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MANAGING DISSENT: STATE CAPACITY, DEMOCRACY, AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN MEXICO

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A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science.

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ABSTRACT

HEATHER SULLIVAN: Managing Dissent: State Capacity, Democracy, and Contentious Politics in Mexico
(Under the direction of Evelyne Huber and Graeme Robertson)

This dissertation is an exploration of protest and its management in Mexico. It seeks to understand not only the factors that increase the likelihood of protest success, but also those that increase violence – either on the part of state actors in the form of protest event repression or on the part of protesters in the form of protest violence. The central argument is that state capacity plays a key role in shaping protest and its management. Protest management is a complex task, requiring institutional resources and skilled state authorities. In short, state agents must know when and how to intervene. When states have high capacity they are better able to avoid violence and employ a conciliatory approach. When states lack capacity, protest management tends to break down, making both repression and violence on the part of protesters more likely. The argument is tested using original micro-level data on Mexican protest events and responses, and leverages within-country variations in democracy and state capacity. In making the argument, the study also makes a case for a particular conception of state capacity, emphasizing the state's ability to penetrate society and implement binding rules. I demonstrate that there is a greater likelihood of concessions in high capacity states, while repression and protest violence are more likely in low capacity states.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the Arab Spring, the Occupy movement, and recent protests across Europe and the former Soviet states, political protest and state responses to it are firmly back on the agenda of comparative politics. Protests can have wide-ranging consequences, including facilitating democratization (Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Tilly 2004, 2006; Wood 2000) and holding democratic governments accoun

(Levine and Molina 2011; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2003). Protests can expose governmental malfeasance, potentially goad other state actors, such as the judiciary, into punishing governmental wrong-doings, and can also put issues ignored by state elites onto the political agenda – especially in many new democracies where democratic quality is low (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006). Yet protest is not uniformly successful and mobilization can be met with many responses other than reform (Andrews 2004; Fuentes 2006; Schock 2005). This dissertation seeks to understand, on the one hand, the factors that increase the likelihood of protest success (concessions) and, on the other, what factors increase violence – either on the part of state actors in the form of protest event repression or on the part of protesters in the form of protest violence.

The central argument of my dissertation is that state capacity plays a key role in shaping protest and its management. In this study, high capacity states are conceptualized as those having "the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all

the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a given territory" (Migdal 1988, 19). In order to effectively do this, states need not only institutional capacity, but must also have the capacity to penetrate civil society (Mann 1986; Migdal 1988). This conceptualization of state capacity is particularly apt for a study of protest management since scholars of contentious politics have noted that the state's administrative and rule-making capacity (Jenkins 1995), or put more specifically, the state's legal system (Lipsky 1969) are amongst the most salient elements of state capacity for protesting groups. Therefore, I measure state capacity in terms of the resources, abilities, and penetration of the legal system.

Scholars of democratic transition and consolidation have noted that high levels of state capacity are necessary for the consolidation of democracy (Bunce 2000; Diamond 1999; Linz and Stepan 1996); and others have noted high levels of capacity can be equally useful for consolidating authoritarian regimes (Alexander 2008; Levitsky and Way 2010). Thus, state capacity clearly conditions the ability of state elites – be they democratic or authoritarian – to achieve political goals. I argue that state capacity also has a strong influence on state management of protest. When states are faced with protest, state authorities not only need to accurately assess the contours of protest in order to decide if intervention is necessary and what kind of intervention is appropriate, but they must be able to effectively carry out their chosen strategy. Doing so effectively requires state authorities to correctly identify protest leaders and salient demands, facilitate negotiations, ensure protesters' safety from arrest during negotiations, and offer credible concessions. In sum, managing protest peacefully requires considerable manpower and administrative skills.

In contrast, social movements scholars have focused on the ways that certain elements of state weakness, such as splits in elites or lowered capacities for repression, represent opportunities for protesters (McAdam 1996; Meyer 2004; Tarrow 1998). Perhaps because these studies have focused primarily on the emergence, behavior, and trajectory of social movements, they have tended to see state weakness as beneficial for movements. In fact, in their explanation of levels of mobilization, Goldstone and Tilly (2001) take it as a given that "the probability of success depends on state weakness" (184). While there is evidence to support this claim when looking at revolutionary success (Goodwin 2001; Skocpol 1979), successful revolutions, unlike other types of collective action, involve the collapse of the old state. To better understand protest, we should not only pay more attention to state techniques of managing protest, but should also question the near ubiquitous idea that weaker states necessarily represent propitious contexts for protest success.

In the first chapter, I look specifically at concessions, analyzing them as a tactic used and facilitated by state elites in order to get protesters out of the street. The state is positioned "at the center of political conflicts" (Jenkins and Klandermans 1995, 5) irrespective of a protest's target. As such, the state's role in maintaining public order, facilitating negotiations, and enforcing agreements is critical to the use of concessions as a tactic of protest management. As Oberschall (1973) points out, this is no small task, because the "conciliatory enterprise" is complicated with numerous points for breakdown (264). Where state capacity is weak, state actors will be less capable of carrying out the activities of protest management, making the use of concessions – which requires some degree of conciliation and enforcement capacity – a less feasible management tactic. I

find that that protests taking place in higher capacity states as well as those taking place in more democratic states are more likely to extract acceptable concessions, suggesting that both state capacity and regime type condition the use of concessions, affecting responsiveness to civil society demands.

In the second chapter, I turn to the other side of the spectrum: repression. The most robust finding in quantitative studies of repression is that consolidated democracies are less repressive than other regime types. Democracy's pacifying effects, which have been termed the "domestic democratic peace" (Davenport 2007), result in fewer violations of civil liberties, such as freedom of the press and of speech (Davenport 1995, 2007) and reductions in human rights violations, such as political imprisonment and other types of political violence (Davenport 2007; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Poe and Tate 1994). However this relationship tends to break down in the face of dissent which is thought to provoke repression (Davenport 1995, 2007; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Regan and Henderson 2002). When looking specifically at repression of protest events, I find that democracy is not a salient factor for explaining repressive responses to protest. Instead, I argue that state capacity is linked to repression of protest in large part because elites do not rely solely on coercion to manage dissent. Protest management requires manpower and coordination; when states lack capacity, protest management tends to break down, making repression more likely. I demonstrate that states lacking capacity end up relying more heavily on coercion to manage protest (see also Jackman 1993; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 2006).

Finally, I explore a clear failure of protest management: protest violence. Here, too, democracy has been a principal explanatory factor used in theories explaining the

decline of protest violence, yet there is little empirical evidence to support this claim. While regime type should be expected to color the rules surrounding what types of protest are tolerated and forbidden, it is the state's capacity for protest management that strongly conditions the forms protest takes. Historical studies of the evolution of protest in Europe suggest that the increasing penetration of the state in the private life of citizens had an important effect on protest tactics. As states gained in capacity, "ordinary people began turning to courts and police" (Tilly 2003) instead of taking matters into their own hands or turning to nonstate authorities. In the process of state building the modern police were born, which led not only to a more effective internal coercive apparatus, but importantly also to "the penetration and continual presence of central political authority throughout daily life" (Silver 1967, 12-13). As the state became more complicated and more deeply penetrated the lives of its citizens, the state was able to engage in more complicated protest management. Thus, protesters were induced or compelled by the state officials directly involved in local protest management to shed the direct, often violent, tactics of the past (Tilly 1979). As such, increases in state capacity also played a significant role in reducing violent protest.

To test my arguments, I use a subnational research design that leverages within-country variations in democracy and state capacity, matches the level of analysis to the level of government at which protest management is carried out, and allows for the collection of original micro-data. My original database of Mexican protest events preserves detailed information on all facets of events and responses. The data are built from newspaper articles collected using keyword searches from an online news aggregator. The database currently includes 1219 events along with responses by elites

and groups of counter-protesters. The data were entered in narrative form, preserving the particularities of each event and response, capturing event-response sequences, and allowing for fine-grained tests of theories. In addition, the use of multiple news sources minimizes political bias.

Mexico was selected as the case for this study because it is a federal system divided into thirty one states and a federal district and, although formally democratic at the national level after 2000, there is considerable variation in regime type (Gibson 2005; Giraudy 2009, 2010) and state capacity (Magaloni and Zepeda 2004; Uildriks 2010) at the subnational level. While many scholars conceptualize and measure regime type and state capacity at the national level, less attention has been paid to the fact that both exhibit substantial subnational variation. Recent literature on federal countries, specifically in Latin America, shows that subnational undemocratic regimes exist, and sometimes flourish, within nationally democratic countries (Gervasoni 2010; Gibson 2005; Giraudy 2009, 2010). In fact, several studies have measured the within country regime variations, showing them to be quite significant (Gervasoni 2010; Giraudy 2009, 2010). Likewise, there is evidence that important differences in state capacity are also seen within a single country, although there has been much less progress in terms of empirically measuring these subnational differences (Goodwin 2001; O'Donnell 1993; Taylor 2011).

CHAPTER 2

WHEN ELITES CONCEDE: STATE CAPACITY, PROTEST LEGIBILITY, AND THE MANAGEMENT OF DISSENT IN MEXICO

In both the scholarly and popular imagination, when conjuring successful protests we tend to think of those occurring in the context of major social upheaval – the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, the Eastern European revolutions of 1989, or Egyptians toppling the Mubarak regime. Protests that overthrow regimes are not only dramatic and history-changing, but also clear instances of success. But protests take place every day across the globe and some succeed in getting some or all of their demands met. These more mundane acts of protest that manage to extract concessions from elites provide a lens with which to view the responsiveness of political systems of all stripes, especially in places with deep inequality, to popular demands. In addition, these ordinary acts of protest represent instances in which protesters and elites are not playing zero-sum games as they are in revolutionary situations, so concessions represent a potentially useful tool in the state's repertoire of tactics for managing dissent. As such, these protests with their much more limited or qualified successes provide an interesting opportunity to explore the factors leading to the use of concessions in protest management.

The role of the average citizen in pressuring the government to respond to her preferences and concerns has been an enduring source of contention among social scientists. Dahl (1971) asserted that a key characteristic of democracy was a near complete responsiveness to its citizens. Yet he also noted in the context of the United

States, an advanced, consolidated democracy, that the "actual influence of the average citizen" over decisions is quite small (Dahl 1961, 305). Dahl acknowledged this "slack in the system," but argued that it stems from a benign lack of participation by ordinary citizens busy with work and desirous of leisure and, therefore, does not represent a problem for democracy. If it were merely apathy, however, we would expect that when citizens did engage, they would be able to elicit substantive responses. Yet looking at one form of citizen engagement, protest, as a way in which relatively powerless groups can assert their demands and attempt to enter the policy-making process, we see that their success is far from certain even in democratic regimes (see, for example, Lipsky 1968; 1969).

In spite of a robust social science literature on social movements and protest, the study of protest's consequences remains underdeveloped (for reviews of the relevant literature, see, for example, Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander 1995; Giugni 1999). In part, the difficulty in creating a coherent theory of protest's impact stems from the many ways successful outcomes can be conceptualized, including achieving broad policy or structural changes, extracting material rewards, eliciting symbolic rewards or recognition, changing culture, or impacting the life course of participants. To address the difficulty in defining movement success, some focus specifically on protest groups' own aspirations (Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander 1995; Gamson 1975). Burstein et al (1995) argue that delimiting success to the achievement of a group's own "formally stated objectives" allows for greater comparability across studies and movements and permits goals to be defined and measured through public sources, such as the media. Importantly, they also argue that these formal objectives are substantively important since they tend to be the

ones that occasion consideration by targets and third party audiences. Another factor constraining the study of outcomes is that most studies have used protest groups as the unit of analysis, creating problems of categorization since movements are inherently dynamic with tactical choices, alliances, levels of organization, etc. varying across time and space. This problem can be mitigated to some extent by using protest events rather than protest groups as the unit of analysis (see, for example, Kowalewski 1980; Kowalewski and Schumaker 1981; O'Keefe and Schumaker 1983).

The study of protest, in general, and successful protest, in particular, requires consideration of the role played by the state. Social movements scholars using a political process approach put considerable weight on the effects of non-movement variables related to the state including, but not limited to, the openness or closure of the political system, elite alignments, and the state's capacity to repress (for comprehensive explanations of the political opportunity approach, see McAdam 1996; Meyer 2004; Tarrow 1998). Perhaps because these studies have focused primarily on the emergence, behavior, and trajectory of social movements, they have tended to see state weakness as beneficial for social movements. In fact, in their explanation of levels of mobilization, Goldstone and Tilly (2001) take it as a given that "the probability of success depends on state weakness" (184). There is evidence to support this claim when looking at revolutionary success (Goodwin 2001; Skocpol 1979), but unlike other types of collective action, successful revolutions, by definition, involve the collapse of the old state. While the role played by the state in the success of non-revolutionary protests is a particularly understudied area within the literature on social movement outcomes, Kitschelt (1986) provides a notable exception, arguing that "substantive gains are least likely to be found

in weak regimes, be they open or closed" (67). To understand the successful protest outcomes, we should not only pay more attention to the role of the state, but should also question the near ubiquitous idea that weaker states necessarily represent propitious contexts for protest success.

In this paper, as opposed to looking broadly at protest's impacts, I look specifically at concessions, analyzing them as a tactic used and facilitated by state elites in order to get protesters out of the street. The state is positioned "at the center of political conflicts" (Jenkins and Klandermans 1995, 5) and, as such, has a key role to play in protest management, maintaining public order, facilitating negotiations, and enforcing agreements. This is true irrespective of the protest's target. And as Oberschall (1973) points out, this is no small task, because the "conciliatory enterprise" is complicated with numerous points for breakdown (264). Therefore, I argue that where state capacity is weak, state actors will be less capable of carrying out the activities of protest management, making the use of concessions – which requires some degree of conciliation and enforcement capacity – a less feasible management tactic.

Furthermore, when state capacity is understood as central to protest management, characteristics that increase a protest's "legibility" (Scott 1998) simplify the state's task. Scott (1998) notes that because state officials face complex social realities, tools that simplify social practices into "a legible and administratively more convenient form" (3) facilitate officials' ability to carry out state functions. I suggest that institutionalized unions and the presence of elite allies are two features that make protests more legible to state officials. Officially recognized unions can use their institutional linkages to the state to help extract concessions. But their legibility is a double-edged sword; while it can

make concessions more likely, it can also lead to a moderation of demands. Furthermore, I suggest that elite allies do not necessarily represent a weak state nor do they simply imply access to additional resources; rather, when state elites support protests, they facilitate the bargaining process since they speak the language of the state, something that many protest leaders do not (on the problem of protest leaders entering the bargaining arena, see Lipsky 1969).

I test this theory of protest outcomes using an original dataset of responses to protest in Mexico. The dataset provides unique micro-data on all reported protest event characteristics as well as the full range of responses from protest targets, state agents, and non-state actors playing a managing role (i.e. counter-protesters, unidentified violent actors, etc.). I show that state capacity and protest legibility are important determinants of the successful use of concessions in protest management even when controlling for many of the other potential variables that have been found to influence protest success, including a protest's disruptive power, radical demands, distance from the target, and repressive responses to protest. In addition, I show that democratic governments, while far from Dahl's ideal of responsiveness, are more likely to use concessions to manage protest than their nondemocratic counterparts. The paper proceeds as follows: the first section develops the theory of concessions as a tool of protest management; the next two sections provide an elaboration of the research design and description of the measures; the hypotheses are then tested using a logit analysis with protest events as the unit of analysis; finally, I present some concluding remarks.

Explaining Concessions

State capacity is fundamental to the granting of concessions in response to protest, at heart, because the state is central to all conflicts that enter the public sphere. Once a conflict engages wider publics, it becomes political and its management is pushed into the purview of state authorities (Schattschneider [1960] 1975).[1] When protest erupts, the state's role is complex and multifaceted, with the state serving not only as a target for protest, but also as "sponsor and antagonist…as well as the organizer of the political system and the arbiter of victory" (Jenkins and Klandermans 1995, 3). Regardless of the target of protest, the state plays a role in protest outcomes. For example, at its simplest, the state, as a protest target, may grant concessions, but it also may affect the use of concessions by refraining from applying coercion or pressuring private sector elites into offering concessions (Piven and Cloward 1979). Protest management is strongly influenced by the administrative and rule-making capacity of the state, which Jenkins (1995) argues is the arena of state action "most directly relevant for social movements" (23). Where state capacity is weak, the ability of state authorities to accurately identify the interests at stake, successfully recognize and reach out to protest leaders, facilitate negotiations, and enforce agreements is compromised, making concessions less likely to prove an available or effective protest management tactic.

