.1E/L	✓				####	
94-02.26.94.1E/I	✓				####	
94-02.26.94.1E/C	✓	✓	3	5	0.60	
94-02.28.94.1E/I	✓				####	
February, Q1,'94		36	11	34	41	0.83
Year-to-date		62	29	172	173	
94-03.01.94.1E/C	✓	✓	11	21	0.52	
94-03.01.94.2E/C	✓	✓	0	0	####	
94-03.01.94.3E/C	✓	✓	2	6	0.33	
94-03.03.94.1E/I	✓				####	
94-03.05.94.1E/L	✓				####	
94-03.15.94.1E/C	✓	✓	9	2	4.50	
94-03.15.94.2E/C	✓	✓	1	7	0.14	
94-03.15.94.3E/A	✓				####	
94-03.15.94.4E/C	✓	✓	1	1	1.00	
94-03.24.94.1E/C	✓	✓	12	11	1.09	
94-03.24.94.2E/C	✓	✓	5	1	5.00	
March, Q1,'94		11	8	41	49	0.84
Q1,'94 docs		73	37	213	222	0.96
Year-to-date		73	37	213	222	
94-04.07.94.1E/C	✓	✓	5	3	1.67	
94-04.10.94.1E/C	✓	✓	11	1	11.00	
94-04.10.94.2E/C	✓	✓	6	0	####	
94-04.10.94.3E/C	✓	✓	11	1	11.00	
94-04.10.94.1E/I	✓				####	
94-04.11.94.1E/C	✓	✓	6	2	3.00	

94-04.20.94.1E/C	√	√	3	7	0.43
94-04.21.94.1E/C	√	√	7	5	1.40
April, Q2,'94	8	7	49	19	2.58
Year-to-date	81	44	262	241	1.09
94-05.01.94.1E/C	√	√	8	0	####
94-05.11.94.1E/I	√				####
94-05.11.94.2E/I	√				####
94-05.28.94.1E/A	√				####
May, Q2,'94	4	1	8	0	####
Year-to-date	85	45	270	241	1.12
94-06.01.94.1E/A	√				####
94-06.01.94.1E/C/D	√	√	32	47	0.68
94-06.03.94.1E/C	√	√	0	1	0.00
94-06.03.94.2E/C	√	√	0	6	0.00
94-06.10.94.1E/C	√	√	9	15	0.60
94-06.10.94.2E/C	√	√	18	48	0.38
June, Q2,'94	6	5	59	117	0.50
Q2,'94 docs	18	13	116	136	0.85
Year-to-date	91	50	329	358	0.92
July, Q3,'94	0	0			
Year-to-date	91	50	329	358	0.92
94-08.08.94.1E/C	√				####
94-08.08.94.1S/C	√	√	33	41	0.80
94-08.15.94.1S/C	√	√	7	8	0.88
94-08.17.94.1S/A	√				####
94-08.24.94.1S/C	√	√	6	17	0.35
94-08.24.94.2S/A	√				####
94-08.28.94.1S/L	√				####
94-08.29.94.1S/A	√				####
August, Q3,'94	8	3	46	66	0.70
Year-to-date	99	53	375	424	0.88
94-09.03.94.1S/C	√	√	12	0	####
94-09.15.94.1E/C	√				####
94-09.15.94.1S/C	√	√	42	5	8.40
94-09.15.94.2S/C	√	√	13	8	1.63
94-09.16.94.1S/L	√				####
September, Q3,'94	5	3	67	13	5.15
Q3,'94 docs	13	6	113	79	1.43
Year-to-date	104	56	442	437	1.01
94-10.06.94.1S/C	√	√	0	4	0.00

94-10.08.94.1S/C	v	v	4	3	1.33
94-10.08.94.2S/C	v	v	11	14	0.79
94-10.26.94.1E/L		v			####
94-10.26.94.1S/L	v				####
94-10.26.94.1S/C	v	v	1	8	0.13
94-10.27.94.1S/A	v				####
October, Q4,'94	7	4	16	29	0.55
Year-to-date	111	60	458	466	0.98
94-11.01.94.1E/A		v			####
94-11.02.94.1S/C	v	v	3	7	0.43
94-11.02.94.2S/C	v	v	6	15	0.40
94-11.17.94.1S/C	v	v	44	41	1.07
November, Q4,'94	4	3	53	63	0.84
Year-to-date	115	63	511	529	0.97
94-12.03.94.1E/L		v			####
94-12.03.94.1S/L	v				####
94-12.04.94.1S/C	v	v	6	10	0.60
94-12.06.94.1S/C	v	v	4	11	0.36
94-12.09.94.1E/P/I		v			####
94-12.13.94.1S/A	v				####
94-12.17.94.1S/C	v	v	13	13	1.00
94-12.19.94.1S/L	v				####
94-12.27.94.1S/C	v	v	3	2	1.50
94-12.30.94.1S/C	v	v	10	4	2.50
94-12.30.94.2S/A	v				####
94-12.30.94.3S/C	v	v	5	7	0.71
December, Q4,'94	12	6	41	47	0.87
Q4,'94 docs	23	13	110	139	0.79
Year-to-date	127	69	552	576	0.96
1994 Year Totals	127	69	552	576	0.96

