RESTORING THE BALANCE

PEACE TEAMS AND VIOLENCE REDUCTION IN CHIAPAS, MEXICO

CONTRASTING APPROACHES TO NONVIOLENT INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY

CHRISTIAN PEACEMAKER TEAMS, SIPAZ AND *LAS ABEJAS*

PAUL NEUFELD WEAVER

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS
St. Paul/Minneapolis, Minnesota

A Dissertation submitted to the Education Faculty of the University of St. Thomas in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degree of

Doctor of Education

JUNE, 2002

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS

St. Paul, Minnesota

This dissertation for the Education Doctorate degree by

Paul Neufeld Weaver

has been approved by a dissertation committee composed of the following members:

Committee Chair

Committee Member

Committee Member

Committee Member

Committee Member

Committee Member

July 17, 2002

Date

Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge all the support and assistance I received on this project from many sources. To begin with I would like to thank my wife and partner Laurel and my children Erin, Justin and Ana Esperanza. You encouraged me, tolerated me and loved me through the two years of research and writing on this project. Other relatives temporarily relieved me of full-time fathering duty so I could travel, transcribe and write. Thank you Lila, Cynthia and Marsha, without you this work would still be languishing–half-written–on my computer.

I would especially like to thank all those who consented to be interviewed as part of this research project, particularly the members of The Bees, Christian Peacemaker Teams, and International Service for Peace. Your commitment to your work and willingness to reflect together on it made this project possible.

The members of the critical pedagogy doctoral cohort at the University of St. Thomas–Adamma, Adele, Deb, Doug, Emma, Karen, Margo, Mev, Neng, Pat, Siri and Stephanie–provided repeated feedback on the project as it progressed. Thank you, colleagues. My appreciation also goes to my professors, Stephen Brookfield, Seehwa Cho, Kerry Frank, Zeus Leonardo, Marcia Moraes, Steven Preskill, Karen Rogers and Eleni Roulis. The twenty-one of us struggled together to maintain a counter-hegemonic vision within a traditional academic structure and to constantly view theory and practice through the lenses of race, class and gender.

I would like to thank my advisor, Tullio Maranhao, and the other members of the dissertation committee–Marc Becker, Seehwa Cho, John Holst, Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer and Teresa Ortiz. You consistently reminded me to bring my own analytical lens into the interpretation of the stories and ideas of which I write. Many thanks to all those who read various drafts of part or all of the dissertation. In addition to the dissertation committee members, valuable input was given by Laurel Neufeld Weaver, Marsha Weaver, Cynthia Weaver, Duane Ediger, Marina Pages and other members of the SIPAZ-Chiapas team, Lynn Stoltzfus, Ron Rich and Elaine Sommers Rich.

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Abstract

Two models of third party nonviolent intervention in Chiapas were studied in relation to local indigenous struggle. The study was carried out in 2001 through interviews, archival research and personal observation/participation.

Two sister peace team organizations, International Service for Peace (SIPAZ) and Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) seek to reduce violence and create political space in this southern Mexican state–the site of an indigenous rebellion since 1994. SIPAZ seeks to promote dialogue by building relationships with all sides in the conflict. CPT seeks to "get in the way" of injustice, allying themselves with *Las Abejas*, a nonviolent Mayan Catholic group, target of the 1997 Acteal massacre. *Las Abejas* support the goals of the Zapatista rebels while opposing armed struggle. This study explores violence and nonviolence, tells the story of these three groups, examining their impact through the voices of members, colleagues and opponents, and discusses the implications of their differing approaches.

The international presence, working with local indigenous communities and Mexican NGOs, has been a deterrent to violence. It also has helped create space for local groups to dialogue, carry out nonviolent action and work for human rights. Peace teams do this work through their presence in conflict zones, information dissemination, building nonviolent capacity, peace action and international advocacy.

SIPAZ and CPT employ contrasting approaches on the issue of nonpartisanship, adopting "political independence" and "taking sides," respectively, as part of their strategic focus. Both approaches can be effective in reducing violence and creating political space in the appropriate context. Conflict transformation as employed by SIPAZ and nonviolent direct action as employed by CPT and *Las Abejas* draw on related but distinct traditions within nonviolence.

Teachers are encouraged to teach about the costs of violence, tell the story of nonviolent movements, build capacity for nonviolent action, and practice nonviolent pedagogies. The transformational pedagogy of active nonviolence can form the basis for *restoring the balance* in societies that have been disrupted by violence.

Despite important differences in philosophy and strategy, SIPAZ, CPT and *Las Abejas* share a fundamental commitment to a nonviolent struggle for justice and a birthing of reconciliation.

Figure 1: A Codification of Nonviolent Indigenous Struggle: Pedro Valtierra's Photo of the Women Resisters of X'oyep

January 3, 1998

Photo by Pedro Valtierra, *La Jornada*

Illustrating Nonviolent Action

"Nonviolence" encompasses a host of traditions ranging from the passive withdrawal of the Amish, to Gandhian resistance, to secular social change movements, to theological treatises. The phrase is even used unapologetically in a CIA produced training manual to describe U.S.-backed terrorists (Tayacán, 1985).

The photograph on the preceding page has become an icon representing indigenous resistance in Chiapas. I am using it to illustrate a particular perspective on nonviolence, that of active nonviolence, or nonviolent resistance. The *Abeja* women of this photograph are not passive, nor are they seeking the destruction of their enemies. They are forcefully defending their community from an armed incursion by Mexican military forces a few days after members of their group were massacred by paramilitaries in Acteal.

Nonviolent resistance seeks justice through active resistance to evil, while never equating one's opponent with the evil one seeks to defeat. Love for the enemy and defense of one's own dignity are both essential elements of nonviolent action.

Chapter 2 includes a narration by a resident of X'oyep of the confrontation shown in this photograph. I recommend the use of this photograph to educators and nonviolence trainers as a codification (Freire, 1970) of the *coyuntura* (critical juncture, see footnote p. 12) of indigenous struggle and nonviolence.

Some Reflections on my Journey

Learning War, Learning Peace

When I studied history in school, what we looked at was largely the history of warfare. In U.S. history we went from the French and Indian War, to the Revolutionary War, to the War of 1812, to the Civil War, to the Mexican-American War, to the Spanish-American War, to World War I, to World War II, and, if we got that far, to the Korean War. When we studied war, we looked at how the war started, who it was between, how it was waged, what kind of armaments were used, what the issues were over which the war was fought, and finally, who won and what the spoils and consequences were. Rarely, though, did we look deeply at who suffered as a result of the war.[1]

The way we studied war was a great contrast to the way I was experiencing the war which was going on when I was a school-child–the Vietnam War. Every day on the news I saw people getting hurt, suffering, and dying. I saw people being dislodged, and I saw U.S. government officials struggling to explain how we must shoot, maim, dispossess, and kill to save the world. And I saw people protesting against and resisting this war. But while I had studied war in school, I hadn't studied resistance to war or alternatives to war.

I wish I would have been taught in school about the many times in history when people opposed war and tried to reduce the violence caused by war and to stop the oppression of tyrants. I wish I would have learned about those who struggled to defend their rights and end oppression without violence, the times people looked for ways to act that would change relationships, change thinking, change consciousness. I wish I would have learned about Henry David Thoreau's war tax resistance, about Helen Keller's opposition to World War I (Loewen, 1995). I wish I would have learned about Satyagraha and the Free India Movement led by Gandhi which won independence for India without firing a shot. I wish I would have learned how Dictator Maximiliano Hernandez was

[1] One exception was the fate of Jews who died in WW II, the holocaust, but usually this was touched on only briefly.

overthrown in a nonviolent revolution in 1944 in El Salvador (Parkman, 1988). I wish I would have read the words of African leaders of nonviolent struggles such as Albert Luthuli in South Africa, Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, and Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana (Sutherland & Meyer, 2000). I wish I would have studied the Montgomery bus boycott as a way of changing something that is wrong without destroying those who oppress you.

By day I learned the history of war in school. By night, outside of school I was a Boy Scout. I learned to start fires, tie knots, use a compass, use a bow and arrow, shoot a gun, and survive outside in the cold. I marched in the Memorial Day parades to remember our country's fallen war heroes. I loved Boy Scouts, and still appreciate many of the things I learned there. But recently when I looked back at some old issues of *Boy's Life*, the magazine all Boy Scouts received, what drew my notice was the many ads for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. The ads, the marching, the survival skills . . . was Boy Scouts preparing me to be a soldier?[2]

I wish I would have been trained to be a nonviolent warrior, a Satyagrahi, as Gandhi's troops were called. I wish I would have been taught how to live the life of nonviolent solidarity with the oppressed, how to speak out against violence even when it is unpopular. I wish I would have learned how to print flyers, speak languages, deconstruct ideologies, and refuse to comply with unjust laws. I wish I would have had classrooms that practiced the democracy we were told about.

But I *was* taught some things. I read that our country stood for the principle that all people are created equal, that we are endowed by the creator with the inalienable right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. I was taught that people could make a difference. Although my classmates and I were aware of the abolitionist movements, suffragist movement, unions, the civil rights movement, and the anti-Vietnam War movement, the way we were taught history put forth the idea that the

[2] Paradoxically, my Boy Scout experience also helped train me in the endurance necessary to practice nonviolence.

primary way change in the world comes about is through the violence of war.[3]

In a democratic classroom, perhaps there would have been space to explore questions like why we tolerate gross inequality when we believe in equality. Why we kill to preserve the right to life. Why our military occupies other countries, tells the people there what they have to do and builds military bases there, and says they are doing it in the cause of freedom.

My family and church provided a space for me not available in school and Scouts. It provided a counter-hegemonic ideology. In church this ideology responded to the dominant hegemony that said "my country right or wrong" by saying a Christian must follow God first, and by teaching that God commands "Thou Shalt not Kill." My family told me stories of my father who refused to fight in the "good war," World War II, but instead was a conscientious objector, doing alternative, civilian service in Puerto Rico. I heard of my brother and sisters protesting the Vietnam War and injustice at home, at times being jailed briefly for such protests.

I experienced between the public sphere–school and Scouts–and the private sphere–church[4] and home–what James Loewen (1995) calls "cognitive dissonance," the conflict between ideas and experience.[5] I chose to seek to be faithful to the private sphere, that which taught me to resist the honoring of war and the preparation for killing. I determined to spend my life seeking to discover the causes of violence and inequality and to find my place in the struggle against them.

Over the years since then I have learned Spanish, worked with refugees both in North America and elsewhere, traveled three continents, and studied history anew. Along the way I ran

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[3] Two recent works which attempt to look at U.S. history from the perspective of nonviolence are *The Missing Peace: The Search for Nonviolent Alternatives in United States History* (Juhnke and Hunter, 2001) and *Nonviolent America: History through the Eyes of Peace* (Hawkley and Juhnke, 1993). See also *Lies My Teacher Told Me* (Loewen, 1995) and *A People's History of the United States* (Zinn, 1980).

[4] While for some groups church may feel more like a part of the public sphere, for Mennonites, Brethren and other Anabaptist groups like the Amish, Hutterites, etc., as well as for other peace church groups such as the Quakers, church often represents a site where standard cultural norms are contested. In contemporary western, secular society, all church communities are becoming part of the private sphere, whereas in nations where the state closely identifies with a particular church or faith, the church may still be considered part of the public sphere.

[5] Loewen applies this concept to Christopher Columbus, whose desire to exploit the Indians was dissonant with his initially favorable opinion of them. Therefore, rather than change his behavior, he changed his opinion.

into people working creatively to subvert violence and inequality–people who chose to forgo their expected roles in society and instead to work collectively with others to creatively disrupt the system that produces war, oppression, and poverty amidst wealth. Some of these people were from privileged communities within the rich nations, white people from the US, Canada, Western Europe. Others were from poor nations in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, or from Third World communities in the rich countries. All were searching for ways in which these two groups, one from the ranks of the oppressors, the other from the ranks of the oppressed, could work together for transformation of individuals, groups, institutions, societies, nations, and world systems.

Having grown up in a rural, all-white community in the U.S. Midwest, I sought out new experiences, inviting members of Latin American communities in Honduras and Costa Rica, African American communities in Chicago, and exiled Central Americans to be my teachers. I looked for models of ways white westerners could be in authentic solidarity with those who had so often been the victims of "my" history–slavery, colonialism, war, and inequality.

One small location I discovered where the struggles of marginalized people for empowerment came together with the solidarity of citizens of privilege was in the peace teams movement. In 1983 my ten-year involvement with Witness for Peace (WFP) began (as a member of the WFP Midwest staff and steering committee). WFP brought 5,000 U.S. citizens, in groups of 15-20 at a time, to the towns and cities of Nicaragua to stand with Nicaraguans against attack by the United States and its paramilitary arm, the Contras.

In 1986 I volunteered with Peace Brigades International (PBI) in Guatemala where North American and European volunteers accompanied human rights workers whose lives had been threatened. When the soldiers aimed their guns at the unarmed members of the *Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo* (Mutual Support Group of Relatives of the Disappeared, or GAM) and yelled "death to the communists," I stepped in between. For half a minute I shared the fear my Guatemalan *compañeros* experienced 24 hours a day and the knowledge that choosing to speak up could carry a cost.

In 1992 I traveled to Haiti to explore a possible presence of the newly formed Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) to accompany communities under threats from Haitian paramilitary death squads associated with military leaders who had deposed Haiti's first democratically elected president. While living in Cuernavaca, in central Mexico from 1993-97, I kept in touch with the progress of the establishment of SIPAZ (International Service for Peace) and its work in Chiapas, many miles to the south, through friends and coworkers who were part of that process. When CPT started sending delegations, I met with each group as they came through.

After moving back to the United States, I participated in CPT delegations to Colombia and Chiapas and went through the training to become a CPT reservist, a position I hold today. I have also volunteered to serve on a subcommittee of the SIPAZ organization. These participations clearly mark me as not a neutral observer (which is probably impossible in any case), but as a participant observer.

The dream of peace teams is to have groups of trained practitioners of nonviolence prepared to travel to and intervene in situations of armed conflict in order to prevent and reduce violence and to create space for local groups to work for justice and reconciliation. This study seeks to contribute to the understanding of the dynamics of this particular form of nonviolent action.

It is my hope that my children and grandchildren, as well as all people, will have the opportunity to learn in school about diverse peoples' struggles for liberation without violence, and the action of others to stand in nonviolent solidarity with those struggles. Furthermore, I expect that we will equip young and old people alike with what they will need to wage tomorrow's struggles; the analytical skills to deconstruct oppressive systems of domination; an understanding of the history and dynamics of violence and nonviolent action; the ability to reach across barriers of class, race, culture, and gender; the personal skills to transform conflict; and the ability to face fear and go forward.

This dissertation seeks to contribute to that process by exploring one experiment in liberation and solidarity, through looking at the experience of SIPAZ and CPT in Chiapas, and the way in

which they have entered the nonviolent struggle of local groups including *Las Abejas* (The Bees). It comes out of a unique four year experience as part of the first doctoral cohort in Critical Pedagogy at the University of St. Thomas, in Minneapolis/St. Paul, Minnesota (we spent time on both campuses). Together, thirteen activist educators guided by eight professors from the Department of Curriculum and Instruction explored critical theory, educational practice, and how we, as teachers, can be agents of liberation. It was during this time that I gradually became conscious of how action for peace was really what I hoped for as a consequence of an effective liberatory pedagogy.

The nonviolent activists from within the ranks of SIPAZ, CPT, *Abejas*, and Zapatistas may not describe their work in pedagogical terms, but really what they are doing is, to use the words of Paulo Freire, who was the midwife of critical pedagogy, "education for critical consciousness." The nonviolent practitioner, or Satyagrahi as Gandhi would call her, acts in order to transform–transform the consciousness of the oppressor as well as of the oppressed, transform the relationship between groups with different amounts of power in a society, and transform the practitioner herself. These kinds of transformations is what critical pedagogy is all about.

The Research Process

In response to the incredible suffering represented by twentieth-century violence, the United Nations has declared 2001-2010 to be the "Decade for a Culture of Peace and Nonviolence." It seems fitting at the beginning of that decade, to undertake a study of how the vision of peace teams has played out in Chiapas (FOR, 2000).

In gathering experiences, relationships, space, and information for producing this work, I traveled three times to Chiapas, once in 1999 and twice in 2001 (for a total of eight weeks in Chiapas). I conducted 30 interviews with 36 people (several were group dialogues and several people were interviewed two or three times) both in Chiapas and in the United States. I read widely

on peace teams, nonviolence, and Chiapas. I went through hundreds of articles, press releases, newsletters and documents produced by and about CPT, SIPAZ, and the *Abejas*. I spent time with the CPT team, the SIPAZ team, and with the *Mesa Directiva* (steering committee) of the *Abejas*.

I hesitate to claim expertise about any of these groups. Those who have worked with them for the last 5-10 years are closer to being experts than I. But I do feel privileged to have been invited to observe, participate, and dialogue with these experts. What I present to you here is part of what I got out of these encounters. I cherish the deeper understandings, the good times, and the hospitality of all those I visited with.

My hope is that the work presented here will be useful to a variety of audiences. It is written for academics and activists, for those interested in peace and justice in Chiapas as well as those interested in promoting "third party nonviolent intervention"[6] (TPNI) around the world, for both internationalists and those deeply grounded in local struggles, for those whose primary peacemaking focus is in the area of conflict resolution/transformation and for those whose focus is on nonviolent revolution.

While many groups, including the Zapatistas, other local indigenous groups, Mexican Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and numerous international groups have employed nonviolent tactics in the struggle in Chiapas, the focus of this study will be three groups who have an ideological/religious commitment to nonviolence and who have been most active in employing forms of nonviolent action on the ground in Chiapas out of that commitment.[7]

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[6]"Third party nonviolent intervention" is a term which defines peace team work particularly in comparison with UN peacekeeping missions, which are third party interventions but are usually armed.

[7] Other groups such as Witness for Peace and *Xi'nich* could have been included in this study. Time and energy necessitated limiting the study to the three groups with which I was most familiar and which were the most active in principled nonviolent action in Chiapas during recent years. A future study of nonviolence in Chiapas should surely include these two and other groups, as well as a study of the much larger phenomenon of Zapatista nonviolent struggle.

The Research Questions

I set three goals for the dissertation. First, I seek to tell the story of CPT and SIPAZ in Chiapas, particularly in their relation with the *Abejas*. I do this largely through bringing together the voices of those I interviewed, from both inside and outside the groups. The story is told from the perspectives of nonviolence and local/international collaboration and solidarity.

Second, I seek to explore various ideological concepts which interested me as I specifically compared the work of CPT and SIPAZ. While CPT and SIPAZ are sister organizations which largely share the same goals and are close allies in the struggle for peace and justice in Chiapas, there are some important distinctions in the philosophy and practice of the two groups.

I present these issues as four dichotomies, representing the philosophy and practice of CPT and SIPAZ, respectively. They are: partisanship versus nonpartisanship, justice versus reconciliation, political action versus noninterference and nonviolent direct action versus conflict transformation. Although there is an inherent tension within each dichotomy, they are not dichotomies from which we must choose right or wrong, but instead are wedded pairs which together dance through the story of nonviolent solidarity and indigenous resistance in Chiapas. It is of great importance to understand and listen to the voices of each of these approaches, for each has a lesson to offer us in keeping the peace team endeavor within the necessary balance to be effective and to carry out the work in a way which is sufficiently proactive but also sufficiently respectful of the local dynamics.

Finally, I seek to evaluate the impact of the work of CPT, SIPAZ, and *Las Abejas* in Chiapas. Has violence been reduced? Has political space been created or preserved for local people in Chiapas to work for justice and reconciliation? What learnings are here for those who are interested in using peace teams to reduce violence? What kind of impact results from various ways in which peace teams are deployed? And what should be the response of educators who seek to carry out a

pedagogy which is transformational?

In preparing and writing this text, I struggled with competing impulses, reflected in the three goals above. On the one hand, I had what could be called a "modernist" desire to do an empirical study that "tells the truth" about the work of nonviolent peace teams in Chiapas, evaluating the "success" or "failure" of CPT and SIPAZ in reducing violence and creating space. On the other hand, I wanted to produce a "postmodern" dialogical account that weaves together the various stories and the discourses behind them that are in tension in Chiapas as well as in the interventions of peace teams, seeking to critique the ideological assumptions that inform these discourses.

I have not sought to resolve this tension within myself because I believe both have an important place in scholarship. I believe that those of us involved in peacemaking, pedagogy, and other types of social change work have the responsibility to try to "measure" our impact, or, better, to listen to the critique of our allies about our impact. In the words of one advisor, "If someone has their boot on my neck, it matters to me whether the boot is lifted or not." Therefore the question, "Does peace team work reduce violence?" is relevant to the struggles of the indigenous people of Chiapas. But, on the other hand, the empirical approach can reduce our questions to the point of missing some important and interesting learnings. By listening not just for the answers to our specific questions, but instead paying attention to what is important to others about their stories, we can discover answers to questions we never knew to ask. We can learn by listening to peoples' stories, thinking about the discourses they are a part of and analyzing the ideologies behind those discourses. In this manner, new ways of understanding reality can emerge out of competing and interweaving narratives.

So, when we enter an area of conflict, when we become part of the *coyuntura*,[9] there are important issues to be conscious of that are beyond the capacity of our empirical questions to filter.

Therefore it is helpful to reflect on our practice both in the context of an evaluation based on our original explicit goals, and based on a more general reflection on discourses, ideologies, and processes. So, while an empirical study might try to decide "which approach, partisan or nonpartisan, is most effective in reducing violence," a dialogical approach would ask "what are the assumptions behind and the implications of each of these approaches," and "how do the ways we describe what we do compare with the ways others perceive what we do?"

A challenge, therefore, in this task, has been the open-endedness of the second approach. How do I know when I am done? There are always more perspectives that would be useful to hear and to reflect on. There are always other ways to analyze the questions. But, finally, the absolute truth of temporal limitations determines that, at some point, the writing must be done, and the work must come to an end, if not a totally satisfactory conclusion.

So the conclusion, then, should try to give some answers to certain questions at the same time it tries to avoid simplistically constructing answers to questions which have no answers. Examples of the first type of question are: What has been the nature of violence in this context? What strategies does nonviolent action posit? How have these groups implemented their nonviolent strategies? Have these groups been successful in achieving their goals? Points one and three, above, then, produce some more or less concrete answers, a story and a conclusion.

But the second point, exploring the ideological discourses, is meant not to produce answers, but instead to help us understand the dynamics and implications of the varying choices peace teams make in the ongoing struggle for social change and peace. This is evident frost in each group's philosophical stance: one declares that it takes sides (a partisan position), the other is politically independent (non-partisan). For one justice is the proximate goal, for the other it is reconciliation.

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[8] A *coyuntura* (conjuncture) is an historical moment with a particular confluence of events which make it a moment in which to act for change. Coyuntural analysis considers the current political, economic, social, and spiritual "signs of the times" and discerns an appropriate response.

The implications of these philosophical stances are seen in each group's practice. One group chooses to interfere to a greater degree in internal political matters in the local community, the other chooses to avoid local political involvement. One chooses to put time and energy into campaigns of nonviolent direct action, together with local groups seeking to achieve change while the other works to promote dialogue and implement strategies of conflict transformation.

An Overview of the Chapters

I begin Chapter 1 by trying to define violence and looking at the worldwide impact of violence in the twentieth century. A brief discussion of the philosophy and history of nonviolence is set in the context of an analysis of the relation between violence, power, obedience, and nonviolent action. After a brief look at efforts of the UN in armed peacemaking since 1945, the emergence of peace teams since the 1980s is described.

In Chapter 2, I look at the indigenous struggle for liberation in Chiapas, paying special attention to nonviolent action as part of that movement of Mayan people rebelling against 500 years of injustice in the tradition of Emiliano Zapata. A particular focus in this chapter is *Las Abejas* (The Bees), who have worked closely with CPT and the Catholic Diocese of San Cristobal in developing Indian Theology and a nonviolent philosophy and practice drawing on indigenous traditions, Catholic spirituality, Zapatista political principles, and modern nonviolence.

Chapter 3 presents a history of the work of two peace team groups, SIPAZ and CPT, in Chiapas. Chapter 4 explores some of the ideological issues which arise in the conjuncture of international peace team solidarity and local Mayan resistance, specifically, the issues of nonpartisanship versus taking sides and the question of what actions are appropriate for foreigners to engage in. Chapter 4 also looks at the shifting emphasis on justice and reconciliation and compares and contrasts two overlapping streams within active nonviolence: conflict transformation and

nonviolent direct action. In Chapter 5, out of this study of peace teams from the context of critical pedagogy I challenge myself and other educators is to make the transformational pedagogy of nonviolence a centerpiece of our educational work.

The reference list includes four sections; a list of interviews, a bibliography, and lists of CPT and SIPAZ publications. Appendix A expands upon the discussion on violence in Chapter 1 by presenting a mapping of lethal violence in the twentieth century. Appendix B is a discussion of some of the texts which I have found useful in understanding Chiapas and peace teams. Appendix C presents a sermon which draws on the experience of the *Abejas* and Acteal to point to a suggested response to the attacks of September 11. Appendix D is a chart which juxtaposes 13 Peace Team experiments of the latter twentieth century. Appendix E presents SIPAZ's Statement of Purpose, a foundational document for SIPAZ's work. Appendix F is the CPT Chiapas goal statement. Appendix G is the Statement of the Problem presented to my Dissertation Committee at the University of St. Thomas in March, 2001. It is included here since it represents the starting point for this project. Finally, Appendix H is a list of the 45 people killed in Acteal on December 22, 1997.

Perhaps you are reading this from a website, in which case there are links throughout which you may find helpful. I welcome feedback about this work. In fact, it is my hope that it will stimulate further dialogue on these issues. It is also my hope to produce a summary form of this manuscript in Spanish as well as English. Your assistance in holding my feet to the fire to fulfill this commitment is requested.

Chapter 1 - Stopping Killing: Peace Teams and Violence Reduction

The aim and result of war necessarily is not peace but victory, and any victory won by violence necessarily justifies the violence that won it and leads to further violence. If we are serious about innovation, must we not conclude that we need something new to replace our perpetual "war to end war?"