There are, however, characteristics of some protest events that partially mitigate the challenges of protest management, especially for low capacity states. Protest management is a difficult task for state authorities in large part because protesting groups tend to be "amorphous and heterogeneous" (Oberschall 1973, 244), often lacking clear

[1] Schattschneider ([1960] 1975) refers to this as "socializing conflict" and notes that this tactic is potentially useful for weak groups who may not be able to win conflicts without broadening the bargaining arena and calling on public authorities.

leaders, at times failing to articulate clear demands, and using tactics that are not entirely predictable. This tends to make protest, in James Scott's terms, "illegible" to state authorities, serving to hinder "effective intervention by the state" (Scott 1998, 78). Indeed while one important goal of statecraft is to standardize the "chaotic, disorderly, constantly changing social reality" (Scott 1998, 82) into more easily administrable forms, these attempts are never wholly achieved. When protests are made more legible, the state's capacity for managing them is amplified; when they remain illegible, state interventions will be "necessarily crude" (Scott 1998, 77).

While scholars of social movements have not used the term legibility with respect to protest or movements, the institutionalization of labor unions and collective bargaining is perhaps the most significant way that states have made protests more legible. The institutionalization of labor facilitates the state's ability to more accurately assess conflicts and pushes confrontations into an arena backed by law. This can positively affect outcomes in several ways. First, "officials are bound by law and by public opinion to recognize these leaders as legitimate representatives of larger groups who must be received, listened to, bargained with in good faith…[and] a concrete sequence of steps and appeals is spelled out for resolving outstanding differences" (Oberschall 1973, 267). As Oberschall (1973) nicely sums up, once protest is institutionalized, "the question of whom to negotiate with, when, under what rules, and which issues, is answered with reference to rights, to laws, to precedent" (267). Authorities are exempted from the complex task of identifying a leader who can speak for and negotiate on behalf of the protest group, and debates over procedural issues do not complicate the substantive conflict at hand. In essence, institutionalizing unions and collective bargaining provides

state authorities with “a legible bureaucratic formula” (Scott 1998, 45) that allows them to manage worker unrest. This legibility decreases the occasions in which the conciliatory approach is liable to breakdown, increasing its chances of success and making concessions more likely.

Yet there is another side to the legibility that comes with institutionalization. Scott (1998, 2009) is largely wary of state efforts to make social groups legible. While acknowledging that legibility can serve the purpose of increasing public welfare, he focuses his analyses on the ways that legibility serves the interests of those in power often at the expense of ordinary people. Scott is not alone in this concern. By institutionalizing labor movements, the chaotic, disruptive power of labor protest is channeled into a conflict that is “regulated and bounded with penalties to those who step out of the institutionalized channels” (Oberschall 1973, 245). For this reason, Piven and Cloward (1979), who see the success of protest as directly related to protest’s disruptive power, have railed against unionization in the United States, arguing that although unions have been good for workers in some regards, it is in spite of, not because of the official recognition of the right to unionize and bargain collectively. In fact, they argue that the loss of worker power arose because with the institutionalization of the labor movement, “it was government as much as the unions that organized workers” (Piven and Cloward 1979, 147).Thus, union legibility may prove to be a double edged sword, potentially preempting protest or pushing unions toward moderating their demands.

While institutionalizing collective bargaining may be one of the most comprehensive manners of making protest more legible, participation or support by state authorities can also serve to increase the legibility of a protest event. Protest leaders are

often skilled in mobilizing supporters and demonizing their opposition, but "protest militancy seems to be incompatible with securing the 'respect' of city officials and established civic leaders" (193). This is problematic both for protest leaders attempting to extract concessions and for state officials attempting a conciliatory approach. What results is a situation in which there "tends to be action with very little interaction – that is, very little bargaining" (Lowi 1971, 55). This problem is almost certainly compounded in new democracies or hybrid regimes where independent organizations are weak or nonexistent. In these contexts, protests come and go without developing into social movements (Robertson 2011), leaving little chance for leadership continuity that would allow protest leaders to develop the necessary skills to negotiate successfully with state authorities. In these types of regimes, current or former state elites who participate in or support protest events, can serve as effective arbiters, presenting demands to the appropriate authorities in a style accessible to other elites.[2] This is resonant with scholarship showing the importance of influential allies to movement success (Gamson 1975; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Tarrow 1998), but differs in a crucial respect. These studies assume that influential allies shift the balance of power, strengthening a relatively resource poor movement in relation to a more powerful target. But since concessions may be a useful and desirable tool of protest management, influential allies should be seen not simply as providing resources that shift the balance of power, but importantly, as a conduit between protest groups and state authorities. In this respect, influential allies serve to make protest events more legible to the state.

[2] Robertson (2011) has shown that regional elites in Russia mobilized protest in an effort to extract concessions from the center and argues that these "noisy" bargaining strategies are more likely to result in mass actors demanding a share of the resources, he does not explore in what cases concessions are actually granted.

In addition to state capacity and protest legibility, regime type should be expected to influence the use of concessions for several reasons. First, the costs of repression are thought to be greater in democracies than in authoritarian regimes (see, for example, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Poe and Tate 1994), which leads Goldstone and Tilly (2001) to take as a given that concessions will be a more likely response to protest in democratic regimes. Second, concessions may be more likely in democracies because elections make leaders more responsive to citizen demands. As Cleary (2010) succinctly states, "while all regimes respond to some public interests some of the time, democracies are more responsive, more often" (62). Cleary, as well as Mueller (1992), argues that this responsiveness is not only (or in Mueller's case, primarily) due to elections, but is strongly related to non-electoral participation. Citizens in democracies have the right to, among other things, "complain, to petition, to organize, to protest, to demonstrate, to strike" (Mueller 1992, 984) and these actions will generate responses from the government. Clearly (2010) notes that politicians may fear, and therefore respond to, protest "not because of any worry about civil unrest or physical violence, but rather because it is a signal of how the vote may go in the next election" (71). Thus, more democratic regimes should be more likely to use and attempt to facilitate concessions as a tool of protest management.

Two additional factors – disruption and organization – have been shown to increase the likelihood of protest success and are particularly important to include when arguing that union power stems in large part from its legibility. The ability to disrupt has been considered to be a central, if not *the* central, component of protesting group's power (Gamson 1975; McAdam 1983; Piven and Cloward 1979). Gamson's (1975) influential

study on protest strategy finds that "unruly groups" – those using disruptive strategies, including those employing violence – have better than average success. While this is one factor among many for Gamson, Piven and Cloward (1979) go further, arguing that "the most useful way to think about the effectiveness of protest is to examine the disruptive effects on institutions…and then to examine the political reverberations of those disruptions" (24). In short, they argue that protests that do not or cannot use disruptive tactics will not succeed. While disruption is theoretically important to studies of concessions in its own right, Piven and Cloward also suggest that institutionalized unions' power is weakened by its links to the state and that unions' power exists only insofar as they are willing to flex their disruptive muscle.

Organization has also been argued to positively influence protest success, though its effect is quite contested. Gamson (1975) argues that the infrastructure provided by bureaucratic organization puts protest groups on more equal footing with their antagonists. Other scholars, however, have found that organizational attributes of protest groups do not impact success in achieving protest goals (Goldstone 1980; Mirowsky and Ross 1981). In spite of the mixed impact, it is important to consider organization because of the potential that the legibility of unions comes less from institutionalized links to the state and more from its nature as an organized group. If this were the case, one might expect organized civil society groups and associations to be as effective as unions in extracting concessions.

Finally, there are a number of factors – the articulation of radical demands, repression, and national-level targets – that have been argued to make concessions less likely. Gamson (1975) argued that radical demands hurt a group's chance of success,

noting that "there is some modest advantage in setting one's sights low" (49; see also, Mirowsky and Ross 1981). Gamson (1975) also shows that being the passive recipient of repression negatively impact chances of success. Finally, Cleary (2010) argues that extracting concessions from a national-level target requires large scale collective action and that the quotidian protests that do not achieve such grand scale are more likely to win concessions from local targets.

In sum, I argue that state capacity will influence the granting of concessions in response to protest because the conciliatory approach to protest management is complex, requiring state authorities to, among other things, effectively assess protests, apply leverage, and enforce binding commitments. Relatedly, protests that are more legible to state authorities will also be more likely to get concessions because they subsidize the process of negotiation, making it more likely that a concession agreeable to all parties can be agreed upon. Finally, I argue that more democratic regimes should be more likely to respond to protest with concessions because greater electoral accountability will make state authorities more likely to work to resolve citizen demands. I test these hypotheses in light of competing or complementary explanations that explain concessions with respect to protesters' use of disruptive tactics, their level of organization, the articulation of radical demands, the passive acceptance of repression, and the protest target. We should expect to see an increased likelihood of concessions in high-capacity states, in response to legible protests, and in more democratic states when controlling for the other relevant factors.[3]

[3] For a full list of variable descriptions and hypothesized effects, see Tables 1.1 and 1.2 (pp. 31-32).

Research Design: Protest and Response in Mexico

I test these hypotheses using an original dataset of protest and response in Mexico. Mexico is a new democracy and, like many new democracies, the formal, national level rules of the game are not fully operative throughout the country. There is considerable variation in regime type and state capacity across Mexican states, and the federal system gives subnational actors considerable legal leeway to control politics in their territorial arena. This is particularly important because protest, even when directed at a national target, must be managed where it physically occurs. The subnational design allows me to more closely match the level of analysis to the level of government at which protest management is carried out. Finally, the design allows for the collection of fine-grained micro-data. My dataset captures sequences of protest events along with all recorded responses across all Mexican states and preserves the rich and detailed information provided in news articles.

Mexico is an excellent case for a study of this sort because it is a federal system divided into thirty one states and a federal district. Each Mexican state has an executive, a state congress, and a judiciary – a structure that mirrors national politics to a large extent. In addition, the salience of state-level politics has increased in the last two decades as governors have become key players in Mexican politics (Cornelius 1999; Díaz-Cayeros 2004; Gibson 2005). Although formally democratic at the national level after 2000, there is considerable variation in regime type (Gibson 2005; Giraudy 2009, 2010) and state capacity (Magaloni and Zepeda 2004; Uildriks 2010) at the subnational level. While many scholars conceptualize and measure regime type and state capacity at the national

level, less attention has been paid to the fact that both exhibit substantial subnational variation.

Recent literature on federal countries, specifically in Latin America, shows that subnational undemocratic regimes exist, and sometimes flourish, within nationally democratic countries (Gervasoni 2010; Gibson 2005; Giraudy 2009, 2010). In fact, several studies have measured the within country regime variations, showing them to be quite significant (Gervasoni 2010; Giraudy 2009, 2010). This study makes use of Giraudy's (2009) indicator of subnational democracy in Mexico, which measures the following dimensions of democracy: executive turnover, executive and legislative contestation, and clean elections.

Likewise, there is evidence that important differences in state capacity are also seen within a single country, although there has been much less progress in terms of empirically measuring these subnational differences (Goodwin 2001; O'Donnell 1993; Taylor 2011). In this paper, high capacity states are conceptualized as those having "the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a given territory" (Migdal 1988, 19). In order to effectively do this, states need not only institutional capacity, but must also have the capacity to penetrate civil society (Mann 1986; Migdal 1988). This conceptualization of state capacity is particularly apt for a study of protest management since scholars of contentious politics have noted that the state's administrative and rule-making capacity (Jenkins 1995), or put more specifically, the state's legal system (Lipsky 1969) are amongst the most salient elements of state capacity for protesting groups. Therefore, I measure state capacity in terms of the resources, abilities, and penetration of

the state-level legal system in each Mexican state and the Federal District. The variation in subnational state capacity and democracy in the Mexican case is illustrated in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1: Democracy-Capacity Distribution



Many variables have been used to proxy some element of a state's capacity, such as GDP per capita (Fearon and Laitin 2003), the presence of lootable resources (Fearon 2005), military personnel per capita (Walter 2006), country risk assessments (DeRouen and Sobek 2004), and tax to GDP ratio (Thies 2005). These measures, however, are all quite removed from the state's actual ability to penetrate civil society and implement its decisions. Very direct measures of state capacity have been used in studies of individual protest movements, such as Lipsky's (1969) study of rent strikes in Harlem. Because his

study is so specific, he is able to explore the state's legal capacity, as well as the city agency, the Department of Buildings, which was responsible for addressing the grievances in this case. However, this type of specificity is only possible when studying a specific movement; looking across the range of protests would produce a dizzying array of agencies potentially relevant in addressing protest demands. Moving from the national to the subnational level allows for the construction of a more precise measure of state capacity. Moving from the movement to the state level, allows for an exploration of protest management across multiple types of protest and allows for the use of concepts that are broadly comparable to those used in cross-national research.

Mexico is also a particularly interesting place to explore the positive side of union institutionalization in large part because of its famous history of authoritarian corporatism. Mexico's labor movement was initially organized under the ruling party in the 1920s, and although the organization of labor gave them important powers, it came at the cost of "strong government control over labor affairs" (Bensusan 2004, 239). In fact, Mexico's shifted away from import substitution industrialization to neoliberal economic policies in the 1980s and 1990s, which eroded many of labor's previously won gains, was marked overall by restraint on the part of the traditional corporatist unions (Bensusan 2004; Murillo 2001). However, alongside the economic and political opening of the 1990s, the traditional authoritarian corporatist controls loosened, giving labor unions much greater autonomy (Cleary 2010; Grayson 1998; Samstad 2002). In spite of the recent changes away from unions serving, in practice, as vehicles to "discipline workers" (Bensusan 2004, 241), historically, Mexican unions have exhibited precisely the characteristics that so concerned Piven and Cloward – linkage to the state that

substantially truncated at least certain forms of labor's potential power. Mexico, then, provides a particularly tough case for a test of union legibility – the arbitration boards that settle labor disputes today are the ones codified under federal labor law in 1931 and might be expected to be as likely to represent the dark side of legibility as the version of legibility I have put forth.

The focus on a single case also allows for the collection of richer data. I constructed an original database of Mexican protest events that preserves detailed information on all facets of the events and responses (Sullivan Protest Response Database or SPRD). The data are built from newspaper articles collected using keyword searches from an online news aggregator called InfoLatina.[4] The data include detailed information on 1219 events, as well as all the protest management tactics used by elites or groups of counter-protesters in response to the protests. I employed a multi-pass coding strategy, which "greatly reduces the risk of duplicating events, facilitates reliable chronological ordering of information, and helps detect inconsistencies in the information found in different documents on the same event" (Franzosi 2004). In brief, in the first pass, irrelevant articles generated by the search were removed and bibliographic information was entered into the database; in the second, articles were sorted by event and labeled to prevent accidental duplication of an event; and, third the data was entered into the database. The data was entered in narrative form, preserving particularities included in the reporting. This allows for fine-grained tests of theories and allows the researcher to define analytical categories with reference to the specific research question at hand.

[4] InfoLatina aggregates information sent by news agencies, newspapers, on-line news groups, magazines, and government agencies. They do not edit the information they receive from their news providers; they simply aggregate what is sent.

Creating a protest database, especially a narrative database that links each event to tactics of event management, is extremely labor-intensive. Therefore tradeoffs must be made to narrow the scope of the data collected. Some scholars of protest choose to narrow the geographical scope to several cities or a single state, some use a single source, some only code protests from a single day during the week or month, some reduce the information from the articles that is coded, and some use a combination of these strategies (for a comprehensive discussion on sampling strategies, see Franzosi 2004). I chose to sacrifice the temporal coverage of events by only coding and analyzing six continuous months in order to preserve detailed information on each event, capture event-response sequences, and get a fuller picture of events and responses. While there is no reason to think that the character of the authorities' response to protest would be systematically different from one month to the next, the thicker descriptions that come from the use of multiple sources and the ability to follow coverage of an event over multiple days make the temporally limited, but continuous sample from multiple sources the ideal for studying responses to protest.

The sample is from 2005, which is an appropriate period from which to generalize for several reasons. First, I selected a year in which there is not a presidential election in order to avoid a period of high media attention on the national electoral contest that could be expected to crowd out other news. Second, and more important, the period predates the dramatic spike in drug violence that occurred in 2008 (Ríos and Shirk 2011). Because my key variable of interest is state capacity, the influence of narco-traffickers over state institutions – which is thought to be significant but is extremely difficult to measure –

would make the analysis far more context-specific. Thus, I chose a period prior to the spike in order to maintain a broader generalizability.

Newspapers were chosen as the data source primarily because they provide the most comprehensive accounts of protest events and the responses they generate. The media is crucially important to protest because, as Lipsky (1968) puts it, "like the tree falling unheard in the forest, there is no protest unless protest is perceived and projected" (1151). Activists make choices with an eye to how protest will be seen by wider publics, and in the contemporary world, protesters and their audience do not "interact directly… Rather, information about activist events is communicated through mass media" (Meyer 2007, 4). Indeed, Lipsky (1968, 1969) has argued that the media plays a crucial role not only in publicizing protest, but in publicizing the concessions granted. This is because part of protest's power lies in its ability to draw wider publics into the conflict, creating a situation in which protest targets are faced with appeasing both protesters and wider publics. Because protest broadens the sphere of conflict from the private to the public, a private concession could serve only the goal of appeasing protesters, but could not serve to appease wider publics.