1995 Zapatista Documents

1995						
95-01.01.95.1E/C/D		v			###	
95-01.01.95.1S/C	v		v	22	3	7.33
95-01.01.95.1S/C/D	v		v	29	42	0.69
95-01.12.95.1S/C	v		v	2	4	0.50
95-01.14.95.1S/C	v		v	1	10	0.10
January '95	4		4	54	59	0.92
1995						
95-02.09.95.1S/C	v		v	14	8	1.75
95-02.09.95.2S/C	v		v	19	25	0.76
95-02.10.95.1S/L	v					###
95-02.11.95.1E/C		v				###
95-02.11.95.1S/C	v		v	6	1	6.00
95-02.12.95.1S/C	v		v	13	6	2.17
95-02.17.95.1E/C		v				###
95-02.17.95.1S/C	v		v	10	21	0.48
95-02.20.95.1S/C	v		v	15	23	0.65
95-02.23.95.1S/C	v		v	2	10	0.20
95-02.24.95.1S/C	v		v	8	11	0.73
95-02.25.95.1S/C	v		v	4	2	2.00
95-02.27.95.1S/C	v		v	6	3	2.00
February '95	13		10	97	110	0.88
Year-to-date	17		14	151	169	0.89
95-03.11.95.1S/C	v		v	2	15	0.13
95-03.11.95.2S/A	v					###
95-03.12.95.1E/C		v				###
95-03.12.95.1S/C	v		v	23	0	###
95-03.14.95.1S/A	v					###
95-03.17.95.1S/C	v		v	46	13	3.54
95-03.17.95.2S/A	v					###
95-03.24.95.1S/C	v		v	4	34	0.12
95-03.24.95.2S/A	v					###
March '95	9		4	75	62	1.21
Q1,'95 docs	26		18	226	231	0.98
Year-to-date	26		18	226	231	0.98
95-04.03.95.1S/L		v				###

95-04.04.95.1S/A	√				####
95-04.05.95.1S/C	√	√	1	27	0.04
95-04.10.95.1S/C	√	√	17	0	####
95-04.15.95.1S/C	√	√	3	22	0.14
95-04.15.95.2S/A	√				####
95-04.21.95.1S/C	√	√	1	9	0.11
April '95	7	4	22	58	0.38
Year-to-date	33	22	248	289	0.86
95-05.05.95.1E/C		√			####
95-05.05.95.1S/C	√	√	27	47	0.57
95-05.05.95.2S/A	√				####
95-05.12.95.1S/L	√				####
95-05.17.95.1S/C	√	√	3	0	####
95-05.20.95.1S/L	√				####
95-05.20.95.2S/C	√	√	17	16	1.06
95-05.24.95.1S/C	√	√	3	16	0.19
95-05.29.95.1S/L	√				####
May '95	9	4	50	79	0.63
Year-to-date	42	26	298	368	0.81
95-06.07.95.1S/C	√	√	6	25	0.24
95-06.08.95.1S/C	√	√	20	57	0.35
95-06.09.95.1S/A	√				####
95-06.10.95.1S/A	√				####
95-06.11.95.1S/A	√				####
95-06.15.95.1S/C	√	√	1	9	0.11
95-06.20.95.1S/L	√				####
95-06.25.95.1S/L	√				####
95-06.30.95.1S/A	√				####
95-06.30.95.1S/C	√	√	3	16	0.19
June, Q2,'95	10	4	30	107	0.28
Q2,'95 docs	26	12	102	244	0.42
Year-to-date	52	30	328	475	0.69
95-07.14.95.1S/C	√	√	3	6	0.50
95-07.15.95.1S/C	√	√	3	4	0.75
95-07.17.95.1S/A	√				####
95-07.18.95.1S/C	√	√	1	3	0.33
95-07.24.95.1S/C	√	√	8	34	0.24
July, Q3,'95	5	4	15	47	0.32
Year-to-date	57	34	343	522	0.66
95-08.03.95.1S/L	√				####
95-08.09.95.1S/VideoS.	√				####
95-08.25.95.1S/P/I	√				####
95-08.25.95.1S/C	√	√	17	31	0.55

95-08.25.95.2S/C	✓	✓	14	15	
95-08.27.95.1S/C	✓	✓	6	14	0.43
95-08.28.95.1S/C	✓	✓	10	7	1.43
95-08.28.95.1S/V/I	✓				####
August, Q3,'95	8	4	47	67	0.70
Year-to-date	65	38	390	589	0.66
95-09.00.95.1S/C	✓	✓	6	11	0.55
95-09.13.95.1S/L	✓				####
95-09.29.95.1S/C	✓	✓	71	149	0.48
September, Q3,'95	3	2	77	160	0.48
Q3,'95 docs	16	10	139	274	0.51
Year-to-date	68	40	467	749	0.62
95-10.02.95.1S/C	✓	✓	3	3	1.00
95-10.02.95.2S/C	✓	✓	1	2	0.50
95-10.04.95.1S/C	✓	✓	6	15	0.40
95-10.12.95.1S/C	✓	✓	17	1	17.00
95-10.17.95.1S/C	✓	✓	1	2	0.50
95-10.19.95.1S/C	✓	✓	4	21	0.19
95-10.20.95.1S/C	✓	✓	4	17	0.24
95-10.21.95.1E/C		✓			####
95-10.21.95.1S/C	✓	✓	3	6	0.50
95-10.21.95.2E/C		✓			####
95-10.21.95.2S/C	✓	✓	1	5	0.20
95-10.22.95.1S/C	✓	✓	6	27	0.22
95-10.27.95.1E/C		✓			####
95-10.27.95.1S/C	✓	✓	5	27	0.19
95-10.27.95.2E/C		✓			####
95-10.27.95.2S/A	✓				####
95-10.28.95.1S/P/I	✓				####
95-10.31.95.1S/P/I	✓				####
October, Q4,'95	18	11	51	126	0.40
Year-to-date	86	51	518	875	0.59
95-11.02.95.1E/L		✓			####
95-11.04.95.1E/C		✓			####
95-11.04.95.1S/C	✓	✓	3	3	1.00
95-11.07.95.1E/P/I		✓			####
95-11.10.95.1S/A	✓				####
95-11.16.95.1E/C		✓			####
95-11.17.95.1E/C		✓			####
95-11.17.95.1S/C	✓	✓	7	0	####
November, Q4,'95	8	2	10	3	3.33
Year-to-date	94	53	528	878	0.60
95-12.14.95.1E/C		✓			####