-Wendell Berry (2001)

Introduction: Violence and September 11, 2001

Over the last hundred years the world has seen nearly 200 million killings. The details of all these massacres, acts of terror, wars, murders, forced starvation, and executions would fill thousands of pages. Even then most of the victims would remain anonymous. (Appendix A attempts a brief mapping of 20th century violence.)

In the months I have been writing this manuscript, one case of lethal violence has occupied the attention and passions of people in my country, the United States. The 3,181 mostly civilian victims of the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York City and Washington, DC (*USA Today*, 2002) have been perhaps the highest profile victims of lethal violence since the holocaust.[10] Most victims of violence in our world do not receive the privilege of this attention. Since September 11, thousands have been killed in Colombia, Sudan, Congo, Afghanistan and Iraq, but their names are not listed daily in the world's newspapers, their killers are not hunted down.

Our differentiated reaction to different cases of lethal violence has multiple sources. First of all, we are reliant on receiving the news of killing, so we are dependent on the media, which in turn are strongly directed by their corporate structure and the hegemonic assumptions of western societies. These assumptions are closely related to U.S. government policy, perceived national interest, and the need to perpetuate U.S. power worldwide (Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Herman, 1995). Second, the perceived guilt or innocence of the victims influences our level of outrage. For non-pacifists, one measure of whether it is OK to kill someone is the guilt of the victim. Third, the degree to which the victims are "like me" is directly related to my own emotional engagement with

the issue. It is much easier to identify with those who share a common nationality, language, and culture. Fourth, we have been socialized to expect violence in certain places, and not expect it in others–this being closely related to race, class, and gender issues. Violence worldwide disproportionately affects people of color, women, and the poor. The September 11 attacks affected a significant number of people of privilege, people we are not accustomed to seeing as victims of violence. Finally, outrage at violence tends to be focused on violence against those on "my side" of the conflict. Armed conflicts are not unlike sports competitions where fans cheer for their home team and hope for the defeat of the opponent not because they believe they are better or more moral or more deserving than the other, but simply because *we* want to defeat *them*.

However, some who condemn the killings in the New York City and DC attacks feel uneasy about the privileging of these deaths over the many voiceless others. Proponents of peace teams want to take action to stop violence, especially that which results from the power of the world's privileged. The mission of peace teams is to *restore the balance* (Coy, 1997) in our response to war and violence, lending our privilege, including the protection afforded us by our citizenship and race, access to travel, media, and resources, to those who are denied that privilege[9] and utilizing the tradition of nonviolent action inherited largely from people of the two-thirds world[10] (Lakey, 2001).

For the purpose of this dissertation, peace teams will refer to groups that enter violent conflict situations seeking to prevent or reduce violence and to create the political space for local actors to work for justice and reconciliation. (Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber, 2000). To the extent that violence is inflicted disproportionately by those with greater power and wealth–often as a means of

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[9] One of the ways in which peace team accompaniment is effective is by using what Gene Sharp (1973) calls "political jiu-jitsu." Since the world's powers place more value on the lives of white people, showing more reluctance to kill white people than they show to kill people of color, leaders of social change and human rights movements in Guatemala, El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Mexico and Colombia have invited first world people to escort those threatened with assassination as "nonviolent bodyguards" thus lending their privilege, and allowing the work to change those systems of privilege to go on. See Coy (1993) for an in-depth discussion of this dynamic and the difficulties it presents to peace team practitioners.

[10] The marginalized, poorer countries of the world, usually called the "Third World," are sometimes referred to as the "Two-thirds World" instead since they contain two-thirds of the world's population.

maintaining or exacerbating existing imbalances of power and wealth (which some peace teams would see as a form of violence in itself)—peace teams seek to restore the balance. In doing so, some peace teams openly ally themselves with oppressed groups. This was the approach of CPT in Chiapas. Even when groups adopt a nonpartisan, impartial, or politically independent position—one that avoids close identification not only with any of the armed parties to a conflict but also often with unarmed actors--peace teams can be motivated by, and have proven capable of, opening space for acting for justice to people and groups who have been marginalized, impoverished and targeted by violence. This has been the approach of groups like PBI or SIPAZ..

The incident of violence whose memory permeates this text and the work of the three groups I write about: *Las Abejas*, SIPAZ, and CPT, occurred in the village of Acteal, on December 22, 1997. On that day 45 Mayan-Tzotziles; 21 women, 15 children, and 9 men were killed while they were fasting and praying for peace. While even smaller than September 11, and much smaller when measured against the death tolls of a century of international violence, Acteal, like September 11, has become a potent symbol of violence against innocents. It has also become a symbol of resistance. It is in the work and witness of a Mayan pacifist Christian group, *Las Abejas*, within a larger context of Indigenous Zapatista resistance, that our story will take shape.

Violence, Nonviolence and Power

The first concepts we are confronted with as we study peace teams are the competing paradigms of violence and nonviolence. Violence, the intentional causing of harm to the other, is a common method of both social control and social struggle. Nonviolence, the intentional refusal to do harm to another, has always been an alternative to violence, and, although it was not always labeled as such, nonviolent means of social struggle have existed as long as has human interaction. Understanding the nature of power, "the possession of control, authority, or influence over others," is

key to understanding how nonviolent action can overcome violence.[11]

Violence

The word "violence" is almost as loaded a term as is the term "terrorism."[12] It is loaded in the sense that it is used more often to describe a certain behavior when done by others, and not as often used to describe the actions of oneself or one's allies. It is also somewhat ambiguous in its application, as it can refer to many things.

In preparing the data and discussion in Appendix A which I was calling "Violence in the Twentieth Century," a friend challenged me that my definition of violence was not consistent with how the word is normally used. I was using "violence" to refer to the intentional killing of one human being by another. My friend pointed out that the *American Heritage Dictionary* defines violence as "Physical force exerted for the purpose of violating, damaging, or abusing: 'The essence of war is violence.' (Macaulay)" (Ron Rich, personal communication, October 15, 2001). Therefore, violence should not be used just to refer to killing, but also includes other kinds of harm. "For the purpose" implies intentionality. For Gandhi, though, violence is much broader, being "anything that impedes individual self-realization" (quoted in Burrowes, 1996, p. 106).

As one who desires to be a social change agent, I believe it is important to be able to communicate clearly. This is easier if, when we use words like violence, we know the context of meaning in which they are received. In order to better understand how the word violence is commonly understood, I decided to further explore how the word violence is used in different venues. I drew on three sources: internet searches in English and Spanish, a *New York Times* search,

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[11] The definition of power here used comes from *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary* (1977). The definitions of violence and nonviolence are my own.

[12] Terrorism is a politically loaded term used currently almost exclusively to describe violent acts carried out by the opponents of those who dominate the world. The violence of the powerful is called "retaliation," or "a just cause" which is precisely how "terrorists" see their actions. In other words, one person's "terrorist" is another person's "freedom fighter."

and a review of the interviews I conducted.

In my internet search, the term violence is used most often to describe domestic violence. Entering the word "violence" on the Google search engine, of the first 30 sites presented, thirteen were on domestic violence, five on school and youth violence, three were on gun violence, three on anti-gay violence. Only three of the thirty, or 10% were related to the violence of war. Workplace violence, the criminal justice system, and video games each had one site.[13] A search on the Spanish word *violencia* yielded results in which over 75% were related to domestic violence, focusing on physical and sexual violence against women and children.[14] This suggests that in talking about "violence reduction" we should be aware that this could easily evoke images of interventions to reduce domestic, youth and gun violence. (A study of interventions in these types of situations would be worthwhile, but is not within the purview of this study.[15])

Looking at one day's articles in the on-line version of the *New York Times* (February 15, 2002) produced a decidedly different focus on violence. Of the 32 articles in which the word "violence" appeared, a third dealt with Afghanistan, a third with domestic U.S. concerns such as movies (5), art (2), prisons (2), youth and video games, and the final third dealt with elsewhere in the world: Israel (3), and one each for Zimbabwe, Kashmir, Yemen, Russia (death penalty), Fiji, and Yugoslavia. Two-thirds, then, were related to war and international political conflict. In the context of an internationally recognized daily newspaper, then, we come closer to the identification of "violence" with war, but also encounter a quite diverse spread of foci.

The violence which is the concern of most of the above references is not primarily lethal violence, but instead includes other kinds of mostly physical violence. However, both searches

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[13] Search conducted on February 15, 2002, using the Google search engine.
[14] First 30 results of *violencia* search conducted March 30, 2002: domestic violence–24, and one each; nonviolence, television violence, psychology of violence, street violence, school violence, and talking with kids about violence.
[15] In fact, CPT has carried out several projects in U.S. cities addressing issues of urban violence. In Colombia, where CPT's most recent project is located, 85% of the 30,000 killings per year are the result of non-political homicide. CPT's priority is to focus on preventing and reducing political violence.

include references to lethal violence, whether it be in the context of domestic violence, war, crime, or school violence. Perhaps the internet is a more personal space, as the sites found in my search mostly deal with forms of violence which, while they have clear political implications, are primarily personal acts of violence. The violence referred to in the *New York Times* tends to be of a more collective nature (Marc Becker, personal communication, February 23, 2002). As we move toward collective violence we move toward the type of violence peace teams are designed to prevent or reduce.[16]

Physical and sexual violence against noncombatants, especially women and children, has always been a part of war.[17] But world attention was drawn to extreme examples of sexual violence in war in the 1990s. In Sierra Leone, one study found that over half of women who came into contact with one armed group were sexually abused (Sierra Leone, 2002) and in the war in Bosnia, over 20,000 rapes were reported (UNICEF, 1996 and 2002). Bekele (2001) reports that "Nearly 90 per cent of victims of war today are civilians, mainly women and children." While the victims of both war and "domestic" violence are often women and children, the perpetrators are almost always men. Thus, war and domestic or gender-related violence cannot be completely separated into different categories.

Feminist scholars and activists identify a link between war and patriarchy.[18] In order to end

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[16] It should be recognized that the internet is not representative of society in general, especially across class lines. Internationally, its use is highly weighted toward the wealthy countries. *The New York Times*, likewise, serves a mostly middle and upper-class readership. Therefore, the uses of the word revealed here are not necessarily generalizable to society, but at least they provide us with the dominant uses of the word "violence."

[17] See Judges, 11 and 12, 1 Samuel, 15-16, the latter of which includes, "Now go and attack Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have; do not spare them, but kill both man and woman, child and infant, ox and sheep, camel and donkey . . . So Saul defeated the Amalekites, . . . utterly destroyed all the people with the edge of the sword." See *Los Genocidios en la Biblia* (Byler, 1997) for a discussion of Christian interpretations of Genocide in the Old Testament.

[18] "Patriarchy is the power of the fathers: a familial-social ideological, political system in which men–by force, direct pressure, or through ritual, tradition, law and language, customs, etiquette, education, and the division of labor, determine what part women shall or shall not play, and in which the female is everywhere subsumed under the male. It does not necessarily imply that no woman has power, or that all women in a given culture may not have certain powers . . . .

"The power of the fathers has been difficult to grasp because it permeates everything, even the language in which we try to describe it. It is diffuse and concrete; symbolic and literal; universal, and expressed with local variations which obscure its universality" Adrienne Rich (quoted in Warnock, 1982, p. 23).

war, therefore, patriarchy, or male domination must be overcome, and the essence of being a man must be revisioned. Barbara Zonotti (1982) writes

> In the male world of war, toughness is the most highly prized virtue. . . . The man who recommends violence does not endanger his reputation for wisdom, but a man who suggests negotiation becomes known as soft, as willing to settle for less. . . . It is no accident that patriarchy relates the history of war–that is precisely their history. (p. 17)[19]

A key factor, then, in combating violence is working to change the idea that masculinity is augmented by violence and is diminished by negotiation, compromise, or nonviolent action. It is also important to diminish and end the gender oppression of which so much violence is a part.

In Chiapas 50 women were reported raped in the first few years of the war (UNICEF, 1999). During the Acteal massacre most of the victims were women and children. In linking war, patriarchy, racism and violence against women, Warnock quotes a Vietnam veteran who reported that on the way to Vietnam, U.S. troops were told, "There's a lot of loose ass over there men, and they just love GI dick. And best of all, they are only Gooks, so if you get tired of them you can cram a grenade up their cunt and 'waste' them." Warnock also reminds us that 400,000 Bengali women were raped by Pakistani soldiers in the 1971 war between Pakistan and Bangladesh (Warnock, 1982). SIPAZ described the consequences of Low Intensity Warfare on women, including: harassment, rape, prostitution, and deterioration of health (*Report* 3:1, January, 1998).

The violence referenced in the interviews I conducted refers primarily to killing and the physical effects of war and low intensity conflict, but also to economic violence, discrimination and denial of the dignity of the other. Discussions of violence, its meaning(s) and its presence and prevention flow throughout the interview transcripts. I looked specifically at each use of the words

[19] Historians Juhnke and Hunter also discuss how the need to prove one's masculinity can lead to war in looking at U.S. history. "In a letter to [George] Washington, explaining his decision [to prepare for war with France], [President John] Adams defensively distanced himself from the 'babyish and womanly blubbering' for peace at any price" (2001, p. 63).

violence, violent, *violencia* and *violento*. This reflects both my own perspective on violence, since I was directing the interviews with my questions, as well as the concerns and interpretations of the people I was talking with.

A number of categories of use became clear. By far the most common use of "violence" in all its forms was to refer to the use of arms in causing displacement, physical harm or death, particularly by the paramilitaries. This accounted for 1/2 of the references. Next was the use of the terms to refer to denial of human rights, threats, harassment, lack of respect and unfair treatment. This category accounted for 1/6 of the uses. The economic/structural violence of neoliberalism, low coffee prices, poverty, and the high standard of living in First World countries also accounted for 1/6 of the references. The breaking of relationships was discussed, especially in relation to the Bees' view of violence. This included not resolving conflicts when they arise, and the issues of seeking or taking power, 1/10 of the cases. The covert violence of Low Intensity Warfare and psychological violence was mentioned in 1/10 of the cases.

Thus, the violence discussed in my Chiapas interviews is the type of violence addressed by peace teams, physical violence and the violence which is the instrument of and result of war in its various forms. Secondarily, the structural violence of economic injustice and the breakdown of community are also deemed important in these interviews.

The Mission Statement of Christian Peacemaker Teams refers specifically to "lethal violence."[20] For Gene Stoltzfus, CPT director, violence is "the use of weapons . . . to make things come out right, to come out my way. . . .We wouldn't deny that there is such a thing as psychological violence" such as the imperialism of the conquistadors, but CPT primarily focuses on stopping physical violence (Interview 11). However, in the Chiapas context of Low Intensity Warfare, CPT

[20] "Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) offers an organized, nonviolent alternative to war and other forms of lethal inter-group conflict. CPT provides organizational support to persons committed to faith-based nonviolent alternatives in situations where lethal conflict is an immediate reality or is supported by public policy" (CPT, 2002).

also addressed a different kind of violence. For example, in an interview conducted in March of 2001, CPTer Scott Kerr commented, "There is a violent situation going on in the communities every month, even though there hasn't been anyone killed in Chenalhó[21] since May. Someone was killed in an ambush. But there's constantly rumors, there's constantly threats, and these things are violent, because they prevent people from living abundantly" (Interview 2). The idea of something being violent if it simply prevents abundant living may make most of us victims of violence at some point, and necessitates a way to sort out these categories. Figure 2 is an attempt to do so.

Figure 2: An Expanding Definition of Violence



[21] San Pedro Chenalhó is the *municipio* or county of which Acteal is a part and where most of the *Abejas* live.

The categories in Figure 2 are not completely mutually exclusive, but instead are intended to represent various categorizations. Peace teams are designed to respond primarily to the violence of the middle oval of this illustration, armed violence. But their work often carries them into the next level, responding to the threats and harassment of military occupation and psychological aspects of low intensity warfare.

It is often the most challenging for peace teams to find ways to creatively deal with economic violence. The outer circle represents problems which are often at the root of violence. Broken relationships are many times a part of the conflict which those dedicated to a ministry of reconciliation seek to heal. Helping communities to reconstitute the torn social fabric is part of this work. Inequality is at the core of the violence of the powerful against the weak. Lending your voice and your physical presence to the marginalized is a response to the imbalance, the injustice of this inequality.

The economic policies of "neoliberalism," globalization and structural adjustment are identified by those people struggling for justice in Chiapas and elsewhere as a form of violence since they cause harm to individuals and communities. CPT worker Lynn Stoltzfus describes three of the types of violence shown in Figure 2, shooting, low intensity warfare, and poverty.

> There's lots of different kinds of violence, there's an overt violence where people are shooting each other or inflicting physical harm, there's the violence of low intensity warfare, psychological pressure, psychological things that have gone on here in Chiapas, there's the violence of poverty, there's the violence of economic injustice, where the things that people produce aren't valued in correlation to the amount of energy they put into producing them. (Lynn Stoltzfus, Interview 5)

Antonio Gutierrez, an *Abejas* leader, describes how low intensity warfare is a method the government uses to kill indirectly.

> The Mexican government does not want to kill us directly with its army or Public Security Police because they know that would be a serious crime. Therefore they began to form paramilitary groups. These paramilitary groups are trained, instructed and advised by the Mexican Army. They began to enter into communities shooting into the air. The owners of the homes began to flee to the mountains to save themselves. The paramilitaries robbed the belongings from the houses and burnt them down. (Witness for Peace, 2001)

Here, Gutierrez links the overt violence of the paramilitaries and the indirect violence on the part of the government.

While much of nonviolent action in general is focused on prevention of injustice and economic violence, most peace teams properly focus their efforts on preventing and reducing direct, physical, lethal violence. Despite CPT's focus on nonviolent action on the side of the oppressed, the focus of their actions are the actors who are propagating violence and who are responsible for that violence

While "violence" can, and does, refer to many things, there are some commonalities; intentionality, harm, causation. Therefore, for this work, let's define violence as intentionally causing harm to another. Lethal violence is willful, reckless or negligent behavior that causes the death of another human being. This definition does not address the question of "justification." Whether or not a particular act of violence may be considered justified (by self-defense, retribution, etc.) does not change the fact that the act is violent. The question of justification is another way of distinguishing a pacifist from a nonpacifist. A pacifist believes no violence is justified.[22]

The issue of intentionality is an important factor. There is a continuum (see Figure 3) with intentional acts on one end, accidents on the other, and negligent or reckless action which causes harm in the middle.

Spectrum of Violence

So, without abandoning our definition of violence, let us also recognize the existence of a spectrum of violence. The chart below shows the spectrum of intentionality in causing harm, from violence to accidents. All actions which cause harm can be placed on this spectrum. Violent acts are

those in which the harm is intentional. Accidents are unintentional harm, and I place negligence in the middle.

Figure 3: Spectrum of Intentionality in Causing Harm



The distinctions made in Figure 3 are not always so easy to make in real life, since it may be unclear or subject to debate what the intent and responsibility of the perpetrator was. Looking at some of the examples given above, in the case of the low intensity warfare of counterinsurgency, such as is taught at the School of the Americas and at Fort Bragg, and carried out in Chiapas and Colombia (and many other places) the harm caused by this training is intentional to the extent that the training is employed in the type of counterinsurgency for which training was given. When used in other ways by the trainees, the training is negligent.

But in the case of structural adjustment policies and free trade agreements, it is not so clear that the intention is to harm or to kill, although many feel that is, indeed, the consequence. In that case, the question of negligence arises. Is it a violent act to institute a policy which you know or suspect may cause harm to others, even if that is not the reason you are instituting the policy?[23] A corollary question, dealt with differently by different peace team organizations, is whether to focus violence reduction efforts on stopping direct, physical violence as that carried out with weapons, or

[22] Of course, in the real world the lines can become fuzzier. Many Christian pacifists have a "two-kingdom" theology, in which Christians are prohibited from violence, but the state, being of "the world" is not prohibited from violence. Others make a distinction between the large-scale, mass, and often indiscriminate and uncontrollable violence of war; and the limited violence of a (local) police force.

[23] This is a moral question which must be faced by militaries which assert that civilian deaths were unintentional. Is it negligent to continue a policy which has caused "unintentional" deaths in the past?

to also focus on "economic violence."[24]

Cathy Wilkerson (2001), writing in *Z* magazine, attempts a definition of physical and economic violence:

> For me, political violence includes the Gulf War, the U.S. attack on the Sudan, ethnic cleansing, world wars, civil wars, and national liberation–all of it. The decision to commit acts which intentionally or peripherally by chance injure or kill human beings, their cultures, and their environment never happens without lasting repercussions to those who do it, to the victims, and to the world that cradles these individuals. Unfortunately, political violence also has a partner, economic violence, in which people or corporations or organizations engage in activity, which inevitably or by chance results in the death and injury of human beings, their cultures and environments.

Economic violence is cited by political analysts from both the Left and the Right. The Left labels unbridled capitalism as an agent of economic violence which has resulted in the deaths of millions through policies which allocate resources according to wealth instead of by need. The Right labels authoritarian communism as the agent of death for millions as the result of economic policies such as forced collectivization. A debate currently rages regarding whether those who died of famine under communist governments should be counted as victims of violence. Three cases are most widely cited: the famine in the Ukraine in the 1930s, the increased death rate all over China during the Great Leap Forward in the early 1950s, and the famine of last 5 years in North Korea. The victims of the first two were cited in *The Black Book of Communism* (by Stephane Courtois and others, cited in Chomsky, 2000a and White, 2001) as part of the oppression of communism's rule.

Indian economist Amartya Sen was the one who first pointed out that the natural rate of increase of China was off by 30 million from 1958-61, the time of Mao's vast social experiment known as the Great Leap Forward.[25] Others, including the authors of the *Black Book* have used Sen's numbers to argue that since Mao proceeded with the policies, despite the suffering it engendered, he is guilty of those deaths. However, Noam Chomsky points out that these same writers ignore Sen's

[24] Witness for Peace is the peace team organization which has focused most intensely on economic violence.

further analysis of the toll of "capitalism." He compares India and China, which at the time their revolutions triumphed, 1947 and 1949, respectively, were roughly equal in economic levels and standard of living. However, over the next fifty years, life expectancy rose faster in China, meaning tens of millions of people died in India who would not have died if India had matched China's decreasing death rate (Chomsky, 2000).

The most obvious difference between the two countries over the past 50 years is the policy paths they took. Therefore, it could be argued that the government policies in India continued to be followed despite the fact that they were leading to higher death rates than those which resulted from policies in China. If India would have adopted China's program, and if those policies would have led to a reduction in India's death rate which was similar to the reduction that China appears to have achieved through their policies, there would have been about 3.8 million fewer deaths per year by the 1980s (Chomsky, 2000, Patniak, 1999). Over fifty-three years the total would have been about 190 million additional deaths in India, equal to the estimated total killed in the whole world in 100 years.

Another example along this vein is to note that in Russia there have been 600,000 more deaths each year since the fall of communism than there would have been if the death rate of the Soviet Union of 1990 would have continued at 1990 levels.[26] It could be argued, therefore, that the change of policies in the post-Soviet years led to an increase in deaths. This number would rival the tolls of Stalin's purges![27] (See Appendix A for a further discussion of this topic.)

In addition to the indirect results of death as a result of structural adjustment, capitalism, collectivization, or bad policy, there is the question of the consequences of coercive international policies enacted to control the behavior of others. Boycotts, embargoes and economic sanctions are

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[25] Ursa Patnaik (1999) argues that Sen overestimates the population shortfall, and that the deaths were spread out over the entire population (see Appendix A).

[26] My estimate based on death rates as listed in *Time Almanac 2001* . This argument is somewhat complicated by the fact that the rise in death rates actually began before the fall of communism, although economic changes since then have not stopped this rise.

[27] If you include all of the countries of the former Soviet Union, the total may approach 1 million/year.

examples of this. Considered by some to be part of the arsenal of nonviolent action, sanctions can cause death and, when this becomes apparent and they are continued, the sanctions become a form of lethal violence.

A relevant question today is the moral responsibility for the more than one million deaths which have resulted from the International Sanctions against Iraq (ICA, 2000). The stated purpose of the sanctions is to stop the production of weapons of mass destruction, but the consequence is the death of Iraqi civilians. Some would argue that the deaths are the fault of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, others that the deaths are unfortunate side effects, but it is also very plausible that the death of Iraqi civilians is intentional on the part of the United States and is meant to be the mechanism through which policy objectives will be achieved. In any case, the policy has remained in effect although all involved know that it is causing death on a massive scale. On the TV show *Sixty Minutes*, CBS Reporter Lesley Stahl (speaking of post-war sanctions against Iraq) asked Madeleine Albright, "We have heard that a half million children have died. I mean, that's more children than died in Hiroshima. And–and you know, is the price worth it?" Albright (at that time, U.S. Ambassador to the UN, and later Secretary of State) responded, "I think this is a very hard choice, but the price–we think the price is worth it" (CBS News, 1996).[28]

A nonviolent ethic demands that we condemn not only armed violence, but also economic violence, whether it comes from the Left or the Right. Forced collectivization and neoliberalism can both result in death for many and must be opposed. At root, these two kinds of economic violence rely on concentrations of power as surely as does the massive application of military might. When people and communities have control of making decisions which effect their lives, they will usually choose those which are least harmful to themselves.

[28] The more common U.S. government line is to blame the deaths on Saddam Hussein.

The Death Toll

It is difficult to grasp the magnitude of the death toll of violence in the twentieth century. In Appendix A I have put together three tables: "Lethal Violence in the Twentieth Century," "Lethal Violence in the Last Decade," and "Lethal Violence in the Americas in the 20th Century" (Tables A1, A2, and A3). Each table lists the top 10 cases of killing, the nationality of the victims and perpetrators, and the number of people who lost their lives. Each chart also includes the case where the highest proportion of a particular nationality were killed, and, for the 20th century, the event with the single greatest one day death toll (this was compiled in the aftermath of the September 11 attack). Drawing mainly on the work of Matthew White (2001) in the *Twentieth Century Atlas*, I added homicide figures to his total estimate of 180 million victims of lethal violence in the 20th century to come up with an estimated total of 190 million human beings killed by other human beings in the 20th century in the world.