In addition, newspapers have been used extensively as a data source for studying protest, and findings suggest that newspapers report the basic facts about protest events with reasonable accuracy (Earl et al. 2004). Nevertheless, there are challenges that come with using newspapers as a data source.[5] In order to mitigate potential political biases, my data is constructed from four national news sources: La Jornada, a left-leaning paper

[5] For comprehensive reviews of findings on media biases, see Franzosi (2004) or Earl et al. (2004).

with a long history of covering protest; La Reforma, a right-leaning paper; El Universal, a centrist paper with high circulation; and Notimex, the Mexican government's newswire.[6]

In order to effectively explore the pattern of responses to protest events, it is important that the sample of events does not overwhelmingly capture violent events or systematically omit events occurring far from the capital or in less developed states. Using a very broad definition of violence, less than 15% of the data used in this analysis were marked by some form of violence against people or property. In addition, while there were many more events reported in Mexico City than any other state (approximately one quarter of the events reported took place in the capital), the correlation between the number of events per 100,000 people in a given state and the distance from the capital (r=-0.14) was low and there was no sign of an underreporting of events in less developed states as measured by the Human Development Index; in fact, the correlation between number of events and level of development was negative (r=-0.41).

Data

The indicator of *Concessions* comes from the Sullivan Protest Response Database (SPRD). It is a dichotomous indicator that captures the absence or presence of concessions as a response to a protest event. The indicator includes full concessions, as well as partial concessions and alternative offers *that are accepted by protesters*. It is possible that elites make offers in bad faith, propose inappropriate concessions because they have failed to correctly identify salient demands, or are not trusted to enforce an agreement. These types of offers amount to no more than symbolic gestures that not only do not require high state capacity and, in fact, may be a sign of state weakness. Therefore,

[6] For more information on the print media in modern Mexico, see Lawson (2002).

if a concession is offered that is explicitly rejected by protesters or is offered but protests continue with the same demand and same target, the response is not considered a good-faith, credible concession and is therefore not included in my indicator of Concessions.

To measure the key independent variable, *State Capacity*, I focus specifically on law enforcement because of its direct connection to the maintenance of order; its centrality to all types of states, democratic and nondemocratic alike; and, its importance irrespective of state policy goals and priorities. Conceptually, I am interested in measuring the state's ability to penetrate society and implement binding rules, both crucial aspects of all states' ability to manage protest. While a measure of the resources, efficacy, and penetration of all state agencies would give a more complete picture of state capacity, it would be an impossible measure to construct and it lacks parsimony. My indicator captures a state's ability to carry out its core functions, and as such serves as a proxy for its general institutional capacity.

My indicator of State Capacity is made up of three separate components. The first two are adapted from Magaloni and Zepeda's (2004) Law Enforcement Performance Index, the first capturing state resources for investigating crime and, the second, the ability to bring investigations to a successful close.[7] The third component captures the extent of state penetration of society in the sense of citizens making "repeated voluntary use of and action in state-run or state-authorized institutions" (Migdal 1988, 32). I keep this tightly connected to law enforcement by using a measure of the percent of reported crimes.

[7] While the Law Enforcement Performance index is quite rich, it covered the years 1996-2000 so could not be used in this paper. In addition, serious problems with missing data prevented the extension of the full index.

More specifically, the first component of the measure quantifies the human capacity that the public prosecutors' offices (*ministerios públicos)* have to investigate crimes and levy charges against accused criminals. This component has two subcomponents: the number of public prosecutors per hundred thousand people in a state and the average number of crime reports each agent must handle. Both components are standardized to a base of 100 and the latter subcomponent's scale is reversed so that higher numbers are associated with higher capacity. Then the subcomponents are averaged. The second component of the state capacity indicator is the weighted conviction rate. It is built from the percent of murders reported that ended in a conviction and the percent of other reported crimes that ended in a conviction. These two conviction rates are then averaged. These data are drawn from official statistics reported from the national statistical institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, INEGI) and are operationalized in a manner consistent to the corresponding subcomponents in Magaloni and Zepeda's (2004) index.

The final component is the percent of crimes reported. This data is taken from a crime victimization survey in which respondents who have been victims of crimes are asked if they filed a report. The survey is carried out by ICESI (Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios sobre la Inseguridad), a nongovernmental organization that specializes in the generation of statistical information about security issues in Mexico. These three components are all standardized to a base of 100 and then averaged to create the measure of state capacity.

The analysis includes three indicators of legibility, *Union Protester*, *State Elite Protester*, and *External Support*. The indicator, Union Protester, includes officially

registered labor unions, as well as labor federations that are officially recognized by the Ministry of Labor (*Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social*). The indicator, State Elite Protester, includes state elites, former state elites, and family members of state elites. The indicator, External Support, includes events at which a state elite has offered support, including material support, legislative or legal support, intervention on behalf of protesters, speaking publicly on behalf of protesters at a protest event, etc. All three are coded as dichotomous variables that capture whether the legible actor is present or absent at an event (or, in the case of support, whether or not support has been offered in response to an event).

My measure of *Democracy* is adapted from Giraudy's (2009) indicator of subnational democracy in Mexico. The indicator measures the following dimensions of democracy: executive turnover, executive and legislative contestation, and clean elections. It is a multiplicative index, so a zero in any one category produces a zero for the total score.[8] The clean elections variable uses post-electoral conflict as a proxy for fraud. I adapted this indicator by adding a component to capture whether the incumbent party was unseated in the relevant election.

Maximal Disruption is a dichotomous variable capturing events at which one of more of the following tactics are used: building blockade/occupation, disrupt elections, disrupt official act, disrupt services, land invasion, road block, strike, break police line/impede police action, hijack property, property destruction, protest by armed actors, threaten violence, throw projectiles, violence.

[8] Mexico has many state governments where there has never been turnover in the executive from the old ruling party (the PRI); however, this does not automatically generate a zero in this subindicator because only places with no turnover on party or governor would score a zero. This condition is not met in any Mexican state.

Organization is also a dichotomous variable that captures events at which protesters include one or more non-union civil society groups. Armed revolutionary groups are not included.

I have included an additional variable, *Economic Demands*, in order to fully assess the role of unions in extracting concessions. This dichotomous variable captures events at which protesters are making concrete economic demands, including demands for economic restitution, salary increases, back pay, or the delivery of modest poverty assistance or disaster relief. Note that this does not include demands for broad economic policy changes.

Radical Demands are those that can be seen as directly threatening elites, including the presence of demands for the removal of an elected official or other person in a position of authority (be they in the private or public sector), demands calling into question electoral procedures or fairness, and calls for indigenous autonomy. This is also coded as a dichotomous variable capturing the presence or absence of a demand of this type at an event.

I include a simple measure of *Repression*, which is a dichotomous variable capturing events at which the response included: arrests, application of tear gas, violence by non-security actors (actively or passively allowed by police), force/police brutality (punching, causing injuries, etc.), police intimidation/harassment. As a robustness check, I also created a *Repression minus Disruption* variable in order to more closely match Gamson's theory that it is not simply repression, but passive acceptance of repression that reduces the likelihood of concessions. This dichotomous variable captures events at

which protesters do not use any maximally disruptive tactics (see description of Maximal Disruption above) even in the face of a repressive response from authorities.

National Target is a dichotomous variable for protest events at which the national government is a target.

Finally, I include one additional control, *Logged GDP/capita*. I include this variable in order to be sure that state capacity is still a salient variable even when controlling for the wealth of the state.

Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Full Sample (Models 1 & 2)

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Expected Direction
Concessions	0.09	0.29	0	1	
State Capacity	50.88	12.33	31.56	78.37	+
Union Protester	0.13	0.33	0	1	+
State Elite Protester	0.09	0.28	0	1	+
External Support	0.07	0.26	0	1	+
Democracy	0.59	0.40	0	1.19	+
Maximal Disruption	0.30	0.46	0	1	+
Organization	0.29	0.45	0	1	+/−
Radical Demands	0.17	0.38	0	1	−
Economic Demands	0.13	0.34	0	1	+
Repression	0.13	0.33	0	1	−
Repression minus Disruption	0.05	0.23	0	1	−
National Target	0.40	0.49	0	1	−
Logged GDP/capita	11.21	0.57	10.43	13.03	+
n=1175					

Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Sample Excluding Threat-Only Events (Models 3 & 4)

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Expected Direction
Concessions	0.09	0.29	0	1	
State Capacity	50.94	12.33	31.56	78.37	+
Union Protester	0.12	0.33	0	1	+
State Elite Protester	0.09	0.28	0	1	+
External Support	0.07	0.26	0	1	+
Democracy	0.59	0.40	0	1.19	+
Maximal Disruption	0.32	0.47	0	1	+
Organization	0.29	0.45	0	1	+/−
Radical Demands	0.18	0.38	0	1	−
Economic Demands	0.13	0.33	0	1	+
Repression	0.13	0.34	0	1	−
Repression minus Disruption	0.06	0.23	0	1	−
National Target	0.41	0.49	0	1	−
Logged GDP/capita	11.21	0.57	10.43	13.03	+
n=1096					

Models and Results

I test my hypotheses using a logit model with protest events as the unit of analysis. A logit model was used due to the dichotomous dependent variable, which captures the presence or absence of concession as a response to a protest event. The logit models are run with clustered standard errors to account for the different variance in the errors across states. In Models 1 and 2, I use the broadest sample of events that includes both protest events and reported threats to protest. In Models 2 and 3, I exclude events that were only threats to protest and look only at the sample of protests that were actually carried out. Models 1 and 3 include the following independent variables: State Capacity,

Union Protester, State Elite Protester, External Support, Democracy, Maximal Disruption, Organization, Radical Demands, Repression, National Target, and Logged GDP/capita. Models 2 and 4 have the same specification, but include an additional variable, Economic Demands.

Table 2.3: Event-Level Analysis of Concessions – Full Sample (Logit Model with Clustered Standard Errors)

Variable	Model 1	Model 2
State Capacity	0.02**	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Union Protester	0.70**	-0.01
	(0.26)	(0.27)
State Elite Protester	0.76**	0.83**
	(0.22)	(0.24)
External Support	0.58*	0 .62*
	(0.25)	(0.25)
Democracy	0.83**	0.91**
	(0.24)	(0.27)
Maximal Disruption	0.85**	0.78**
	(0.27)	(0.27)
Organization	-0.82	-0.80
	(0.52)	(0.52)
Economic Demands		1.33**
		(0.24)
Radical Demands	-0.26	-0.03
	(0.32)	(0.27)
Repression	-0.16	-0.13
	(0.25)	(0.27)
National Target	-0.85**	-0.77**
	(0.23)	(0.22)
Logged GDP/capita	-0.39*	-0.40*
	(0.18)	(0.20)
Constant	0.32	0.06
	(1.87)	(1.92)
N	1175	1175
Log pseudo-likelihood	-326.78	-316.80
Pseudo-Rsquared 29	0.09	0.12

**=significant at the .01 level, *=.05

Table 2.4: Event-Level Analysis of Concessions – No Threat-Only Events (Logit Model with Clustered Standard Errors)

Variable	Model 3	Model 4
State Capacity	0.02*	0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Union Protester	0.62*	-0.11
	(0.27)	(0.28)
State Elite Protester	0.74**	0.80**
	(0.23)	(0.24)
External Support	0.68**	0 .71*
	(0.27)	(0.27)
Democracy	0.82**	0.92**
	(0.26)	(0.29)
Maximal Disruption	0.89**	0.80**
	(0.28)	(0.28)
Organization	-0.82	-0.80
	(0.51)	(0.52)
Economic Demands		1.37**
		(0.26)
Radical Demands	-0.24	-0.01
	(0.31)	(0.26)
Repression	-0.25	-0.22
	(0.26)	(0.28)
National Target	-0.70**	-0.62**
	(0.21)	(0.21)
Logged GDP/capita	-0.39*	-0.41*
	(0.18)	(0.19)
Constant	0.54	0.39
	(1.87)	(1.90)
N	1096	1096
Log pseudo-likelihood	-305.12	-295.25
Pseudo-Rsquared 29	0.09	0.12

**=significant at the .01 level, *=.05

Both models provide strong support for my argument that state capacity conditions the use of concessions in response to protest events. The State Capacity variable is significant and positively influences the use of concessions. What is interesting about the two different samples is that when both protests and threats to protest are included (Models 1 and 2), the effect of state capacity is stronger and has a slightly larger substantive effect. Comparing the fully specified models (Models 2 and 4), in Model 2, the probability of a protest event receiving a concession goes from 4.32% at the lowest state capacity to 12.76% at the highest capacity. In Model 4, the substantive effect is slightly smaller, going from 4.51% at the lowest to 10.61% at the highest capacity. This suggests that higher capacity states are not only more likely to successfully use a conciliatory response when faced with protest, but are also more adept at successfully using a conciliatory approach before protest hits the streets.

In Model 1, all three measures of protest legibility – Union Protester, State Elite Protester, and External Support – were also significant and positive. In Model 1, the presence of a union protester increased the probability of a concession by 7.19 percentage points (from 8.32% to 15.51%) and the presence of a state elite protester increased the probability by a roughly similar amount (7.91 points, from 8.32% to 16.23%). Finally, External Support increased the probability by 5.68 percentage points (from 8.32% to 14.00%). Model 3 had similar substantive effects, though the significance was a bit weaker for union actors once the threat-only events were removed from the sample.

On its face, the power of a union protester seems quite powerful. Looking simply at descriptive statistics we see that while state elite protesters and external support of events were present at 7-9% of events (full sample) and were present at 11-12% of events

successfully managed with concessions, union protesters were present at 13.73% of all events, but were present at a staggering 24.56% of events managed with concessions. And this effect holds even in the face of the power of maximally disruptive tactics. Maximal Disruption was significant and positive, approximately doubling the chances of receiving a concession in all models. However, once Economic Demands are controlled for, the effect of unions disappears both in terms of substance and significance (Models 2 and 4). Economic Demands are highly significant and have a powerful substantive effect, increasing the likelihood of concessions by nearly 15 percentage points. Taken together, these results suggest that while maximally disruptive tactics and concrete economic demands – both of which tend to be present at union protests – increase the likelihood of concessions, formal unionization brings no additional leverage in terms of extracting concessions.

Democracy also had a significant and positive effect on the use of concessions. Again focusing on the fully specified models, in Model 2, at the lowest level of democracy, there was a 4.13% probability of a protest event being successfully managed with concessions, while at the highest level of democracy that probability increased to 11.22%. The substantive effect was close, but slightly smaller in Model 4. While this demonstrates that more democratic regimes are more likely to use concessions than their less democratic counterparts, states falling into the most democratic cluster still only successfully managed 10.5% of protest events with concessions (compared to close to 8% of events in the nondemocratic cluster).[9]

Protest events directed at a National Target significantly decreased the probability of a concession, while the controls for Organization, Radical Demands, and Repression

[9] The two samples produced nearly identical results.

all failed to achieve significance. Using the Repression Minus Disruption variable instead of the simple Repression variable also failed to achieve significance in any specification of the model (results available on request). Oddly, the control for Logged GDP/capita was significant but in a counterintuitive direction. When controlling for the other factors, including state capacity and democracy, poorer states were more likely than their richer counterparts to successfully manage protest with concessions.

Conclusion

In this article, I explored the use of concessions as a tactic of protest management. The paper argues that state capacity is a crucial determinant of the use of concessions to successfully manage protest because the conciliatory approach requires a great deal from state actors who must be able to accurately identify protest leaders, understand protest demands, engage in negotiations, and offer concessions that will be seen as credible by protesters, inducing them to end their protests. In addition, because state capacity is central to protest management, characteristics that make protests more legible to state actors will also increase the likelihood that concessions will be used as a form of protest management. Finally, the argument is put forth that higher levels of democracy will make states more likely to be more responsive to protest demands and therefore will make greater use of concessions to manage protest than their less democratic counterparts. I tested these hypotheses using an original database of protest and response in Mexico.

Using a novel measure of state capacity that combines a measure of the effectiveness of state actors in carrying out core state functions with a measure of state penetration in society, I demonstrated that state capacity is indeed a crucial variable for understanding the use of concessions for protest management. Furthermore, I outlined

potential characteristics that could make protests legible to state actors – institutionalized unions, state elite protesters, and external support from state elites. While on its face, it appeared that unions' legibility increased the likelihood of concession, once simple economic demands were controlled for, the effect disappeared. In addition, although democracies are far from any ideal of comprehensive responsiveness to their citizens, they are more likely to grant concessions than nondemocratic states.

Because much of the literature on protest looks not to the thousands of ordinary protests taking place across the globe on any given day, but to grand scale protests that topple regimes, concessions tend to be viewed as symptomatic of state weakness. While there is certainly much merit in this theory when it comes to revolutionary protest movements, for protesters engaged in the everyday forms of contentious politics, state weakness may actually be a barrier to the successful extraction of a concession. In light of my findings on state capacity and protest legibility, I would like to suggest that we should think of most protests, most of the time not as a threat to the state, but as an administrative problem that, in order to solve, requires institutional resources and skilled state authorities. Seen as such, it is no surprise that higher levels of state capacity and protest legibility make a conciliatory approach possible and, therefore, more likely.