95-12.14.95.1S/C	v	v	7	7	1.00
95-12.22.95.1E/C	v				####
95-12.22.95.1S/C	v	v	11	8	1.38
95-12.22.95.2E/C	v				####
95-12.23.95.1E/C	v				####
95-12.23.95.1S/C	v	v	8	12	0.67
95-12.23.95.2S/A	v				####
December, Q4,'95	8	3	26	27	0.96
Q4,'95 docs	34	16	87	156	0.56
Year-to-date	102	56	554	905	0.61
94 Year Totals	127	69	552	576	0.96
95 Year Totals	102	56	554	905	0.61
Total documents	229	125	1106	1481	0.75
			1158	1563	0.74

APPENDIX B

Zapatista documents (translations) were obtained from the *Chiapas95's* internet address at the University of Texas, Austin, Texas. I wish to express my gratitude here for the great and unselfish work of the people who make available to the research community these materials.

First Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle: 1/1/94

Indigenous Revolutionary Clandestine Committee--General Command of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation

TODAY WE SAY ENOUGH IS ENOUGH!
TO THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO: MEXICAN

BROTHERS AND SISTERS:

We are a product of 500 years of struggle: first against slavery, then during the War of Independence against Spain led by insurgents, then to avoid being absorbed by North American imperialism, then to promulgate our constitution and expel the French empire from our soil, and later the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz denied us the just application of the Reform laws and the people rebelled and leaders like Villa and Zapata emerged, poor men just like us. We have been denied the most elemental preparation so they can use us as cannon fodder and pillage the wealth of our country. They don't care that we have nothing, absolutely nothing, not even a roof over our heads, no land, no work, no health care, no food nor education. Nor are we able to freely and democratically elect our political representatives, nor is there independence from foreigners, nor is there peace nor justice for ourselves and our children.

But today, we say ENOUGH IS ENOUGH. We are the inheritors of the true builders of our nation. The dispossessed, we are millions and we thereby call upon our brothers and sisters to join this struggle as the only path, so that we will not die of hunger due to the insatiable ambition of a 70 year dictatorship led by a clique of traitors that represent the most conservative and sell-out groups. They are the same ones that opposed Hidalgo and Morelos, the same ones that betrayed Vicente Guerrero, the same ones that sold half our country to the foreign invader, the same ones that imported a European prince to rule our country, the same ones that formed the "scientific" Porfirista dictatorship, the same ones that opposed the Petroleum Expropriation, the same ones that massacred the railroad workers in 1958 and the students in 1968, the same ones the (sic) today take everything from us, absolutely everything.

To prevent the continuation of the above and as our last hope, after having tried to utilize all legal means based on our Constitution, we go to our Constitution, to apply Article 39 which says: "National Sovereignty essentially and originally resides in the people. All political power emanates from the people and its purpose is to help the people. The people have, at all times, the inalienable right to alter or modify their form of government."

Therefore, according to our constitution, we declare the following to the Mexican federal army, the pillar of the Mexican dictatorship that we suffer from, monopolized by a one-party system and led by Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the maximum and illegitimate federal executive that today holds power.

According to this Declaration of War, we ask that other powers of the nation

advocate to restore the legitimacy and the stability of the nation by overthrowing the dictator.

We also ask that international organizations and the International Red Cross watch over and regulate our battles, so that our efforts are carried out while still protecting our civilian population. We declare now and always that we are subject to the Geneva Accord, forming the EZLN as our fighting arm of our liberation struggle. We have the Mexican people on our side, we have the beloved tri-colored flag highly respected by our insurgent fighters. We use black and red in our uniform as our symbol of our working people on strike. Our flag carries the following letters, "EZLN," Zapatista Army of National Liberation, and we always carry our flag into combat.

Beforehand, we refuse any effort to disgrace our just cause by accusing us of being drug traffickers, drug guerrillas, thieves, or other names that might be used by our enemies. Our struggle follows the constitution which is held high by its call for justice and equality.

Therefore, according to this declaration of war, we give our military forces, the EZLN, the following orders:

First: Advance to the capital of the country, overcoming the Mexican federal army, protecting in our advance the civilian population and permitting the people in the liberated area the right to freely and democratically elect their own administrative authorities.

Second: Respect the lives of our prisoners and turn over all wounded to the International Red Cross.

Third: Initiate summary judgments against all soldiers of the Mexican federal army and the political police that have received training or have been paid by foreigners, accused of being traitors to our country, and against all those that have repressed and treated badly the civil population and robbed or stolen from or attempted crimes against the good of the people.

Fourth: Form new troops with all those Mexicans that show their interest in joining our struggle including those that, being enemy soldiers, turn themselves in without having fought against us, and promise to take orders from the General Command of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation.

Fifth: We ask for the unconditional surrender of the enemy's headquarters before we begin any combat to avoid any loss of lives.

Sixth: Suspend the robbery of our natural resources in the areas controlled by the EZLN.

To the People of Mexico: We, the men and women, full and free, are conscious that the war that we have declared is our last resort but also a just one. The dictators are applying an undeclared genocidal war against our people for many years. Therefore we ask for your participation, your decision to support this plan that struggles for work, land, housing, food, health care, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice and peace. We declare that we will

not stop fighting until the basic demands of our people have been met by forming a government of our country that is free and democratic.

JOIN THE INSURGENT FORCES OF THE ZAPATISTA ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION. General Command of the EZLN. 1993

Second Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle: 6/1/94

Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Zapatista National Liberation Army)
Mexico

Today we say: We will not surrender!