Current Wars

In the year 2000, according to Project Ploughshares (2001), 40 countries had conflicts with cumulative death tolls of 1000 or more. The map reproduced in Figure 4 was created by Project Ploughshares which shows the distribution of these conflicts (Project Ploughshares, 2001). Table 1 shows the armed conflicts of the 1990s with the highest death tolls.[29] There are several distinctive aspects of current wars. One is that almost all of them are internal, or intra-country as opposed to inter-country.

By far the greatest toll of lethal violence currently occurs in Africa. Of the top six conflicts in terms of numbers of deaths, five are in Africa,[30] as opposed to the middle part of the

[29] This is slightly different than Table A2 in Appendix A since the information comes from a different source.
[30] Although elsewhere in its website Project Ploughshares (2001) cites UN figures on the death tolls in Iraq of U.S./UN sanctions, apparently this doesn't qualify as an "armed conflict:" Perhaps it would fall under "economic violence."

Figure 4: Armed Conflicts in 2000



Source: Project Ploughshares Armed Conflict Report (used with permission). Available online at: www.ploughshares.ca Map is at: http://www.ploughshares.ca/imagesarticles/ARC01/armed_conflict.pdf

Table 1: Recent Armed Conflicts Resulting in at least 100,000 Deaths[31]

1. Sudan 2,000,000 since 1983
2. Afghanistan 1,500,000 since 1978
3. Congo 350,000 - 2,000,000 1990 - present
4. Rwanda 750,000 in 1994
5. Angola, 1975-92: 200,000 1992-2001: 300,000 - total 500,000
6. Somalia 350,0000
7. Indonesia - East Timor 200,000
8. Iraqi Kurds and Shias 200,000*
9. Philippines, Mindanao and NPA/CPP – 125,000
10. Israel 110,000 since 1947 (100,000 killed In Three Wars 1948, 1956, 1973; 12,000 killed in invasion of Lebanon in 80s; 2000 killed in current phase, year 2000 – present)
11. Algeria 100,000 from 1992 - present
12. Ethiopia -Eritrea 100,000

*Project Ploughshares cites UN estimates that by 1999, 1,500,000 Iraqis had died as a result of sanctions (ICA, 2000). That figure by 2002 may be closer to 2 million.[35]

Source: Project Ploughshares, 2001

century when Europe and Asia were the location of what White (2001) calls the Hemoclysm. At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, Africa was still beset by the colonial wars which cost so many millions of lives.

William Shawcross points out another distinctive of current wars. Nearly all are being carried out primarily with small arms. "Of the forty-nine conflicts which broke out between 1990 and 1997, light weapons were the only weapons used in forty-six" (Shawcross, 2000).

[31] These numbers and cases differ from Table A2, primarily due to different criteria used by Project Ploughshares

Violence and Power

Power is of two kinds. One is obtained by the fear of punishment, and the other by the arts of love. Power based on love is a thousand times more effective and permanent than the one derived from fear of punishment. (Gandhi, 1962)

In *On Violence,* Hannah Arendt, writing in 1970, laments the lack of reflection on the question of violence among those writing about history and politics. Arendt is disturbed that political scientists fail to distinguish between such key words as power, strength, force, authority, and violence. For Arendt, power is collective action, force should be reserved to refer to the forces of nature, authority is invested in persons or offices and depends on respect, and violence relies on "instruments of violence" or weapons (pp. 44-46; here Arendt and CPT concur). Arendt argues that while power and violence frequently appear together, they are not the same thing. In addition, power does not depend on violence. In fact, Arendt says, violence and power are opposites of each other. Governments turn to violence because their power is in jeopardy (p. 56). Arendt quotes Voltaire "Power consists in making others act as I choose" (p. 36), while Clausewitz declares that war is "an act of violence to compel the opponent to do as we wish."

For Arendt, power depends on consent and cooperation.

> Where commands are no longer obeyed, the means of violence are of no use; and the question of this obedience is not decided by the command-obedience relation but by opinion, and, of course, by the number of those who share it. Everything depends on the power behind the violence. The sudden and dramatic breakdown of power that ushers in revolutions reveals in a flash how civil obedience–to laws, to rulers, to institutions–is but the outward manifestation of support and consent. (p. 49)

Therefore, "no government exclusively based on the means of violence has ever existed. . . . Power is the essence of all governments, but violence is not" (pp. 50-51).

Arendt, however, does not go so far as to advocate a pacifist position. She recognizes a right to violence in self-defense and for certain justifiable purposes. She also argues that power and

violence are near constant companions.

> "Violence . . . is rational to the extent that it is effective in reaching the end that must justify it. . . . [it] can remain rational only if it pursues short-term goals. Violence does not promote causes . . . but it can serve to dramatize grievances and bring them to public attention."

She goes on, though, to critique the way violence is resorted to and lifted up by modern revolutionaries and modern governments alike. Arendt feels that modern implements of violence have made the potential benefits of violence for the most powerful countries obsolete, citing the failing U.S. effort in Vietnam as an example, and the nuclear arms race as another.

On the other side, she criticizes Sartre, who she says goes far beyond Marx in his advocacy of and glorification of violence. While Marx recognized some violence as necessary for the oppressed as a class to reconstitute themselves, Sartre posits violence for individual liberation. She quotes Sartre in the introduction to Fanon's Wretched of the Earth. "'To shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone . . . there remain a dead man and a free man.' This is a sentence Marx could never have written," says Arendt. Sartre even goes farther than Fanon, whose work is seen as a classic justification of revolutionary violence. "Fanon himself is much more doubtful about violence than his admirers." Violence, Arendt argues, while sometimes justifiable is never legitimate (1970).

Michel Foucault warns against limiting our understanding of power to that power held by the state, nor should we see power as a purely negative force. This is an important concept in understanding the operation of nonviolent action. Foucault (1980) says,

> What makes power . . . accepted is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression. (p. 119)
>
> . . . relations of power . . . necessarily extend beyond the limits of the state [which] only is able to operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations. The state is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology, and so forth. (p. 122)

This view of power helps us understand how the Zapatistas and their supporters, a relatively

small group without access to those levers of power we usually recognize–state apparatuses, firepower, wealth–were able to rebel against the Mexican government, which for 70 years had specialized in co-opting nearly every social movement which came along and repressing the rest. The autonomous communities in Chiapas have been able to redirect their loyalty through the construction of alternative structures and refusal to recognize or accept the authority or aid of Mexican government institutions, while carefully placing themselves solidly within a Mexican nationalist tradition.

A further perspective on power, this time in relationship to economics, is that of Quaker economist Jack Powelson, who has spent his life studying history to discover the reason why some countries are poor and others are rich. He argues that "The historic contrast between Japan and northwestern Europe on the one hand and the rest of the world on the other lies primarily in the concentration or diffusion of power. In this book, power means the ability to influence or direct the behavior of others" (Powelson, 1994, p. 4). His point is that where power is more concentrated, economic development is less likely to occur. Where power is more diffused, a society will become more prosperous. In this framework, structural adjustment policies such as those that have been imposed over the last 20 years on many Third World nations are counter to the processes of negotiation and compromise and general diffusion of power between individuals and groups within a society, which produce both relative equality and prosperity. The process in Mexico and elsewhere in recent years of the development of a "civil society"–non-governmental groups and coalitions which present a vision for society or a particular part of society and work and negotiate and leverage for the adoption of that vision–may be part of a process of power diffusion.[32]

A line of reasoning which echoes parts of Powelson's arguments comes from Uruguayan Eduardo Galeano (1973). In *The Open Veins of Latin America*, a book which documents "five

Eduardo Galeano (1973). In *The Open Veins of Latin America*, a book which documents "five centuries of the pillage" of Latin America by Europeans and their descendants, Galeano suggests that a reason for the relative wealth of the United States compared to Latin American countries can be found in the settlement patterns of much of the United States, where small farmers were granted land, creating the relative equality necessary for democracy and development.

The concentration of power is a requisite for war, for oppression, and for poverty and marginalization. To the extent that democracy is a call for popular participation in the decision making processes of a society, then democracy can lead to peace, economic development, and equality.

Violence, which forcibly deprives another of her or his well-being, is incongruent with power-diffusion or democracy. It leads to the concentration of power, more violence, and domination. Nonviolence, on the other hand, is a tool for constructing a more just society which is consistent with the goals of that struggle.

Nonviolence

> *Society is like a house, the foundation is the cooperation or compliance of the people. The roof is the state and its repressive apparatus . . . . What happens to the house if the foundation gives way?*
>
> -Bernard Lafayette, 1960s SNCC civil rights activist (quoted in Lakey, 2001)

The relationship between violence and power can be further understood by looking at the ideas of Gene Sharp, whose *Power of Nonviolent Action* is a major work on nonviolent theory and practice. Sharp, like Arendt, argues that power does not depend on violence, but on the consent of the governed, on obedience. When that obedience is withdrawn, the ruler may resort to violence, but unless the violence convinces the governed to once again obey, the power of the ruler is lost. This

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[32] See also, Elise Boulding, *Cultures of Peace: The Hidden Side of History* (2000) for a discussion of the importance of civil society and the development of institutions within a society which mediate for justice and reconciliation.

concept is the basis of the effectiveness of nonviolent action. Diverging from Arendt, who repeats the often stated argument that Gandhi's methods could work against the British, but would have been useless against the Germans or Soviets, Sharp argues that nonviolent action is universally applicable.

Sharp has an encyclopedic litany of actions throughout history, all over the world. In fact, a key example for Sharp is the Czech resistance of 1968, a case which Arendt cites to argue against nonviolence. Sharp (1973) points out that "Despite the absence of prior planning or explicit training for civilian (nonviolent) resistance, the Dubcek regime managed to remain in power until April, 1969, about eight months longer than would have been possible with military resistance" (p. 101). Sharp also lists many examples of successful nonviolent resistance to the Nazis, including the Norwegian teachers' resistance to Nazi education in 1942, and the successful resistance of German wives of Jewish men in Berlin in 1943. Others have added to Sharp's chronicles of nonviolence throughout history (Sutherland and Meyer, 2000; Wink, 1992; Taylor, 1977; Lakey, 2001; among others).

Sharp's approach is also unique in its secular, utilitarian nature. Sharp intentionally sets out to defend nonviolent action and prove its effectiveness without reference or recourse to moral, religious, or spiritual justifications. Groups, as well as nations, should adopt nonviolence not because it is "right" or "good," but because it is more effective than violence at achieving objectives (Sharp, 1985).

However, most practitioners of nonviolence base their actions on a belief system which prohibits the use of violence. Mohandas K. Gandhi, Martin Luther King, César Chavéz, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the Christian Peacemaker Teams and the *Abejas* all base their commitment to nonviolence on a spiritual belief. A catechist and leader of the *Abejas*, explains their nonviolence.

> Since we are believers in the Word of God, of course we work for peace and nonviolence. Jesus Christ came to the earth to bring unity to the people of Israel, because they were divided. Jesus Christ worked hard, and he gave unity to the people of Christ. He

> suffered, he just came to give the kingdom, the kingdom of justice, the kingdom of peace, the kingdom of love. That's where the *Abejas* begin. Jesus Christ didn't take up arms, he didn't pick up a machete to defend himself. Instead he talked about himself–it's good to suffer, it is good to take the cross to save yourself. So, from there, until he was crucified. But from his death, in the resurrection he defeated his enemies. From there we . . . begin to say that neither will we take arms. It is good to defend yourself in the peaceful way, defending ourselves in that way in an organization, a unity, of other groups and organizations and other brothers in search of justice and peace. That's where we are. (Interview 27)

Other groups, such as Peace Brigades International, Witness for Peace, SERPAJ (Peace and Justice Service of Latin America) and SIPAZ have both religious and philosophical bases for their nonviolence. At the same time, the efficacy of nonviolence, and the monopoly of violence on the part of the power structures of the world, are an important factor in the continued existence and growth of nonviolent movements for social change.

I define pacifism as an ideological, philosophical, or religious belief that violence is always wrong. In other words, a pacifist has an ideological, spiritual, or philosophical commitment to nonviolence. This is what distinguishes the *Abejas* from the Zapatistas, even though the Zapatistas almost exclusively use nonviolent action as their means of struggle. Although Zapatista leader *Subcomandante* Marcos still carries a weapon and maintains a small army, he sees violence as futile, saying "Violence will always be useless (*inútil*), but one doesn't realize that until you exercise or suffer it." He also believes strongly that armed groups should never seek or obtain political power (La Entrevista Insólita, 2001). One of the Zapatista slogans is *mandar obedeciendo* or lead by following[33] (Ross, 2000).

Nonviolence is the ethic that guides the actions of a pacifist rooted in compassion for and respect for all human life. Nonviolent action is the use of any one of the array of techniques for stopping violence or pursuing social change without the use of violence.

William Miller (1964) distinguishes three types of nonviolence: nonresistance, passive

[33] One would hope that this principle of the Zapatistas will help break the cycle of the oppressed becoming the oppressors (Sowell, 1994; Powelson, 1987; Freire, 1970).

resistance, and nonviolent direct action. *Nonresistance* is the historic stance of most Mennonites. It is not primarily a method of political action, but instead a principled refusal to participate in violence. It is least coercive of the three, relying on example and witness to influence others to act for good.

Refusal to participate in war and refusal to fight back when provoked can be manifestations of nonresistance. In its religious manifestation, nonresistance stems more from a desire to be faithful to one's religious beliefs than a desire to enact social change.[34] *Passive Resistance*, or non-cooperation is a purposeful withdrawal of compliance, as in Bernard Lafayette's quote, above. Strikes, walkouts, and boycotts are examples. *Nonviolent Direct Action*, or nonviolent resistance or nonviolent intervention (Sharp, 1973) includes more militant kinds of action which often constitute civil disobedience. Nonviolent blockades, selective breaking of unjust laws, nonviolent invasions, and public prayer and fasting can be examples of nonviolent direct action.

There are also two levels on which nonviolent action can be carried out. Principled nonviolence, such as that of Gandhi, King and others comes out of a belief that killing is wrong. Gandhi conceptualizes nonviolence as *Satyagraha*–the "relentless search for truth and a determination to reach truth" (Burrowes, 1996, p. 107). Burrowes explains that "satyagraha, according to Gandhi, excludes the use of violence precisely because *no one is capable of knowing the absolute truth"* (emphasis in the original). But a nonviolent action can also be pragmatically used as a strategy or tactic, by those who are willing to use violence to achieve their end, but who believe nonviolent action is more effective in a particular situation or campaign (Miller, 1964; Burrowes, 1996).

Two other dichotomies faced by peacemakers committed to nonviolence are conflict transformation versus nonviolent direct action and justice versus reconciliation. These will be

addressed when we look at contending nonviolent practice.

Nonviolence in Latin America

> *My love of war becomes a war of love in a war without arms, in a war without death, in a war without violence, in a war of fraternity and the spirit . . . I am a soldier that walks with peace, a warrior who carries his heart as his only weapon to be the voice for those without voice . . . in order to recover the breath that breathes in all of us.*
>
> -Benito Balam, Mexico City, 1997 (CPTNet, August 13, 1997)

While the best-known cases of nonviolence are those of movements in South Africa, India (Gandhi), Philippines (Aquino), Poland (Solidarity), Moscow in 1991, the U.S. south (civil rights movement) and west (Cesar Chavez), Latin America has a long and rich tradition of unarmed, civilian resistance (McManus and Schlabach, 1991).

Latin America is often associated with violence in at least the dominant North American psyche. In my activist work in the 80s, I would sometimes be asked "Why are Central Americans so violent?" with an implication that there is a greater cultural propensity to violence among Latinos than there is among people of other cultures. In fact, while the history of Latin America does include many examples of oppression, conflict, and violence, most social struggles in Latin America have been nonviolent. [35]

In addition, much of the political violence in Latin America can be linked to the policies of the United States government in the region. Since 1847 when the United States invaded Mexico, captured Mexico City and demanded the hand-over of 1/2 of Mexico's territory, the United States has

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[34] See *Two Kingdoms, Two Loyalties: Mennonite Pacifism in Modern America*, by Perry Bush (1998) for the story of the evolution of Mennonite peace witness from passive nonresistance and nonparticipation in war to active engagement with society and issues beyond their communities. For Bush, this means the recovery of "the prophetic Anabaptist voice" which had been normative until persecution led 16th century Anabaptists to become the "quiet in the land."

[35] Several countries of Latin America have high homicide rates, but these same countries usually have a high level of political violence. El Salvador and Colombia, for example, have the highest homicide rates in Latin America and have gone through or are going through civil wars (Berquist, 2001; Suter, 1994; PAHO, 1997). Violence may also be related to the gap between the rich and poor in a country. Latin America as a whole has a much more unequal distribution of income than does Asia, it also has a higher homicide rate (World Bank, 1998; World Bank 2001; WHO, 1989).

repeatedly utilized military violence in Latin America. In Central America and the Caribbean the principal option has been direct U.S. military intervention. U.S. troops occupied Nicaragua, Haiti, Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic for decades in the twentieth century. In South America, the United States in the 20th century took over Britain's 19th century role of arming and directing surrogate military forces in violent overthrow of leftist democratic governments and suppression of popular movements for reform or revolution (Chomsky, 1993; Blum, 1995; Galeano, 1973). Appendix A, mapping violence in the world, shows that the Americas have had proportionately less killing in the 20th century than other regions.

Since the conquest, indigenous people across the Americas have been engaged in a multitude of forms of active and passive resistance to conquest. While violent uprisings have regularly been a part of that resistance, nonviolent resistance has been more prevalent. Among the nonviolent actions used are land invasions, strikes, road blockades, sit-ins, marches, and construction of alternative counter-hegemonic institutions such as peace zones in Colombia, and autonomous zones in Mexico. Passive resistance has included refusal to work; refusal to assimilate linguistically, culturally, economically; maintenance of communal land-holdings and traditions, boycotts and refusal to pay electric bills.

Many of these actions came together in 1944 when nonviolent movements overthrew two governments, that of Jorge Ubico in Guatemala and that of General Maximiliano Hernandez in El Salvador. The Salvadoran resistance, after winning an amazing victory against the dictator who oversaw the massacre of 10,000 *campesinos* in 1932, soon turned to a reliance on military strength and was easily defeated (Parkman, 1988). But the Guatemalan experiment continued to rely on people power and led to a 10-year springtime of democracy and freedom in Guatemala which was only ended with the intervention of the United States in 1954 (Kinzer and Schlesinger, 1981).

Phil McManus (who would later found SIPAZ) and Gerald Schlabach (1991) edited one of the most comprehensive compilations of nonviolent actions in Latin America. In *Relentless*

Persistence: Nonviolent Action in Latin America, a number of authors describe 13 cases of nonviolent action in Latin America: Guatemala's "ten years of springtime," 1944-54; the struggle of Brazilian cement company workers (CERUS) in Sao Paulo from the 50s to the 70s; the 1978 hunger strike of four wives of imprisoned miners in Bolivia; the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina; the fast of Luis Perez Aguirre and SERPAJ-Uruguay in 1983 (an action which the authors label "the pedagogy of human rights"); the 20-minute "lightening action" of 200 women in Antofagasta, Chile, on April 30, 1987, against military Dictator Agusto Pinochet; the ministry of accompaniment of the Catholic Church in rural Peru during the years of the war between the government and Sendero Luminoso; Miguel D'Escoto's Evangelical Insurrection in 1986 in Nicaragua; The Movement of *Sem Terra* in Brazil in the late 80s; the work of SERPAJ in the Las Limas neighborhood of Guayaquil, Ecuador; the Moravian Church's ministry of reconciliation between Sandinistas and Contras on Nicaragua's east coast in the 80s; Father Andres Giron's land movement in Guatemala in the mid-80s; and finally the work of Adolfo Perez Esquivel, the Argentinean founder of SERPAJ (Service for Peace and Justice of Latin America). The text closes with a plea from Schlabach to North Americans and others from the "First World" to not ignore nonviolent movements in Latin America, thereby reducing their effectiveness.

All too often liberation movements and popular organizations in Latin America attract attention and spawn international "solidarity groups" only when they turn or seem about to turn violent. By then the only contribution North Americans can make is to minimize a tragedy, rather than to open space for Latin American creativity. . . . A further tragedy is that doubts about the viability of nonviolence in Latin America become self-fulfilling prophecies. A nonviolent action that no one knows about is like a tree falling in the forest that no one hears. The tree has made no sound; in the worlds of politics and the media the action has not even happened. . . . So long as the desperate poor of the Third World can get the attention of First World opinion leaders only when they take up guns, of course nonviolence "doesn't work." And we potential allies share the blame.

(McManus and Schlabach, 1991, p. 261)

In 1990, in Ecuador, indigenous people from all over the country united in what Mexican SERPAJ member Rafael Landereche (who works in Chiapas) has called a "nonviolent insurrection" which lasted three weeks. The campaign included a declaration of a strike on supplying food to the cities, blocking highways, a march to the capital city of Quito and the peaceful occupation of the church of Santo Domingo, the occupation of plazas and government buildings all over the country, and popular tribunals which brought to light the crimes of officials. Through all this, and due to the disciplined nonviolence of the movement, only one person was killed, by an accidental discharge of a soldier's gun. Landereche (1988) goes on to argue that although revolutionary leaders in Latin America are most familiar with Marx and Lenin, that

> the thought and figure of Gandhi, with all that this means for peasants, communalism, and self-reliance, is much closer to the Ecuadorian indigenous movement (and those of other areas of Latin America) than the much more westernized figure of Marx, with its implications of industrialization, proletarian force, and a certain historic anti-peasantism. Including, if we pass on from the proletarian-developmentalist dialectic of Marx to the much more peasant dialectic of Mao, we will have difficulty encountering anything which explains why this Chinese figure can be assimilated and appropriated by the Latin American peasant movement, while the Hindu figure [of Gandhi] should not.

Latin America has produced leaders in nonviolence, including Bishop Dom Helder Camara in Recife Brazil, and Argentine Nobel peace prize winner Adolfo Pérez Esquivel who founded Peace and Justice Service of Latin America (SERPAJ).

Peacekeeping, Peace Teams and Violence Reduction

UN Peacekeeping

The dominant model for international violence reduction intervention in situations of conflict is that of the UN Peacekeeping Forces. Armed, military-based peacekeeping forces deployed by the UN and, at times, by national governments in a third country have been and remain the standard way of reducing international violence by direct intervention. Therefore, a study of nonviolent third party intervention would not seem complete without some mention of the UN Peacekeeping experience.

The first UN Peacekeeping mission began in 1948 in the Middle East, and there have been 54 operations since then, as of January, 2002. Currently, there are 15 operations underway (see Figure 4)–four in Africa, two in Asia, four in Europe, and five in the Middle East. 47,095 military personnel and civilian police from 87 countries now serve with the UN peacekeeping forces which have a yearly budget of nearly $3 billion (US dollars) (UN, 2002). In the eyes of the public in the United States, UN Peacekeeping was somewhat discredited when eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed in 1993 while serving as part of a UN Peacekeeping Force in Somalia. However, the bad press the Somalia incident received hid the fact that earlier in the UN effort in Somalia, many lives had been saved by allowing the entrance of humanitarian shipments. But when more aggressive tactics were employed, specifically clumsy efforts to arrest one of the warlords, the mission deteriorated. In fact, Shawcross gives an estimate that 250,000 lives were saved by the intervention. In all, 130 Peacekeepers lost their lives, including Pakistanis, Moroccans and others, in addition to the U.S. soldiers (Shawcross, 2000). Much less publicity was given to the positive roles of the UN in Cambodia, Mozambique, and Namibia (Shawcross, 2000; Renner, 1993).

Figure 5: Peacekeeping/Observer/Enforcement Missions in 2000



Source: Project Ploughshares, Armed Conflict Report. Available online at: www.ploughshares.ca

As a result of the reluctance of the United States to get involved, or even to allow other countries to get involved, in peacekeeping operations after the problems in Somalia, the UN was prevented from responding effectively in Rwanda, where the small UN contingency was forced to withdraw from a compound where the refugees they had been protecting were subsequently killed. Nearly a million people would be killed there in 100 days. The cost of not sending peacekeeping forces is usually greater than the cost of sending them. In fact, since 1948, only 1,706 Peacekeepers have been killed while in UN peacekeeping service (UN, 2002). During the same time period, over 50 million people have been killed in war and other lethal violence.

A drawback of using large military forces for peacekeeping is the social problems they can bring with them. UNICEF (2002) reports that:

> In Mozambique, after the signing of the peace treaty in 1992, United Nations Observer Mission in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) soldiers recruited girls aged 12 to 18 years into prostitution. After a commission of enquiry confirmed the allegations, the soldiers implicated were sent home. In 6 out of 12 country studies prepared for a research report ... the arrival of peace-keeping troops has been associated with a rapid rise in child prostitution.

A further weakness of UN peacekeeping efforts is that while nations are willing to send soldiers to sacrifice their lives in warfare, they do not see an equal or higher value of being willing to sacrifice one's life in peacekeeping. Do nonviolent peace teams have something to teach in this area?

Another difficulty with UN Peacekeeping is that soldiers are trained in combat, and not in peacekeeping or peacemaking. What is needed is the creation of a force designed to intervene in situations of violent conflict and trained to be able to reduce the violence.

Peace Teams

For many years pacifists have sought to not just refuse to participate in war but also to work actively to prevent or reduce the violence of war. One place evidence of very early peacemaking traditions can be found is the sacred texts of some of the world's oldest religious traditions. Jainism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Daoism, Hinduism, Indigenous traditions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam

all have peacemaker traditions (Smith-Christopher, 1998). Peacemakers have been carrying out organized, nonviolent interventions in violent conflicts for centuries. In the 6th century BCE the Buddha is said to have stopped a war through nonviolent intervention (Schirch, 1995, p. 3). In *Lysistrata*, the Greek playwright Aristophanes suggests that wives withhold sexual relations from their husbands until they stop their war. In 1600 Iroquois women withheld sex, refusing to bear children until their husbands finally gave the women power to decide about war-making. Women in southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in 1963 refused sex to their husbands until a bombing campaign was stopped (Sharp, 1973, p. 191).

It was in the twentieth century that a movement arose to form teams of peacemakers who would travel to zones of war or potential violent conflict to undertake nonviolent direct action to stop the violence. Nonviolent, anti-racist and anti-imperialist movements in South Africa and India led by M.K. Gandhi and others drew worldwide attention to the potential of nonviolent action as an effective means of struggle for liberation and justice. Western disciples of Gandhi were intrigued by the possibility of using mass unarmed action to stop war.