CHAPTER 3

DEMOCRACY, STATE CAPACITY, AND REPRESSION: EVIDENCE FROM MEXICO

In April of 2005, the governor of the Mexican state of San Luis Potosi fired five employees for attempting to join the state bureaucrats' union. The workers demanded that their labor rights be respected, staging two small sit-ins, one in front of the governmental palace and the other in front of the governor's official residence. After a few days, the protesters' camps were forcefully dismantled by state police and three people were arrested. At the protest site in front of the official residence, the nine female protesters were removed by approximately 30 policemen and when bystanders attempted to come to the women's defense, they were beaten by the officers. In January of the same year, less than 120 miles away in the neighboring state of Zacatecas, a seemingly more threatening protest occurred. Over 2000 teachers from the dissident teachers' union occupied the regional ministry of education offices and the governmental palace to denounce the governor's replacement of over 20 education officials for what were perceived to be political reasons. Although the governor publicly refused to cede to pressure from protesters, the protests were not repressed and negotiations ensued between the dissident teachers and state government officials.

These two examples, from the thousands of protests that take place in Mexico in a given year, raise some important questions for the study of political protest and repression. First, why are some protests repressed and others not? In particular, why are

some large and apparently threatening protests not the target of repression while less threatening protests are? These questions are not well understood in large part because most of the literature to date has focused on the general apparatus of repression in regimes as a whole rather than looking at the use of repression at specific events. In this paper, I shift the focus to the determinants of repression of protest in different kinds of states and in different contexts. Doing so, I argue that when it comes to event level repression it is not the level of democracy that matters, but the capacity a state possesses.

In the wake of the Arab Spring, the Occupy movement, and recent protests across Europe and the former Soviet states, political protest and state responses to it are firmly back on the agenda of comparative politics. Protests can have wide-ranging consequences, including facilitating democratization (Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Tilly 2004, 2006; Wood 2000) and holding democratic governments accountable (Levine and Molina 2011; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2003). Protests can expose governmental malfeasance, potentially goad other state actors, such as the judiciary, into punishing governmental wrong-doings, and can also put issues ignored by state elites onto the political agenda – especially in many new democracies where democratic quality is low (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006). Yet protest is not uniformly successful and mobilization can be met with many responses other than reform (Andrews 2004; Fuentes 2006; Schock 2005). Protesting, in fact, may be dangerous, yet little is known about the factors that make some protests more likely to be targets of violent repression than others.

Repression is also an important scholarly subject because it is an integral part of political struggle just like protest, but its causes and consequences are not well understood. For example, in their extensive case work on democratization in post-

communist countries, Bunce and Wolchik (2011) noted that although repression was repeatedly brought up in the interviews they conducted with opposition activists, a consistent relationship between levels of repression and electoral outcomes could not be found. Repression and mobilization have also been theoretically linked, but here, too, the empirical analyses fail to show consistent effects. Repression has been shown to decrease mobilization, increase it, cause one effect in the short-run and the other in the longer-term, or change the character of mobilization (see for example, Francisco 1995; Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998; Rasler 1996). Koopmans (1997) suggests an interesting explanation for conflicting findings: not all repression is the same. He shows that formal, institutional repression, including bans on mobilization, trials and court rulings against activists, and coordinated, large-scale police actions not directly related to protest events decreased mobilization, while direct repression of protest events escalated it. There may be distinct logics behind different repressive tactics and, therefore, in order to understand repression's consequences – and its causes – we need to disaggregate it, analyzing separately its different forms.

In this paper, I follow Koopmans' insight and disaggregate the analysis of repression.[10] Rather than looking at the much studied question of generalized regimes of repression, I focus specifically on the repressive reactions of state elites in response to contentious challenges. Most cross-national empirical work on repression focuses on overall levels of state violence, political arrests, and restrictions placed on freedoms of speech and press (Davenport 1995, 2007; Fein 1995; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). This literature points to factors such as regime type, level of economic development, and the level of violent threat state elites face in their explanations. Yet the factors that have been

[10] Earl (2003) and Davenport (2007) have called scholars of repression to move in this direction.

identified to explain these variations in countries' overall levels of human rights violations cannot explain why protests within a single country elicit repression in some instances and not in others.

The central argument of this paper is that state capacity plays a key role in shaping event-level repression of protest. Scholars of democratic transition and consolidation have noted that high levels of state capacity are necessary for the consolidation of democracy (Bunce 2000; Diamond 1999; Linz and Stepan 1996); and scholars of hybrid regimes have noted that high levels of capacity can be equally useful for consolidating authoritarian regimes (Alexander 2008; Levitsky and Way 2010). Thus, state capacity clearly conditions the ability of state elites to achieve political goals regardless of regime type. I argue that state capacity also has a strong influence on the management of protest. When states are faced with protest, they are not faced with a dichotomous choice between conceding to protest demands in their entirety or repressing protesters. Rather, there is a broad repertoire of tactics that can be used, which includes repression and full concessions, but also includes ignoring the event, negotiating, granting partial concessions, etc.[11] Moreover, protest management is a complex undertaking that requires state agents to monitor protest events, assess threats to their interests, and know when and how to intervene. Handling protest peacefully, I argue, consequently requires high levels of state capacity. By contrast, beating up protesters does not. As a result, states with lower capacity should be more likely to resort to repression. In making my argument, I build on Tilly's (2006) work which suggests that state capacity is connected to the state's response to mobilization. I develop more fully

[11] For a fuller elaboration of the state's repertoire of social control see, for example, Oberschall (1973) and Schock (2005).

the theory linking state capacity to repression, construct a relevant measure of state capacity, and provide the first rigorous test of these ideas.

In addition to state capacity, it is important to take into account differences in the protests themselves. Here, the work on social movements and contentious politics provides some leverage. The rich accounts of conflict between protesters and the actors attempting to raise the costs of collective action demonstrate that the state's use of repression is not only conditioned by structural factors, but also event or movement characteristics (Andrews 2004; McAdam 1982; Wood 2003). Scholars of contentious politics have shown that in addition to violent tactics, a protest's intensity and the type of demands articulated by protesters make some protests seem more threatening to elites and are therefore more likely to elicit repression.

I test this theory of protest repression using an original dataset of responses to protest in Mexico. The dataset provides unique micro-data on all reported protest event characteristics as well as the full range of responses from protest targets, state agents, and non-state actors playing a managing role (i.e. counter-protesters, unidentified violent actors, etc.). The subnational research design allows for a rigorous test of national level theories with more precise data. The paper proceeds as follows: the first section develops the theory of protest repression; the next two sections provide an elaboration of the research design and description of the measures; the hypotheses are then tested in three principal ways – bivariate and multivariate analyses with Mexican states as the unit of analysis and then with multivariate analyses where the protest event is the unit of analysis; finally, I present some concluding remarks.

Explaining Repression

One of the most robust findings in quantitative studies of repression is that consolidated democracies are less repressive than other regime types. Democracy's pacifying effects, which have been termed the "domestic democratic peace" (Davenport 2007), result in fewer violations of civil liberties, such as freedom of the press and of speech (Davenport 1995, 2007) and reductions in human rights violations, such as political imprisonment and other types of political violence (Davenport 2007; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Poe and Tate 1994). This effect has been theoretically linked to two main mechanisms that are argued to be democratic attributes: electoral accountability (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Poe and Tate 1994) and the reduction of extra-institutional conflict (Davenport 2007; Regan and Henderson 2002). However, some recent work argues that this is a non-linear effect. Some scholars find that there is "more murder in the middle" or more human rights violations in semi-democracies (Regan and Henderson 2002) or "partly free" states (Fein 1995).[12] Others do not find this effect, but nonetheless suggest that reductions in human rights violations and restrictions on civil liberties are only achieved at the highest levels of democracy (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005; Davenport 2007; Davenport and Armstrong 2004). In the end, the finding with the most empirical support shows us what we know to be true as a matter of definition: highly institutionalized democracies protect human rights and civil liberties.

The management of protest, on the other hand, is not embedded in our definition or understanding of democracy. The right to protest is derived from rights to speech,

[12] Robertson (2011) also argues that protest and its management take on a different cast in hybrid regimes than they do in either democracies or closed autocracies. He illustrates a number of additional repressive tools at the disposal of elites in hybrids that are used to curtail opposition activity, such as forming state sponsored protest movements and using covert forms of repression.

assembly, or organization and does not tend to be explicitly protected even in democracies. Since all states are responsible for providing law and order, a tension exists in democratic states between protecting protesters' civil liberties and protecting the persons and property of bystanders and targets. There is no uniform way for democracies to address this inherent conflict. Changes in the partisan make-up of government have been shown to influence the application of repression and there are cases where democratic governments see protest not as a component of citizen participation but as a threat to democracy itself (Della Porta 1995; Della Porta and Reiter 1998). Even work on the domestic democratic peace suggests that the effects of democracy on repression break down in the face of political threats (Davenport 1995, 2007; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Regan and Henderson 2002). Although the empirical tests tend to use measures of violent dissent (riots, guerrilla warfare) and civil war, Davenport and Armstrong (2004) note that governments employ coercion "when protest takes place, threatening existing leaders, policies, and structures" (540). Davenport (2007) puts it even more succinctly, arguing that "dissent provokes;" he includes sit-ins, strikes, and demonstrations alongside more violent forms of dissent in his list of actions expected to increase repression. In short, although scholars have shown that democracies are marked by a higher respect for human rights and civil liberties, when tested by people acting contentiously, they may respond with force. By focusing on responses to protest, another axis on which to evaluate the relationship between democracy and repression is opened.

Both mechanisms linking democracy to reductions in human rights violations lose much of their force when looking specifically at the repression of protest. First, electoral accountability cannot be expected to always push democratic leaders toward less

repressive policies. For example, in his study of the extreme right in Germany, Koopmans (2005) shows that third party actors called for the authorities to use "increased or more efficient repression" against the movement (178). The tension between maintaining law and order and upholding civil rights is at play not only for protest managers, but also can be seen by shifts in public opinion. While politicians may sometimes be punished at the ballot box for applying repression, they may also reap rewards for using it to manage protest.

The second mechanism – the reduction of extra-institutional conflict – is potentially even more salient. If democracies uniformly reduced extra-institutional conflict, the distinction between overall levels of human rights violations and the repression of protest would be of little importance, but social movement scholars have shown that this is not the case. True, democratization tends to substantially curtail forms of protest that directly threaten life and property (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 2004), but democratic regimes also allow much more space for civil society to organize, mobilize, and express discontent through contentious actions (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Oberschall 1973; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 2004). Therefore, we should expect the effects of democracy to be blunted when looking specifically at the repression of protest as opposed to overall levels of human rights violations. Of course not all protests are equally threatening to state elites. Social movement scholarship also suggests that threatening movements tend to draw repressive reactions from the state. In democratic and nondemocratic regimes alike, some protest characteristics should be more likely to elicit repression than others; however, we should not assume that protest itself will be reduced in democracies.

Although regime type exerts an influence on the kinds of protests that are tolerated, Tilly (2006) notes that this effect is heavily conditioned by a state's capacity. States with low-capacity, no matter where they lie on the regime type continuum, lack the ability to effectively manage protests. However, state capacity has been largely ignored in the empirical studies of repression.[13] This oversight is particularly surprising since one of the central components of most definitions of the state is that the rules that it creates and the projects it carries out are ultimately backed by force. Although Weber's (1946) definition stressed the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force, he noted that "force is certainly not the normal or the only means of the state" (78). In fact, in his lengthy analysis of the modern state (Weber 1968), his focus was on the legal system and bureaucracy, not the military and police. Many contemporary theorists of the state have viewed force as one element of the state, but have also put greater emphasis on other aspects of the state, such as the legal system and the state's penetration of society. Thus, O'Donnell (1993) has defined the state as an aggregation of public bureaucracies and "a set of social relations that establishes a certain order" that is formalized in a legal system and ultimately backed by a "centralized coercive guarantee" (1356). Similarly, Migdal (1988) defined it as an organization "that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way" (19). While these definitions of the state certainly suggest that we should look to state capacity to understand dynamics of repression, they also suggest that what makes a

[13] For one notable exception, see Englehart (2009) who finds that state capacity influences the overall level of human rights violations in a country. Unlike studies of repression, which have primarily focused on regime type, the relationship between civil war and state capacity has been explored in more depth (see, for example, Fearon 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Thies 2010).

state strong is not necessarily related to having more repressive might, but rather having broad tools to make and enforce "the operative rules of the game" (Migdal 1988, 261).

I build on these insights about the nature of state power to argue that state capacity is linked to repression of protest in large part because elites do not rely solely on coercion to manage dissent; rather, they have a broad repertoire of tactics for dealing with protest.[14] In response to protest events, state elites engage with protesters in many ways, including receiving and adjudicating claims, negotiating with protesters, and possibly even granting some type of concession. However engagement between protesters and state elites is not uniform across space and time, and the observed variance is driven partially by a state's capacity. As Tilly (2006) notes: "in high-capacity regimes, governmental agents participate more actively in all sorts of contention than do the governmental agents of low-capacity regimes" (72). Protest management requires manpower and coordination. For example, the apparently simple choice to enter into negotiations involves multiple steps and places for breakdown. State actors must identify negotiating parties, delineate procedural rules, set an agenda and determine the parameters for negotiation, and guarantee the protest leaders' safety from arrest during the negotiations. If this can be accomplished, state elites then need sufficient capacity to enforce agreements (Oberschall 1973). States lacking capacity end up relying more heavily on coercion to manage protest (Jackman 1993; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 2006).

In low-capacity states, the lack of alternative methods of protest control is compounded by the fact that the police, who become the primary protest managers in

[14] Long-term strategies of social control, such as expanding or contracting political rights (Oberschall 1973) or creating state-sanctioned movements or corporatist unions (Roberts 2007; Robertson 2011) are certainly related to patterns of protest and to state capacity. However, in this project I deal only with the tactics that are available in the moment that the state is faced with an angry crowd gathered in the street.

these regimes, tend to be ineffective at enforcing the law. Crime proliferates, unsuccessfully checked by the police and other institutions of criminal justice. In the face of ineffective courts that cannot be counted on to back police actions, police are left with only immediately available tools for social control and will "frequently harass, curb, and interfere with what they define as threatening and socially harmful" (Oberschall 1973, 248; see also White and White 1995). Paradoxically, in these situations where citizen insecurity is high and the police are viewed as incompetent at best and criminal at worst, citizens tend to have not only a higher tolerance for repression and police violence, but actually demand more heavy-handed policing (Goldstein et al. 2007; Pérez 2003; Smulovitz 2003). In low-capacity states, the task of protest management falls more often to police who are encouraged by larger institutional weaknesses and citizen demands to repress. Thus, low capacity states with weak institutions generate increased reliance on repressive force to manage protest.

In sum, I argue that state capacity will be a significant determinant of the repression of protest because states will be less likely to apply repression if they can use other tools to manage protest. However, because not all protests represent the same level of threat to the authorities, I expect that highly threatening events will be more likely to elicit repression regardless of structural factors. Finally, because democracy should not necessarily reduce extra-institutional conflict nor should we expect elected leaders to necessarily be punished for repressing protest, we should expect no relationship between regime type and the repression of protest. We should therefore expect to see:

H_1: High-capacity states repress less than low-capacity states

H_2: Protests that are threatening are more likely to be met with repression

H_3: Variations in regime type do not affect the repression of protest

Research Design

I test these hypotheses using an original dataset of protest and response in Mexico. Mexico is a new democracy and, like many new democracies, the formal, national level rules of the game are not fully operative throughout the country. There is considerable variation in regime type and state capacity across Mexican states, and the federal system gives subnational actors considerable legal leeway to control politics in their territorial arena. This is particularly important because protest, even when directed at a national target, must be managed where it physically occurs. The subnational design allows me to more closely match the level of analysis to the level of government at which repressive actions are carried out. Finally, the design allows for the collection of fine-grained micro-data. My dataset captures sequences of protest events along with all recorded responses across all Mexican states and preserves the rich and detailed information provided in the news articles.

Mexico is an excellent case for a study of this sort because it is a federal system divided into thirty one states and a federal district and, although formally democratic at the national level after 2000, there is considerable variation in regime type (Gibson 2005; Giraudy 2009, 2010) and state capacity (Magaloni and Zepeda 2004; Uildriks 2010) at the subnational level. While many scholars conceptualize and measure regime type and state capacity at the national level, less attention has been paid to the fact that both exhibit substantial subnational variation. Recent literature on federal countries, specifically in Latin America, shows that subnational undemocratic regimes exist, and sometimes flourish, within nationally democratic countries (Gervasoni 2010; Gibson 2005; Giraudy 2009, 2010). In fact, several studies have measured the within country

regime variations, showing them to be quite significant (Gervasoni 2010; Giraudy 2009, 2010). Likewise, there is evidence that important differences in state capacity are also seen within a single country, although there has been much less progress in terms of empirically measuring these subnational differences (Goodwin 2001; O'Donnell 1993; Taylor 2011). This variation in the Mexican case is illustrated in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: Democracy-Capacity Distribution



A subnational design also has important benefits particular to studying repression. Actors tightly connected to national elites are only one potential type of repressor, and quite possibly not the most salient in repressing protest events once they have erupted (Earl 2003; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; White and White 1995). To understand the

repression of protest, we must look at the dynamics on the ground. However, if we move to the most local administrative divisions, it becomes more difficult to make a case that regime or state capacity could be defined in a way that corresponds to our conception of these concepts at the national level. Therefore, I chose to focus on the state level because each Mexican state has an executive, a state congress, and a judiciary – a structure that mirrors national politics to a large extent. In addition, governors have become key players in Mexican politics in the last two decades (Cornelius 1999; Díaz-Cayeros 2004; Gibson 2005) and their power is enhanced by their control of state police forces. While federal police forces exist and are responsible for preventing federal crimes such as drug trafficking and assisting state and local authorities, each state has its own relatively autonomous force controlled by the state governor (Reames 2007; Uildriks 2010).[15] The variation of structural characteristics at the state level and the importance of state level actors in managing protest make the state the appropriate unit of analysis.