"Those who bear swords aren't the only ones who lose blood or who shine with the fleeting light of military glory. They aren't the only ones who should have a voice in designating the leaders of the government of a people who want democracy; this right to choose belongs to every citizen who has fought in the press or in the courts. It belongs to every citizen who identifies with the ideals of the Revolution and who has fought against the despotism that has ignored our laws. Tyranny isn't eliminated just by fighting on the battlefield; dictatorships and empires are also overthrown by launching cries of freedom and terrible threats against those who are executing the people. . . Historical events have shown us that the destruction of tyranny and the overthrow of all bad government are the work of ideas together with the sword. It is therefore an absurdity, an aberration, an outrageous despotism to deny the people the right to elect their government. The people's sovereignty is formed by all those people in society who are conscious of their rights and who, be they civilians or armed, love freedom and justice and who work for the good of the country."

Paulino Martínez, Zapatista delegate to the Revolutionary Sovereignty Convention, Aguascalientes, Mexico, on behalf of Emiliano Zapata. October 27, 1914.

To the people of Mexico:

To the peoples and governments of the world:

Brothers:

The Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN), on a war footing against the government since January First, 1994, addresses itself to you in order to make known its opinion:

Brother Mexicans:

In December, 1993, we said, "Enough!" On January First, 1994, we called on the Legislative and Judicial powers to assume their constitutional responsibility and to restrain the genocidal policies that the Federal Executive imposes upon our people. We base our constitutional right in the application of Article 37 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States:

"National Sovereignty essentially and originally resides in the people. All political power emanates from the people and its purpose is to help the people. The people have, at all times, the inalienable right to alter or modify their form of government."

The government responded to this call with a policy of extermination and lies. The powers within Mexico ignored our just demand and permitted a massacre. However, this massacre only lasted twelve days. Another force, a force superior to any political or military power imposed its will upon the parties involved in the conflict. Civil society assumed the duty of preserving our country. It showed its disapproval of the massacre and it obligated us to dialogue with the government. We understand that the ascendancy of the political party that has been in power for so long cannot be allowed to continue. We understand that this party, a party that has kept for itself the fruits of every Mexican's labor, cannot be allowed to continue. We understand that the corruption of the presidential elections that sustains this party impedes our freedom and should not be allowed to continue. We understand that the culture of fraud is the method with which this party imposes and impedes democracy. We understand that justice only exists for the corrupt and the powerful. We understand that we must construct a society in which those who lead do so with the will of the people.

There is no other path.

This is understood by every honest Mexican in civil society. Only those who have based their success in the theft of the public trust, those who protect criminals and murderers by prostituting justice, those who resort to political murder and electoral fraud in order to impose their will, are opposed to our demands.

These antiquated politicians plan to roll back history and erase from the national consciousness the cry that was taken up by the country after January First, 1994: "Enough already!"

We will not permit this. Today we don't call upon those weak powers within Mexico who refuse to assume their constitutional duties and who permit themselves to be controlled by the Federal Executive. If the legislature and the judges have no dignity, then others who do understand that they must serve the people and not the individual will step forward. Our call transcends the question of presidential terms or the upcoming election. Our sovereignty resides in civil society. Only the people can alter or modify our form of government. It is to them that we address this Second Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle.

First: We have respected the international conventions of warfare while we have carried out our military actions. These conventions have allowed us to be recognized as a belligerent force by national and foreign forces. We will continue to respect these conventions.

Second: We order all of our regular and irregular forces, both in national territory and outside the country, to continue to obey the unilateral offensive cease-fire. We will continue to respect the cease-fire in order to permit civil society to organize, in whatever forms they consider pertinent, toward the goal of achieving a transition to democracy in our country.

Third: We condemn the threats against civil society brought about by the militarization of the country, both in terms of personal and modern repressive equipment, during this time leading up to the Federal elections. Without a

doubt, the Salinas government is trying to impose its will by fraud. We will not permit this.

Fourth: We propose to all independent political parties that are suffering from intimidation and repression of political rights - the same intimidation and repression that our people have suffered for the last 65 years - that they declare themselves in favor of a government of transition toward democracy.

Fifth: We reject the manipulation and the attempts to separate our just demands from the demands of the Mexican people. We are Mexicans, and we will not put aside our demands nor our arms until we have democracy, freedom and justice for all.

Sixth: We reiterate our disposition towards finding a political solution to the transition to democracy in Mexico. We call upon civil society to re-take the protagonist's role that it first took up in order to stop the military phase of the war. We call upon civil society to organize itself in order to direct the peaceful efforts towards democracy, freedom and justice. Democratic change is the only alternative to war.

Seventh: We call on all honest sectors of civil society to attend a National Dialogue for Democracy, Freedom and Justice.

For this reason we say:

Brothers:

After the start of the war in January, 1994, the organized cry of the Mexican people stopped the fighting and called for a dialogue between the contending forces. The Federal government responded to the just demands of the EZLN with a series of offers that didn't touch on the essential problem: the lack of justice, freedom and democracy in Mexican territory.

The offers with which to the Federal government responded to the demands of the EZLN are limited by the system of the political party in power. This system has made possible the continuation of certain sectors in the Mexican countryside that have superseded the power of the constitution and whose roots have maintained the party in power. It is this system of complicity that has made possible the existence and belligerence of the caciques, the omnipotent power of the ranchers and businessmen and the spread of drug-trafficking. Just the fact that the government offered us the so-called Proposals for a Dignified Peace in Chiapas provoked tremendous agitation and an open defiance by these sectors.

The single-party political system is trying to maneuver within this reduced horizon. It can't alienate these sectors without attacking itself, yet it can't leave things as they are without having to face the anger of the peasants and indigenous peoples. In other words, to go through with the proposals would necessarily mean the death of the state party system. By suicide or execution, the death of the current Mexican political system is a necessary precondition, although not sufficient, for the transition to democracy in our country. There will be no real solutions in Chiapas until the situation in Mexico as a whole is resolved.