Third Party Nonviolent Intervention

Third party nonviolent intervention (TPNI) is the organized, unarmed intervention in an armed conflict by a group which is not a party to that conflict. Various forms of nonviolent intervention in conflict have been used by citizens of a nation to stop fellow citizens from violence. Two examples cited by Lisa Schirch (1995) are:

- United States–During the civil rights movement, Whites accompanied and participated with Blacks in the freedom rides, voter registration campaigns and other efforts with one goal of their participation being that of deterring violence (p. 4).
- China–"During China's Cultural Revolution in 1968, 30,000 unarmed workers interpositioned

themselves between fighting factions of the Ultra-Maoist Red Guard" (p. 4).

However, specific, organized third party nonviolent interventions are relatively new. Proposals for this kind of intervention were made throughout the first half of the twentieth century, but only began to be instituted in the second half of the century.

In 1957 Vinobe Bhave, also a disciple of Gandhi, founded the Shanti Sena in India. Based on Gandhi's proposal for a peace army, to intervene as a third party in disputes, the Shanti Sena has worked for the past 35 years primarily within India as local and regional peace forces which aim to reduce and prevent violence, as well as teach Satyagraha, Gandhi's method of nonviolent struggle (Schirch, 1995,; Weber, 1996; Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber, 2000).

Some early proposals for third party nonviolent intervention were made in England in the 1930s. Peace activist and suffragist Maude Royden, who was an admirer of Gandhi, tried to organize a "peace army" to intervene in the Japan-China conflict in 1932, when Japan occupied Manchuria. Royden (Quoted in Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber, 2000) wrote:

> Chinese and Japanese troops were facing each other and firing at each other across the streets of Shanghai, and even a few thousand unarmed volunteers (interpositioning themselves between the two parties) would have been seen, would have been effective, and could, by their acceptance of death without resistance, have stirred the conscience of the human race. (p. 18)

Royden failed in her effort to convince the League of Nations to adopt the plan, although 1000 people volunteered for her unarmed army, and the peace army never materialized (Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber, 2000).

The current movement for international peace teams really got off the ground in the 1980s with the founding of the Peace Brigades International (PBI) in 1981, Witness for Peace (WFP) in 1983, and Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) in 1986. By the 1990s, a dozen peace team groups were operating around the world, with varying agendas, constituencies, and objectives, but sharing in common a commitment to civilian (unarmed) cross-border intervention in situations of conflict to save lives and create political space through active nonviolence.

Profiles of Peace Teams: PBI, WFP, CPT, SIPAZ, NP

Table 2 shows, side by side, profiles of four currently active International Peace Team groups: Peace Brigades International, Witness for Peace, Christian Peacemaker Teams, and SIPAZ. Basic information is given on each, including size of the organization, budget, origin of workers/volunteers, location of projects, approach to nonpartisanship, and specific nature of work. In order to give a sense of the vast difference in scale, the last row shows the level of resources and personnel devoted by the United Nations to armed peacekeeping–UN peacekeeping has a budget 1000 times that of the four peace team groups put together, as well as 1000 times the number of personnel. It is difficult to really judge the effectiveness of unarmed peacekeeping in reducing violence when such a small amount of resources has been committed to this path.[36]

Peace Brigades International

The modern wave of the peace team movement was kicked off when a group of European, Asian, and American peace activists formed the Peace Brigades International (PBI) in 1981. Peace Brigades presence in Guatemala, then in El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Colombia, and Mexico not only served to save lives and open space for local social and political actors in these countries, it also popularized the idea of peace teams internationally.

PBI is "a third-party force [which] applies methods of nonviolent intervention in situations of conflict to establish peace and justice" (PBI, 2002). Peace Brigades' workers come from all over the world, but especially from North America and Europe, and primarily provide unarmed protective

[36] It should be noted that, in turn, UN Peacekeeping is dwarfed by worldwide military expenditures, by 1877 to one.

Table 2: Peace Teams in 2002

Group	National origin of workers	Year founded	Location of project(s) (current projects in **bold**)	Policy regarding nonpartisanship	Focus of work (primary foci in **bold**)	Number of full-time workers (approx.)	Recipients of newsletter, emails.	Expenditures, 2001 and major sources of income
PBI	Europe, North America, Asia, Latin America	1981	Guatemala, El Salvador, Sri Lanka, **Colombia, Mexico, East Timor**	nonpartisan	**protective accompaniment,** peace education, conflict resolution, information, urgent action	60	Europe, Asia, North America, Latin America	$1.4 million (2000) Germany, Switzerland, US, Spain, Belgium
WFP	US	1983	**Nicaragua, Guatemala, Cuba, Mexico, Colombia,** Haiti	politically independent	**Human rights documentation, delegations, information, legislative work**, urgent actions	20	Primarily US	$600,000, US
CPT	US, Canada	1986	**Hebron,** Haiti, Chiapas, **Colombia,** US, **Canada, Puerto Rico**	takes sides	**Nonviolent Direct Action, civil patrols/protective accompaniment, information**, urgent actions	25	2000 Primarily in North America	$500,000 US, Canada
SIPAZ	Europe, North America, Latin America	1995	**Chiapas (Mexico)**	politically independent	**Peace education, information, conflict transformation**, presence, urgent actions	9	8,000, Europe, N. America, L. America	$150,000 US
UN Peaceke eping	WORLDWIDE	1948	55 missions, 1948-2001 **15 current**	"nonpartisan"	Peacekeeping	75-100,000+		$2.67 billion*

SOURCES: *Moser-Puangsuwan & Weber* (2000), Nonviolent Intervention Across Borders, personal interviews, and Coulon (1998) Soldiers of Diplomacy (for UN info) *(Bolton, 2001), PBI Website, personal correspondence with PBI, Witness for Peace Newsletter, CPT annual report, conversation with CPT office, conversation with SIPAZ International office, UN Peacekeeping Website

accompaniment to human rights workers and other activists whose lives have been threatened. In addition, they document human rights abuses and issue emergency action alerts to their constituency (they maintain an emergency response network) when human rights workers are threatened with or are the victims of violence. Currently PBI has over 60 full-time volunteer accompaniers in Colombia, East Timor/Indonesia and Mexico, where they have their own project in the state of Guerrero and are part of the SIPAZ coalition in Chiapas. PBI has what they call a "nonpartisan" position. PBI members Mahony and Eguren (1997) describe PBI as "partial, but nonpartisan" which means "we will be at your side in the face of injustice and suffering, but we will not take sides against those you define as enemies."

PBI tries to maintain a relatively low public profile in the countries where it carries out accompaniment, communicating regularly with the local and national authorities about their activities and intent. PBI, in contrast to CPT, "requires that PBI teams and their members do not become involved in the work of the groups or individuals whom they assist or escort; . . . that they do not become involved in the official policies of the host country" (PBI, 2002, p. 9).

In addition to escorting, PBI's mandate includes peace education and conflict resolution or "sharing experience and knowledge in the use of nonviolent methods of . . . mediation, negotiation reconciliation," as well as engaging in direct mediation or facilitation of negotiation.

PBI's workers have come from over two dozen countries, making it the most international of the on-going peace team organizations in terms of where their volunteers are from. There are local PBI affiliates or offices in: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and the United States.

In their study, arguably the most important work written to date about peace teams, Mahony and Eguren (1997) interviewed former government and military leaders in Guatemala, as well as the people who were escorted by PBI. Perhaps the strongest affirmation that accompaniment can save lives comes in the words of Nineth de García, president of the Mutual Support Group (GAM) of

Guatemala, who agreed to take leadership in GAM after two previous leaders were brutally killed. Garcia, in referring to the PBI accompaniment over several years said "Thanks to their accompaniment, I am alive. That is an indisputable truth. If it had not been for them, I would not be here telling you this today" (Mahony, 2000, p. 138). There had been a relentless wave of killing of human rights leaders. But after protective accompaniment began, high profile killings ceased (Mahony, 2000).

My own involvement with the Peace Brigades was in 1986 when I served for two weeks as an escort for members of the Group de Apoyo Mutuo (Mutual Support Group, or GAM), a group of relatives of the disappeared. Two tense confrontations between military and government forces occurred during my time there. The story of this is recounted by Mahony and Eguren (1997).

PBI's strengths are in its wide international network and support, its ability to maintain a program for an extended period of time, and the refinement of the tactic of escorting. It successfully promotes human rights from a nonpartisan position. Sometimes PBI suffers from delays in decision making from a process that in the past has been cumbersome at times.

Witness for Peace

One of the most prominent of peace team groups is Witness for Peace (WFP), founded in 1983 by U.S. citizens trying to stop U.S. military aggression against Sandinista Nicaragua. Over the next decade several thousand people from the United States traveled to Nicaragua's war zones to nonviolently "witness for peace" and to listen to the voices of Nicaraguan victims of the violence of the U.S.-backed Contras. These witnesses returned home to share what they saw and heard in their churches and communities, to write about what was happening in Nicaragua, and to lobby the U.S. government to stop sending aid to the Contra terrorists. At the same time, WFP deployed a long-term team in conflict zones to maintain a permanent international presence, believing that the Contras

would not risk the bad publicity of killing a U.S. citizen.[37] The long-term team also hosted short-term delegations (2 weeks) and documented human rights abuses and issued report after report on civilian victims of the U.S. Contra War.

It is difficult to evaluate the success of an effort such as that of Witness for Peace. The Contra War continued until the 1990 elections led to the loss of power by the Sandinistas (after the United States announced the war against Nicaraguans would end if the Nicaraguan people voted the Sandinistas out). However, the long-threatened invasion by U.S. troops during the Reagan administration never happened. Some observers credit the U.S. anti-intervention movement, led by Witness for Peace, for helping deter a U.S. invasion of Nicaragua, by making such an invasion too politically costly for the Reagan administration.[38] Since 1989, WFP has expanded into other countries, including Guatemala, Mexico, Haiti, Cuba, and Colombia, and spun off a short-lived Mideast Witness.

Witness for Peace employed a combination of nonviolent direct action and traditional political action, but the genius of WFP was its pedagogy. More than any other group, WFP put its organizational time, money, and energy into transformation of First World people through short-term experiences in war zones. Over 5,000 people from the United States have participated in two-week experiences with WFP. WFP employs a carefully planned and voluminously documented training process, accompanied by careful screening, construction of a high-quality learning experience in country, and extensive follow-up work. Many people have had their world-view and life-focus transformed by their WFP-facilitated encounter with Third World liberation struggles. WFP then effectively used this group of alumni to carry out both legislative campaigns (stop Contra aid) and

[37]The killing of an ABC news reporter in 1979, broadcast on TV in the United States, was a factor in the cutoff of U.S. aid to long-time U.S. ally, brutal dictator Anastasio Somoza, contributing to the fall of his regime to the Sandinistas on July 19, 1979.

[38] "I think that this Witness has been fifty percent of the reason that this Señor [Reagan] has not invaded us." A Nicaraguan associate of WFP quoted by Griffin-Nolan in Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber, 2000.

direct action in the United States (the Pledge of Resistance[39]). Witness for Peace continues to send about 30 delegations each year to Nicaragua, Cuba, Chiapas, Guatemala, Colombia, Honduras and Haiti, and continues to work to change U.S. policy towards these countries.

Today, Witness for Peace, with about 20 full-time workers, continues to place long-term volunteers in conflict zones to document human rights abuses, sends delegations, produces quality publications on physical and economic violence and pursues legislative strategies for change. WFP research, publications and action have focused especially on globalization and neoliberalism and their effects on marginalized peoples.

Witness for Peace from the beginning has adopted a policy of "political independence" which in Nicaragua meant not aligning themselves with the Sandinista government, even though most volunteers were sympathetic to the Sandinistas. For WFP, political independence meant their focus was on opposing U.S. policy, and not on supporting the Sandinistas (Griffin-Nolan, 2000).

My involvement with Witness for Peace began in 1983 at its founding and continued until 1993. During this time I served on the WFP Midwest staff (part-time) and steering committee, led a delegation to Nicaragua, and did fundraising.

WFP's strengths are in their careful orientation and training, clear procedures, and excellent research and publications. WFP has moved somewhat away from a focus on nonviolent direct action, and focuses more on education and public policy in the US. Their funding process (relying in the past on direct mail appeals for most income) has led to serious instability and cuts, especially when news coverage of Nicaragua decreased in the early 90s. After the September 11, 2001, attacks, WFP withdrew its personnel briefly from Colombia and Chiapas, making WFP perhaps the most cautious of the peace team organizations in terms of placing their personnel at risk.

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[39]The Pledge of Resistance was a separate, Witness for Peace-initiated campaign where thousands of U.S. citizens signed pledges to carry out either legal protest or civil disobedience if the United States invaded Nicaragua.

Christian Peacemaker Teams

Christian Peacemaker Teams was founded in 1986 as an activist peacemaking ministry of the "historic peace churches" (Mennonite, Brethren, and Quaker) in the United States and Canada. CPT has had projects in Hebron, Palestine/Israel; Haiti; Washington, DC; Richmond, Virginia; South Dakota; New Brunswick; Chiapas, Mexico; Vieques, Puerto Rico; and Colombia. CPT operates with a full-time corps, currently consisting of twenty-two members, who volunteer for three years each, a reserve corps, currently of 103 members who volunteer 2-8 weeks a year for three-year terms, and a network of local support groups and congregations throughout the United States and Canada. CPT specializes in assertive Nonviolent Direct Action, and often takes sides with Third World groups it identifies as oppressed.

CPT does not use the terms politically independent or nonpartisan to describe its work, although their strict code of nonviolence precludes them from alliance with or support of any armed actor in a conflict. CPT's commitment to following Jesus' commandments directs them to constantly seek ways to creatively engage the "enemy," to humanize the opponent, dialogue with the other side, and pray for the repentance and conversion of the oppressor, while standing with those who do not have political power, those who are poor, and those who are targets of violence.

CPT is an explicitly Christian group which uses scripture, prayer, worship and fasting as forms of public witness and as spiritual "weapons." Rather than trying to maintain a distance from local political issues, CPT believes that "injustice has no borders" and that as peacemakers they have the obligation to publicly denounce that injustice whenever and wherever it occurs.

CPT's current projects are in Hebron, Vieques, Colombia and New Brunswick. The full-time Chiapas presence was suspended in December, 2001. Relationships and periodic visits are continuing. CPT's current organizational goal is to have 50 full-time volunteers by 2005.

My personal involvement with CPT has spanned the entire life of the project, although I have never been full-time with CPT.

SIPAZ

SIPAZ was founded in 1995 by a coalition which has grown to include over 50 groups from North America, Latin America, and Europe (the majority are U.S.-based). SIPAZ has offices in the United States, Mexico, and Uruguay, but its work focuses entirely on the conflict in Chiapas. SIPAZ began with the belief that there were plenty of solidarity groups in Chiapas, international organizations which had come to support the Zapatista movement and its goals. What SIPAZ saw as an unmet need was for someone to try to be a bridge between the two sides in all the divided communities. SIPAZ, then, from the beginning saw its mission in Chiapas as being in the middle. In contrast to most international organizations which were at that time arriving in Chiapas in solidarity with the Zapatistas, SIPAZ determined to seek a "politically independent" position. In this way they would seek to be a presence to prevent or reduce violence and help create valuable political space for local actors to work for peace in a context of respect for human rights (Statement of Purpose, see Appendix E). In an early article describing SIPAZ' mission, David Batstone (1995) explained that

> SIPAZ wants to play an active role in promoting conditions that would make a dialogue in the region possible. The broader conflict in Chiapas is over land. Indian communities carried out more than 2,000 occupations of idle land last year alone. The private ranchers who own the property rarely hesitate to evict them with violence, often with their own paramilitary forces. SIPAZ plans to explore ways that "common ground" might be found in these disputes.

SIPAZ has four programmatic focuses. They include (1) accompaniment, especially in the northern zone of Chiapas and in Chenalhó, (2) education through workshops and other educational efforts on nonviolence and conflict transformation, (3) information sent out primarily through the highly respected quarterly *Report* and through urgent action alerts and the hosting of high-profile diplomatic delegations, as well as constituency group delegations; and (4) inter-religious dialogue within divided communities in Chiapas.

SIPAZ volunteers come from North America, Europe, and Latin America, in roughly equal

parts. However, most of their financial supporters, most of their member groups, and most of the *Report* subscribers are based in the United States.

My involvement with SIPAZ has been peripheral, mostly as an interested observer, until the beginning of this research project.

Nonviolent Peaceforce

A new initiative seeks to take a step toward large-scale, global unarmed peacekeeping. The Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) has been in the planning and organizational stages since 1999, and is set for deployment in 2003. NP's vision is of a force of hundreds of full-time Peacekeepers,[40] growing to two thousand over five years (Nonviolent Peaceforce, 2002).

NP is unique in that it has representation from every continent. NP's mission is stated as "To facilitate the creation of a trained, international civilian nonviolent peace force. The Peace Force will be sent to conflict areas to prevent death and destruction and protect human rights, thus creating the space for local groups to struggle nonviolently, enter into dialogue, and seek peaceful resolution" (Nonviolent Peaceforce, 2001; Schweitzer, et al., 2001).

Other efforts

Other ongoing peace team related efforts include:

- *Dhammayietra*, which has mobilized thousands of Cambodians and some internationals to walk through zones of conflict in Cambodia;
- Memorial Human Rights Observer Missions in the Republics of the former Soviet Union which sends observers into conflict areas in that region;
- Project Accompaniment, a Canadian initiative to accompany refugees returning to their

[40] Specifically, "200 active members, 400 reserves, and 500 supporters by 2003, building to ...2,000 active members, 4,000 reserves, and 5,000 supporters by 2010" (Nonviolent Peaceforce Website, April, 2002).

communities in Guatemala;

- Pastors for Peace, a primarily U.S.-based initiative to carry material aid in caravans to Cuba and Chiapas as a protest against U.S. policy and
- Balkan Peace Teams (1993-2001), a mostly European effort which deployed peace teams in the former Yugoslavia.

See Appendix D for a more detailed chart which summarizes 13 peace team efforts since 1959 as discussed in the book *Nonviolent Intervention Across Borders.*

Objectives of Peace Teams: Violence Reduction and Protecting Political Space

> *But being present in key places, in key moments, so that people [can] exercise their rights, that, I believe, is our role.*
>
> - Heike Kammer, veteran SIPAZ volunteer (Interview 23)

Creating Space

All peace teams have either a stated or implicit goal of reducing violence. For CPT and SIPAZ this goal is explicit. SIPAZ's purpose is to "forestall or reduce violence and to protect and expand the precious political space in which dialogue is valuable" (SIPAZ Statement of Purpose, 1997, see Appendix E). CPT also has both violence reduction and creating space as part of their agenda: "CPT Mexico functions as a physical and structural violence-reduction presence." "CPT seeks, through visible, nonviolent presence and action, to 'open up space' so that change can take place" (CPT-Chiapas Goal Statement, see Appendix F).

Making it possible for local groups to pursue peacemaking is a central goal for both organizations. However, in the goal statements a key difference between the two groups already emerges. SIPAZ seeks to create space for "dialogue," and CPT seeks to create space "so that change can take place." While both groups believe that justice and reconciliation are closely linked ultimate goals, SIPAZ brings to the Chiapas conflict the project of dialogue and reconciliation through the

mechanism of conflict transformation. CPT brings to the Chiapas conflict the project of justice and social change through nonviolent direct action.

While SIPAZ keeps a low profile on Mexican political issues, being careful to consider various perspectives in writing their widely read *Report* articles, CPT takes their action to the streets. SIPAZ workers, who are often in Chiapas for years at a time, are wary of endangering their immigration status, in fact, SIPAZ's work would be severely disrupted if its workers were expelled, since the kind of relationship building SIPAZ does takes time and continuity of personnel. CPT directly confronts military and immigration authorities when they feel they are acting unlawfully, unjustly, or inconsistently, maintaining a high profile on political issues, and maintaining a team presence which does not rely on continuity.[41]

As a small part of a much larger foreign presence in Chiapas, both groups have helped provide an international shield to protect indigenous communities from violence, both by their physical presence and by their international information distributing and response networks. CPT spends more time in the communities, but SIPAZ has spent time in the more-dangerous and remote northern zone, and has brought many high-profile diplomats and human rights figures into Chiapas communities.

The difference in the impact has to do with the kind of political space they are developing. While PBI individually escorts human rights workers, allowing them to continue their work, CPT and SIPAZ accompany communities, and are more active in promoting their particular agendas, nonviolent direct action and conflict transformation, respectively.

In seeking to reduce violence, peace teams send teams into a conflict situation to:

- physically accompany those threatened with violence,
- disseminate information internationally about human rights abuses and threatened abuses and

[41] This is both a strength and a weakness.

- have the group's constituency place pressure on the threatening party or parties (such as governing authorities) who have the power to deter the violent attack and
- support efforts of people living in the conflict area to transform the conflict through dialogue, mediation, and direct action by providing educational resources and intervening in specific situations.

We will return to these issues after introducing the recent history of Chiapas and tracing the story of the work of *Las Abejas*, SIPAZ, and CPT in Chiapas.

Chapter 2 - Chiapas and *Las Abejas*: Indigenous Struggle and International Solidarity

There are many people dead.
Acteal, Chiapas, December 23, 1997[42]

Introduction

The Massacre at Acteal

On the morning of December 22, 1997, members of the Civil Society of the Bees, or *Abejas*, were gathered together in their makeshift chapel in the hillside village of Acteal, in the municipality of San Pedro Chenalhó, in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas. The Bees, Maya-Tzotzil pacifists closely linked to the Catholic Diocese of San Cristobal, were in their third day of fasting and praying for peace. Many of them had, in the previous weeks and months, taken refuge in Acteal after being threatened and forcibly expelled from their nearby villages by neighbors who were loyal to the PRI (the Institutional Revolutionary Party), the official party of Mexico which had been in power for 70 years. These local Maya-Tzotzil communities had become increasingly polarized since the January, 1994, uprising of the indigenous Zapatistas in the highland and jungle region of Chiapas, demanding land, democracy, autonomy, and justice. The Bees joined the Zapatistas in their calls for justice for indigenous people, but rejected the path of armed struggle. In mid-1997 tensions rose in Chenalhó as paramilitary groups had been organized drawing on young, unemployed men from the PRI supporters in Chenalhó who were then armed, trained, and instructed to attack the Zapatistas.

The population of Acteal had expanded from a few hundred to over a thousand with the arrival of the Bee refugees. After receiving threats from the paramilitaries, who refused to make distinctions between the Zapatistas and the nonviolent Bees, the Bees planned a three-day time of prayer and fasting for peace. On December 22, while the Bees were praying, a group of 60 paramilitaries descended on them. In an initial attack several Bees were killed, and for the next

[42] Aide reporting to the chief police advisor on the road above Acteal, Chiapas, December 23, 1997 (Quoted in Womack, 1999).

several hours the paramilitaries hunted down and killed those who fled. Meanwhile, Chiapas state police stood by on the road above, a few hundred feet from the site of the killing, and never intervened, despite pleas from church officials to the governor to do something. In the end, 45 lay dead–21 women, 15 children, including several infants, and 9 men.

The World's Reaction

The world was shocked at the brutality displayed in Acteal, and relief arrived from many institutions. In addition, volunteers, both Mexican and foreign, responding to a call issued by the Diocese, arrived to stay in Acteal to provide protective accompaniment to the refugees. The Bees themselves, mourning their losses, announced their intention to continue their nonviolent struggle for justice.

The Christian Peacemaker Teams was one group which arrived to accompany the Bees, and there soon developed a close cooperative relationship between the two groups, who would carry out many nonviolent direct actions together for justice in Chiapas. SIPAZ also had close links to the Bees and other groups in Chenalhó. Later, members of the Bees would approach SIPAZ to help facilitate a dialogue with neighboring evangelical groups, who had links to some of those accused of participating in the massacre.

This chapter and the next look at the context of Chiapas and at the Bees, CPT and SIPAZ, which are committed to using nonviolent action to achieve justice and promote reconciliation. These three groups have close connections with each other and all talk about and actively promote a nonviolent approach to the Chiapas conflict.

Within Chiapas there are a number of other groups which operate from a basis of nonviolent action. The Zapatistas, while not pacifists, also use primarily nonviolent means to carry out their

struggle.[43]

Peace Teams and Chiapas

In Latin America, lethal violence has been used as a tool of repression by governments facing popular rebellions to their rule. This violence has been supported and funded by the government of the United States. However, not all North Americans support this policy of their government. Those who object have undertaken many forms of international solidarity to support those throughout the Americas who have resisted government oppression and unjust economic systems. One place where local resistance and international solidarity have come together is Chiapas.

In the highlands and jungle region of Chiapas, Mayan Indians have for 500 years been the victims of repression, marginalization and exploitation by the Spanish-speaking minority. In 1994, the Zapatista National Liberation Army rebelled against this system on the day that NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement, went into effect. Chiapas today is the site of a struggle between two visions of the future; a vision of a multicultural world where indigenous cultures can exist in autonomy and dignity as a participant in the world of the 21st century, versus a vision of the gradual melding of cultures and peoples into a globalized marketplace dominated by a small number of rich and powerful people and corporations.

A smaller group of Mayan Christians in the central highlands municipality (county) of Chenalhó has declared its support for the struggle for justice, autonomy and survival of indigenous communities in Chiapas, but has rejected the path of armed struggle. This group, calling itself *Las Abejas* or The Bees, was born out of the coming together of traditional Mayan culture and

[43]In addition to The Bees, there are other Mayan groups, also with close ties to and history with the Catholic Diocese of San Cristobal, such as *Xi'nich* and *Yomlej*. Other international pacifist groups working in Chiapas include Witness for Peace and the Michigan Peace Teams. SERPAJ has several members in Chiapas working with other groups. In addition, CEPAZ is a Mexican group which works with peace education among NGOs and in Indigenous communities.

the radical Catholic ethic of the Diocese of San Cristobal de las Casas, with the strong political influence of the Zapatistas (Tavanti, 2001).