While choosing to focus on the state level balances concerns over where the action is happening with the need for an arena that could arguably be used to explore and deepen national-level theories, the subnational design has some limitations. Because Mexico is nationally democratic there would be consequences for a severe bloodbath and, as Gibson (2010) notes: "local authoritarianism must, in some way, be rendered institutionally compatible with national democratic politics. In such contexts, provincial military regimes obviously cannot exist" (4). In other words, while there is considerable variation among the Mexican states, there is truncation on both ends of the regime spectrum. However, if we placed the Mexican states on Vanhanen's (2000) index of

[15] Mexico also has municipal police forces, though outside of the largest cities these forces are rarely significant (Reames 2007).

democratization, 91 countries fall between the highest and lowest Mexican states. Mexico's highest state scores on par with Uruguay and Ireland, while the lowest scores on par with El Salvador and Nigeria. Although this index has weaknesses, it does suggest that there is actually a considerable range of regime types represented by the Mexican states. In addition, this internal variation is common in new democracies and exploring the impact of democracy's unevenness is important in its own right.

The focus on a single case also allows for the collection of richer data. I constructed an original database of Mexican protest events that preserves detailed information on all facets of the events and responses (Sullivan Protest Response Database or SPRD). The data are built from newspaper articles collected using keyword searches from an online news aggregator called InfoLatina.[16] The data include detailed information on 1219 events, as well as all the protest management tactics used by elites or groups of counter-protesters in response to the protests. I employed a multi-pass coding strategy, which "greatly reduces the risk of duplicating events, facilitates reliable chronological ordering of information, and helps detect inconsistencies in the information found in different documents on the same event" (Franzosi 2004). In brief, in the first pass, irrelevant articles generated by the search were removed and bibliographic information was entered into the database; in the second, articles were sorted by event and labeled to prevent accidental duplication of an event; and, third the data was entered into the database. The data was entered in narrative form with analytical categories entered separately. These categories were then refined in a subsequent step and can be added or changed depending on the research question being considered. This type of data

[16] InfoLatina aggregates information sent by news agencies, newspapers, on-line news groups, magazines, and government agencies. They do not edit the information they receive from their news providers; they simply aggregate what is sent.

collection is extremely useful because, for example, responses are not entered as "repression" or "concession," but recorded in their most disaggregated form (e.g. "leaders of the PRD were attacked by bodyguards of Governor Eugenio Hernández and policemen during the march"). This allows for fine-grained tests of theories and allows the researcher to define analytical categories as broadly or as narrowly as the research question demands.

Creating a protest database, especially a narrative database that links each event to tactics of event management, is extremely labor-intensive. Therefore tradeoffs must be made to narrow the scope of the data collected. Some scholars of protest choose to narrow the geographical scope to several cities or a single state, some use a single source, some only code protests from a single day during the week or month, some reduce the information from the articles that is coded, and some use a combination of these strategies (for a comprehensive discussion on sampling strategies, see Franzosi 2004). I chose to sacrifice the temporal coverage of events by only coding and analyzing six continuous months in order to preserve detailed information on each event, capture event-response sequences, and get a fuller picture of events and responses. While there is no reason to think that the character of the authorities' response to protest would be systematically different from one month to the next, the thicker descriptions that come from the use of multiple sources and the ability to follow coverage of an event over multiple days make the temporally limited, but continuous sample from multiple sources the ideal for studying responses to protest.

The sample is from 2005, which is an appropriate period from which to generalize for several reasons. First, I selected a year in which there is not a presidential election in

order to avoid a period of high media attention on the national electoral contest that could be expected to crowd out other news. Second, and more important, the period predates the dramatic spike in drug violence that occurred in 2008 (Ríos and Shirk 2011). Because my key variable of interest is state capacity, the influence of narco-traffickers over state institutions – which is thought to be significant but is extremely difficult to measure – would make the analysis far more context-specific. Thus, I chose a period prior to the spike in order to maintain a broader generalizability.

Newspapers were chosen as the data source primarily because in developing countries like Mexico, where police records are not made public and are often of dubious quality (Bruhn 2008), newspapers provide the most comprehensive accounts of protest events and repression. Indeed, newspapers have been used extensively as a data source for studying protest, and findings suggest that newspapers report the basic facts about protest events with reasonable accuracy (Earl et al. 2004). Nevertheless, there are challenges that come with using newspapers as a data source.[17] In order to mitigate potential political biases, my data is constructed from four national news sources: La Jornada, a left-leaning paper with a long history of covering protest; La Reforma, a right-leaning paper; El Universal, a centrist paper with high circulation; and Notimex, the Mexican government's newswire.[18]

In order to effectively explore the pattern of responses to protest events, it is important that the sample of events does not overwhelmingly capture violent events or systematically omit events occurring far from the capital or in less developed states. Using a very broad definition of violence, less than 15% of the data used in this analysis

[17] For comprehensive reviews of findings on media biases, see Franzosi (2004) or Earl et al. (2004).

[18] For more information on the print media in modern Mexico, see Lawson (2002).

were marked by some form of violence against people or property. In addition, while there were many more events reported in Mexico City than any other state (approximately one quarter of the events reported took place in the capital), the correlation between the number of events per 100,000 people in a given state and the distance from the capital (r=-0.14) was low and there was no sign of an underreporting of events in less developed states as measured by the Human Development Index; in fact, the correlation between number of events and level of development was negative (r=-0.41).

Finally, the subnational design has the benefit of keeping cultural and historical factors more or less constant.[19] Reducing this variance is particularly important when it comes to studying the repression of protest because protests are both historically and culturally embedded. As Tarrow (1998) notes, "people do not simply 'act collectively'…the learned conventions of contention are part of a society's public culture" (20). In other words, the ways in which dissent is expressed are not spontaneously generated with each grievance that arises; rather, when making claims, protesters in a particular place tend to use culturally familiar tactics again and again, often with only small modulations. While one would expect some subnational variation of repertoires of protest, they should be narrower than cross-country variation in large part because modern protest repertoires are often national in scope with national media outlets serving as an important vehicle for the diffusion of grievances and protest tactics (Tarrow 1998; Tilly 2004). With a common cultural and historical backdrop, the focus can be on the structural variables of primary interest: regime type and level of state

[19] On the benefits of subnational designs, see, for example, Snyder (2001).

capacity, which have both been shown to vary not only cross-nationally, but also within a particular country.

Data

The indicator of repression comes from the Sullivan Protest Response Database (SPRD). The SPRD contains all responses to protest, recorded in narrative form. In this paper, repression is operationalized as a response that includes the use of force and/or threats of force. Force and threat of force include the following actions:

> Force: Arrests, application of tear gas, forcefully ending protests, violence by non-security actors (actively or passively allowed by police), police brutality (punching, causing injuries, etc.), police intimidation/harassment
>
> Threat of force: Threaten repression, police prevent press coverage, surveil protesters, police surround protesters, large movement of police/military in response to protest, police present and awaiting orders to begin repressive operation, deployment of riot police

It is important to note that I excluded from threat of force the simple presence of police, since police acting in their normal role to maintain order may actually facilitate protest. The only types of police presence coded as threat of force were those in which police presence was accompanied by threats of action, where police were mobilized at a level far outside of what would be needed to contain an event, or if riot police were deployed. Repression is measured in two ways. In the state-level analysis, I look at the percent of events repressed in a state (*Percent Repressed*). In the event-level analysis, I model *Repression* as a dichotomous outcome variable – repression is either used as a management tactic or it is not.

To measure the key independent variable, *State Capacity*, I focus specifically on law enforcement because of its centrality to all types of states, democratic and nondemocratic alike; its importance irrespective of state policy goals and priorities; and

its direct connection to the maintenance of order. Conceptually, I am interested in measuring the state's ability to penetrate society and implement binding rules, both crucial aspects of all states' ability to maintain order. Many variables have been used as proxies for state capacity, including GDP per capita (Fearon and Laitin 2003), the presence of lootable resources (Fearon 2005), and tax to GDP ratio (Thies 2005), but these measures are all quite removed from a state's actual ability to implement and enforce its rules. Others have used perceptions of the quality of public services and institutions to measure state capacity (Taylor 2011), but this may be picking up as many differences in government priorities as the state's ability to implement them. Although more closely connected to the maintenance of order, measures of coercive capacity (Levitsky and Way 2010; Walter 2006) are too narrow, failing to capture the broader capacities needed to carry out core state functions. My measure of state capacity stays tightly connected to the state's ability to maintain order and allows for a key test of my argument that in the absence of capable non-coercive state institutions, protests are more likely to elicit repressive responses.

My indicator of State Capacity is made up of three separate components. The first two are adapted from Magaloni and Zepeda's (2004) Law Enforcement Performance Index, the first capturing state resources for investigating crime and, the second, the ability to bring investigations to a successful close.[20] The third component captures the extent of state penetration of society in the sense of citizens making "repeated voluntary use of and action in state-run or state-authorized institutions" (Migdal 1988, 32). I keep

[20] While the Law Enforcement Performance index is quite rich, it covered the years 1996-2000 so could not be used in this paper. In addition, serious problems with missing data prevented the extension of the full index.

this tightly connected to law enforcement by using a measure of the percent of reported crimes.

More specifically, the first component of the measure quantifies the human capacity that the public prosecutors' offices (*ministerios públicos)* have to investigate crimes and levy charges against accused criminals. This component has two subcomponents: the number of public prosecutors per hundred thousand people in a state and the average number of crime reports each agent must handle. Both components are standardized to a base of 100 and the latter subcomponent's scale is reversed so that higher numbers are associated with higher capacity. Then the subcomponents are averaged. The second component of the state capacity indicator is the weighted conviction rate. It is built from the percent of murders reported that ended in a conviction and the percent of other reported crimes that ended in a conviction. These two conviction rates are then averaged. These data are drawn from official statistics reported from the national statistical institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, INEGI) and are operationalized in a manner consistent to the corresponding subcomponents in Magaloni and Zepeda's (2004) index.

The final component is the percent of crimes reported. This data is taken from a crime victimization survey in which respondents who have been victims of crimes are asked if they filed a report. The survey is carried out by ICESI (Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios sobre la Inseguridad), a nongovernmental organization that specializes in the generation of statistical information about security issues in Mexico. These three components are all standardized to a base of 100 and then averaged to create the measure of state capacity.

In order to test the theory I present, I also need to measure the level of threat a given event poses. Scholars of contentious politics, like those who study repression, consider violent tactics among the most important elements of what represents a threat and expect that elites threatened with violence will be more likely to respond to protest with repression. However, violence is not the only characteristic thought to make protests more threatening to elites. Studies of social movements also show that other threatening features of events, such as the articulation of radical demands and or high levels of event intensity, are more likely to elicit repressive responses from the state (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). I created measures representing each of these types of threat, all of which are drawn from the SPRD.

My first measure of threat codes events at which violent tactics are used. I excluded events at which the violence was reported as a row between police and protesters because the violence is not attributed to the protesters or described as a tactic, but documented in interactive terms. However, I included all other violent tactics that are not reported in such terms, even when the violent tactics accompany an otherwise peaceful protest and occur during the unfolding of the event. The reason for this specification of the measure is that while tactics such as throwing rocks, punching police officers, or smashing police car windows seem to be clear examples of violence to people or property, coding violent tactics is not quite as clear cut as simply identifying violence. Tilly (2006) notes that when protests become violent in a democracy, it often occurs because government agents, such as the police, attempt to block a protest group's "initially nonviolent making of claims" (72). Thus, the problem with coding every such instance as violent protest is that in some cases violence is instigated by the police. Thus,

violent tactics may be a response to police actions as opposed to an independent action that could be used to predict repression. For the state-level analysis, *Percent Violent* is coded as the percent of events with violent tactics, while in the event-level analysis *Violence* is a dichotomous variable with violence either present or absent as a protest tactic.

In the event-level analysis, I used several additional variables to represent threat. Although revolutionary demands for the overthrow of the government could clearly be defined as threatening, they are also rare, especially in democracies, and no demands of this sort were recorded in the SPRD. Nevertheless, it has been argued that protests featuring other types of radical demands are more likely to be repressed because they represent a stronger challenge of the status quo (Earl and Soule 2006; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Koopmans 1993). Some studies have coded an extremely broad range of demands as radical, including for example, calls for gay and lesbian rights and demands to end the Vietnam War (Earl and Soule 2006; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003). However, I chose to only code demands that can be seen as directly threatening state elites. To capture this type of threat, I added a dichotomous variable, *Threatening Demands*, which includes the presence of demands for the removal of an elected official, demands related to electoral procedures or fairness, and calls for indigenous autonomy.

To capture protest intensity, which can also potentially increase elites' perception of threat, I categorized each events *Length* as short, medium, or long (1 day, 2-6 days, 7 or more days). Protests in which the length was not able to be determined by the news coverage, were coded to the average length of events of that type.[21] I chose to use length

[21] The correlation between the estimated length variable and the length variable with the missing values is 0.9987.

rather than size to measure the intensity of an event for two reasons. First, the number of participants is often not recorded in the newspapers. And second, social movement scholars have noted that "media information on the number of participants in collective action events is likely to verge on the fantastic" (Franzosi 2004, 172). Protest length, therefore, provides a more reliable measure.

My measure of *Democracy* is adapted from Giraudy's (2009) indicator of subnational democracy in Mexico. The indicator measures the following dimensions of democracy: executive turnover, executive and legislative contestation, and clean elections. It is a multiplicative index, so a zero in any one category produces a zero for the total score.[22] The clean elections variable uses post-electoral conflict as a proxy for fraud. I adapted this indicator by adding a component to capture whether the incumbent party was unseated in the relevant election. Importantly, Giraudy's measure of democracy does not include freedom of speech and assembly or human rights violations. While some have argued that minimalist definitions miss fundamental elements of democracy (Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán 2001; Schmitter and Karl 1991), studies of repression require such measures. Including human rights and civil liberties as a component of democracy in studies of repression creates a misspecification of statistical models because these violations end up on both sides of the equation. Many scholars of repression use measures such as Vanhanen's (2000) democracy index or the Polity data series (Jaggers and Gurr 1996; Marshall and Jaggers 2002). Neither measure is available at the subnational level, but the Vanhanen index, unlike the Polity index, is based on only

[22] Mexico has many state governments where there has never been turnover in the executive from the old ruling party (the PRI); however, this does not automatically generate a zero in this subindicator because only places with no turnover on party or governor would score a zero. This condition is not met in any Mexican state.

two quantitative indicators – voter turnout and the share of votes going to the largest party – and thus can be rather easily recreated at the subnational level. I created an *Alternative Democracy* variable, which is a recreation of the Vanhanen index for Mexican states. This variable provides a measure of cross-national comparability and also allows me to cross-check the findings from the primary analysis with an alternate measure of democracy.[23]

I included several additional controls in both models. Studies of repression find that, all else equal, more populous countries are associated with higher levels of repressiveness, while wealthier states are associated with lower levels (Davenport 2007; Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994). Following the conventions in the literature, I include *Logged GDP per capita* and *Logged Population* as control variables. In addition to these general control variables, I included one control unique to Mexico. The Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI), which ruled Mexico for approximately seventy years, still controls many governorships. Cornelius (1999), in his discussion about Mexican politics before the transition to national-level democracy, argued that: "in those subnational spaces where entrenched, hard-line PRIista leaders continue to hold sway, we can anticipate even greater impunity and more rigid authoritarian control, including freer recourse to official violence" (11). It is therefore possible that PRI governors will be more likely to resort to violence, increasing the repression of protest in those states. Thus, I included a dummy variable for PRI control of the governorship (*PRI Governor*).[24] [25]

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[23] In addition to running the analysis with these democracy scores, I created an additional variable, *Democracy Threshold*, which is a dichotomous measure separating states falling into the highest scoring cluster of Democracy from all other states. Results using this measure are presented in the appendix.

[24] In one state, the governorship switched from the PRI to the PRD during the period under consideration. The change is reflected in the event-level analysis, but it is coded as a PRI state in the state-level analysis. There is little change in the percent of events repressed in the two periods.