The EZLN understands that the problem of poverty in Mexico isn't due just to a lack of resources. Our fundamental understanding and position is that whatever efforts that are made will only postpone the problem if these efforts aren't made within the context of new local, regional and national political relationships - relationships marked by democracy, freedom and justice. The problem of power is not a question of who rules, but of who exercises power. If it is exercised by a majority of the people, the political parties will be obligated to put their proposals forward to the people instead of merely relating among themselves.

Looking at the problem of power within the context of democracy, freedom and justice will create a new political culture within the parties. A new type of political leader will be born and, without a doubt, new types of political parties will be born as well.

We aren't proposing a new world, but something preceding a new world: an antechamber looking into the new Mexico. In this sense, this revolution will not end in a new class, a faction of a class or group in power. It will end in a free and democratic space for political struggle. This free and democratic space will be born on the fetid cadaver of the state party system and the tradition of fixed presidential succession. A new political relationship will be born, a relationship based not in the confrontation of political organizations among themselves, but in the confrontation of their political proposals with different social classes. Political leadership will depend on the support of these social classes, and not in the mere exercise of power.

In this new political relationship, different political proposals (socialism, capitalism, social democracy, liberalism, christian democracy etc.) will have to convince a majority of the nation that their proposal is the best for the country. The groups in power will be watched by the people in such a way that they will be obligated to give a regular accounting of themselves and the people will be able to decide whether they remain in power or not. The plebiscite is a regulated form of confrontation between the nation, political parties and power and it merits a place in the highest law of the country.

Current Mexican law is too constricting for these new political relationships between the governed and those who govern. A National Democratic Convention is needed from which a provisional or transitional government can emerge, be it by the resignation of the Federal Executive or by an electoral route.

This National Democratic Convention and transitional government should lead to the creation of a new constitution, and in the context of this new constitution, new elections should be held. The pain that this process will bring to the country will be less than the damage that would be caused by a civil war. The prophecy of the southeast is valid for the entire country. We can learn from what has already occurred so that there is less pain during the birth of the new Mexico.

The EZLN has its idea of what system and proposal are best for the country. The political maturity of the EZLN as a representative of a sector of the nation

is shown by the fact that it doesn't want to impose its proposal upon the country. The EZLN demands what is shown by their example: the political maturity of Mexico and the right for all to decide, freely and democratically, the course that Mexico must take. Not only will a better and more just Mexico emerge from this historic synthesis, but a new Mexican as well. This is why we are gambling our lives: so that the Mexicans of the future can inherit a country in which it isn't shameful to live.

The EZLN, in a democratic exercise without precedent within an armed organization, consulted its component bases about whether or not to sign the peace accords presented by the Federal government. The indigenous bases of the EZLN, seeing that the central demands of democracy, freedom and justice have yet to be resolved, decided against signing the government's proposal.

Under siege and under pressure from different sectors that threatened us with extermination if the peace accords weren't signed, we Zapatistas reaffirmed our commitment to achieve a peace with justice and dignity. In our struggle, the dignified struggle of our ancestors has found a home. The cry of dignity of the insurgent Vicente Guerro, "Live for the country or die for freedom," once again sounds from our throats. We cannot accept an undignified peace.

Our path sprang out of the impossibility of struggling peacefully for our elemental rights as human beings. The most valuable of these rights is the right to decide, freely and democratically, what form the government will take. Now, the possibility of a peaceful change to democracy and freedom confronts a new test: the electoral process that will take place this August, 1994. There are those who are betting on the outcome of the elections and the post-election period. There are those who are predicting apathy and disillusionment. They hope to profit from the blood of those who fall in the struggle, both violent and peaceful, in the cities and in the countryside. They found their political project in the conflict they hope will come after the elections. They hope that the political demobilization will once again open the door to war. They say that they will save the country.

Others hope that the armed conflict will restart before the elections so that they can take advantage of the chaotic situation to perpetuate themselves in power. Just as they did before when they usurped popular will with electoral fraud, these people hope to take advantage of a pre-electoral civil war in order to prolong the agony of a dictatorship that has already lasted decades. There are others, sterile nay-sayers, who reason that war is inevitable and who are waiting to watch their enemy's cadaver float by. . . or their friend's cadaver. The sectarians suppose, erroneously, that just the firing of a gun will bring about the dawn that our people have waited for since night fell upon Mexican soil with the death of Villa and Zapata.

Every one of these people who steal hope suppose that behind our weapons are ambition and an agenda that will guide us to the future. They are wrong. Behind our weapons is another weapon: reason. Hope gives life to both of our weapons. We won't let them steal our hope.

The hope that came with the trigger came about at the beginning of the year. It is precisely now that the hope that comes with political mobilizations takes up

the protagonist's role that belong to it by right and reason. The flag is now in the hands of those who have names and faces, good and honest people who have the same goal that we yearn for. Our greetings to these men and women. You have our greetings and our hope that you can carry the flag to where it should be. We will be standing there waiting for you with dignity. If the flag should fall, we will be there to pick it up again. . .

Now is the time for hope to organize itself and to walk forward in the valleys and in the cities, as it did before in the mountains of the southeast. Fight with your weapons; don't worry about ours. We know how to resist to the last. We know how to wait. And we know what to do if the doors through which dignity walk close once again.

This is why we address our brothers in different non- governmental organizations, in peasant and indigenous organizations, workers in the cities and in the countryside, teachers and students, housewives and squatters, artists and intellectuals, members of independent political parties, Mexicans.

We call you all to a national dialogue with the theme of democracy, freedom and justice. For this reason, we put forward the following invitation to a National Democratic Convention:

We, the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, fighting to achieve the democracy, freedom and justice that our country deserves and considering that:

One: The supreme government has usurped the legality that we inherited from the heroes of the Mexican Revolution.

Two: The constitution that exists doesn't reflect the popular will of the Mexican people.

Three: The resignation of Federal Executive usurper isn't enough and that a new law is necessary for the new country that will be born from the struggles of all honest Mexicans.