Chiapas: Indigenous Struggle in a Global Context

> *Everything arrives late in Chiapas . . . even war. . . . Don't leave us alone five hundred more years.*[44]

Overview: Chiapas and San Pedro Chenalhó

Chiapas is in the far southeast of Mexico, on the border with Guatemala. The indigenous people of Chiapas have long experienced violence and exploitation at the hands of a Spanish-speaking ruling class. This violence took many forms: conquest, rape, imprisonment, forced labor, poverty, theft of land, denial of social and political rights and deprivation of dignity. Today most Mexicans (85%) are Spanish-speaking Mestizos who have Indian ancestors and cultural heritage. People who speak one of the 52 indigenous languages of Mexico (Ruiz, Sanders, and Sommers, 1998) make up 7.5% of the population, but in Chiapas, they make up 26.4%.[45] The *municipio*[46] of San Pedro Chenalhó where the Bees live, is, like the other rural highland *municipios* of central Chiapas, 98.4% indigenous. There are nine indigenous languages spoken in Chiapas. The four largest groups are the Tzeltal, Tzotzil, Chol and Tojolabal (*Para Entender Chiapas*, 1997).

Chiapas is divided into several geographical regions (see maps in Figure 6, on following pages). The western coastal plains give way to mountains as you move inland. These areas are mostly non-indigenous and Spanish-speaking. The central highland region (*Los Altos)* around San Cristobal de las Casas is predominantly indigenous and highly marginalized. The easternmost part of

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[44] Elva Macias, "Moveable Empire" in Katzenberger, Ed. (1995), quoting Eraclio.

[45] Nationally, of nearly 8 million speakers of indigenous languages, 3/4 also speak Spanish, leaving less than 2% of Mexicans who do not speak Spanish (Womack, 1999). In Chiapas, 1/3 of the indigenous people do not speak Spanish, meaning nearly 10% of Chiapas population, and almost half in some highland communities, do not speak Spanish (Tavanti, 2001).

[46] A *municipio* is roughly equivalent to a county in the United States, but in Mexico it is the primary local government.

Chiapas contains one of the largest remaining areas of rain forest in Mexico, in the *Lacandón* jungle (*selva*). *Los Altos* and the *selva* are considered the conflict zone. To the north, on the border with the state of Tabasco, is the northern zone, an isolated and very conflicted region where SIPAZ has focused much of its accompaniment work.

Chiapas represents less than 4% of Mexico's territory, but it contains the greatest level of biodiversity: 40% of the nation's species of plants, 66% of birds, and 80% of butterflies. The jungle region has been reduced in the last 50 years both by logging and cattle ranching by Mestizos and foreign companies and by government encouraged migration of indigenous peasants in search of land and livelihood. This, then, became a region of new settlements of multiple ethnicities. It is this region in which the majority of the early Zapatista organizing occurred and which continues to be a Zapatista stronghold.

The nearly four million people of Chiapas (4% of the Mexican population) occupy last place out of 31 states and the Federal District (Mexico City) in the Mexican government's index of marginalization. Within Chiapas, the quarter of the population which is indigenous is far behind the non-indigenous *Chiapanecos* in health, sanitation, education, and nutrition. In 1994, 17 municipalities had only one trained medical professional. In marginalized zones tuberculosis and malnutrition were the primary causes of death. While less than 8% of Mexico's population is indigenous, a majority of illiterate Mexicans, 57%, are indigenous (*Para Entender Chiapas, 1997*).

Table 3 compares several quality of life indicators from all of Mexico, from Chiapas and from Chenalhó, the county north of San Cristobal where the *Abejas* live and where CPT has focused most of its work and where SIPAZ has also worked. Chenalhó is one of over 100 municipalities of Chiapas, and represents 1% of Chiapas' population. Chenalhó's population of 31,000 is slightly larger than that of the county in which I live, Nobles County, in Southwestern Minnesota which has a population of just over 20,000. Chiapas, with 3.9 million people, represents 4% of Mexico's

Figure 6: Maps of Chiapas

Source: "Chiapas, Before it's too Late"
Source: SIPAZ





Municipalities (counties) with Zapatista Presence, Location of Indigenous Groups

Source: SPAN



population. This is a little less than the 5 million people of Minnesota. In a marginalization index produced by the Mexican government taking into account several economic and social factors, out of 2,403 *municipios* in Mexico, only 65 are more marginalized than Chenalhó while 2,347 are less marginalized. According to Mexican government statistics, 80% of Chenalhó's residents are malnourished, 90% live in houses with dirt floors, and less than 25% have electricity. Over 85% of those who work earn less than the Mexican minimum wage, which is $3 per day. By comparison, in Mexico as a whole, 88% of homes have electricity, while only 20% have dirt floors. Half of Chenalhó's adult residents can read and write, while nearly 90% of Mexicans are literate (*Para Entender Chiapas*, 1997; Tavanti, 2001).

The works of Rosario Castellanos and other authors vividly illustrate the social position of indigenous people in Chiapas during the last century. They have been made second-class citizens in their own land. Many were forced to migrate to coastal plantations for work, and their lives controlled by Mestizos through debt-peonage[47] (Castellanos, 1992 and 1997; Womack, 1999). Chiapas is ruled by the Ladino, Spanish-speaking population. Racism against the indigenous is prevalent. According to John Ross, writing in 1995, "even today, *indigenas* will step deferentially into the gutter to allow the highborn to traverse the sidewalks unimpeded by the barefooted rabble." After a meeting with a general of the Mexican army, a Colonel pulled two CPTers aside and commented, "These indigenous people are very, very bad, just like the Indians in your country, the Sioux" (CPT press release, July 16, 1999).

[47] Debt-peonage was a system common throughout Latin America and in parts of the United States in both the 19th and 20th centuries whereby workers were controlled by being kept in perpetual debt to their employers.

Table 3: Indices of Living Standards in Chenalhó, Chiapas and Mexico

	1990		
Category	Chenalhó	Chiapas	Mexico
Population	31,000	3.2 million	87 million
Malnutrition (% of population)	80%	67 %	NA
School attendance of children 6-14 yrs old	71%	71%	86%
Literacy (of those over 15 years Old)	50%	70%	87%
Indigenous language speakers	98.4%	26.4%	7.5%
Portion of economically active population who earn the minimum wage (about $3 per day) or more	<15%	37%	69%
Houses with dirt floors	90%	49%	20%
Houses with electricity	<25%	67%	88%

Sources: *Para Entender Chiapas*, 1997; Tavanti, 2001; INEGI, 2001

Land has always been central to the life of the Mayan people, and issues related to land have been at the center of the current struggle. While there was some land reform after the Mexican Revolution early in the 20th century, the continued domination of land by Spanish-speaking ranchers with close ties to the Chiapas state government has been a source of conflict.[48]

The Mayan peoples of Chiapas have fought back against their marginalization in many different ways over the centuries; wars of resistance, uprisings, passive resistance, land invasions, political action, migration, religious conversion and maintenance and nourishment of cultural autonomy (Womack, 1999). One form this resistance took over the centuries was in the appropriation of faith. While Catholicism was part of the violence of the conquest, the local Mayan peoples eventually adapted Catholic forms into their indigenous traditions, as a way of keeping their

traditions alive.

Religion: The Diocese of San Cristobal de las Casas and the Evangelicals

In 1960 Samuel Ruiz was named Bishop of San Cristobal. Traveling through the many communities of his Diocese in the highlands of Chiapas, Ruiz was shocked by the poverty, marginalization and suffering of the Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Tojolabal, and Chol[49] communities which were part of his Church. Traveling by foot or by mule, since there were few roads in the region, he recognized that these communities had been just as abandoned by the church as they had by their government, this despite the fact that much of Mexico's wealth–oil, hydroelectric power, and timber–lies in this region. Over the next few years Ruiz and the priests he sent into the communities were to become transformed together with their indigenous brothers and sisters. Paralleling Paulo Freire's approach of *concientización*, the church's priests, sisters, and catechists sat down with people in their communities and studied the Bible and their social reality together, reading "the word and the world" (Freire, 1970).

Ruiz came to be compared with the first bishop of San Cristobal, Bartolomé de las Casas, who, as one of the first Spanish clerics in the new world, loudly denounced the brutal practices of the Spaniards against the Indians of the Americas. Las Casas succeeded in convincing the King of Spain to abolish Indian slavery in his colonies, but other ways were found to subjugate the peoples of the Americas. Ruiz came to San Cristobal as the reforms of the Catholic Church of Vatican II were developing, and as many of the Latin American church would soon choose the "preferential option for the poor" as the key message of the Gospel, so would Ruiz. Under Ruiz, the indigenous voice was heard in the church, and indigenous communities organized to demand their economic, social and political rights in the larger society. New priests were brought in and sent into the communities

[48] This is an issue of contention, and, indeed, in some municipalities, such as Chenalhó, Indigenous people control most of the land.

to learn the languages of the people, catechists were selected and trained and indigenous deacons were ordained. In fact, by the 90s, Chiapas would have more indigenous deacons than any diocese in the world (around 400) (SIPAZ, May, 2000). Working together with the various indigenous communities, the pastoral teams, catechists and community members worked to develop a *Teología India*, or Indian Theology (Campos, 2001).

The introduction of Protestantism in the 20th century was also to have profound effects in Chiapas. In the 1930s Protestant (called *Evangélicos* in Mexico) missionaries entered Chiapas. By the 60s, evangelical churches, especially Presbyterians, were emerging in the highlands of Chiapas. This led to often violent conflict, as traditional authorities, especially in San Juan Chamula, expelled up to 30,000 indigenous Protestants from their communities. The expulsions resulted from the threat to both traditional views of culture and community as well as challenges to the political power of traditional *caciques* (traditional, autocratic leaders often linked to the PRI). Much of the tension centered on the Evangelicals' refusal to carry out *cargos* or communal responsibilities related to celebrations of the community's patron saint, which often involved alcohol, to which the Evangelicals were opposed. However, the conflict was not merely one of traditional indigenous values versus a foreign value system. It was also a political and economic conflict since the small group of leaders who held power through their alliance with the ruling PRI also controlled the production and distribution of alcohol in Chamula. The refusal of the *Evangélicos* to contribute money, perform *cargos* and consume alcohol all threatened the local power structure and the wealth of the *caciques* (Shupak, 1995).

The Chamula *caciques* had also expelled the Diocese of San Cristobal as an equally unwanted external challenge to their power. Bishop Samuel Ruiz denounced the expulsions of the Evangelicals and the diocese aided the displaced who were now in huge squatters communities

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[49]Smaller indigenous groups in Chiapas are Zoque, Mixe, Mam, Kakchiquel, and Lacondón.

around San Cristobal.

There are three principal religious tendencies in Chenalhó (as in the rest of indigenous Chiapas) today. They are Catholic followers of the Diocese, sometimes called followers of "The Word of God" (Palabra de Dios) or "Pueblo Creyente" (A Believing People), Protestants, in Spanish usually referred to as *Evangélicos* (mostly Presbyterians), and Traditionalists (or *costumbristas)*, who maintain allegiance to the traditional syncretic beliefs of their Mayan ancestors mixed with Catholicism, or what is sometimes called "folk Catholicism." [50]

All of these choices also have political and cultural meanings. Both the Word of God and Evangelical movements are choosing to appropriate and adapt theology and ideology from the outside in their search for survival. While some traditionalists emphasize the need to hold on to tradition, part of which is the alliance with the PRI, the Word of God followers use tools of social analysis to defend themselves against what they see as the threat of globalization and neoliberal economics which threatens their traditional communal way of life. Christene Eber (2000, 2001a) explains how the Word of God advocates seek to retain the good parts of their tradition (including wearing of traditional clothing, not speaking Spanish within the communities, and honoring of elders and ancestors), and to abandon the bad parts of tradition (subordination of women, excessive alcohol consumption which often leads to abuse).

Evangelicals have chosen a path which not only prohibits alcohol, but also has a more individualistic view of the world. Eber (2001) explains, "The idea of personal salvation through Jesus Christ threatened traditionalists' beliefs in the importance of nurturing a collective soul that would outlast those of individuals and be able to defend them when the day of judgement came."

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[50] Some would add a fourth, conservative Catholics, representing Catholics who are not comfortable with the radical theology and work of the Diocese of San Cristobal (Eber, 2001a). It is important to note that the "Word of God" followers are also closely connected to traditional Mayan religion. The Diocese has encouraged the development of "*Teologia India*" (Campos, 2001). Evangelicals also retain many Mayan traditions such as dress (although perhaps to a lesser degree), language, food and an underlying worldview, even as they reject many of the outward forms of traditional religious expression.

SIPAZ reports that in Chiapas, 57% of the population is Catholic, 23% Protestant and 20% Traditionalist (*Informe*, May, 2000).

Some of the issues faced by communities which are divided by religion are revealed in a catechism written in and used in Tzeltal communities:

> Brothers, what I am going to tell you here is what I said with brother Manuel, who no longer wants to be our Indian brother. Last Sunday I was walking along, carrying my bag, headed for the colony to go to church with my community. On the road I met Manuel, who lives on the farm on the other side of the river. He was coming riding his horse, wearing his pants and his new shirt, his good hat and his fine shoes. I said to him, "Good morning, brother Manuel, how is your heart?" "Hello *indito* [little Indian]," he answered me in Castilla. I said to him, "Are you not Indian too? Maybe you are not Manuel, son of my Uncle Tomás, who is of our Indian race?" "Yes, I am Manuel, and I am owner of that farm on the other side of the river. I am the owner of those cattle you see in the pasture. I am the owner of the land where the boys from the colonies go to make some money. But I am not Indian like you," he told me. I do not know how to speak your language. My language is Castilla. Boy, do not say that my papa is your uncle. My family does not deal with Indians. . . . You stupid Indian, you are Catholic. That is why you are poor, you are wasting your time. It is from going off to pray that you have no cattle, no farm, or animals or money." . . . Along the road I kept thinking about many things. . . . Brothers, I believe in God and I believe that it is possible that with the work of all of us united we may come to be a great people, a respected Indian people, where we may live as brothers. (Quoted in Womack, 1999, pp. 134-135)

There are fundamentally different world views behind the differing religious practices of Evangelicals, on one side, and the Catholics and *tradicionalistas* on the other. Christine Eber (2001a) explains the difference in reference to Chenalhó. "The idea of personal salvation through Jesus Christ threatened Traditionalists' beliefs in the importance of nurturing a collective soul that would outlast those of individuals and be able to defend them when the day of judgement came."

Zapatistas

The uprising of January 1, 1994, when 3000 masked indigenous took over the town halls of six county seats in Chiapas had deep roots. In the 1970s and 80s, secular political organizers came to Chiapas from northern Mexico at Ruiz's invitation to help organize the 1974 indigenous congress and local indigenous movements. Out of this work came a number of unions and political organizations through which a new round of struggles for land and fair treatment began.

What would later be known as the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Zapatista National Liberation Army) or EZLN was founded in the *Lacandón* jungle in 1983. Over the next 11 years they quietly organized and built a movement based on the long work of the diocese in organizing and working for social justice. Throughout the 80s the Mexican economy was in crisis, to which the government responded by accepting the externally imposed policies of structural adjustment, reducing subsidies to consumer goods, devaluing the currency, opening the economy up to more imports, etc. The fraudulent imposition of Carlos Salinas as president in 1988 over center-left PRD candidate Cuautemoc Cardenas, who had received more votes, ushered in an era of unbridled neoliberalism. The following years included massive privatizations (many government enterprises were sold at a low price to Salinas' cronies), reductions of tariffs, and constitutional reforms. At the same time, Salinas used funds from privatizations to organize "Solidarity," a massive social welfare program designed to ameliorate some of the worst effects of his economic reforms, encourage grassroots organization, and build community-level infrastructure (Womack, 1999). Solidarity was administered though, as a tool to buy PRI control and reward supporters of the government.[51]

In 1992, Mexican President Carlos Salinas' government amended the 1917 Constitution to end the land reform which had, over the 75 years since Emiliano Zapata led a struggle for land and liberty, re-distributed half of Mexico's arable land. These reforms to Article 27 also promoted the privatization of communal lands (through replacing communal titles with individual titles thereby allowing farmers to participate in the "free market" for land) and for the first time permitted foreign ownership of land. Salinas was preparing the way for the approval of NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement with the United States and Canada, which had been negotiated in secrecy

[51] A friend in Cuernavaca explained to me that she supported the PRI because they promised to build a new bridge in her community. Perhaps these kind of promises and largesses are found in all electoral democracies, but the PRI was especially known for subverting the electoral process in this way.

without input from the Mexican people. At the same time, Salinas, a former leftist with roots in the same movements which birthed some of the EZLN (Zapatista National Liberation Army) organizers (Womack, 1999), poured in government funds through his pet organization, Solidarity, which also organized local groups in many communities.

The group which would later become the Zapatistas had been organizing for years. It began out of the contact between organizers brought in by the San Cristobal Diocese in the 70s. With the 1992 reforms to Article 27, this group now definitively chose the path of armed struggle. The Diocese, which had been increasingly in conflict with their former allies (including many catechists and deacons), encouraged the followers of the Word of God to choose a nonviolent path. Many communities met in 1992 and some chose the armed path of the Zapatistas, others chose a nonviolent path (this was the year the *Abejas* were formed), others remained undecided. Later, many Zapatista communities would expel those who did not support their armed struggle (Womack, 1999, p. 43), and Priista[52] communities would expel Zapatistas and Word of God followers. In 1992, the catechists in Chenalhó joined either ANCIEZ (later to call themselves the EZLN) or *Abejas*. Before that, ANCIEZ catechists had asked to be trained separately from the other catechists (Interview 29).

To emphasize their inconformity with Salinas' economic project, the Zapatistas chose the day NAFTA went into effect, January 1, 1994, to announce their presence to Mexico and the world, by taking six municipal seats in the highlands and the canyon region of Chiapas. In the 12 day war which followed, hundreds were killed and the Zapatistas were routed. But they had made their point, and captured the sympathy of people all over Mexico with their eloquent pleas for justice, land and democracy. Public demonstrations all over Mexico and the international outcry over the Mexican army's indiscriminate bombing and execution of Zapatista prisoners led to a cease-fire. Soon, negotiations began with Samuel Ruiz mediating.

A central figure in the Zapatista's struggle has been *Subcomandante* Marcos, the masked,

pipe-smoking Mestizo leader/spokesperson of the EZLN. A poet as well as a revolutionary, Marcos has been a focal point of the Zapatista struggle. When thousands of young people in Mexico City marched in support of the Zapatistas, many wore shirts saying, *Somos Todos Marcos* (we are all Marcos). Marcos first went to the *Lacandón* in the 70s along with other leftist organizers from northern Mexico. Instead of importing revolution into the *cañadas* or canyons, Marcos says that out of his encounter with the other, indigenous world he encountered, he was "reborn" as an *indígena*. Since the rebellion, Marcos has served as the primary spokesperson for the EZLN. The Zapatista facility with getting out their message through the media and internet, the globalization of their struggle, the emphasis on the indigenous nature of the struggle rather than on traditional Marxist formulations, and the fact that they have repeatedly declared that they do not seek political power, have led many to call this the first "postmodern" revolution.

Since 1994, Marcos has produced thousands of pages of communiqués, letters, philosophical musings and declarations. John Womack (1999) says

> Marcos' communiqués and interviews were playful, sarcastic, poetic, arbitrary, funny, narcissistic, poignant, snide, allusive, Foucaultian, magically realistic, the perfect lingo for contemporary discourse and negotiation, not with a government or rival movements, but through the modern media with a modern public, the message being not war, or peace, or reconciliation, but endless, seductive argumentation. "We did not go to war on January 1 to kill or to have them kill us," the *Subcomandante* in his new mode told the media. "We went to make ourselves heard." (Womack, 1999)

Eighteen days after the initiation of their struggle, Marcos (2001) responded to the government's offer of amnesty:

> What are they going to pardon us for? For not dying of hunger? For not accepting our misery in silence? For not accepting humbly the historic burden of disdain and abandonment? For having risen up in arms after we found all other paths closed? . . . For showing the rest of the country and the whole world that human dignity still exists even among the world's poorest people? (p. 38)

While much of the public saw the face of Marcos as a personification of the Zapatista

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[52] Those allied with the government and its ruling party, the PRI, or Institutional Revolutionary Party.

movement, the backbone of the movement was the thousands of indigenous–Tzeltales, Tzotziles, Choles and Tojolabales–who lived in the *cañadas* and *selva* and made up the rank and file of the movement. These communities deliberated as a group on each major decision the Zapatistas would make.

The Zapatista movement was further increased as tens of thousands of indigenous from the highlands and from the northern zone joined Zapatista support bases (*los bases de apoyo)*, forming autonomous communities and municipalities which refused to recognize the authority of the local, state, or federal governments, but who still considered themselves to be profoundly Mexican. By the year 2000, there were 1111 villages[53] in 34 municipalities where there are Zapatista bases of support (Ortiz, 2001; talk given by Enlace Civil, July, 2001). These communities were coordinated by five regional centers or "Aguascalientes," named after the convention which wrote the 1917 Mexican constitution in Aguascalientes, in northern Mexico, where some of Emiliano Zapata's political goals were enshrined. The autonomous communities and municipalities are primarily (but not exclusively) in the more indigenous areas of Chiapas, the *selva,* the *cañadas* and the highlands.

In Chenalhó, about 11,000 of the *municipio's* 30,000 residents opted to side with the Zapatistas. They joined communities all over Chiapas by 1995 in the movement of autonomous communities, and in Chenalhó, set up an opposition autonomous municipal government in Polhó, next to Acteal. The autonomous group maintained ties to the *Abejas*, who supported their goals, but not the armed struggle of the EZLN.

Since the initial 12 days of armed struggle, the Zapatistas, while retaining their arms, have pursued their revolution with almost exclusively nonviolent strategies. They have used the internet, extensive international networks of supporters, caravans, alternative political structures (local and statewide autonomous governments), refusing all government money, teachers, clinics, and police,

[53] This number may be more symbolic than literal, it was declared in connection to the 1111 representatives the EZLN sent to Mexico City in a march.

forming cooperatives, blockading roads and forming human chains or peace belts to protect Zapatista leaders during negotiations and public appearances. Without abandoning the option of returning to armed struggle at some point, several Zapatista declarations have referred specifically to "nonviolent struggle." Their "Third Declaration of the *Lacandón* Jungle" left open both options:

> Today, after calling the people of Mexico first to arms, and later to a civic and nonviolent struggle, we call them to struggle BY ALL MEANS, AT ALL LEVELS, AND IN ALL PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, for democracy, liberty, and justice. . . (emphasis in the original, translated and reprinted in Womack, 1999, p. 292)

In 1996, after two years of negotiations, mediated by the CONAI (National Commission of Intermediation), led by Bishop Samuel Ruiz, and COCOPA, a commission of national legislators from the various political parties, the Zapatistas and the representatives of Ernesto Zedillo's government signed the San Andrés Accords[54] which were to grant autonomy to Mexico's indigenous groups. But the accords would never be passed into law by the National Congress, and the negotiations would never produce another agreement. The struggle of indigenous groups, including the EZLN, the *Abejas*, and many others for the ratification of the San Andrés accords would be a major theme of conflict in the following years.

In 2000, when the PRI lost the presidency for the first time in over 70 years, President Vicente Fox of the conservative PAN party promised to pass the San Andrés accords. But the PAN and PRI members of congress joined together to gut the law and pass a plan that was unacceptable to the Zapatistas and their supporters.

The Bishops

Already before 1994 efforts were under way from within the Mexican government and conservative sectors of the church to remove Bishop Ruiz, but these efforts were put on hold when Ruiz became a key mediator in the conflict. The Vatican did, however, appoint a conservative co-

adjudicator to control Ruiz and eventually to replace him. Raul Vera proved to be, like Oscar Romero, open to hearing the spirit of God in the voice of the poor, and was soon as fierce a defender of indigenous rights as was Don Samuel. At the end of 1999, Tatic (the honorific title given to elders by the Tzotzil) Samuel had to retire upon reaching 75. But instead of assigning Tatic Raul to replace him, the more centrist Bishop Arizmendi from Tapachula, on the coast, was appointed to replace Ruiz.

International Solidarity

From the first days of the Zapatista uprising, in January, 1994, the Chiapas conflict has had a strong component of external solidarity. The support of the *Caxlanes* (what the Mayans in Chiapas call all outsiders, including Spanish-speaking Mexicans) has been a key part of the strategy of indigenous resistance in Chiapas. Mexicans from all over the Republic joined other Latin Americans, North Americans, Europeans, and even a few Asians, in visiting Chiapas to provide accompaniment to indigenous communities. Two groups in San Cristobal, Enlace Civil and the Fray Bartolome de las Casas Human Rights Center (CDHFBC, or Frayba) coordinated the foreigners' presence. The following quote from Global Exchange (2001), one of the more prominent of international solidarity organizations working in Chiapas, describes the importance of the Peace Camps organized by the BRICO program of the CDHFBC.

> The Peace Camp volunteers have two key functions. First, by their mere presence they discourage the aggressions of military, police, and paramilitary forces against the lives and property of the indigenous communities. They are literally the physical personification of international preoccupation about the rights of indigenous peoples, unarmed civilians using their status as foreigners to support and protect the position of the indigenous people....
>
> By showing this international support, and linking the communities to the outside world, the observers help counteract the low-intensity counterinsurgency warfare perpetrated by the Mexican government against the EZLN, its bases of support or Zapatista sympathizers. Second, they act as witnesses to human rights violations, documenting and then reporting them to concerned local and international groups. By publicizing these abuses

[54] Negotiated and signed in the community the government calls "San Andrés Larrainzar" and which the Zapatistas call "San Andrés Sacamchen de los Pobres," which is just west of Chenalhó.

> abroad, the observers bring the threat of international diplomatic and economic pressure to bear against the Mexican government.

Global Exchange goes on to report that the indigenous communities credit Peace Camp volunteers with saving lives.

> Many members of indigenous communities and local NGOs (non-governmental organizations) have testified that the foreign observer presence has significantly diminished the effectiveness of the government's counterinsurgency tactics. In fact, communities without a foreign presence have experienced greater levels of military and/or paramilitary harassment, leading various human rights groups to conclude that if there had been a permanent observation presence in Acteal, the massacre of December 22, 1997 would not have happened. Communities have also testified that violence tends to escalate after international observers leave. (Global Exchange, 2001)

CPTer Pierre Gingerich, who worked in Chiapas during the early part of CPT's presence there, sees the presence of and attention of so many international and national Mexican observers as a deterrent to aggressive Mexican army action in Chiapas.