Models and Results

I test my hypotheses in three principal ways. First, I present simple bivariate evidence of the relationship between state capacity and repression, using the Mexican states as the unit of analysis. Then, I show that the bivariate relationship holds up strongly in a multivariate context at both the state-level and the event-level. In the state-level model (Model 1), the dependent variable is the percent of protest events repressed in each state and therefore a simple OLS regression is used. The independent variables in Model 1 are: Democracy, State Capacity, Percent Violent, PRI Governor, Logged GDP/capita, and Logged Population. I then explore the hypotheses using protest events as the unit of analysis (Models 2 and 3). For this part of the analysis, logit models are used due to the dichotomous dependent variable, which captures the presence or absence of a repressive response. The logit models are run with clustered standard errors to account for the different variance in the errors across states. Model 2 replicates the state-level specification with the event-level data, while Model 3 adds event-specific characteristics, providing a more nuanced picture of threat by including variables on protest intensity (Length) and protest demands (Threatening Demands and Intractable Demands).

[25] For summary statistics on the variables used in the analyses, see Appendix Table 3.A1.

Figure 3.2: Percent of Events Repressed by State Capacity



Figure 3.3: Percent of Events Repressed by Democracy



Figures 3.2 and 3.3 provide strong prima facie evidence of the relationship between the repression of protest and state capacity and the lack of a relationship between the repression of protest and democracy. Figure 3.2 clearly illustrates that there is a negative relationship between state capacity and the percent of events repressed (r=-0.67). On the other hand, we can see in Figure 3.3 that the relationship between democracy and repression is much weaker and of the wrong sign (r=0.18). To take two examples, Zacatecas and Michoacán have relatively similar democracy scores (1.02 and 0.88, respectively), but they differ considerably in terms of both State Capacity and percent of events repressed. In Zacatecas, where state capacity is high (67), only 5% of events were repressed, while in Michoacán where state capacity is low (36), 15.6% of events were repressed.

Table 3.1 State-Level Analysis of Percent of Protest Events Repressed (OLS)

Variable	Model 1
Democracy	3.54
	(3.05)
State Capacity	-0.33**
	(0.09)
Percent Violent	0.21
	(0.14)
PRI Governor	-2.74
	(2.23)
Logged GDP/capita	-4.12
	(2.17)
Logged Population	3.57*
	(1.46)
Constant	19.33
	(35.39)
N	32
Adjusted R-squared	0.57

**=significant at the .01 level, *=.05

These relationships hold in multivariate analysis. As seen in Model 1, there is a highly significant negative association between State Capacity and percent of events repressed. A decrease of one standard deviation (12.9 points) on the state capacity index is associated with a 4.3 point increase in the percent of events repressed, which is especially noteworthy considering the range between the highest and lowest percentages of events repressed is only 27 points. In contrast, Democracy did not have a statistically

significant effect. Although repression scholarship exploring overall levels of human rights violations shows the importance of democracy in reducing repression, when focusing on the repression of protest events, the effect disappears. Dissent provokes in authoritarian regimes and democracies alike. Surprisingly, the threat variable, Percent Violent, was also insignificant in this model. Finally, Logged Population was significant and positive, while the other controls, Logged GDP/capita and PRI Governor, were not significant.

The event-level models also provide support for my theory that state capacity is an important determinant of the repression of protest. Models 2 and 3 both support the hypotheses that regime type is not associated with the repression of protest. Democracy is not significant in the event level models, suggesting that it is not useful to the explanation even when looking at the repression of particular events. In addition, both models support the hypothesis that events taking place in states with higher capacity are less likely to be repressed than those taking place in low capacity states. In Model 2, the probability of an event being repressed goes from 22% at the lowest capacity to 5% at the highest capacity. Model 3 shows a similar though slightly smaller effect, with the probability going from 19% at the lowest capacity to 4% at the highest.

Table 3.2: Event-Level Analysis of Repression (Logit Model with Clustered Standard Errors)

Variable	Model 2	Model 3
Democracy	0.02	0.05
	(0.25)	(0.24)
State Capacity	-0.03**	-0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Violence	1.79**	1.78**
	(0.22)	(0.23)
Length		0.25**
		(0.07)
Threatening Demands		0.56*
		(0.25)
PRI Governor	-0.51**	-0.58**
	(0.18)	(0.16)
Logged GDP/capita	-0.06	0.03
	(0.17)	(0.15)
Logged Population	0.26*	0.30**
	(0.13)	(0.10)
Constant	-3.58	-5.52*
	(2.39)	(2.39)
N	1097	1097
Log pseudo-likelihood	-397.26	-392.06
pseudo-Rsquared	0.08	0.09

**=significant at the .01 level, *=.05

In the event-level models, the effect of Violence was significant and quite strong; events at which violent tactics are employed are approximately three and a half times more likely to be met with repression than events in which violent tactics are not used.

This represents an important difference between the event-level analysis and the state-level analysis where violence was not significant. While violence is a strong predictor of repression at an event, there is no cumulative effect of violent protest on repression. States with higher aggregate levels of violent protest do not become generally more repressive of protest.

In addition to violent tactics, the other threat variables that are included in Model 3 – Length and Threatening Demands – were significantly associated with an increased probability of an event being repressed. A shift from the shortest length category to the longest increased the probability of an event being repressed by five percentage points. The presence of threatening demands also had a significant effect, increasing the probability of an event being repressed from 11% to 17%. Therefore, even when controlling for differences in state capacity, threatening protest characteristics were strongly associated with event repression.

The control for Logged Population remained significant and positive in both event-level models, while Logged GDP/capita remained insignificant. One difference between the state-level and event-level models – and one that represents a surprising finding – is that in the event-level models, PRI control of the governorship is significantly associated with *lower* probabilities of an event being repressed. Although this may seem counterintuitive, the PRI's long history of quite masterful control of unions and social movements may actually reduce the use of force at protest events. The strong ties between the party and organized groups, nondemocratic as they may be, creates channels between party and group leaders that could facilitate negotiation or cooptation, thereby reducing the need to apply repression at protest events.

I also carried out a series of robustness tests (see the appendix for a selection of additional models). The results still hold if repression is only defined as the use of force (as opposed to the operationalization used in this paper which combines force and threats of force), though the size of the effect is slightly smaller. There was no evidence of a "more murder in the middle" or threshold relationship between democracy and protest repression in any of the model specifications. I also ran all specifications with the Alternative Democracy variable, coded based on the rules of the Vanhanen Index to see if changing the measure of democracy would yield different results; however, democracy remained insignificant and state capacity significant. Finally, I ran the models without the Federal District (Mexico City) and the effects of state capacity remained. In conclusion, the significance of state capacity is robust to many alternative specifications of the model.

Conclusion

In this article, I explored the application of repression in response to protest. I argued that state capacity is a crucial determinant of protest repression because the management of protest requires a great deal from state actors who must monitor protest events and be able to effectively intervene when necessary. I also argued that violent tactics, long protests, and threatening demands make protests appear more threatening to authorities, and therefore are more likely to spark a repressive response. Finally, I argued that the mechanisms linking democracy to lower overall levels of human rights violations will not be at play when it comes to the repression of protest events. Therefore, regime type does not effect repression specifically applied in response to protest events. I tested these hypotheses using an original database of protest and response in Mexico that fully captures both event characteristics and responses to protest.

Using a novel measure of state capacity that combines a measure of the effectiveness of state actors in carrying out core state functions with a measure of state penetration in society, I demonstrated that state capacity is indeed a crucial variable for understanding the repression of protest. Threatening event characteristics also matter, creating an increased likelihood of repression. Nonetheless, state capacity's effect holds even in the face of threatening protest characteristics. Finally, while literature on repression has shown convincingly that democracy reduces overall levels of human rights violations, this paper shows that the effect does not hold when looking at the state's response to angry protesters in the streets. The application of repression at a protest event was not influenced by a state's level of democracy. Thus, we see that in spite of some similarities, namely the importance of threat in sparking repression, there are important differences between the determinants of overall levels of human rights and the repression of protest. This suggests that it is indeed important to disaggregate repression and look at the causes and consequences of its different forms.

There are several issues not answered by this paper. First, if the pacifying effects of democracy are only seen in consolidated liberal democracies, it is possible that these effects do not appear in this study because no Mexican state reaches these levels. On the other hand, there are a number of states in Mexico that receive equivalent scores to some of the world's consolidated democracies based on measures of electoral competition and participation. This suggests that even at relatively high levels, these particular aspects of democracy are not the factors that condition a state's response to protest. Second, the paper cannot speak to potential differences in protest management after an event is over.

Exploring the long-term repercussions of protesting is an interesting topic that requires more extensive case analysis than was possible here.

Recent scholarship has devoted much more attention to the ways that democratization, democratic consolidation, and quality of democracy affect political outcomes than it has to the role state capacity plays in political life. In some ways, repression of protest is an area in which we should have expected democracy to matter – protest can be seen as a manifestation of citizens' rights to speech and organization, as well as a way that elected leaders can be kept accountable between elections. Yet protesters calling for indigenous autonomy, the removal of elected officials, or that called into question electoral procedures – none of which are truly revolutionary demands, but rather demands that could be seen as a legitimate part of the democratic process – increased the likelihood of repression. And it is state capacity, not democracy that reduces the likelihood of repression. Consequently, low-capacity democracies cannot capitalize on the benefits that democracy ought to bring. The lost potential of democracy in many countries may not be solely a function of not enough democracy, but rather may have much more to do with the weakness of the state.

Appendix

Table 3.A1: Summary Statistics for State-Level Analysis

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Percent Repressed	10.72	8.74	0	26.67
Democracy	0.44	0.36	0	1.19
State Capacity	50.95	12.90	31.56	78.37
Violence	8.02	8.67	0	33.3
PRI Governor	0.53	0.51	0	1
Logged GDP/capita	11.13	0.51	10.43	13.03
Logged Population	14.70	0.78	13.14	16.46
n=32				

Table 3.A2: Summary Statistics for Event-Level Analyses

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Repression	0.13	0.34	0	1
Democracy	0.59	0.40	0	1.19
State Capacity	50.92	12.32	31.56	78.37
Violence	0.07	0.25	0	1
Length	1.44	0.78	1	3
Threatening Demands	0.15	0.35	0	1
PRI Governor	0.44	0.50	0	1
Logged GDP/capita	11.21	0.57	10.43	13.03
Logged Population	15.35	0.74	13.14	16.46
n=1095				

Table 3.A3: State-Level Analysis of Percent of Protest Events Repressed – Force Only (OLS)

Variable	Model A
Democracy	-.33
	(2.67)
State Capacity	-0.24**
	(0.08)
Violence	0.28*
	(0.12)
PRI Governor	-2.36
	(1.96)
Logged GDP/capita	-4.35*
	(1.91)
Logged Population	2.10
	(1.28)
Constant	36.66
	(31.04)
N	32
Adjusted R-squared	0.52

**=significant at the .01 level, *=.05

Table 3.A4: State-Level Analysis of Percent of Protest Events Repressed (OLS)

Variable	Model B	Model C	Model D
Democracy	-16.48		
	(10.81)		
Democracy squared	18.34		
	(9.55)		
Democracy threshold		1.92	
		(2.46)	
Alternative Democracy			-0.18
			(0.27)
State Capacity	-0.34**	-0.33**	-0.32**
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Violence	0.12	0.22	0.23
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
PRI Governor	-2.29	-3.07	-3.85
	(2.13)	(2.23)	(2.27)
Logged GDP/capita	-3.92	-3.92	-3.19
	(2.07)	(2.20)	(2.24)
Logged Population	3.00*	3.46*	4.02**
	(1.42)	(1.55)	(1.49)
Constant	29.31	17.83	6.63
	(34.02)	(36.28)	(35.78)
N	32	32	32
Adjusted R-squared	0.61	0.56	0.56

**=significant at the .01 level, *=.05

Table 3.A5: State-Level Analysis of Percent of Protest Events Repressed – Federal District Omitted (OLS)

Variable	Model E
Democracy	3.37
	(3.14)
State Capacity	-0.34**
	(0.10)
Violence	0.20
	(0.14)
PRI Governor	-2.49
	(2.40)
Logged GDP/capita	-4.43
	(2.42)
Logged Population	3.31
	(1.69)
Constant	26.90
	(42.98)
N	31
Adjusted R-squared	0.57

**=significant at the .01 level, *=.05

CHAPTER 4

PROTEST VIOLENCE: STATE CAPACITY, DEMOCRACY, AND THREATS TO SURVIVAL IN MEXICO

In January 2005 in the Mexican state of Michoacán, 2000 students from seven teacher-training colleges marched to the state's governmental palace to demand teaching positions for the schools' graduates. When unable to secure a meeting with the governor, the students surrounded and retained two government functionaries and met police efforts to free the detainees with insults and blows. While this event began with a nonviolent march, making it appear like the bulk of collective claim-making that occurs without violence in countries across the globe (Tilly 2006), the tactical choices of the protesters make the Michoacán student protest not simply a protest event, but an act of collective violence. While violence and its threat are intimately tied to the power of protest, scholars of contentious politics have tended to shy away from the violent side of protest (Piven 2012). Thus, studies of violent claim-making have been largely left to those studying revolution, civil war, and terrorism, leaving a gap in our understanding of the collective violence that occurs more commonly as part of protest. This paper explores the factors that make some protests more likely to take on a violent form, arguing that it is not democracy, but state capacity that reduces the likelihood of protest violence.

Violent protests are an interesting object of study, in part, because unlike the more studied forms of collective violence, they do not represent "a sharp break from 'normal'

political life…[but] tend to accompany, complement, and extend organized, peaceful attempts by the same people to accomplish their objectives" (Tilly 1979, 87). While violence tends to be seen as representing the dark side of political and social life, it is often closely tied to nonviolent movements that may serve positive ends, such as pushing for democratization or greater responsiveness. For example, in his examination of nonviolent, democracy movements, Schock (2005) acknowledges that, "of course, unarmed insurrections are rarely completely nonviolent, as riots, arson, and murders of opponents or government collaborators may occur during the course of these highly charged struggles" (xvi). Yet protest violence should not be considered simply a side note. Scholars have demonstrated that violence serves social movements' pursuit of strategic goals, including recruiting participants and extracting concessions (Gamson 1975; Piven 2012). Understood in this manner, violent tactics should not be seen as pathological or even wholly negative, but as "expression[s] of social malaise when other means for making demands are inadequate" (Gurr 1970, 4) that may be strategically advantageous to protesters.

Violent protests were historically viewed as events in which ordinary people and/or social deviants become subsumed by a crowd mentality and vented emotional outrage through violence (for a review of the scholarly literature, see Waddington and King 2005). Although this type of interpretation continues to appear in the popular press (see, for example, Owen 2006), it has been wholly discredited in the scholarly work on social movements and collective violence. Relative deprivation theories, associated with scholars like Gurr (1970), also focused on the emotions driving collective action, but without the assumption of an irrational crowd. Gurr argued that collective violence is, at

its heart, driven by discontent stemming from “societal conditions that increase the average level or intensity of expectations without increasing capabilities” (13). When people experience these feelings of relative deprivation, discontent intensifies and the likelihood of collective violence increases.

Other scholars emphasized the role of political context in their explanations of violent protest, criticizing relative deprivation theories for their lack of attendance to structural variables (Lodhi and Tilly 1973; Snyder and Tilly 1972). The focus on political processes led to rich historical accounts that connected changes in the nature of protest to the process of European state building. In particular, in nineteenth century Europe, premodern protest, “aimed mainly at extracting claims directly from antagonists or taking vengeance upon them,” was largely replaced by a modern form of protest marked by an orientation to performances designed to change public opinion and influence national politics or politicians (Tarrow 1998, 94; see also Tilly 1979; Tilly 2004). This distinction between premodern and modern forms of protest then came to be overlaid onto authoritarian and democratic regimes, respectively (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 2004). McAdam et al. (2001) put it concisely: “democratization greatly limits life- and property-threatening forms of public, collective claim making” and diminishes “nonnegotiable direct actions” (269). However, European state building was complex, and I will argue that collapsing the broad changes that occurred in Europe over the course of four centuries to the single dimension of democratization incorrectly identifies democratization as the main factor behind the decrease in protest violence.

While the historical shift in protest tactics was driven in part by industrialization, urbanization, and incipient democratization, it was also influenced by increases in state

capacity. The components of state building that social movement scholars have focused most heavily on are the creation of national citizenship through the expansion of public education, the corresponding increases in literacy, and the rise of the popular press. These changes are argued to have changed protest by shifting it away from local protest targets and toward national ones, which resulted in the decline of direct tactics in favor of more performative ones (Tarrow 1998; Tilly 2004). But European state building also involved disarming civilians, creating police forces responsible for controlling not just crime, but also crowds, and generally increasing state penetration of society; these aspects of state building also contributed to declines in violent protest (Tilly 1979, 2003). The influence of state capacity on collective violence has also been demonstrated by scholars of revolution (Goodwin 2001; Skocpol 1979) and civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Thies 2010). Thus, there is considerable reason to believe that state capacity is related to protest violence both historically and in the present day.