Four: Every form of struggle is necessary in order to achieve the transition to democracy in Mexico.

Considering these things, we call for a sovereign and revolutionary National Democratic Convention from which will come a transition government and a new national law, a new constitution that will guarantee the legal fulfillment of the people's will.

This sovereign revolutionary convention will be national in that it all states of the federation will be represented. It will be plural in the sense that all patriotic sectors will be represented. It will be democratic in the way in which it will make decisions by national consultations.

The convention will be presided over, freely and voluntarily by civilians, prestigious public figures, regardless of their political affiliation, race, religion,

sex or age.

The convention will be launched by local, state and regional committee in every ejido, settlement, school and factory. These committees of the convention will be in charge of collecting the people's proposals for the new constitution and the demands to be completed by the new government that comes out of the convention.

The convention should demand free and democratic elections and should fight for the people's will to be respected.

The Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional will recognize the National Democratic Convention as the authentic representative of the interests of the Mexican people in their transition to democracy.

The Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional is now to be found throughout national territory and is in a position to offer itself to the Mexican people as an army to guarantee that the people's will is carried out.

For the first meeting of the National Democratic Convention, the EZLN offers as a meeting-place a Zapatista settlement with all of the resources to be found there.

The date and place of the first session of the National Democratic Convention will be announced when it is opportune to do so.

Brother Mexicans:

Our struggle continues. The Zapatista flag still waves in the southeastern mountains of Mexico and today we say: We will not surrender!

Facing the mountains we speak to our dead so that their words will guide us along the path that we must walk.

The drums sound, and in the voices from the land we hear our pain and our history.

"Everything for everyone," say our dead. "While this is not true, there will be nothing for us."

Find in your hearts the voices of those for whom we fight. Invite them to walk the dignified path of those who have no faces. Call them to resist. Let no one receive anything from those who rule. Ask them to reject the handouts from the powerful. Let all the good people in this land organize with dignity. Let them resist and not sell-out.

Don't surrender! Resist! Resist with dignity in the lands of the true men and women! Let the mountains shelter the pain of the people of this land. Don't surrender! Resist! Don't sell-out! Resist!

Our dead spoke these words from their hearts. We have seen that the words of our dead are good, that there is truth in what they say and dignity in their counsel. For this reason we call on our brother Mexicans to resist with us. We

call on the indigenous peasants to resist with us. We call on the workers, squatters, housewives, students, teachers, intellectuals, writers, on all those with dignity to resist with us. The government doesn't want democracy in our land. We will accept nothing that comes from the rotting heart of the government, not a single coin nor a single dose of medication, not a single stone nor a single grain of food. We will not accept the handouts that the government offers in exchange for our dignity.

We will not take anything from the supreme government. Although they increase our pain and sorrow, although death may accompany us, although we may see others selling themselves to the hand that oppresses them, although everything may hurt and sorrow may cry out from the rocks, we will not accept anything. We will resist. We will not take anything from the government. We will resist until those who are power exercise their power while obeying the people's will.

Brothers:

Don't sell-out. Resist with us. Don't surrender. Resist with us. Repeat along with us, "We will not surrender! We will resist!" Let these words be heard not only in the mountains of the southeast of Mexico, but in the north and on the peninsulas. Let it be heard on both coasts. Let it be heard in the center of the country. Let it cry out in the valleys and in the mountains. Let it sound in the cities and in the countryside. Unite your voices, brothers. Cry out with us: "We will not surrender! We will resist!"

Let dignity break the siege and lift off us the filthy hands with which the government is trying to strangle us. We are all under siege. They will not let democracy, freedom and justice enter Mexican territory. Brothers, we are all under siege. We will not surrender! We will resist! We have dignity! We will not sell-out!

What good are the riches of the powerful if they aren't able to buy the most valuable thing in these lands? If the dignity of the Mexican people has no price, then what good is the power of the powerful?

Dignity will not surrender!
Dignity will resist!

Democracy! Freedom! Justice!
From the mountains of southeastern Mexico
Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous Committee - General Command of the
Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional
Mexico
June, 1994

The Third Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle: 1/1/95

Clandestine Indigenous Revolutionary Committee--General Command of the Zapatista National Liberation Army.

One year after the Zapatista uprising, today we say:

"The motherland lives! And she is ours! We have been disgraced, it is true; our luck has been bad many times, but the cause of Mexico, which is the cause of the people's rights and justice, has not succumbed; it has not died and it will not die because there still exist committed Mexicans, in whose hearts burns the sacred fire of patriotism. Wherever in the Republic weapons are clenched and the national banner flies, there, as well as here, will exist, with vitality and energy, the protest of Right against Force.

Understanding well the gullible man who has accepted the sad mission of being the instrument for enslaving a free people: his vacillating throne does not rest on the free will of the nation, but rather on the blood and cadavers of thousands of Mexicans who have been sacrificed without reason and only because they defend their freedom and their rights.

Mexicans: those who have the disgrace to live under the dominion of the usurpers, do not resign yourselves to putting up with the yoke of oppression that weighs on you. Do not delude yourselves with the perfidious insinuations of the followers of the consummated deeds, because they are and have been always the followers of despotism. The existence of arbitrary power is a permanent violation of people's rights and Justice, which neither the passage of time nor arms can ever justify, and whose destruction is necessary to honor Mexico and humanity.

I declare myself: in action and deeds, just as resolute as in the first day."

Benito Juarez, January 1865, Chihuahua

To the people of Mexico:
To the peoples and governments of the world:
Brothers and sisters:

The first day of January of 1994 we released the "First Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle". The 10th of June of 1994 we released the "Second Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle". First one and then the other were inspired by the fervor of the struggle for democracy, liberty and justice for all Mexicans.