> The Zapatista's principal power has never been military–that has been the government's card. But the government's military incursions have been somewhat restrained by the presence of outside eyes, both Mexican and foreign monitoring events in Chiapas, and working through their governments to pressure the Mexican government to pursue negotiated rather than military solutions. The presence of outside observers is an inconvenient, even infuriating, hindrance to government efforts to pursue a military solution. (Post to CPTNet, Sept. 19, 1999)

Military and Paramilitaries

Immediately following the Zapatista uprising in January, 1994, the Mexican Army moved in with force into Chiapas. However, Mexican military mobilization was slowed by the cease-fire of January 12 and the subsequent negotiations between the Mexican government and the EZLN mediated by Bishop Ruiz. However, in February, 1995, two months after the inauguration of Priista Ernesto Zedillo as President, succeeding Carlos Salinas,[55] a military offensive was launched against

[55] While the PRI held tight control of the Mexican government from the 1920s to 2000, rivaling the tenure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, it dutifully followed the principle of no reelection established by the Revolution of 1910-1920, and the Constitution of 1917. However, this did not indicate democracy. Until 2000, each President hand-picked his successor.

EZLN strongholds in the *selva* and communities in the highlands were occupied. According to CONAI, the number of Mexican army installations doubled from 1995 to 1996 to a total of 170 (SIPAZ *Report*, 2:4, October, 1997). The massacre at Acteal was used as a pretext for further militarization, and an estimated 70,000 Federal troops were present in Chiapas, one-third of the Mexican army, by 1998 (Global Exchange, Cencos, 2000; SIPAZ *Report* 6:1, February, 2001). And "in the days following the massacre, 5000 more soldiers were sent to Chiapas, including 2000 more to Chenalhó" (SIPAZ *Report* 3:1, January, 1998, p. 7).

General Jose Ruben Rivas Pena, a graduate of the U.S. School of Americas[56] at Fort Benning, Georgia, drew up a "Chiapas Campaign Plan" at the 7th Military Region in Tuxtla Gutierrez in October, 1994. The plan called for "the creation of civil counterinsurgency squads in the 38 Chiapas municipalities in which the EZLN had influence" (Ross, 2000, p. 248). "Military operations will include the training of these self-defense and paramilitary formations," wrote Rivas Pena. The Chiapas plan was implemented by General Mario Renán Castillo, Mexican Army Commander for Chiapas, who was trained in psychological operations and counterinsurgency at the Center for Special Forces at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Two ex-army officers were convicted of training the perpetrators of the Acteal massacres, and the weapons used in the massacre have been traced to the state police, the same force which gave protection to the paramilitaries the day of the massacre and after. The Mexican government still denies complicity in the massacre, although the governor of Chiapas and the Secretary of the Interior (the most important of the President's cabinet officers) were both forced to resign days after the massacre.

The response by international civil society to the Acteal massacre was loud and swift, testimony to the high profile of Chiapas within First World solidarity circles and among human rights

[56]In *School of Assassins* Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer (1997) documents the links between training at the School of the Americas and human rights abuses in Latin America. Quoting the *Los Angeles Times*, "It is hard to think of a coup or human rights outrage that has occurred [in Latin America] over the last 40 years in which alumni of the School of the Americas were not involved" (p. xii).

organizations. It was also related to the increased attention paid to Mexico by the United States after the signing of NAFTA and the interest in Europe around negotiations for free trade with Mexico. According to the EZLN, protests were held in 130 cities in 26 countries on 6 continents, and in Mexico City, led by several *Abeja* members, the largest march was held since the 1994 uprising. Sixty thousand people marched in Rome, and Ben and Jerry's purchased *Abeja* coffee for making their ice cream (Ross, 2000).

Why would the government plan an act which was so damaging to their international image, and counterproductive to their objectives in Chiapas? There are several possible analyses. One is that the state police and paramilitary group were overzealous in carrying out their job, attacking the unarmed *Abejas* instead of the nearby armed Zapatista community. Tensions had been aggravated by a number of killings in Chenalhó. Local Priistas and Evangelicals claim 18 of their members were killed by Zapatista supporters in a dozen incidents during the preceding months. Another is that the intent at Acteal was to provoke an armed response, and to be able to move in further troops to "quell the domestic disturbance" and go after the Zapatistas and expel foreign human rights observers. The *Abejas*' refusal to "fight back," threw a monkey wrench into the plan. But, in fact, the army still did establish new bases and began deporting foreigners, beginning with Miguel Chanteau, the French parish priest in Chenalhó for 30 years who had been pastor to the *Abejas* (Chanteau, 1999; Interview 24). In all, 144 foreigners were expelled in 1998 (Global Exchange, 1999) but many more came down, among them, the Christian Peacemaker Teams, who established a permanent presence in May/June of that year.

The army has an estimated 10,000 troops in Chenalhó, or one for every three residents of Chenalhó (Pierre Gingerich post to CPTNet, Sept 19, 1999). But despite four years of army occupation, Chenalhó was still not safe for the 10,000 displaced Pedranos to return home.

Paramilitaries: There are at least half a dozen paramilitary groups active in Chiapas. The groups against which Frayba received the greatest number of denunciations in 2000 are *Paz y*

Justicia (Peace and Justice),[57] in the north, *Alianza San Bartolomé de los Llanos*, the *Chinchulines*, *Mascara Roja* in the area around Chenalhó, and MIRA (CDHFBC, 2001a). According to Frayba,

> The paramilitary groups are illegal organizations of people who use violence and terror to weaken the armed and civil opposition, and they do it supported by agents of the state, through economic and/or military resources, training, protection and impunity. (CDHFBC 2001b)

Miguel Chanteau reports that in the spring and summer of 1997 residents of Chenalhó began to notice government troops arriving and training shooting going on but no one getting shot. They later realized that this was paramilitary training. Six months later these same paramilitaries carried out the massacre at Acteal (Chanteau, 1999; Interview 24).

Low Intensity Warfare

The development of irregular military forces to carry out terror and assassination against the civilian population to deter support for the opposition is a classic counter-insurgency strategy. Haiti, Colombia, and Mexico have all seen the development of pro-government paramilitary organizations, forced displacement of population in the conflict zone, and disruption of economic activity. The setting up of "social labor" camps, where residents can come for medical or dental attention, meals, and haircuts, is part of an attempt to win the loyalty (hearts and minds) of the population by using the military to administer aid. Similar programs were used in Vietnam and in Central America (U.S. troops in Honduras in the 1980s).

The Displaced

Of 20,000 people displaced in Chiapas by the conflict between 1994 and 2000, half were in

[57] Later they changed their name to "Development, Peace and Justice." There is also a group, "Ejido Tomas Munzer," made up of anti-Zapatista cattle ranchers. This group is named after Thomas Munzer, the 16th century Anabaptist leader who, rejecting the nonviolence of other early Anabaptist leaders in Switzerland, Germany, and Holland, led a violent peasant revolt (SIPAZ *Report* 1:2, September, 1996). The Anabaptists were the precursors to the Mennonites.

the municipality of Chenalhó. These were divided between *Abejas* and Zapatistas. The displaced *Abejas* lived in camps in Acteal, X'oyep, and Tzajalchen. Zapatistas lived in the autonomous community of Polhó. Conditions in the displaced camps were poor, with little land available nearby, and varying levels of access to lands in the communities from which people had fled.

Many displacements in Chenalhó happened in 1997, at the same time the first paramilitaries were noticed. Displacement of the civilian population is also a tactic of counterinsurgency, or low intensity warfare–"draining the ocean." In the months preceding and following the massacre in Acteal, about 2,500 *Abejas* were forcibly displaced by paramilitary action in their communities. Altogether, in Chenalhó, 6000 fled their homes between May and December, and an additional 4,000 after the massacre. By March, 1998, the total number of displaced in Chenalhó was 10,000, half of the number which would be displaced in Chiapas by the year 2000.[58] Community members were pressured to either join the armed patrols of the paramilitaries or contribute money to purchase arms. When members of the *Abejas* and of Zapatista supporters in Chenalhó refused, they were driven out of their community. Many had their houses burned and their coffee crop stolen. Coffee is the chief source of income for most people in Chenalhó (CPTnet, December 2, 1997).

Killing in Chiapas

The Fray Bartolome de las Casas Human Rights Center (CDHFBC, 2000) estimated in the year 2000 that 1,500 people had been killed in Chiapas since the January 1, 1994 Zapatista uprising. This testimony given by her uncle about one 9 year old girl gives a brief glimpse at what is lost in lethal violence.

> *JUANA PEREZ LUNA - Nacida en Acteal - 8 agosto 1988 - 22 diciembre 1997*
> *Se portaba muy bien con sus papas. La mandaban a traer agua y a moler el*

[58] It is interesting that numbers of displaced by conflict in Chiapas do not normally include the 30,000 Evangelicals who have been expelled from San Juan Chamula and other areas. Displacements in the 90s were effected by both Priistas and Zapatistas. Nearly all the displaced *Abejas* returned to their homes by the end of 2001. Most of the rest of the Chenalhó displaced are Zapatista supporters who remain displaced.

nixtamal. Obedecía muy bien. También ayudaba a hacer tortillas. Le gustaba jugar y subirse al arbol de guayaba de nuestra casa, a cortar guayabas. -testimonio de Vicente Luna Ruiz (tío).

JUANA PEREZ LUNA - Born in Acteal - August 8, 1988 - December 22, 1997
She behaved very well with her parents. They would send her to bring water and to grind the *nixtamal*. She obeyed very well. She also helped to make tortillas. She liked to play and climb the guava tree at our house to pick guavas. -testimony of Vicente Luna Ruiz, Juana's uncle (Nuevo Amanecer, 1998).

Las Abejas

Ha sido mucho el dolor y el sufrimiento, pero no se cansa nuestra esperanza a conseguir una paz justa y digna. -Acteal, Tierra Sagrada[59]

Las Abejas, or The Bees, are a Christian pacifist organization made up of mostly Catholic Tzotzil-Mayan people in the *municipio* of San Pedro Chenalhó, in the highlands of Chiapas, north of San Cristobal de las Casas. The Bees were founded in December, 1992 after five men from the community of Tzajalchen, in the *municipio* de Chenalhó, were arrested and falsely charged with murder after a local conflict over land. Several hundred people walked from Yabteclum, in Chenalhó, to San Cristobal to demand their release. A group of 300-500 people carried out a campaign which included the pilgrimage, a vigil at the prison, information dissemination, prayers and penance in 30 communities. Twenty-seven days after their arrest, the five men were released. During the march the group decided to name themselves "*Las Abejas*" (The Bees) and organize themselves officially as the "Civil Society of The Bees" (*Abejas*, 2001). Today there are between 4,000 and 5,000 members of the *Sociedad Civil de Las Abejas*, living in several communities of Chenalhó (Campos, 2001; Eber, 2001a).

In the *History Las Abejas* have written, they explain why they chose the name "The Bees."

Our symbol has a bee, it has a queen. The queen is in a box with her bees, in the

[59] "Our pain and suffering has been great, but our hope for achieving peace with justice and dignity does not tire." Quote from poster produced by Bees of the women of Acteal.

> same box and there are no divisions. The queen represents the Reign[60] of God, the bees are the multitude of the world. The Reign of God does not want injustices, nor violence, nor imprisonment. It wants there to be freedom for all human beings. (*Abejas*, 2001)

The Bees have been studied from a variety of perspectives. Several books and many articles have been written about the massacre at Acteal. A representative (not exhaustive) sample has been referenced here (Álvarez, 2000; Hernández, 2001; *Acteal: Una herida abierta*, 1998; CDHFBC, 1998; Falcon, 2001). The government's attempt to cast the massacre as a local conflict between two indigenous groups is presented in its *Libro Blanco Sobre Acteal* (White Paper on Acteal; *Libro Blanco*, 1998).

While a multitude of books, articles, and reports are available about the massacre in Acteal, general studies of *Las Abejas* as a group are fewer. There are two excellent academic studies of the *Abejas*. Marco Tavanti's (2001) doctoral dissertation is a sociological study of the *Abejas* movement from the perspective of the Bees' "syncretic identities of resistance." Gabriela Campos' (2001) thesis is an anthropological study which locates the *Abejas* within the context of the work of the Diocese of San Cristobal and the development by Mayan Christians of *Teología India* (Indian Theology). Father Miguel Chanteau (1999) has written a personal narrative account of his 30 years as parish priest in Chenalhó. Anthropologist Christine Eber (2000, 2001a, 2001b) has written a book and several articles about Chenalhó which focus particularly on women, alcohol, and the autonomy movement. Teresa Ortiz (2001) has published a book of interviews of Indigenous people of Chiapas, mostly women, including Zapatistas and *Abejas*. In addition the *Mesa Directiva* (steering committee) of the Bees has issued many public statements and Bee members have made speeches. Both SIPAZ and CPT have published information about the Bees. I have also drawn on meetings with the members of the *Mesa Directiva*, interviews I conducted with four Bee members (Interviews 6, 19, 20, and 28) and interviews with a number of people who have worked with or know the Bees

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[60] *Reino de Dios* = Kingdom, or Reign of God, in the original the word *reina* is used, since it means queen and the analogy is with the queen bee. *Reina de Dios* could be translated as "Queendom of God."

(Interviews 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 21, 22, 24, 26, 29, 30).

Abejas and Zapatistas

After the Zapatista uprising, most Pedranos who were followers of the Word of God and closely linked to the Diocese and its catechists either became part of the support base of the Zapatistas and joined the autonomous municipality centered in Polhó, or joined the Bees (Chanteau, 1999; Eber, 2001a). The Bees explain:

> When the armed uprising of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) happened, we didn't know who they were nor why they fought, nor against whom they fought. Eight days later we found out that they were against the poverty of Mexico, for national liberation, and for the ten demands: land, housing, food, health, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice and peace.[61] Then we realized that we the bees were in agreement with their demands. But we are civil society, pacific and not armed and that we are not in agreement with the armed path but instead with the political and peaceful path. (*Abejas*, 2001)

The Bees are Christians who interpret the Bible as prohibiting violence and requiring work for justice. A Mexican evangelical SIPAZ worker describes the *Abejas*:

> *Las Abejas* are an indigenous, *campesina* (peasant), social organization where there are distinct expressions of Christian faith, as Catholics and Evangelicals, but with a commitment to peace and social justice, also identified with the Zapatista cause, but not with the method of violence. . . . [*Las Abejas* have a] profound indigenous identity. (Interview 7)

The *Abejas*, like the Zapatistas, make important decisions in general assembly of the community. Their goal is "a society where all voices count" (Interview 7).

A member of the *Mesa Directiva* explained their philosophy:

> We believe that the Word of God teaches us that we should not use violence since Jesus Christ taught us how to love each other, how to act, how to see our situation, and our rights. God told us to defend, to support the blind, the marginalized, those who are forgotten. Jesus Christ illuminates our path and teaches us how to do the work of nonviolence. (Interview 6)

Although their roots are in the Catholic Church, the *Abejas*, like the communities of Zapatista supporters, also include Protestants and traditionalists. This is part of what Eber describes as a new

alignment along political lines more than religious lines (Eber, 2001a).

Divided Communities

Today Chiapas is fundamentally divided, with Priistas, most Evangelicals, paramilitaries, and cattle ranchers on one side, and Zapatistas, *Abejas*, the center-left PRD party and most Catholics active in the diocese on the other. In Chenalhó, Eber (2001a) identifies four distinct political alignments: 1) Priista: aligned with the PRI and the Mexican power structure, 2) Zapatista: alignment with the EZLN support base, 3) *Abeja*: member of the Civil Society of the Bees, and 4) independents: not aligned with any of the above movements. This division represents a realignment from the 80s, when the religious divisions (into Evangelicals, Catholic followers of the Diocese, traditional Catholics, and traditionalists) were the more salient ones.

CPTer Scott Kerr explains the conflict in Chiapas as a struggle for the survival of indigenous culture. "A friend of mine in one of the communities said to me one time, 'the conflict is not a political one, not one between communities, and not religious, it is a conflict to exterminate indigenous culture'" (Interview 2).

On the other hand, some indigenous Evangelicals see a threat to their own community's survival in the Zapatista movement and in the San Andrés Accords. Many indigenous groups seek the right to run their affairs according to *usos y costumbres*, the traditional organizing principles of Mayan society. One Presbyterian leader in Chenalhó explained to me his fear if the autonomy was granted to indigenous communities.

> We think that if this indigenous law takes effect, it will affect us as Evangelicals. Because if they make this law, that they have the right to do everything, we ourselves will be obligated to do what is not right for the Evangelicals. (Interview 18)

Evangelicals are concerned about being required to participate in community events and activities which they consider to be immoral, idolatrous, and contrary to their religious beliefs.

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[61] Later the EZLN added "work, culture, and rights to information" to the list of demands (Womack, 1999).

These include consumption of alcohol and contributing to festivals honoring the patron saint of a community (in Chenalhó, that would be Saint Peter–*San Pedro).* The expulsions of thousands of Evangelicals from their communities, mostly in the 1980s, has been related to conflicts over these traditions and the power dynamics they engender. They fear, then, the increase of power of local authorities who see the Evangelicals as abandoning indigenous traditions, and seek to force them to abandon their religion, or leave their community.

CPT worker Pierre Gingerich explains his view of the link between Evangelicals and a pro-government position:

> It's quite understandable that in general, individuals and communities allied with the governing party will find resonance with a theology that favors individual salvation and advancement, that emphasizes submission to temporal authority, and that dismisses as pagan the deep traditional ties of the indigenous to their lands and communities. (CPTNet post, Sept. 19, 1999)

Paula Bidle, a UCC mission worker who worked with the San Cristobal Diocese reports that when she asked a group of Presbyterians in Chenalhó what they hoped for their children's future, they replied that they wanted their children to "grow up and be professionals." When the same question was asked to a group of Zapatista supporters, they replied that they wanted their children to "grow up, be educated, live in the community, be where they can determine their future and participate in creating democracy" (Interview 16).

The Chiapas conflict can be (and often is) cast as a conflict between two visions of the future. One is a vision of a global economy, represented by NAFTA, the Plan Puebla-Panama,[62] and the Fox administration, of a world where each person can individually reach her or his potential, compete with others, and achieve as much as possible. The strong, the educated, the competent (and maybe the lucky or the devious) will win. The weak, the ignorant, the incompetent will be left behind, and this fact will serve as a motive to encourage all to do their best and contribute to society. Poor

[62] A plan promoted by the Fox administration in conjunction with the United States for a "development corridor" which would provide labor and transit for U.S. corporations.

countries and groups will benefit by finding the way to best use their labor and resources. Rich countries will be rewarded for efficiency and productivity.

The alternative vision is one where the individual is part of a community which values its particular cultural identity. The individual works for the good of the family, the community, the nation, the human race, and the natural world. Communities have the right to determine their future, power is decentralized, and neither consumption nor economic growth is the highest good.

When CPT worker Scott Kerr says the struggle in Chiapas is over an attempt to exterminate indigenous culture, it is because he, like the *Abejas*, the Zapatistas, the PRD, the Diocese of San Cristobal, and the autonomous movement, believes that the first vision, that of neoliberal globalization, will do just that, result in the extermination of indigenous people. Speaking through tears at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), an *Abeja* spokesperson declared that "The conflict in Chiapas is not a religious one or one that is between communities. It is a social conflict to eliminate the indigenous communities" (CPTNet, June 7, 2000).

More specifically, indigenous groups critique the neoliberal project as the latest campaign of 500 years of oppression and exploitation which seeks to marginalize and destroy indigenous communities. The Steering Committee of the *Abejas*, in one document, declared that

> The governors and ex-governors, federal and state, always want us to pay their debt when we didn't spend it, they are the owners of the factories, the industries, and have their money deposited in a bank in Switzerland. All of this is a great injustice before our people of Mexico. We as indigenous peoples have lived more than five hundred years with a great poverty, misery, exploitation, prejudices, racisms, centralists, forced family planning, aggressions, assassinations, privatizations of our rights over ecology, violations of human rights, especially violations of women, divisions imposed from the outside of the communities by political parties and divided organizations, electoral fraud, religious conflicts, dispossession of the land, latifundists, the modification of Article 27 of the Constitution, forcing without consultation the parcelization and titling of our lands, repercussions of the North American Free Trade Agreement which doesn't bring benefits but instead brings problems, neoliberal policies which enrich the few and impoverish the majority, the looting of national wealth, the bundle of the external debt and impunity. This is what produces the death of our people of Mexico. We, as indigenous peoples are forgotten, abandoned, and isolated, without consideration for our rights by the state and federal governments, and even the municipal authorities who live in conspiracy. (*Abejas*, 2001)

It's important to remember, however, that the conflict does not neatly divide along religious lines. There are Catholics and Evangelicals on both sides, even if the opposition tends to be more Catholic and the government supporters tend to be more Evangelical.

The Bees describe the relation between them and the EZLN in the following way:

> Just as a body has two eyes, two ears, two hands, and two legs, society needs to have two legs. The EZLN is one and we, as civilians, are the other. We are not the EZLN because we do not respond to their orders. We engage in peaceful struggle without arms. We are brothers with them and we have the same principal enemy which is the government and PRI authorities which organize the paramilitaries. (AFSC, 2001)

SIPAZ has drawn on resources and processes produced in Colombia for dealing with fear (*manejo de miedo*). Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer (1997) reports meeting with women in El Salvador who began political organizing as a response to the disappearance of family members by government-sponsored death squads (paramilitaries). "Archbishop Romero . . . told them that the Salvadoran government's wave of terror would not be halted through personal grief but through collective action" (p. x).

Marco Tavanti's Explanation of *Abeja* Identity

As a SIPAZ volunteer, Marco Tavanti spent time during 1999 in *Abeja* communities, and also worked closely with CPT members. Tavanti (2001) describes the *Abejas*' identity through four frameworks: cultural, religious, political, and human rights.

Cultural Identity: Culturally, the *Abejas* are rooted in a Mayan-Tzotzil world view.[63] The *Abejas*' resistance to neoliberalism and solidarity with the goals (if not all the means) of the Zapatista movement is rooted in the goal of defense of their cultural integrity. Tavanti locates a primary importance of Maya-Tzotzil culture in the communal orientation of the *Abejas*.

This sense of collective identity prioritizes service to the community rather than

[63] Tavanti draws on Mayar Zald and Antonio Gramsci to describe culture as "the shared beliefs and understandings that, through interaction between individuals and groups, establishes the basis for society" (2001).

> individual privileges. Tzotzil culture indicates that individual identities find meaning in the community identity and the linkage is *cargo* or service. For a Tzotzil, the *cargo* is a form of realization of his personal identity. The acceptance of a *cargo* is what gives a person dignity and respect in the community. As a civil organization, *Las Abejas* identifies itself with a particular mission among the Pedranos[64] and for the peaceful resolution of Chiapas conflict. They perceive being invested with the particular call (*cargo*) of bringing peace to Chiapas, even accepting the extreme sacrifice of giving up their lives. Their courageous character and solid commitment to serve the community is grounded in their Tzotzil cultural heritage and affirmed by the pastoral work of the Catholic Church. (Tavanti, 2001, p. 140)

I personally witnessed the seriousness with which the *cargo* is taken when I attended a ceremony to inaugurate new officers for *Maya Vinik*, the *Abejas*' coffee cooperative. As the new president was presented with his *cargo*, he began weeping. Not understanding, I later asked for explanation. Because of difficulties with dropping coffee prices and theft by middlemen, the coop was in crisis. But even in good times, a *cargo* is a heavy burden, meaning time away from fields and family. During this time, other community members help work the land of the one who has a *cargo*. The nature of the *cargos* partly explains the lack of women in these roles, since they are unable to leave the home and children for extended periods (and unmarried men and women are not permitted to take *cargos* since they have not had the experience of managing a household). However, women do participate in the *cargos* assigned to their husbands.

Religious Identity: Religiously, Tavanti (2001) identifies the *Abejas* as a progressive religious movement which understands itself as an inculturated Word of God in the construction of "an indigenous, autochthonous church [which] can be distinguished by five dimensions: inculturation, ecumenism, participation, liberation and mobilization" (p. 144). Tavanti quotes Bishop Samuel Ruiz in explaining the idea of inculturation:

> An indigenous man told me years ago, if the church does not make itself [Tzotzil with the Tzotziles,] Tzeltal with the Tzeltal, Chol with the Choles, Tojolabal with the Tojolabales, I don't understand how it can call itself the Catholic Church. It would in effect be a foreign church, belonging to a dominant social class. . . It should be fully understood that the Kingdom of God is not constructed in eternity, although it ends there, but that it is built here, starting with the poor. That is what Jesus preached. (Katzenberger 1995, 72 cited in Tavanti, 2001, p. 146)

[64] Pedranos is a common way to refer to residents of the *municipio* of San Pedro Chenalhó.

Las Abejas are ecumenical, since although the majority are Catholic adherents of the "Word of God," Chiapas' variant of Liberation Theology, there are also Presbyterians and *Costumbristas.* The leadership structure is participatory with lay catechists providing direction to the community. The Diocese, through the catechists, worked based on a philosophy which is Freirian in approach, encouraging the community to construct their own church, their own theology, their own social relationships. The role of the catechists is to bring the community members to reflect together on their social, spiritual, and political reality and to then act on those reflections. According to Tavanti, "the participatory method in the community produced the most important effect among the Tzotziles of the Highlands: their *toma de conciencia* (consciousness raising)" (p. 161).

The liberationist focus of the *Abejas* has its roots in the changes which swept the Latin American Catholic Church in the wake of the Second Vatican Council and the Medellin and Puebla Bishops conferences. Locally, this was manifested in the 1974 Indigenous Congress organized by the Diocese.

> It was from this experience of open dialogue that many nuns, priests and catechists helped the struggling indigenous communities of the Highlands and the *Lacandón* Jungle to actively resist land evictions and to form coffee cooperatives in order to better market their products. (Tavanti, 2001, pp. 165-166)

The lay members of the community were already mobilized before the establishment of *Las Abejas* in 1992, and were known as "Pueblo Creyente" (people of believers). "They are called Pueblo Creyente because the diocese wanted to include our indigenous brothers and sisters in the diocesan assembly, normally formed exclusively by priests and nuns" (Diocesan Vicar quoted in Tavanti, 2001, p. 166). The *Abejas* is a continuation of the Pueblo Creyente's active work for nonviolent social change.