In sum, this paper makes three principal arguments. First, state capacity plays a key role in influencing the likelihood of violent protest. Where state capacity is weak, the probability of violent protest tactics will be greater. In addition, while the ballot box "has proven to be the coffin of revolutionary movements" (Goodwin and Skocpol 1989, 495), I will argue that democracy cannot be similarly expected to end protest violence. Finally, I argue that we should not completely ignore the types of discontent driving protest in our examinations of protest violence; I suggest that direct threats to safety, health and subsistence will increase the likelihood of violent protest. The paper considers these arguments in light of several additional factors, in particular the type of protesters

involved in a protest event, which have been hypothesized to influence the likelihood of protest violence.

I test this theory of protest violence using an original dataset of responses to protest in Mexico. The dataset provides unique micro-data on all reported protest event characteristics. I show that state capacity and certain grievances are important determinants of violence at protest events, while democracy is not. The paper proceeds as follows: the first section develops the theory of protest violence; the next two sections provide an elaboration of the research design and description of the measures; the relationships are demonstrated with descriptive statistics and tested with a logit analysis in which protest events are the unit of analysis; finally, I present some concluding remarks.

Explaining Violent Protest

Historical explorations of protest in the European context have suggested that democratic regimes are less likely to be home to violent protest tactics than their nondemocratic counterparts (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tilly 2004). This is thought to be the case because, in democracies, collective action is more likely to be sanctioned by the regime as a legitimate form of participation, causing it to become less deadly and less destructive than its authoritarian counterparts. While there is evidence to suggest that this theory is borne out when it comes to explaining “serious rebellion” (Gurr 1979) and revolution (Goodwin and Skocpol 1989), there is no empirical evidence to suggest this is the case with violent protest tactics. In addition, there are theoretical reasons to believe that the use of violent protest tactics will not necessarily be influenced by regime type.

In all political regimes, some types of protests are forbidden, while others are tolerated, and engaging in forbidden acts may result in penalties for the protesters. However, in nondemocratic regimes, in contrast to democratic ones, penalties for treading on forbidden ground can be much higher. Nondemocratic regimes tend to "invest heavily in anticipatory repression, not simply waiting until someone does something wrong to put them down" (Tilly 2006, 75) and they have higher overall levels of repression than democracies (Davenport 1995, 2007; Fein 1995; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). This does not, however, effect protest in a uniform way (see for example, Francisco 1995; Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998; Rasler 1996). While in some cases repression increases violent mobilization, it may also successfully eliminate it. As Tilly (1979) has shown, thanks to severe repression, "in the heydays of the German and Italian fascists, virtually the only violence to occur was at the hands of government employees" (110). While lower toleration of protest in nondemocratic regimes pushes some protesters into pursuing "forbidden clandestine attacks" (Tilly 2004), it may also lead protesters to avoid violence and assiduously pursue nonviolent, tolerated tactics. For example, the "rightful resisters" in rural China protested publicly and noisily, but chose a form of contention "based on strict adherence to established values," forgoing violence in order to maintain elite allies (O'Brien and Li 2006, 3-4). Whether protesters in nondemocratic contexts, on average, choose "unobtrusive, symbolic, and peaceful forms of disruption" (Tarrow 1998, 97) or opt for violent tactics is an empirical question that needs further exploration. In addition, empirical studies show that protest violence is not confined to nondemocratic regimes, but also occurs as part of protest in democracies (see, for example, Koopmans and Olzak 2004; Seferiades and Johnston 2012; Zwerman and

Steinhoff 2005). Although all regimes have tools to dissuade protesters from using violence, neither regime type is uniformly successful. Therefore, we should not expect to find a clear relationship between violent protest tactics and regime type.

While regime type should be expected to color the rules surrounding what types of protest are tolerated and forbidden, it is the state's capacity for protest management that strongly conditions the forms protest takes. The state, an organization whose central task is the monopolization of force, is directly relevant to protest and protest violence. The process of European state building that took place between the seventeenth and twentieth was multifaceted. During this period, states began centralizing power and, in doing so they began "dragging Europeans into political life on a larger than local scale" (Tilly 1979, 89). As the national political arena gained salience, it increasingly became a target for protest. This then spurred protesters to replace direct tactics with more performative tactics that would be broadcast to national audiences through the media (Tarrow 1998; Tilly 2004).

It was not just the increasing importance of the national political arena that led to changes in protest repertoires. European state building also involved the increasing penetration of the state in the private life of citizens. For example, premodern policing functions "were often carried out – if at all – by citizens rotating in local offices" or by various militia-like organizations (Silver 1967, 9). In the process of state building the modern police were born, leading not only to a more effective internal coercive apparatus, but importantly also to "the penetration and continual presence of central political authority throughout daily life" (Silver 1967, 12-13). In fact, during this period, in response to private problems "ordinary people began turning to courts and police"

(Tilly 2003) instead of taking matters into their own hands or turning to nonstate authorities. As the state became more complicated and more deeply penetrated the lives of its citizens, it was able to engage in more complicated protest management. Thus, protesters were not only influenced by the increasing geographical distance of their targets, they were also induced or compelled by the state officials directly involved in local protest management to shed the direct, often violent, tactics of the past (Tilly 1979). As such, increases in state capacity also played a significant role in reducing violent protest.

As Tilly (1979) has noted, authorities have "some choice of whether, and with how much muscle, to answer political challenges" (110), and this choice has potentially significant ramifications. In fact, protest violence is often attributed to the interactions between protesters and authorities, both in the moment of authorities' intervention at a protest event and in periods preceding protests' eruption (Della Porta 1995; Oberschall 1968; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1979). Because the actions of state authorities are connected with the choice of protest tactics, state capacity becomes a key variable for understanding protest violence. This is not simply a story of effective or ineffective crowd control, though that is important, but is more generally related to how the state responds to protest. Managing protest peacefully requires considerable manpower and administrative skills. State authorities not only need to accurately assess the contours of protest in order to decide if intervention is necessary and what kind of intervention is appropriate, but they must be able to effectively carry out their chosen strategy. Doing so effectively requires state authorities to correctly identify protest leaders and salient demands, facilitate negotiations, ensure protesters' safety from arrest during negotiations, and offer

credible concessions that will induce protesters to leave the streets. This complexity makes it more likely that high capacity states successfully use concessions as a tactic of protest management, while low capacity states are more likely to fall back on repression in response to protest (Sullivan forthcoming). Because effective management should be expected to reduce protest violence, while poor protest management should be expected to, at best, fail to contain violence and, at worst, serve as its spark, we should expect more protest violence where state capacity is low.

Tilly (2006) argues that there is an interactive effect between state capacity and democracy when it comes to levels of collective violence within countries. He hypothesizes that there will be high levels of violence in low-capacity, nondemocratic regimes; medium levels of violence in both high-capacity, nondemocratic and low-capacity, democratic regimes; and that there will be low levels of violence in high-capacity, democratic regimes. Although he notes that, "overall levels of violence run higher in low-capacity regimes, whether nondemocratic or democratic" (128), it is clear from his schema that he puts more weight on the pacifying effects of democracy than state capacity. However, this is not tested empirically and I would argue does not provide an accurate typology of protest violence.

Although political variables came to replace theories that saw deprivations – relative or otherwise – as the root cause of collective violence, there are reasons that we should not ignore grievances altogether when formulating explanations of protest violence. No one expects revolutions to be fought over the proliferation of irregular taxi cabs or the elimination of green spaces, but people do mobilize to protest these very issues. While protest tactics are in part tied to political context, they are also related to the

goals and strategy of protesters. The use of violent protest tactics increases the likelihood of repression (Eisinger 1973; Sullivan forthcoming; Tarrow 1998), but their use also increases the chances of concessions (Gamson 1975; Sullivan forthcoming). Where grievances or demands are more central to survival, the possibility of extracting a concession may be worth the potential price of repression. Thus, protests over direct threats to safety, health or subsistence should be increase the likelihood of protesters using violent tactics.

The identity of protest actors has also been thought to influence the use of violent protest tactics. Della Porta and Tarrow (1986) note that although historically terms like "the mob" were used as derogatory shorthand for unruly workers, they found that working class protests were, in fact, "less likely than average to involve violence" (620). This finding is resonant with Piven and Cloward's (1979) argument that workers' unions, in many instances, lead to a moderation of protest demands and tactics. Rather, Della Porta and Tarrow found that the bulk of violence occurred in "protests involving students or young people" (621). Finally, although rural protest has long been associated with "premodern" protest, which relies more heavily on direct, often violent tactics (Tarrow 1998; Tilly and Wood 2003), Della Porta and Tarrow found that farmers were close to the average in terms of their use of violence in protests. Thus, union protesters should be expected to decrease the likelihood of violence, youth or student protesters to increase it, and rural protesters may increase it or show no effect on protest violence.

In sum, I argue that although scholars of contentious politics put considerable emphasis on democracy's potential for diminishing protest violence, all regimes experience violent protest and, likewise, all regimes have strategies for minimizing

protest violence. Therefore we should not expect to find a relationship between regime type and protest tactics. State capacity, on the other hand, is strongly related to protest management because protest violence is often intimately tied to the interactions between protesters and authorities. In low capacity states, state authorities are less likely to have the broad tools needed to effectively manage protest; thus, they are less likely to successfully avert protest violence. Finally, I have argued that because protest violence makes both repression and concessions more likely, direct threats to protesters' safety, health or subsistence will make the potential benefits of concessions outweigh the potential costs of repression. These hypotheses should hold even when controlling for the type of actor engaging in protest.[26]

Research Design: Protest and Response in Mexico

I test these hypotheses using an original dataset of protest and response in Mexico. The focus on a single case allows for the collection of fine-grained micro-data that allows violent protest to be considered alongside the negative cases – cases in which protest occurs without attacks on people or property. The choice of Mexico as the case allows for the preservation of detailed information on each protest event, but provides subnational variance on regime type and state capacity. While Mexican in 2005 was considered democratic at the national level, the formal rules of the game had not diffused evenly across the country, leaving considerable variation in regime type and state capacity across Mexican states.

I constructed an original database of Mexican protest events that preserves detailed information on all facets of protest events (Sullivan Protest Response Database or SPRD). The data are built from newspaper articles collected using keyword searches

[26] For a full list of variable descriptions and hypothesized effects, see Table 4.1.

from an online news aggregator called InfoLatina.[27] The search terms included those to capture not only nonviolent protest tactics, including marches, demonstrations, and boycotts, at which violence at times erupts, but also included a number of search terms that specifically capture violent tactics. These include the following terms: lynch, riot, *guerrilla*, land invasion, clandestine/armed organization, and armed action. Excluded from the scope of the dataset were search terms designed to specifically capture terrorist events. In total, the database includes detailed information on 1219 protest events.

I employed a multi-pass coding strategy, which "greatly reduces the risk of duplicating events, facilitates reliable chronological ordering of information, and helps detect inconsistencies in the information found in different documents on the same event" (Franzosi 2004). In brief, in the first pass, irrelevant articles generated by the search were removed and bibliographic information was entered into the database; in the second, articles were sorted by event and labeled to prevent accidental duplication of an event; and, third the data was entered into the database. The data was entered in narrative form, preserving particularities included in the reporting. This allows for fine-grained tests of theories and allows the researcher to define analytical categories with reference to the specific research question at hand.

Creating a narrative protest database is extremely labor-intensive. Therefore tradeoffs must be made to narrow the scope of the data collected. Some scholars of protest choose to narrow the geographical scope to several cities or a single state, some use a single source, some only code protests from a single day during the week or month, some reduce the information from the articles that is coded, and some use a combination

[27] InfoLatina aggregates information sent by news agencies, newspapers, on-line news groups, magazines, and government agencies. They do not edit the information they receive from their news providers; they simply aggregate what is sent.

of these strategies (for a comprehensive discussion on sampling strategies, see Franzosi 2004). I chose to sacrifice the temporal coverage of events by only coding and analyzing six continuous months in order to preserve detailed information on each event and follow coverage of an event over multiple days. Because protest violence may occur in the course of an initially nonviolent protest event, sampling only certain days could cause the omission of violence at an event that begins without violence. In addition, the use of multiple sources provides a more thorough account of the tactics used.

Newspapers were chosen as the data source primarily because they provide the most comprehensive accounts of protest events and the responses they generate. The media is crucially important to protest because, as Lipsky (1968) puts it, "like the tree falling unheard in the forest, there is no protest unless protest is perceived and projected" (1151). Activists make choices with an eye to how protest will be seen by wider publics, and in the contemporary world, protesters and their audience do not "interact directly… Rather, information about activist events is communicated through mass media" (Meyer 2007, 4). In addition, newspapers have been used extensively as a data source for studying protest, and findings suggest that newspapers report the basic facts about protest events with reasonable accuracy (Earl et al. 2004). Nevertheless, there are challenges that come with using newspapers as a data source.[28] In order to mitigate potential political biases, my data is constructed from four national news sources: La Jornada, a left-leaning paper with a long history of covering protest; La Reforma, a right-leaning paper; El Universal, a centrist paper with high circulation; and Notimex, the Mexican

[28] For comprehensive reviews of findings on media biases, see Franzosi (2004) or Earl et al. (2004).

government's newswire.[29] In addition, there is no evidence that the newspapers systematically omit events occurring far from the capital or in less developed states. While there were many more events reported in Mexico City than any other state (approximately one quarter of the events reported took place in the capital), the correlation between the number of events per 100,000 people in a given state and the distance from the capital (r=-0.14) was low and there was no sign of an underreporting of events in less developed states as measured by the Human Development Index; in fact, the correlation between number of events and level of development was negative (r=-0.41).

The protest events all occurred in the first six months of 2005, which is an appropriate period from which to generalize for several reasons. First, I selected a year in which there is not a presidential election in order to avoid a period of high media attention on the national electoral contest that could be expected to crowd out other news. Second, and more important, the period predates the dramatic spike in drug violence that occurred in 2008 (Ríos and Shirk 2011). Because my key variable of interest is state capacity, the influence of narco-traffickers over state institutions – which is thought to be significant but is extremely difficult to measure – would make the analysis far more context-specific. Thus, I chose a period prior to the spike in order to maintain a broader generalizability.

Mexico is an excellent case for a study of this sort because it is a federal system divided into thirty one states and a federal district. Because protest violence is expected to be related, in part, to the skill with which authorities manage it, we must explore the dynamics on the ground. Although as Tilly notes, protests have increasingly targeted

[29] For more information on the print media in modern Mexico, see Lawson (2002).

national political actors, crowds still must be managed in the location where they take to the streets. While moving to the most local administrative divisions would make it more difficult to make the case that regime or state capacity could be defined in a way that corresponds to our conception of these concepts at the national level, exploring state level political characteristics allows for an exploration of on the ground dynamics while maintaining many features of the national governmental structure. Each Mexican state has an executive, a state congress, and a judiciary – a structure mirroring that of the national government. In addition, the salience of state-level politics has increased in the last two decades as governors have become key players in Mexican politics (Cornelius 1999; Díaz-Cayeros 2004; Gibson 2005) and their power is enhanced by their control of state police forces. While federal police forces exist and are responsible for preventing federal crimes such as drug trafficking and assisting state and local authorities, each state has its own relatively autonomous force controlled by the state governor (Reames 2007; Uildriks 2010).[30]

Recent literature on federal countries, specifically in Latin America, shows that subnational undemocratic regimes exist, and sometimes flourish, within nationally democratic countries (Gervasoni 2010; Gibson 2005; Giraudy 2009, 2010). In fact, several studies have measured the within country regime variations, showing them to be quite significant (Gervasoni 2010; Giraudy 2009, 2010). While Mexico was considered formally democratic at the national level after 2000, there is considerable subnational variation in regime type (Gibson 2005; Giraudy 2009, 2010) While many scholars conceptualize and measure regime type and state capacity at the national level, less

[30] Mexico also has municipal police forces, though outside of the largest cities these forces are rarely significant (Reames 2007).

attention has been paid to the fact that both exhibit substantial subnational variation. This study makes use of Giraudy's (2009) indicator of subnational democracy in Mexico, which measures the following dimensions of democracy: executive turnover, executive and legislative contestation, and clean elections.