In the first one we called upon the Mexican people to take up arms against the bad government, as the principal obstacle to the transition to democracy in our country. In the second one we called Mexicans to a civic and peaceful effort. This was the National Democratic Convention, which was to achieve the profound changes that the nation demanded.

While the supreme government demonstrated its falseness and haughtiness,

we, by one gesture after another, dedicated ourselves to showing the Mexican people our social base, the justness of our demands and the dignity that motivated our struggle. Our weapons were laid down, and were put aside so that the legal struggle could demonstrate its possibilities...and limitations. In the "Second Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle" the EZLN attempted, by all means, to avoid the re-initiation of hostilities and to look for a political, dignified and just solution to resolve the demands contained in the 11 points of our program for struggle: housing, land, work, food, health, education, justice, independence, liberty, democracy and peace.

The pre-electoral process in August 1994 brought hope to many sectors of the country, that the transition to democracy was possible by means of the electoral process. Knowing that elections are not, in the current conditions, the road to democratic change, the EZLN accepted being put to one side in order to give legal political opposition forces the opportunity to struggle. The EZLN pledged its word and its effort, then, to seeking a peaceful transition to democracy. In the National Democratic Convention the EZLN sought a civic and peaceful force. One which, without opposing the electoral process, would also not be consumed by it, and that would seek new forms of struggle which would include more democratic sectors in Mexico as well as linking itself with democratic movements in other parts of the world. August 21 ended the illusions of an immediate change through peaceful means. An electoral process that is corrupt, immoral, unfair and illegitimate culminated in a new mockery of the good will of the citizens. The party-State system reaffirmed its antidemocratic vocation and imposed, in all parts and at all levels, its arrogance. In the face of an unprecedented level of voter participation, the Mexican political system opted for imposition and cut off, therefore, the hopes for the electoral process. Reports from the National Democratic Convention, the Civic Alliance, and the Commission for Truth brought to light what the mass media had hidden, with shameful complicity: a gigantic fraud. The multitude of irregularities, the inequity, the corruption, the cheating, the intimidation, the robbery and the lying--they made the elections the dirtiest ones in Mexico's history. The high absentee rates in the local elections in Veracruz, Tlaxcala, and Tabasco showed that skepticism would reign within civil society in Mexico. Not satisfied with this, the Party/State system repeated the fraud of August, imposing governors, mayors and local congresses. As at the end of the 19th century, when the traitors held "elections" to justify the French intervention, today it is said that the nation greets with approval the continuation of an authoritarian imposition. The electoral process of August 1994 is a State crime. They should be judged as criminals and held responsible for this mockery.

On the other side, gradualism and hesitation appear in the lines of the opposition who accept a perception of this great fraud as a series of small "irregularities". A great dilemma in the struggle for democracy in Mexico reappears: the civic struggle bets upon a transition "without pain", a final blow which will light the road to democracy, and only prolongs the agony.

The case of Chiapas is only one of the consequences of this political system. Ignoring the longings of the people of Chiapas, the government repeats its dosage of imposition and domination.

Confronted by a broad movement of repudiation, the Party/state system opts

to repeat to society the lie of its triumph and to exacerbate the confrontations. The present polarization in southeastern Mexico is the responsibility of the government and demonstrates its incapacity to resolve, at their roots, the political and social problems of Mexico. Through corruption and repression they try to resolve a problem that can only be solved when the legitimate triumph of the will of the people of Chiapas is recognized. The EZLN has maintained itself, until now, at the margins of the popular mobilizations, even though they have been subjected to a great campaign of defamation and indiscriminate repression.

Waiting for signs of the government's willingness to accept a political, just and dignified solution to the conflict, the EZLN watched, powerlessly, as the best sons and daughters of the dignity of Chiapas were assassinated, jailed and threatened. The EZLN watched as their indigenous brothers in Guerrero, Oaxaca, Tabasco, Chihuahua and Veracruz were repressed and received mockery as an answer to their demands for a solution to their living conditions.

During all of this period the EZLN resisted not only the military blockade and the threats and the intimidations by federal forces; but also resisted a campaign of slander and lies. As during the first days of 1994, they accused us of receiving foreign military support and financing; they tried to force us to give up our flags in exchange for money and government posts; they tried to delegitimize our struggle by reducing the national problem to a local indigenous context.

Meanwhile the supreme government prepared a military solution for the indigenous rebellion in Chiapas and in the nation despair and impatience arose. Covered by an expressed desire for dialogue that only hid the desire to liquidate the Zapatista movement through asphyxiation, the bad government let time and death run rampant through the indigenous communities in the country.

Meanwhile the Revolutionary Institutional Party, the political arm of organized crime and drug traffickers, went into its most acute phase of decomposition, by resorting to assassination as the method of solving its internal conflicts. Incapable of a civilized dialogue within its own party, the PRI bloodied the national soil. The shame of seeing the national colors usurped by the emblem of the PRI continues for all Mexicans.

The government and the country again forgot the original inhabitants of these lands. Cynicism and laziness returned to take possession of the sentiments of the Nation. Along with their rights to the minimal conditions of life with dignity, the indigenous peoples were denied the right to govern and govern according to their own reason and will. The deaths of our members become useless. Seeing that they did not leave us with any other alternative, the EZLN risked breaking the military blockade that surrounded it, and marched with the help of other indigenous brothers, who were fed up with the despair and misery and tired of the peaceful means. Seeking at all costs to avoid bloodying Mexican soil with the brothers' blood, the EZLN saw itself obliged to call the Nation's attention anew to the grave conditions of Mexican indigenous life. We called attention especially to those who supposedly had received government help, and yet continue living in the misery that they inherited, year after year, for more than

five centuries. With the offensive in December 1994, the EZLN sought to show, to Mexico and to the world, its proud indigenous essence and the impossibility of resolving the local situation without simultaneous profound changes in the political, economic and social relations throughout the country.