Political Identity: Tavanti identifies the *Abejas* as a Neo-Zapatista movement. As discussed above, *Las Abejas* identify closely with the political program of the Zapatistas. However, they maintain a separate structure from the Zapatistas. So, rather than merely being a civil society arm of

the EZLN, they are a distinct, separate organization which has chosen to ally themselves with the Zapatista and autonomous movement in important ways, but, at times, has taken a separate political path. For example, *Las Abejas* participated with the Zapatistas in the Government in Rebellion in 1994 and the FZLN, support the San Andrés Accords and participated in the Zapatista march in March of 2001. However, they have been careful to consistently note their rejection of armed struggle, and politically, they have been closely identified with the center-left PRD party. They chose a distinct path in Chenalho later in 2001, when the autonomous Zapatista community of Chenalho abstained from the municipal elections and the *Abejas* participated as part of a coalition of opposition parties attempting (unsuccessfully, due to the Polhó abstention) to defeat the PRI control over the municipality.

Tavanti (2001) also points out that while the *Abejas* have accepted the Zapatista's 14 demands, these demands actually mirror the demands of the 1974 indigenous congress very closely, indicating more that *Abejas* and Zapatistas have common roots in the work of the diocese rather than that the *Abejas* are simply following the Zapatista line. Tavanti finds parallel language on land, health, services, food, education, work, and commerce between the 1974 Indigenous Congress and 1994 Zapatista demands (pp. 176-177).

Human Rights Identity: The fourth dimension of *Abeja* identity which Tavanti posits is the *Abejas* as an Indigenous Rights movement. In this realm, *Las Abejas* join themselves with the international human rights community. This connection is seen not only through their identification with CPT and their relation to SIPAZ, but also by connections to the Fray Bartolome de las Casas Human Rights Center and international human rights groups.

In a speech at the United Nations in March, 1998, *Abeja* women said the following:

> To the President: we are women survivors of the massacre at Acteal and we bring you greetings from our dead who live through us everyday and sustain us on our path. The dignity that we demand helps us to recover the past.
>
> We, the Indian people, have been humiliated, mistreated, discriminated against and excluded from all kinds of government projects. For many years we have been calling for

> justice, peace, democracy and freedom, all of which have been denied to us for the simple fact that we are poor and indigenous. In response we receive only marginalization, poverty, imprisonment, death and repression at levels of government. That is why we have organized to defend ourselves and to demand that which is ours by right, if only to be able to live as human beings.
>
> The federal government headed by Ernesto Zedillo, the ex state governor of Chiapas, Julio Cesar Ruiz Ferro, the new governor, Roberto Albores Guillén, and the ex president of Chenalho, Jacinto Arias Cruz, have all been incapable of meeting our basic demands.
>
> Although *Las Abejas* (the bees) is a pacifist organisation, they have sought to repress and to kill us by arming paramilitary groups made up of indigenous members of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Backed by the Federal Army and the Public Security Police, some of them are the material and intellectual authors of a low intensity war that is trying to exterminate organized indigenous people because they do not belong to the PRI. That is why they murdered our 45 brothers and sisters, men, women and children, on December 22, 1997. This massacre was neither personal revenge, nor part of an ethnic or religious war. This war has been planned and directed at the highest levels of government and turned into confrontations between indigenous brothers by the paramilitaries.
>
> The massacre at Acteal was carried out by a paramilitary group that had the support of the authorities in the municipal presidency of Chenalho for the transportation of arms, the state government for their purchase, the Federal Army for training in their use, and the Public Security Police for the protection and movement of paramilitaries. (*Abeja* Women, 1998)

The identification of certain rights as common to all people is a modern theme which emerges from 20th century movements for human rights and is related to various international agreements. Currently, during the campaign for the San Andrés accords, indigenous movements in Chiapas have cited the agreement of the International Labor Organization, Resolution 169 which provides for the self-determination of indigenous groups (Ross, 2000).

The Return

The conditions in the camps at Acteal and X'oyep were never good, but as the months and years went by, conditions worsened. Firewood, upon which the people relied for heat and cooking, grew scarce. Gradually, the displaced began traveling back to their parcels of land during the day to tend to their coffee plants. However, occasional threats continued against them, and they were reluctant to return. By the summer of 2001, however, the Red Cross announced that rations would be cut to the displaced communities, since they were now able once again to farm their own land.

The *Abejas* had always demanded justice for the Acteal massacre. And while some 90 individuals had been imprisoned for the massacre, including the municipal president, the *Abejas* felt that the intellectual authors of the crime were still free. In addition, they had demanded a guarantee of safety in their communities and the disarming of the paramilitaries. These demands had not yet been satisfactorily met. Despite this fact, the people in the camps were tired of living as refugees, and decided to risk a "return without justice."

In the fall of 2001, after four years in displacement camps, nearly all the displaced *Abejas* returned to their home communities, in a series of group returns, over several months. CPTers, SIPAZ, and other internationals accompanied the returns. The following CPT Press Release tells a part of this story.

> *Abejas* March Where Federal Police Fear to Tread
> by Cliff Kindy (CPTNet, October 6, 2001)
>
> On Sunday, September 30 another 200 members of *Las Abejas* (the Bees), left the refugee community of X'oyep and returned to their home community of Los Chorros, a center of paramilitary activities, after nearly four years of displacement. Red Cross volunteers, church leaders including Bishop Arizmendi, human rights workers, five CPT'ers and several local families accompanied the returnees in Chenalho County, a highland region of Chiapas in southern Mexico. Starting as 300, the marchers grew in number to over 1000 during the six hour procession to the Catholic Church in Los Chorros.
>
> In November 2000, armed security forces from the federal police mounted an operation to remove the guns still being held by paramilitaries in Los Chorros. Angry townspeople with stones, shouts and shots drove off the security forces. Yet, this week the *Abejas*, a nonviolent Christian group with which CPT has worked since 1998, returned with songs instead of guns, with prayer instead of force.
>
> ELECTION EVE: This return came exactly one week before municipal elections, typically characterized by fraud and violence, are to be held Sunday, October 7. Many *Abejas*, when asked why they would risk going home knowing that the paramilitaries still have guns, gave several reasons. Yes, conditions in the refugee camps have grown ever more intolerable. But mostly they want to be home for the vote. They want to see firsthand that there is no cheating. They believe that a victory by their candidate, *Abejas* leader Jose Vázquez, will help bring about conditions for justice and lasting peace in Chenalho. They also want to offer eyewitness testimony about the presence of weapons in their communities–a charge that current

officials deny.

The *Abejas* returns to Chuchtic, Yaxjemel and Puebla on August 28, and Los Chorros on September 30 are NOT a signal that "all is well" in Chiapas. Rather, they represent another bold step of active nonviolence on the part of pacifist Christians.

Abejas refugees are planning to return to five more communities in the next three weeks. CPT'ers will continue to maintain a violence-reduction presence in the camps and the return communities in the coming weeks.

Las Abejas and Nonviolence

Well, they've been practicing nonviolent resistance for 500 years. They didn't need us to teach them that. So when these groups come in from the outside, they connect with a nonviolent movement that's been here all along.
-Paula Bidle (Interview 16)

The Bees arrived at nonviolence without a close connection to the stream of nonviolent thought and practice represented by M.K. Gandhi, M.L. King, and others. The *Abejas'* nonviolence has its roots both in their indigenous culture and in the Christian faith. Study of the Bible, the orientation of the Diocese, which promoted a nonviolent path of struggle for justice, and an indigenous cultural tradition which has well-developed community-based methods of handling conflict were all important elements. CPTer Lynn Stotzfus recognized the Mayan roots of the *Abejas'* nonviolence in deep respect for relationships with each other and with the earth.

> I think they see using violence as counter-productive in achieving a better society because of the negative effects on relationships that using violence has. In the indigenous culture relationships are valued very highly, and so to break those relationships to gain justice is very much a tension for them, although somewhat a less tension when they are asking for justice for the people who committed the massacre. (Interview 5)

Diocesan Vicar Oscar Salinas, a member of SERPAJ, has played an important role for keeping the voice of nonviolence present within the Diocese. He was a leader of the Jubilee 2000 pilgrimage, described below.

Las Abejas and CPT

> *They come to encourage us, to strengthen our organization, and to fortify our hearts.*
> -*Abeja* member (Interview 6)

CPT and the *Abejas* had distinct methods and understandings of nonviolence prior to their contact, but the alliance of the two groups enriched the nonviolence of both. Several observers credited the faith-based commitment to and action for nonviolence of CPT with encouraging the *Abejas* in their own nonviolence (Interviews 2, 4, 13, 16, 22). *Abeja* members described how they now saw themselves as part of a worldwide nonviolent movement.

> Before and after the massacre, we felt very sad, forgotten, totally excluded, that no one was going to console us, but it wasn't like that. A few days later, the world heard about what happened here in Acteal. And then it was a surprise that in this moment, it was a miracle for us to see many people, not just from Mexico, but people from other parts of the world where there is a lot of violence, there is a war, that the government always oppresses the poor, then we saw all of this, that we aren't alone, that not just the Bees, nor just CPT which we met at that time also, but in fact there were other pacifist people that struggle for a better life, and also we saw the history of Mahatma Gandhi, of Martin Luther King, in truth it was very interesting! This history inspired me a lot. (Interview 19)

CPTers talked about the way the *Abejas* impacted them though their fervent commitment to prayer (often for hours and on the knees on a hard or gravely surface), a communal style of action and decision making, and a strong desire to carry out actions in such a way as not to offend the other. CPTer Claire Evans explained, "In North America, you don't just sit down with people and pray together for hours on end, so I guess I kind of felt [like] kindred spirits with the people there" (Interview 12).

Las Abejas standard form of employing nonviolent action is through *oración y ayuno*, or prayer and fasting, pilgrimages, and sit-ins. Fasting has strong Biblical roots, as well as having been a tool of struggle in various nonviolent movements. Gandhi often used fasts to appeal to his own supporters to greater discipline. In Chiapas, Bishop Samuel Ruiz carried out a fast for peace in December 1994, which moved the country and people throughout the world (Ross, 2000). Marches and *plantones* (sit-ins) are a common form of struggle for civil groups in Mexico, and invoking

religious imagery also has a long history. Miguel Hidalgo led the independence struggle in 1810 with a banner of the Virgen of Guadalupe.

The *Abejas'* and CPT's action repertoire complemented each other nicely, and led to a series of joint actions and support for the actions of the other group. Below is a history of nonviolent actions carried out by the Bees from 1992-Spring, 2001. This list was compiled by a group of Bees and CPT members during an encounter on nonviolence in April, 2001. This chronology is followed by two testimonies by a young *Abeja* man who was living in the X'oyep displaced camp and witnessed/participated in both the January, 1998 X'oyep action (see "Illustrating Nonviolent Action," p. xiii) and the 2000 Lenten action in X'oyep. In this testimony he describes these two events.

Bees Nonviolent Action Chronology

THE CIVIL SOCIETY OF THE BEES[65]

December, 1992

Hundreds of Christian indigenous pacifists march to [San Cristobal] from the community of Tzajalchen. They demand the release of their five companions who were detained on false murder charges. The event resulted in the foundation of the Civil Society of the Bees. Eventually, the charges against the five men were dropped.

1993

Expulsion of a PEMEX brigade in the community of Tzajalchen in the month of April. They arrived in search of primary resources such as gold, silver, copper, zinc, aluminum, and oil. Also, other *Abeja* communities held prayers and fasting against PEMEX, NAFTA, and the changes to Article 27.

January 1, 1994

The organization of the Bees take a posture as a peaceful organization with the EZLN uprising.

1996

Participation of the Bees in the dialogues of San Andrés through the security (peace) belts and also at the negotiating table.

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[65] Document prepared by five CPTers and eight Bees at a three-day encounter on nonviolence held in San Cristobal in April, 2001. Translated from Spanish to English by Paul Neufeld Weaver.

January, 1998

A line of women of the Civil Society of the Bees, pushing, prevents the Mexican Army from establishing a base beside the displaced community in X'oyep. Hundreds of Bees are present. After three days, the army gives up and establishes a base at a greater distance from the community than they had originally planned.

1998

Bee women travel to the UN to denounce the war in Chiapas.

1999

The choirs of the Civil Society of the Bees carry out tours in different parts of the country.

March, 1999

500 women of the Civil Society of the Bees march from Yabteclum to Acteal to celebrate International Woman's Day. They stop to pray at the military installation in Majomut.

Holy Week, 1999

Between four and fifty Bees and four CPTers maintain a daily vigil of prayer and fasting on the hill above the "Social Labor" military base to unmask the deception that the army is present to help meet the needs of the people. On Easter Sunday, more than 50 Bees and CPTers enter the base and plant corn to reclaim the land for uses which give life.

May - June, 1999

As a response to new paramilitary threats, between 70 and 250 Bees, the team and a delegation of CPT make two pilgrimages. In X'oyep, they pray, read the word of God, and sing in various places for four hours. A few days later, 250 Bees make up a procession of five hours around Acteal. This includes going by houses of paramilitary members. Leaders of the the Bees said that the threats ended after the action.

December 28, 1999

One thousand Bees and four CPTers make a pilgrimage of the Holy Innocents from Acteal to Chenalho. In the 15 mile march, in seven hours the participants stopped at four military instalations and prayed. They passed out flyers and candles to the soldiers, they planted corn, and they read a declaration in which they called on the soldiers to lay down their arms and go home.

Lent, 2000

In rotations of two and three persons, Bees and CPTers maintained a vigil for 35 days, praying and fasting, inside a tent on a military base near X'oyep. They demand demilitarization.

On Easter Sunday, more than 400 Bees and CPTers transform the heliport to symbols of peace and

they raise a flag which proclaims, "Peace."

October - December, 2000

250 Bees and members of other pacifist indigenous groups make a pilgrimate to Mexico City, to pray to the Virgin of Guadalupe in the Basilica. They present their demands for demilitarization, return of the displaced without danger, freeing of political prisoners, and the rights of indigenous Mexicans. All this occurrs while the power is changing hands at both the state level and the federal level. Two CPTers accompany them during the beginning and end of the pilgrimage.

March, 2001

Five Bees and three CPTers attend the National Indigenous Congress in Nurio, Michoacan, to support the Law of Indigenous Rights (COCOPA). They hold a one day vigil in front of the National Congress Building.

March 11, 2001

1500 Bees hold a procession of three hours from Yabteclum to Acteal to support the dialogue over the San Andrés Accords. This is done when the Zapatista *commandantes* are entering the *zocalo* (plaza) in Mexico City. Three CPTers accompany the Bees in this procession.

April 17, 2001

The coffee cooperative "Maya Vinic" and three CPTers symbolically burn coffee to denounce the low prices of coffee. The coffee was offered to God, who knows how to value the fruit of people's labor. The free market does not know how to do this.

Stories of *Abeja* Resistance[66]

In August, 2001, I visited the X'oyep camp of displaced Abejas. I had seen the picture of the Abeja women resisting the military incursion, and wanted to know the story behind it. A young man from the camp showed me where the conflict took place, and told me what happened. In the months preceding this incident, thousands of Abejas and Zapatistas had been forced to flee their communities by armed paramilitaries. Then on December 22, the massacre of 45 Abeja members at Acteal. One week later soldiers who looked like the paramilitaries who had driven the displaced from their communities and massacred their compañeros *showed up in X'oyep, a camp of over 1,000 people which six months before had been a village of a hundred people.*

-Paul Neufeld Weaver

The Resistance of the Women of X'oyep.
(Interview 20)

When the soldiers entered, first the women saw them from afar. Two or three soldiers came into the east side of the camp. But, as the women were afraid of the soldiers, they organized

[66] Text of testimony given by a young *Abeja* man living in the X'oyep displaced camp. Editing, translation, and commentary (in italics) by Paul Neufeld Weaver.

themselves quickly and began to block the path. And the soldiers left. The women were afraid, but the men and the children were also afraid because the soldiers looked like paramilitaries [who had caused us to leave our communities.]

The second day, December 30, 1997, the soldiers entered again here in our camp. The women saw them and the men came to talk to them. "What are you doing here?" The soldiers answered, "Don't be afraid of us, because we come to live with you." They brought rice, beans, eggs. The women started yelling at the soldiers, and the soldiers got mad, very mad. But since the soldiers didn't want to leave, the women shouted, "This isn't a military base! Get out of here!"

But the soldiers didn't want to leave. Finally, the women said they would go back to the camp and get the rest of the people. The soldiers started to say, "Maybe we better go." But they went very slowly, with the women following them.

Afterwards we went back to the camp, but very much afraid, because we weren't used to seeing soldiers.

The third (of January) they came back, to where the well is. The women came to draw water that morning, and the whole area around the well was full of soldiers, and the women couldn't get water, and they returned with their *ánforas*[67] empty. But, since the women were afraid, they left running, to tell their families and quickly it was communicated to everyone. And when the men and the women heard that the soldiers had come into the camp again, they went running, shouting, "What is going to happen? Why? The soldiers want to come in. They want to build their military camp here around our well." The children didn't want to let the soldiers build their camp here, they said, "Let's go tear down their houses." (Which the soldiers had begun to put up.)

The women surrounded the soldiers, because they wouldn't let them construct their houses. The children entered to tear down the houses. The soldiers kicked the children, they grabbed them by their necks, and some threw them, and since they had destroyed the houses, the soldiers were mad at the children. "Why did you do this, we aren't doing anything bad," the soldiers said.

Then, since they were afraid, all the women and men surrounded the soldiers. They surrounded them completely. They wouldn't let them leave. When they saw they were surrounded they called their commander. Within an hour a helicopter arrived. The helicopter began to land in the midst of us, but it couldn't land. The soldiers were afraid and ducked down, and said "Get away from there, or the helicopter will kill us," they said. "Then we'll die! Why did you send for the helicopter if you don't want to die? If you die, we die," they answered the soldiers. But since they saw that the women weren't afraid of the helicopter, it just came down for two, three minutes, and then it took off and left. It left.

With all this the soldiers were very angry with us and we were very angry with the soldiers. Some of the women had very strong hearts, because they even grabbed the soldiers. Some of the soldiers tried to kiss the women, but since the women didn't like this, they slapped them. And the soldiers were very angry. And other soldiers, since by now many reporters had arrived, and they didn't want them to see what they were doing, they just stepped on the feet of the women, though the women didn't have shoes on, or even sandals. They scratched the face of one woman, a *compañera* from Polhó. And even if we wanted to take revenge on the soldiers, we couldn't. We couldn't do anything, even though we were very mad. But we shouldn't do anything to the military because it is not our work. Our work is to tell all the bad things the soldiers do. Because this is not a military barracks. It's not a military barracks.

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[67] A vessel to carry water.

That's why we are so mad, because the government doesn't want to fix our problems which arose here in our *municipios*. That's why we saw that it was not good that the government sent many soldiers. Because we saw that it wasn't for our security. They are just afraid of the displaced. That's how I see what happened on January 3rd.

Pablo[68]: Why did the women go first?

The women went first in front of the soldiers and we men behind the women because we have thought a lot about it that the soldiers have a little respect for the women. It's just that if we (men) would have gone first, the soldiers don't respect us because we are men, and they [would have] hit us, and there would have been a fight between us and the soldiers. Why did we do this? Because we saw that they couldn't do anything with the women there.

Some soldiers said, "If you are here to bother us, why don't you come here! Yeah! Come here if you want to, we'll go head to head, hand to hand." "We can't do anything," we said to the soldiers. "If you are men, come here!" said the soldiers. But the soldiers couldn't get through, the women were in front of us. The women had grasped each others hands, so that the soldiers couldn't grab them. The women made two, three layers around the soldiers.

That's what happened the 3rd of January, what I saw anyway. I just want to say what I saw.

Pablo: What happened in the end?

In the end they didn't go, until three or four days later, they left, pulled back a little, about 500 meters, and they are living there. They constructed houses there because they don't want to leave. I don't know if they will leave or not leave. I don't know. That's the way it is.

In both 1999 and 2000 CPT and the Bees of X'oyep held vigils of prayer and fasting at the military camp during Lent, the 40 day period leading up to Easter. After explaining the resistance to the military occupation of January, 1998 (above) he showed me where they had the Lenten vigils and talked about his participation.

-Paul Neufeld Weaver

Fasting and Prayer for Lent with CPT and the Bees at X'oyep

(Interview 20)

Pablo: Last year during lent, CPT and The Bees held a time of fasting and prayer here in front of the military base. Can you explain why you did this and what you did?

Well, when, last year, a group from CPT arrived they told us that we should have a time of prayer behind the military, and we were in agreement because we are Catholic group, because we have the custom of praying where we want to pray to our God. And in that way we organized in our camp. We did it during Holy Week–first we organized ourselves, dividing up every day, every day we switched places, because some of us have other

[68] Interviewer Paul Neufeld Weaver

community responsibilities (*cargo*). We started in the church of the camp, in the camp "Juan Diego X'oyep." When we finished the prayer there, CPT started to pass out a little thing, I'm not sure what it is called, it had a broken gun. It was a thing to put on your shirt (a pin). They started to pass these out so that we could let the military know that they shouldn't do any more harm to us, because God is great. Because God has the power to save us here in the world.

When we arrived in the military camp, we constructed a tent where we could do our prayer vigil. And the soldiers began to see what was happening. We were a little outside of the (center of) the camp, but we were very close to the camp. The soldiers here were standing around the area where they have their barracks. When we began our prayer, first we told the soldiers, so that they would know, what we were doing. But one of the soldiers came to talk with us and we told them everything we were doing. When the soldiers heard they understood everything we were planning to do in their camp, they said "It's fine with us, it's just that if you inform us first, and we think about what is going to happen, what you are doing. For me, it is fine that God finds out what your sufferings are." That is how some of the soldiers responded.

Also a commander arrived, and they told him what we were doing. The commander didn't say anything, because they saw that we were just praying, praying to God. And they just asked what we were doing, but then the soldiers didn't say anything more. We had already denounced them several times, because when they arrived, they didn't respect us. They didn't respect us. But after we had denounced this several times, for that reason things calmed down a little. They didn't respect us in that along the footpath they would make fun of us, and they wanted to hit us and also the women, they wanted to bother, they wanted to rape the women, when they arrived. That's why the women were afraid of the soldiers, and didn't want to walk by the soldiers alone. But little by little it calmed down after our denunciations. Now they respect us a little, and now we see that the soldiers don't say anything.

We did the fast with each prayer vigil, those who are in the tent praying are fasting. It helped us a lot. Because we see that the force of the military and paramilitaries has diminished. We saw the strength of prayer and God is great! If we don't pray to God, when we don't ask for what we need, God doesn't give it to us just like that! God waits until we say all that we feel in our hearts, because God wants us to know all of our suffering. I feel very good because now I see that here there are almost no problems anymore, now there is no conflict (with the soldiers). Because before when we arrived in the camp we hadn't begun the prayer vigil, well, we prayed in the camp each afternoon, but now since we began to do prayer and fasting, we began here in the military camp, then we went over there by the house of the soldiers, and we spend 1 1/2 or 2 hours at each place where we prayed, and later we came again to where the cross is by the Ocote tree. We arrived there and we waited until we completed our schedule. . . . for forty days, the catechists divided us up into teams for each day, each team accompanied by a Catechist.

On Easter Sunday, the CPT and Abeja vigilers gathered on the helicopter pad in the military camp. There they reconfigured the white stones which indicated the landing space and wrote the word PAZ.

The refugees of X'oyep finally returned to their homes in the fall of 2001, not because their home communities were now safe (the paramilitaries still had their guns and were still in the home communities, although they appeared to have lost the support of the government) nor because justice had been achieved but because they were running out of firewood, the Red Cross was cutting their

rations, and they didn't want their children to grow up as refugees. (Abejas Press Conference, August 10, 2001)

Jubilee Pilgrimage 2000

In what was probably the most prominent planned action of the Bees, 250 members of the Bees and *Xi'nich* (the Ants) a nonviolent Mayan group from the northern zone of Chiapas (around Palenque)[69] walked 900 miles from Chiapas to the Basilica of Our Lady of Guadalupe in Mexico City. The pilgrimage was framed by two significant dates: October 12 is *Día de la Raza* the anniversary of the European invasion led by Christopher Columbus in 1492. December 12 is the anniversary of the appearance of the Lady of Guadalupe, the indigenous manifestation of Mary who intercedes for subjugated peoples within the western-imposed religious structure. For part of the way the CPTers accompanied the pilgrimage.[70]

Some excerpts from CPT press releases (Nov. 1, 2000 and Dec. 14, 2000) tell parts of the story through various public voices: the Bee's flyer which declares the purpose of the pilgrimage, the report of a CPT accompanist, which describes the daily routine, and the marchers' prayer litany, which lists their petitions.

"The Civil Society of the Bees, the organization *Xi'nich* [the Ants] and some brothers and sisters from our communities and villages, have decided to carry our prayers to the House of Our Lady of Guadalupe, to ask that she might make our hearts larger, that we might have greater spirit to keep struggling for a just peace and a life with dignity for our people"

-from the Jubilee Pilgrimage 2000 flyer

> Each day the pilgrims walk 20 to 30 kilometers, beginning at 7 a.m.. and ending in the early afternoon. Each night a Catholic church in a community along their route provides food and a place to sleep (usually on the church floor or outside on the ground). Each evening Oscar Salinas, vicar of the diocese of San Cristobal and a pilgrim, celebrates mass with the pilgrims and their hosts. The gospel reading during the mass is read not only in Spanish, but also in the indigenous Mayan languages of Tzotzil, Tzeltal, and Chol, since most of the pilgrims speak Spanish only as a second language, if at all.

Prayers for the Jubilee Pilgrimage 2000 from Acteal to the Basilica of the Virgin of

[69] As well as several members of *Yomlej*, a third Mayan Christian Pacifist group from Chiapas.
[70] While the pilgrimage was going on, CPTers were standing watch at the entrance to Nuevo Yibeljoj, a community of returned refugees which had received threats from paramilitaries.