Likewise, there is evidence that important differences in state capacity are also seen within a single country (Goodwin 2001; O'Donnell 1993; Taylor 2011), and this variation has been noted specifically in the context of Mexico (Magaloni and Zepeda 2004; Uildriks 2010). In this paper, high capacity states are conceptualized as those having "the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a given territory" (Migdal 1988, 19). In order to effectively do this, states need not only institutional capacity, but must also have the capacity to penetrate civil society (Mann 1986; Migdal 1988). This conceptualization of state capacity is particularly apt for a study of protest since scholars of contentious politics have noted that the state's administrative and rule-making capacity (Jenkins 1995), or put more specifically, the state's legal system (Lipsky 1969) are amongst the most salient elements of state capacity for protesting groups. Many variables have been used to proxy some element of a state's capacity, such as GDP per capita (Fearon and Laitin 2003), the presence of lootable resources (Fearon 2005), military personnel per capita (Walter 2006), country risk assessments (DeRouen and Sobek 2004), and tax to GDP ratio (Thies 2005). These measures, however, are all quite removed from the state's actual ability to penetrate civil society and implement its decisions. Therefore, I measure state capacity in terms of the resources, abilities, and penetration of the state level legal system in each Mexican state

and the Federal District. The variation in subnational state capacity and democracy in the Mexican case is illustrated in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1: Democracy-Capacity Distribution



Data

I use two indicators to capture protest violence, both of which are drawn from the Sullivan Protest Response Database (SPRD). The first, *Violence Against People Or Property* includes acts of violence such as: physical aggression; hostage-taking; attempted or successful lynchings; protest actions in which the participants are armed; breaking a police line or impeding police action; throwing Molotov cocktails or other projectiles; hijacking property; invading land; and damaging property. The second measure, *Violence Against People*, is coded like the first, however, excludes hijacking

property, invading land, and damaging property. Both are dichotomous indicators that capture the absence or presence of a violent tactic at a protest event.

To measure the key independent variable, *State Capacity*, I focus specifically on law enforcement because of its direct connection to the maintenance of order; its centrality to all types of states, democratic and nondemocratic alike; and, its importance irrespective of state policy goals and priorities. Conceptually, I am interested in measuring the state's ability to penetrate society and implement binding rules, both crucial aspects of all states' ability to manage protest. While a measure of the resources, efficacy, and penetration of all state agencies would give a more complete picture of state capacity, it would be an impossible measure to construct and it lacks parsimony. My indicator captures a state's ability to carry out its core functions, and as such serves as a proxy for its general institutional capacity.

My indicator of State Capacity is made up of three separate components. The first two are adapted from Magaloni and Zepeda's (2004) Law Enforcement Performance Index, the first capturing state resources for investigating crime and, the second, the ability to bring investigations to a successful close.[31] The third component captures the extent of state penetration of society in the sense of citizens making "repeated voluntary use of and action in state-run or state-authorized institutions" (Migdal 1988, 32). I keep this tightly connected to law enforcement by using a measure of the percent of reported crimes.

More specifically, the first component of the measure quantifies the human capacity that the public prosecutors' offices (*ministerios públicos)* have to investigate

[31] While the Law Enforcement Performance index is quite rich, it covered the years 1996-2000 so could not be used in this paper. In addition, serious problems with missing data prevented the extension of the full index.

crimes and levy charges against accused criminals. This component has two subcomponents: the number of public prosecutors per hundred thousand people in a state and the average number of crime reports each agent must handle. Both components are standardized to a base of 100 and the latter subcomponent's scale is reversed so that higher numbers are associated with higher capacity. Then the subcomponents are averaged. The second component of the state capacity indicator is the weighted conviction rate. It is built from the percent of murders reported that ended in a conviction and the percent of other reported crimes that ended in a conviction. These two conviction rates are then averaged. These data are drawn from official statistics reported from the national statistical institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, INEGI) and are operationalized in a manner consistent to the corresponding subcomponents in Magaloni and Zepeda's (2004) index.

The final component is the percent of crimes reported. This data is taken from a crime victimization survey in which respondents who have been victims of crimes are asked if they filed a report. The survey is carried out by ICESI (Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios sobre la Inseguridad), a nongovernmental organization that specializes in the generation of statistical information about security issues in Mexico. These three components are all standardized to a base of 100 and then averaged to create the measure of state capacity.

I include an indicator, *National Target*, to control for the aspect of European state building in which the national state came to take on greater importance, causing protests to increasingly target national political actors. Because this shift was also expected to

encourage the decline of direct tactics, I have included a dichotomous variable for protest events at which the national government is a target.

My measure of *Democracy* is adapted from Giraudy's (2009) indicator of subnational democracy in Mexico. The indicator measures the following dimensions of democracy: executive turnover, executive and legislative contestation, and clean elections. It is a multiplicative index, so a zero in any one category produces a zero for the total score.[32] The clean elections variable uses post-electoral conflict as a proxy for fraud. I adapted this indicator by adding a component to capture whether the incumbent party was unseated in the relevant election.[33]

The indicator, *Threats To Survival*, is included to capture demands related to direct threats to safety, health and subsistence. This includes demands to end repression or particular police operations; address an environmental issue that poses a direct threat to health; avoid or protest displacement from land; and solve water shortages or electricity outages. This is also coded as a dichotomous variable capturing the presence or absence of a demand of this type at an event.

The analysis also includes indicators for three different types of protest actors, *Rural Protester*, *Union Protester*, and *Youth Protester*. Rural Protester includes protesters from the agricultural sector, including farmworkers, small fishermen, and ranchers, as well as peasants and indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples are included in this indicator because indigenous populations tend to be concentrated in rural areas (INEGI

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[32] Mexico has many state governments where there has never been turnover in the executive from the old ruling party (the PRI); however, this does not automatically generate a zero in this subindicator because only places with no turnover on party or governor would score a zero. This condition is not met in any Mexican state.

[33] In addition, I have created an additional democracy variable, *Dichotomous Democracy*, which is a dichotomous measure separating states falling into the highest scoring cluster of Democracy from all other states. This is included in order to more clearly interpret the interaction effect.

2004). In addition, after making demands along class lines (i.e. as peasants) during Mexico's long period of single-party rule, indigenous identity was politicized in the late 1990s causing people who had once been identified as peasants to be identified as indigenous (Trejo 2012). The indicator, Union Protester, includes officially registered labor unions, as well as labor federations that are officially recognized by the Ministry of Labor (*Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social*). Finally, the indicator, Youth Protester, includes young people (*jóvenes*) and students, while excluding small children (*niños*). All three are coded as dichotomous variables that capture whether the actor is present or absent at an event.

Finally, I include three additional controls, *Logged GDP/capita*, *Logged Population*, and an *Event Count Control*. Logged GDP/capita and Logged Population are included because they have commonly been associated with collective violence, in particular civil wars (see, for example, Collier et al. 2003; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Higher GDP/capita and lower populations are associated with lower likelihoods of violence. Finally, I include a control for the number of events taking place in each state. This is simply because I expect that the more events that occur, the greater the likelihood that any particular tactic – violent ones included – will be used.

Table 4.1: Summary Statistics (Full Sample)

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Expected Direction
Violence against People or Property	0.09	0.29	0	1	
Violence against People	0.08	0.27	0	1	
State Capacity	50.93	12.33	31.56	78.37	−
National Target	0.41	0.49	0	1	−
Democracy	0.59	0.40	0	1.19	−/*none*
Dichotomous Democracy	0.59	0.40	0	1.19	−/*none*
Threats to Survival	0.10	0.30	0	1	+
Rural Protester	0.13	0.34	0	1	+
Union Protester	0.12	0.33	0	1	−
Youth Protester	0.05	0.23	0	1	+
Logged GDP/capita	11.21	0.57	10.43	13.03	−
Logged Population	15.35	0.74	13.14	16.46	+
Event Count Control	111.49	113.86	4	294	+
n=1096					

Models and Results

I test my hypotheses in two principal ways. First, I present simple descriptive evidence of the relationships between protest violence and democracy and state capacity, respectively. Then, I show that these relationships hold up strongly in a multivariate context. Logit models are used due to the dichotomous dependent variable, which captures the presence or absence of protest violence at an event. The logit models are run with clustered standard errors to account for the different variance in the errors across states. The dependent variable in Model 1 is Violence Against People Or Property. In Model 2, the dependent variable is Violence Against People. Both models use the same independent variables: State Capacity, National Target, Democracy, Threats To Survival,

Rural Protester, Union Protester, Youth Protester, Logged Population, Logged GDP/Capita, and Event Count Control.

Figure 4.2: Percent of Events with Violence against People or Property by State Capacity



Figure 4.3: Percent of Events with Violence against People or Property by Democracy



Figures 4.2 and 4.3 provide prima facie evidence of the relationship between protest violence and state capacity and the lack of a relationship between protest violence and democracy. Figure 4.2 shows a striking difference between the percent of protest violence in high capacity versus low capacity states. While 5.7% of events in high capacity states were marked by protest violence, in low capacity states approximately twice as many protests involved the use of violent tactics (12.0%). On the other hand, whether a state had high or low levels of democracy did not substantially impact the percent of events with violence and, in fact, the percent of events with violence was actually slightly higher in the high democracy cluster (with 9.4% as opposed to 9.1%).

These relationships hold in multivariate analysis. Both models support my hypothesis that state capacity strongly conditions protest violence while regime type does not. As seen in Models 1 and 2, there is a significant negative association between State Capacity and protest violence – against people and property and solely against people – while democracy is not significant in either model. The substantive effect of state capacity is somewhat larger when violence against property is included in the specification of protest violence. The probability of Violence Against People Or Property goes from 19.4% at the lowest capacity to 4.0% at the highest capacity and the probability of a Violence Against People goes from 15.4% at the lowest capacity to 4.0% at the highest capacity.

Table 4.2: Event-Level Analysis of Violence Against People Or Property (Logit Model with Clustered Standard Errors)

Variable	Model 1
State Capacity	-0.04*
	(0.02)
National Target	-1.28**
	(0.26)
Democracy	0.19
	(0.60)
Threats to Survival	0.84*
	(0.41)
Rural Protester	0.40
	(0.29)
Union Protester	-1.93**
	(0.66)
Youth Protester	0.62*
	(0.28)
Logged Population	-0.59*
	(0.27)
Logged GDP/capita	-0.72
	(0.62)
Event Count Control	0.01**
	(0.00)
Constant	15.96*
	(6.81)
N	1096
Log pseudo-likelihood	-298.28
Pseudo-Rsquared	0.11

**=significant at the .01 level, *=.05

Table 4.3: Event-Level Analysis of Violence Against People (Logit Model with Clustered Standard Errors)

Variable	Model 2
State Capacity	-0.03*
	(0.02)
National Target	-1.15**
	(0.27)
Democracy	0.04
	(0.54)
Threats to Survival	0.97*
	(0.42)
Rural Protester	0.36
	(0.30)
Union Protester	-1.78**
	(0.67)
Youth Protester	0.63
	(0.34)
Logged Population	-0.51*
	(0.26)
Logged GDP/capita	-0.77
	(0.59)
Event Count Control	0.01**
	(0.00)
Constant	15.03*
	(6.51)
N	1096
Log pseudo-likelihood	-275.11
Pseudo-Rsquared	0.11

**=significant at the .01 level, *=.05

In addition, the effect of the national government being a protest target was highly significant in both models, lending empirical support to the theory that the shift to national targets pushes protest tactics into a more performative and less direct form. Substantively, the probability that protesters use violence (of either specification) moves from around 3% with a national target to approximately 9-10% when the national government is not targeted.

Threats To Survival was also significant in both models. The probability of Violence Against People and Property is 10.4% when protests contain no demands related to threats to survival, while that figure jumps to 21.1% when these types of demands were present. In the Violence Against People model, the probability shifts from 8.8% to 20.2%.

Results on the type of protest actors were mixed. Rural Protester was insignificant in both models. Union Protesters, on the other hand, significantly reduced protest violence in both models. While non-union protests had approximately a 10% chance of violence (10.5% for people/property and 8.8% for people only), the probability dropped to nearly 1.5% at protests with union protesters. The most interesting actor result is that of the Youth Protester. While the presence of youth protesters significantly increased the likelihood of violence against people or property, with a shift from 10.4% when absent to 17.8% when present, this relationship did not achieve significance when only violence against people was considered.

The control for Logged GDP/capita was insignificant, while the Event Count Control was significant and in the right direction. Oddly, the control for Logged Population was significant but in a counterintuitive direction. When controlling for other

factors, including state capacity, democracy, GDP/capita, and the number of protests in a state, more populous states were less likely than their less populous counterparts to experience protest violence.

I also carried out a series of robustness tests. There was no evidence of an interaction effect between democracy and state capacity as can be seen by the overlapping confidence intervals and similarly sloped lines in Figure 4.A1 in the Appendix (see also Model A in Appendix Table 4.A1). In fact, Figure 4.A1 actually shows the opposite pattern of what Tilly expected; although the results are insignificant, higher levels of democracy are associated with a higher probability of protest violence. In addition, I also tested for evidence of several other alternate explanations. Tarrow (1998) suggests that because violence can make a statement without a crowd, small groups will be more likely to engage in violence. The newspaper information on the number of protest participants is notoriously bad; it is often not reported and, when it is, it has been shown "to verge on the fantastic" (Franzosi 2004, 172). However, I have coded a dummy variable, *Size*, which is a dichotomous measure of whether or not 100 or more people were reported at an event. This was insignificant. In addition, Della Porta and Tarrow (1986) argued that extremists were more likely than moderates to engage in protests. While I was unable to measure extremism directly, I attempted to test several proxies. First, I looked at *Length*, assuming that longer protests would be associated with greater protest militancy.[34] This was insignificant. While there were no truly antisystemic demands in my sample, I also tested *Political Demands*, a dichotomous variable

[34] *Length* was coded as short, medium, or long (1 day, 2-6 days, 7 or more days). Protests in which the length was not able to be determined by the news coverage, were coded to the average length of events of that type.

capturing the presence of demands for the removal of an elected official, demands related to electoral procedures or fairness, and calls for indigenous autonomy. This was also insignificant.[35] As Model B shows, none of these additional controls changed the significance of my main variables.

Conclusion

In this article, I explored the structural factors and protest characteristics that influence the use of protest violence. I argued that the historical evolution of protest in Europe was based on multiple factors and that attributing the main causal role to democracy is incorrect and obfuscates the more salient factor involved in the decline of violent protest tactics: state capacity. Because protest management requires a great deal from state actors in terms of deciding when and how to intervene and then possessing the skills to successfully carry out the chosen strategy, higher capacity states will be better able to effectively manage protest and prevent protest violence. Where state capacity is low, protest management will be unpredictable and ineffective, not only making violence prevention more difficult, but also increasing the chances that interactions with state officials will serve as a spark for violence. Furthermore, I argued that because protest violence makes both repression and concessions more likely, when protesters face threats to their survival – a situation in which the stakes are very high – violence will be more likely. I tested these hypotheses using an original database of protest and response in Mexico.

Using a novel measure of state capacity that combines a measure of the effectiveness of state actors in carrying out core state functions with a measure of state

[35] Although I present all three additional variables in the same model in the Appendix, I also tested each alone, which did not alter the results.

penetration in society, I demonstrated that state capacity is indeed a crucial variable for understanding protest violence. Regime type, on the other hand, was not a significant factor in explaining the use of violent protest tactics. In addition, my hypothesis that direct threats to survival increase the likelihood of protest violence was supported by the evidence, suggesting that while political context is very important, the nature of discontent still plays a role in shaping protest. My evidence also supported the theory that protest tactics shift from direct and potentially violent to more performative when protesters target national government actors. The paper also provided evidence that unions are less likely than other types of protest actors to use violent tactics. By contrast, students and youth were more likely to engage in violence against people or property, but when looking solely at violence against people, this relationship did not hold. Finally, I provided evidence that agricultural protesters did not influence the use of protest violence, suggesting that the rural-urban distinction is not salient for explaining differences in protest tactics in contemporary political life.

Appendix

Table 4.A1: Event-Level Analysis of Violence Against People Or Property (Logit Model with Clustered Standard Errors) - Model A

Variable	Model A
State Capacity	-0.04
	(0.02)
Dichotomous Democracy	0.34
	(1.35)
DichotomousDemXCapacity	-0.00
	(0.02)
National Target	-1.27**
	(0.26)
Threats to Survival	0.83*
	(0.41)
Rural Protester	0.41
	(0.29)
Union Protester	-1.94**
	(0.66)
Youth Protester	0.62*
	(0.27)
Logged Population	-0.65*
	(0.31)
Logged GDP/capita	-0.80
	(0.66)
Event Count Control	0.01**
	(0.00)
Constant	17.71*
	(7.27)
N	1096
Log pseudo-likelihood	-297.91
Pseudo-Rsquared	0.12

**=significant at the .01 level, *=.05

Figure 4.A1: Predicted Probabilities of Dichotomous Democracy



Table 4.A2: Event-Level Analysis of Violence Against People Or Property (Logit Model with Clustered Standard Errors) – Model B

Variable	Model B
State Capacity	-0.04*
	(0.02)
Democracy	0.24
	0.54
National Target	-1.29**
	(0.28)
Threats to Survival	0.92*
	(0.46)
Rural Protester	0.38
	(0.31)
Union Protester	-1.89**
	(0.64)
Youth Protester	0.65*
	(0.27)
Political Demands	0.61
	(0.39)
Size	0.29
	(0.26)
Length	-0.05
	(0.15)
Logged Population	-0.59*
	(0.24)
Logged GDP/capita	-0.66
	(0.60)
Event Count Control	0.01**
	(0.00)
Constant	15.12*
	6.81
N	1096
Log pseudo-likelihood	-295.20
Pseudo-Rsquared	0.12

**=significant at the .01 level, *=.05

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