The indigenous question will not have a solution if there is not a RADICAL transformation of the national pact. The only means of incorporating, with justice and dignity, the indigenous of the Nation, is to recognize the characteristics of their own social, political and cultural organization. Autonomy is not separation; it is integration of the most humble and forgotten minorities of contemporary Mexico. This is how the EZLN understood the issue since its founding, and this is how the indigenous communities who make up the leadership of our organization have defined it.

Today we repeat: OUR STRUGGLE IS NATIONAL

We have been criticized for asking for too much. We, the Zapatistas, it is said, should be satisfied with the handouts that the bad government offers us. Those who are willing to die for a just and legitimate cause have the right to ask for everything. We Zapatistas are willing to give up the only thing we have, life, to demand democracy, liberty and justice for all Mexicans.

Today we reaffirm: FOR EVERYONE, EVERYTHING, NOTHING FOR US! At the end of 1994 the economic farce with which Salinas had deceived the Nation and the international economy exploded. The nation of money called the grand gentlemen of power and arrogance to dinner, and they did not hesitate in betraying the soil and sky in which they prospered with Mexican blood. The economic crisis awoke Mexicans from the sweet and stupefying dream of entry into the first world. The nightmare of unemployment, scarcity and misery will now be even more wearing for the majority of Mexicans.

1994, the year that has just ended, has just shown the real face of the brutal system that dominates us. The economic, political, social and repressive program of neo-liberalism has demonstrated its inefficiency, its deceptions, and the cruel injustice that is its essence. Neoliberalism as a doctrine and as a reality should be flung into the trash heap of national history.

BROTHERS AND SISTERS:

Today, in the middle of this crisis, decisive action by all honest Mexicans is necessary in order to achieve a real and profound change in the destinies of the Nation.

Today, after having called first to arms and later to a civic and peaceful struggle, we call the people of Mexico to struggle BY ALL MEANS, AT ALL LEVELS, AND IN ALL PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, for democracy, liberty and justice, by means of this...

III DECLARATION OF THE LACANDON JUNGLE

We call upon all social and political forces of the country, to all honest Mexicans, to all of those who struggle for the democratization of the national

reality, to form a NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT, including the National Democratic Convention and ALL forces, without distinction by religious creed, race or political ideology, who are against the system of the State party. This National Liberation Movement will struggle from a common accord, by all means, at all levels, for the installation of a transitional government, a new constitutional body, a new constitution, and the destruction of the system of the Party- State. We call upon the National Democratic Convention and citizen Cuahtemoc Cardenas Solorzano to head up this National Liberation Movement, as a broad opposition front.

WE CALL UPON THE WORKERS OF THE REPUBLIC, THE WORKERS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE AND THE CITIES, THE NEIGHBORHOOD RESIDENTS, THE TEACHERS AND THE STUDENTS OF MEXICO, THE WOMEN OF MEXICO, THE YOUNG PEOPLE OF THE WHOLE COUNTRY, THE HONEST ARTISTS AND INTELLECTUALS, THE RESPONSIBLE RELIGIOUS MEMBERS, THE COMMUNITY- BASED MILITANTS OF THE DIFFERENT POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, to take up the means and forms of struggle that they consider possible and necessary, to struggle for the end of the Party-State system, incorporating themselves into the NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION if they do not belong to a party, and to the National Liberation Movement if they are active in any of the political opposition forces.

For now, in keeping with the spirit of this Ili DECLARATION OF THE LACANDON JUNGLE, we declare:

FIRST--that from the federal government custody of the Motherland be taken. The Mexican flag, the justice system of the Nation, the Mexican Hymn, and the National Emblem will now be under the care of the resistance forces until legality, legitimacy and sovereignty are restored to all of the national territory.

SECOND--The original Political Constitution of the United Mexican States is declared valid, as written on the 5th of February of 1917, with the incorporation of the Revolutionary Laws of 1993 and inclusion of the Statutes of Autonomy for the indigenous regions, and will be held as valid until a new constitutional body is installed and a new constitution is written.

THIRD--We call for the people of Mexico to struggle for recognition for "the transitional governments to democracy". These shall be social and political organizations, as they are defined by the distinct communities for themselves, which maintain the federal pact agreed upon in the 1917 Constitution, and which are included, without regard for religious creed, social class, political ideology, race, or sex, in the National Liberation Movement.

The EZLN will support the civilian population in the task of restoring the legality, order, legitimacy and national sovereignty, and in the struggle for the formation and installation of a national transitional government for democracy with the following characteristics:

1. The liquidation of the system of Party-State and really separates the government from the PRI
2. The reform of the electoral law in terms that guarantees: clean elections,

legitimacy, equity, non-partisan and non- governmental citizen participation, recognition of all national, regional and local political forces, and that convenes new general elections in the federation.

3. The convening of a constitutional body for the creation of a new constitution

4. The recognition of the particularities of the indigenous groups, recognizing their right to inclusive autonomy and citizenship

5. The re-orientation of the national economic program, putting aside lies and deceptions, and favoring the most dispossessed sectors in the country, the workers and the peasants, who are the principal producers of the wealth that others appropriate.

BROTHERS AND SISTERS:

Peace will come hand in hand with democracy, liberty and justice for all Mexicans. Our path cannot find a peace with justice which our dead demand, if it is at the cost of our Mexican dignity. The earth does not rest; it walks in our hearts. The mockery to our dead demands that we struggle to wash away their shame. We will resist. The oppression and the arrogance will be overthrown.

As with Benito Juarez in the face of French intervention, the Motherland marches today at the side of the patriotic forces, against the anti-democratic forces and authorities. Today we say:

The Motherland lives! And she is ours! Democracy! Liberty! Justice!
 From the mountains of Southeastern Mexico
 Clandestine Indigenous Revolutionary Committee--General Command of the
 Zapatista National Liberation Army
 Mexico, January 1995