Guadalupe, Mexico City

We ask Santa Maria of Guadalupe, Queen of Peace, for her maternal intercession for our needs.

Santa Maria of Guadalupe, intercede for the indigenous people.

For an end to the paramilitary groups acting in Chiapas.

Santa Maria of Guadalupe, intercede for the indigenous people.

For the demilitarization of Chiapas and all of Mexico.

Santa Maria of Guadalupe, intercede for the indigenous people.

For a return for the displaced of Tila, Chenalho, Sabanilla, Tumbala, Las Margaritas and Venustiano Carranza to their homes.

Santa Maria of Guadalupe, intercede for the indigenous people.

For reconciliation in our communities.

Santa Maria of Guadalupe, intercede for the indigenous people.

For liberty for indigenous political prisoners.

Santa Maria of Guadalupe, intercede for the indigenous people.

That all women, men, and children in our indigenous communities enjoy conditions for our full human development.

Santa Maria of Guadalupe, intercede for the indigenous people.

That we might see our mother earth freed from the profanation of the market.

Santa Maria of Guadalupe, intercede for the indigenous people.

That we might overcome all forms of racism and discrimination between the peoples and cultures that form our Mexican nation.

Santa Maria of Guadalupe, intercede for the indigenous people.

For the fulfillment, on the part of all its signers, of the San Andrés Accords.

Santa Maria of Guadalupe, intercede for the indigenous people.

That Congress pass a Law on Indigenous Rights and Culture that satisfies the real needs of the 56 indigenous groups in this country.

Santa Maria of Guadalupe, intercede for the indigenous people.

That a way might be found to continue the dialogue between the EZLN and the government.

Santa Maria of Guadalupe, intercede for the indigenous people.

That our Zapatista brothers and sisters be taken seriously, so that without abandoning the just causes of their struggle, they might be able to lay down their weapons.

Santa Maria of Guadalupe, intercede for the indigenous people.

That in this period of social change in Mexico:

-the people might not fall into the temptation of violent insurrection and
-the government might not return to the temptation of violent repression.

Santa Maria of Guadalupe, intercede for the indigenous people.

That the Mexican people learn and practice ethical and pacifist methods of social change:
-nonviolence
-noncooperation
-conscientious objection
-active resistance
-civil disobedience

Santa Maria of Guadalupe, intercede for the indigenous people.

For a peaceful transition to democracy.

Santa Maria of Guadalupe, intercede for the indigenous people.

That we might achieve a peace with justice and dignity for all Mexico.
-in the hearts of the people
-in the environment
-in the social structures

Santa Maria of Guadalupe, intercede for the indigenous people.

Father of Mercy, who has put these your people under the special protection of the always Virgin Maria of Guadalupe, Mother of your Son, allow us by her intercession to deepen our faith and to seek the progress of our nation in paths of justice and peace. By our Lord Jesus Christ, Santa Maria de Guadalupe, intercede for the indigenous people. Amen.

The Impact of the Bees

> *The soldiers are people too, we are of the same flesh, the same blood.*
> -*Abeja* member (Interview 6)

There are at least two ways in which the witness of the Bees has affected the conflict in Chiapas. First, the refusal of the Bees to retaliate after the massacre likely prevented many more deaths. The Acteal massacre was viewed by many as a provocation encouraged by the government in order to ignite local battles which the government could then use as an excuse for more repression. Indeed, the security forces did use the massacre as a pretext for a much greater military presence, but the kind of explosion which might have otherwise occurred was avoided. The Mideast today, where Israelis and Palestinians are involved in endless retaliatory attacks is but one of many examples where the cycle of violence rages out of control. The Bees showed the power of one side refusing to exact revenge.

A second impact has been that of modeling a different kind of struggle. It is quite common for civil society groups all over Mexico, Latin American, and the world to wage nonviolent struggle. However, it is not so common to do so under the banner of nonviolence, declaring your commitment to love and respect your opponent, while working tirelessly to change that opponent's ways. Teresa Ortiz comments that the *Abejas* "have been important in understanding a new form of insurgency, no, not insurgency, a new form of struggle that is nonviolent" (Interview 14). Mexicans and others who came to Acteal to accompany the Bees in their mourning, found their own commitment to work with "the cast-offs of society" strengthened (CPTNet, August 7, 1998).

In fact, instead of loosing strength as a result of the massacre, in the months and years following the massacre, the *Abejas* grew in numbers. "It appears that the power of a non-violent witness remains strong and grows even in the face of the violence experienced by these communities" (CPTNet, October 9, 1998).

Since 1997, *Abejas* have traveled across Mexico, and to various parts of Europe, North

America, and Latin America to share about their struggle. This outreach has inspired other groups, for example, in Cuernavaca, in central Mexico, a group of 150 people occupied a military base with prayers and flyers in a nonviolent action following an *Abejas* visit (Interview 30). The *Abejas* choir has also traveled throughout Mexico, singing in Tzotzil and Spanish, sharing Jesus' call to a nonviolent struggle for justice for the marginalized.

Chapter 3 - Peace Teams in Chiapas: SIPAZ and CPT

Be the change you want to see in the world.[71]
-Gandhi

CPT, SIPAZ and The Bees have worked closely together in the central highlands. The three groups share a commitment to faith-based, nonviolent struggle for truth, justice and reconciliation. However, the different histories and different intellectual, spiritual and cultural traditions, as well as their differing locations in relation to the political struggle, have led to important differences in the way they see their roles in the nonviolent struggle, and the way in which they have acted.

SIPAZ: Transforming Conflict

SIPAZ was begun in 1995 by an international coalition of groups which sought to establish a presence in Chiapas to support local initiatives for peace. In its Statement of Purpose, SIPAZ clearly sets forth its goals and form of working. SIPAZ seeks "to forestall or reduce violence and to protect and expand the precious political space in which dialogue is possible." This would be accomplished through a presence which is:

- Proactive, promoting "communication and dialogue in place of violent confrontation,"
- Supportive, "enhancing the context in which Mexicans are working to resolve Mexican problems,"
- Politically Independent: "SIPAZ cannot be either part of or under the direction of any of the parties to the conflict,"
- International: North American, Latin American and Europeans in support of peace in Chiapas,
- Faith-based or rooted in a deep commitment to nonviolence (see full text of the SIPAZ Statement of Purpose, Appendix E).

[71] I heard this quote many times in my conversations with SIPAZ workers. It seems to me that it is an informal motto of SIPAZ as "getting in the way" is the motto of CPT.

SIPAZ maintains a team based in San Cristobal de las Casas, Chiapas, as well as international offices in Santa Cruz, California and in Uruguay. The Chiapas team usually consists of from 5-7 members, including a coordinator and international volunteers from Europe, North America and Latin America who serve for at least a year and, at times, Mexican collaborators. The SIPAZ coalition now includes over 50 groups.

SIPAZ divides its work into four areas: accompaniment, information, education and inter-religious. Its accompaniment work focuses primarily on the northern zone, an area which has had fewer contacts with outside groups and a high level of violence. In visits to the Northern Zone (see map, Figure 6) SIPAZ workers have worked hard to establish and maintain contacts with all of the various actors in the conflict, including paramilitary groups, the various political parties, organizations and religious groups.

In the area of information, SIPAZ publishes a widely respected quarterly *Report* which has a paper and electronic circulation of over 5,000. In addition, SIPAZ receives many international visits and delegations, including high-level delegations from various embassies and international institutions. SIPAZ has built up this work through careful reporting in which they seek to fairly and accurately describe the situation in Chiapas taking into consideration the views and interests of various actors in the conflict.

In the area of education, SIPAZ has held many workshops in Chiapas for members of local NGOs, local religious actors, and representatives of indigenous organizations and communities. These workshops have focused on a variety of topics, including conflict transformation, dealing with fear, nonviolence, and Gandhi. Important inspiration and orientation for this work has come from John Paul Lederach of the Center for Conflict Transformation at Eastern Mennonite University (EMU) in Virginia, USA. Two SIPAZ staff members participated in Institutes at EMU and the philosophy and language of conflict transformation have become central to SIPAZ's work.

In the inter-religious area, SIPAZ has worked to promote dialogue between Catholics and

Evangelicals through supporting the Ecumenical Bible School for Holistic Formation, and by planning and carrying out a program to bring together members of *Las Abejas* with Presbyterians in Chenalhó, utilizing the support of members of the Peace Commissions of Nicaragua.

As a relatively young organization, there is not a large body of published research on SIPAZ. However, researcher Carlisle Levine has produced two unpublished studies of the work of SIPAZ, particularly in the context of NGOs working in Chiapas. Her dissertation on NGOs in Chiapas is forthcoming.

SIPAZ Stories

It's good that you visit us, because that way they can't repress us so easily.
-resident of the northern zone (Interview 23)

The story of SIPAZ's work can be viewed through voices from Chiapas:

> Last year SIPAZ had its general assembly. Of the fifty invited member organizations, twenty-five came. We got them accredited to be election observers. I had been working in the northern zone (in accompaniment) a year and a half. We took them to get to know the communities. We observed eight polling places. It fell to us to accompany a community of Zapatista sympathizers and PRD supporters. They had to go to another community to vote, and they were afraid, they felt persecuted. So, in the federal elections they didn't vote. Now they went to vote. The displaced had to travel far to vote. These people were happy. Perhaps they would have voted without us because they were ready, but we contributed giving space for the people to exercise their right to vote for whom they please. It isn't our role to tell them who to vote for. Our role is that they can exercise their right in tranquillity, without experiencing violence. But being present in key places, in key moments, so that people can exercise their right with greater ease, with greater peacefulness, that is, I think, our role. And in that moment I felt stronger, that yes, we filled our role.
> -Heike Kammer (Interview 23)

"SIPAZ is part of the reason the NGOs now talk about conflict resolution and active nonviolence"–Rafael Landereche (Interview 4).

> SIPAZ doesn't just talk with the Bees and the Zapatistas, it also talks with the Priistas, or with other groups which are in the conflict. So I also think that SIPAZ has managed to reduce violence a little, that the paramilitaries no longer take up their arms. And the Bees also hear that there is another form of resolving this conflict through talking, dialogues, and you can reduce violence. I think that the work of SIPAZ has also helped us a lot because they are always bringing other peace observers to talk with us, to take our testimony, and in

> that way they know. They visit other groups, Priista or Zapatista, and they get them together, little by little.
>
> -*Abeja* member (Interview 19)

The Challenges of Political Independence

Ricardo Carvajal, SIPAZ - Chiapas coordinator since the beginning of SIPAZ's work in Chiapas talked about the difficulty of establishing the SIPAZ posture of political independence in an extremely polarized context. There are two sets of organizations in Chiapas. First, there are corporative organizations formed by the Mexican state to support its project. These include farmer, indigenous, women's, teachers and student organizations, all of which are affiliated with and often incorporated into the ruling PRI party. Then there are the non-governmental organizations, the NGOs, which are "diametrically opposed" to the government. The idea of SIPAZ to be an organization "in the middle" which talked to all sides and did not align itself politically with the government nor with the opposition was both unique and confusing. As assistant coordinator Marina Pages explained, the polarization left no middle ground.

> When we arrived here. . . either you were with the Zapatistas, or you were against them.... When we said "we are politically independent," we were told, "either you're with us or you are against us, you can't talk equally with us as you would talk to the Mexican army. You can't talk the same with us as you would talk with the municipal president." A Human Rights NGO told us this. So, it took us months to construct a political independence which was recognized, respected, and valued. . . . Five and a half years later, today, some of these NGOs have begun to consider it important and valuable for the process of peace to listen to the voices of those who were formerly considered enemies. (Interview 3)

Many found it easy, in the early years of SIPAZ's work, to see SIPAZ as one more international solidarity organization which had come to support the Zapatistas. Amanda Stein, who works in the inter-religious dialogue area, told of an evangelical pastor in Chenalhó who said SIPAZ was "an arm of the Diocese," and that "as foreigners we had a preference for the Zapatista side." After months of work in the area, the pastor finally had enough trust in SIPAZ to consider participating in the dialogue (Interview 3).

Marina recalls a key moment when she had recently arrived in Chiapas and, as part of her

orientation, was working in one of the civil peace camps where internationals stayed in communities threatened with violence. The local community was divided into Zapatistas and Priistas. There was no school for the Zapatista children, and some of the international volunteers did activities during the day for these children.

> At one point the person in charge of the camp told me to be careful that non-Zapatista children didn't join us. But I refused, saying that for me, a child is a child. . . . I learned that working in divided communities or with people who struggle perhaps for the same thing, but from distinct spaces. For me this justifies the work of SIPAZ of being in the middle of the people but without supporting one side or the other. (Interview 21)

Creating Space

The goal of creating space is common to CPT, SIPAZ and groups like PBI. But each group goes about it in a distinct way. While all three groups generate international pressure on governments to respect human rights, on the ground the work is carried out in different ways. PBI creates space by personal escorting (protective accompaniment) of people attempting to carry out nonviolent social change or human rights activities, seeking to protect their lives so their work can continue. This protective accompaniment allows them to carry out activities they would not otherwise do, although PBI scrupulously refuses to join in those activities itself.

CPT joins with local groups in carrying out local actions to protest militarization and violence, creating space for development of joint, creative nonviolent strategies. SIPAZ, on the other hand, attempts to create a space for encounter and dialogue in a context which is so polarized that the two sides rarely communicate. The space SIPAZ creates is both psychological - challenging people to look at the conflict from the perspective of the other, and physical - through their presence providing neutral ground where dialogue can take place. Although it does not do daily, individual escorting, SIPAZ also does do protective accompaniment, especially in the northern zone, which is visited by SIPAZ workers regularly. In the case cited above, many supporters of the opposition PRD were accompanied by SIPAZ during an election where they then voted despite their fear of violence

if they did so (Interview 23).

Reconciliation

SIPAZ has a strong commitment to and belief in justice for the oppressed, which is evident in the *Report* where they report on and advocate for the rights of the indigenous of Chiapas. As the organization has developed over the years since its founding, recognizing that others were doing important work in solidarity and advocacy, SIPAZ has come to see reconciliation as a primary focus of its mission. SIPAZ does not discount the importance that achieving justice plays in coming to reconciliation, but the calling of SIPAZ is in being a bridge between the different sides of the community, rather than advocating for one over the other.

> While we cannot be neutral on the issue of justice, we recognize that any real solution will require the participation of all parties to the conflict. Moreover we believe that advocacy is not the only way to actively support justice. In the case of Chiapas we see that a key contribution we as outsiders can make to the achievement of justice is to draw on our experience, our reputations and our best energies to push forward a peace process in which Indian peasants and executive branch representatives sit down as equals to address the legacy of centuries of injustice. (Statement of Purpose, see Appendix E)

The stories I heard testify to the significance of SIPAZ's work. In each of the areas, accompaniment, information, education, and inter-religious, SIPAZ has made important contributions to the journey towards peace in Chiapas. One area in which SIPAZ has focused on facilitating dialogue in a local situation is in San Pedro Chenalhó.

Making a Difference in Chenalhó

Before the Acteal massacre, there was some history of Evangelicals and Catholics working together in Chenalhó. In the early 90s a joint Presbyterian-Diocese project was undertaken to translate the Bible into the Pedrano version of Tzotzil. The team of translators was made up of two Presbyterian pastors and two Catholic catechists, and they worked together for ten years on the translation. The relationships built in this project became the seeds for a dialogue between

Presbyterians and *Abejas* in 1999 when one of the *Abeja* catechists approached one of the pastors to talk. Later they invited SIPAZ to host meetings between the two groups, which grew into the *Pasantía* program. The meetings are held at the SIPAZ office in San Cristobal with the presence of Protestant missionaries and the Parish pastoral team. SIPAZ invited people from the Peace Commissions of Nicaragua, which helped with the process of reconciliation in divided communities after the war there. The Peace Commissioners met with the dialogue group and also visited both *Abeja* and Presbyterian communities in Chenalhó. Several Pedranos, accompanied by a missionary and a member of the pastoral team, traveled to Nicaragua in the fall of 2001.

SIPAZ has collaborated with the Ecumenical Bible School for Holistic Formation, which brings together Evangelicals and Catholics which Bible School worker, Baptist Natanael Navarro calls a "space of reconciliation." In addition, SIPAZ has worked closely with CORECO (Commission for Community Unity and Reconciliation), CEPAZ (Collective for Peace Education), and the Chiapas state Peace Network.

SIPAZ's Impact

The following quotes from a number of sources testify to SIPAZ's impact in Chiapas.

- Father Pedro Arriaga, the priest for Chenalhó, feels that SIPAZ has had a positive impact:

> I believe that SIPAZ is a bridge, on the one hand, locally, between conflicting groups-they talk with the Presbyterians, with the Bees. Then, it is also a bridge internationally, they have been sponsors of visits of important personalities such as German and British ambassadors who have come to dialogue with indigenous people about their situation. They also have made an important contribution in bringing people to offer workshops on dealing with the conflict situations which we experience. Now they are organizing a process of encounter and a search for reconciliation with the help of groups from Nicaragua. (Interview 26)

And a Presbyterian leader in Chenalhó also affirmed SIPAZ's work.. "SIPAZ does good work. They are trying to achieve peace, and we see that we are better for it, and our brothers, the Bees, say this too" (Interview 26).

- Tomás Johnson, of Cloudforest Initiative, who lives in Chiapas and has observed both SIPAZ's and CPT's work from the beginning:

> SIPAZ's impact is a lot greater (than CPT's) and they've done a lot more work in the way of workshops with communities, and then I also think that their *Informe,* the quarterly report they put out is probably read by a lot of people and it's very well written and it has very good content. When you think that in North America, South America, and Europe there are probably bodies of influential people and organization that get a lot of info and are well - informed about Chiapas is something way beyond what CPT can do. But SIPAZ doesn't do anything as well as what CPT does in a very small scale like what CPT has done in its work with the *Abejas.*
>
> SIPAZ has no organic link with any organization like the *Abejas*, and while the *Abejas* are involved with their area of work, it is a key area for CPT. (Interview 22)

- Rafael Landereche, SERPAJ member and human rights worker. "SIPAZ was of the first to talk about active nonviolence, of the nonviolent resolution of conflict, which the NGOs weren't used to, but which now is accepted language: conflict resolution" (Interview 4).

- Teresa Ortiz, Cloudforest Initiative:

> They are accompanying the civil society in order for the civil society to come up with peaceful solutions to the conflict. You know in different kinds of ways, one is with direct accompaniment, another is with workshops and conflict resolution, etc. It's an approach of empowerment of the Mexican people, in order to solve the conflict on their own, helping them with the tools, and also affirming the work of civil society.
>
> I think it's been a tremendous impact, also. I think when they first came people did not understand what their work was. And I think we Mexican people can be very mistrustful. We think that particularly North Americans, and foreigners in general are coming to tell us what to do. This is the perception that people had of SIPAZ in the beginning, and what SIPAZ did was worked really slow. And that's another big difference with CPT. I think CPT worked a lot faster than SIPAZ. SIPAZ worked really, really slow and worked at the very grassroots level. Really close work alongside with the Mexican organizations, to build that trust, number one, and then, to help the Mexican organizations to the point where the organizations felt that SIPAZ was very important resource. (Interview 14)

- A Presbyterian leader in Chenalhó also testified to the importance of SIPAZ.

> They analyze how to avoid problems, how to be friends, and all of this. Those who are looking for problems, we look for a way to talk to them, to analyze, why did this problem occur? They came up with the plan for two Presbyterians and two Bees to go to Nicaragua, because they have had problems there, too. (Interview 18)

The Challenges for Peace and Reconciliation in Chiapas

In this excerpt from a Report *article, SIPAZ discusses the pitfalls and promise of work for reconciliation in a polarized society.*

When words are not enough...

In a context of extreme polarization, it is almost unavoidable that any intervention–even if it aims to transform conflict or reduce tension–could be considered taking sides. This was seen during the first years of the conflict around the issue of "human rights." In the northern part of the state it was common for visitors to be asked "Are you for human rights?" Depending on their answer, visitors were labeled as allies or enemies. Since that time human right organizations have been seen by many allies of the PRI as biased actors in community conflicts.

An example of this is the book from the alleged paramilitary group Peace and Justice. The book's title is "Neither rights nor humans in the Northern Chiapas: the other truth of the events in the Ch'ol region" (1997). In this book, referring to the human rights groups that had been present in the area, it states: "They have not contributed to the lessening of tension in the area and are seen by those affected as protagonists who arrived from abroad with resources which complicate the situation in the region even more."

Another word which has been and continues to be controversial is "peace." In more than eight years of conflict all the actors have talked about "peace." But the understandings of that word have varied: for the government it means the re-establishment of the "order" that existed before the uprising. This "Pax Romana," which is really just an absence of war, is a long way from the "peace and justice with dignity" of the Zapatistas and from the concept of "positive peace" which goes beyond the reduction of violence and which has as its goal the construction of peace based on everyday attitudes and values.

Currently the same thing is happening with the word "reconciliation." The state government and some groups accused of being paramilitary talk about the necessity for "letting bygones be bygones" rather than about a profound and authentic process of reconciliation.

However, the victims of injustice have their own understanding of the word "reconciliation." In the lower Tila region we heard this comment: "Those from the government want reconciliation before justice. We are in the process of obtaining compensation for being displaced. We were prisoners for many years, but they (Peace and Justice) have nobody in jail. We want justice in order to be able to talk about reconciliation." A human rights activist from the Altamirano region also told us: "Now, everybody is talking about reconciliation but they want to make believe that nothing has happened."

Both in Chenalho and in the northern region of Chiapas, we heard the same cries of pain: "We want justice for our dead." At the same time, it is worth noting that when confrontations between indigenous groups take place, a black and white ("the good and bad," "the victims and victimizers") reading is not sufficient in the situations of violence that have torn the state for the past years. It is clear that these processes of reconciliation cannot take place without the approval of those affected nor can they be imposed from the outside if they are to be sustainable in the long run.

Finally, there are some indications of a change in attitude on the part of some of the victims towards the perpetrators of the injustices, the former perhaps assuming that justice will not come from the State. In Nuevo Limar (northern region), a catechist told us: "If those from UCIAF come to us, we will not reject them, even though they beat us." In Jolnixtie, also in the northern region, a member of the PRD affirmed: "We want all the arrest warrants canceled, because it is not fair that those from Peace and Justice pay, when they were forced to do the things they did by the government itself."

The First Conference on Community Experiences of Reconciliation and Peace, was held in San Cristobal in November 2001. Reconciliation remains a priority for the more than 70 people who participated. It is necessary, however, to make clear what this word means for them: "We are seeking a just solution to our problems. It is necessary that everyone be satisfied, that there are no winners or losers. Reconciliation means to come back together. But this unity is not uniformity." To forgive is not to forget; it is "to lose the feeling of revenge," as we heard in a meeting between Catholics and Presbyterians of the county of Chenalho.

What can be done?

At present, controversy regarding what can be done for the peace in Chiapas seems unavoidable. To work on conflict transformation sometimes is seen as "counter-revolutionary," because while attending to problems at the community level one runs the risk of leaving aside their structural dimensions. "It is like giving an aspirin to a seriously ill person," affirmed one member of a nongovernmental organization in San Cristobal.

Certainly, if we hope for a true, meaningful and long-lasting solution, we cannot set aside the need to transform the roots of the conflicts. There has to be a transformation of the economic, social, political and cultural structures which are responsible for the exclusion, misery, discrimination and injustice that is the everyday reality of indigenous communities.

However, a member of another NGO states: "The number one priority should be to overcome the divisions in the communities. What happens at this level does not necessarily reflect the analysis at a higher level. What's the purpose of a wonderful indigenous law if the communities are divided and because of this are unable to construct autonomy? The government could pass the COCOPA law, but then what?..."

In order to keep hope alive in Chiapas, we have to put things into perspective. Gonzalo Ituarte, former vicar of Justice and Peace of the Diocese of San Cristobal and now the priest for the sensitive municipality of Ocosingo, said in an interview: "What's happening in Chiapas is a low-intensity revolution. The vanguard is behind the society, pushing. It is a very slow process of transformation, and one which we would obviously like to speed up. We can't not have hope." (SIPAZ *Report, 7:2,* March, 2002, p. 6)

Christian Peacemaker Teams in Chiapas

What would happen if we in the Christian church developed a new nonviolent peacekeeping force of 100,000 persons ready to move into violent conflicts and stand peacefully between warring parties in Central America, Northern Ireland, Poland, Southern Africa, the Middle East, and Afghanistan?

-Ron Sider (1984)

In 1984, in Strasbourg, France, U.S. theologian Ron Sider prophetically challenged a gathering of thousands of Mennonites from all over the world to take seriously the call to be peacemakers. Some U.S. and Canadian listeners took up Sider's challenge and began working to make it a reality. Thus was born the Christian Peacemaker Teams, usually just known as "CPT."

CPT was established in 1986 as a violence reduction effort of the Mennonite Churches in the United States and Canada who were soon joined in the effort by the Church of the Brethren and Quakers. Early CPT initiatives included delegations to Iraq in 1990 and to the Oka Indian Reservation in Quebec, and sponsoring actions in which local congregations were encouraged to take part, including "Oil Free Sunday" during the buildup to the Gulf War (Kern, 2000).

In 1993 the Christian Peacemaker Corp was established, a team of full-time peacemakers trained and prepared to be deployed in conflict areas. Since then corps members have served in over a dozen locations, including Haiti; Hebron; Chiapas; Washington, DC; Richmond, Indiana; Pierre, South Dakota; Vieques, Puerto Rico and Esgenoopetitj, New Brunswick. In addition to the 22 full-time corps members, 103 reservists, and four full-time administrative staff, hundreds of others have served on delegations, helped raise funds, and participated in local support actions. CPT press releases, newsletters and urgent action alerts reach a constituency of thousands both within the peace churches and within other supporting North American churches. CPT has regional support groups in Ontario, Indiana, Colorado, and Ohio. Currently, CPT's principal projects are in Colombia and Hebron.

CPT's projects are staffed by both full-time corps members and by reservists. Both corps

members and reservists cycle in and out of projects. Corps members generally spend three months in the field, followed by one month at home. While this can make project continuity a challenge, it has some advantages, including providing breaks for workers in very stressful situations, allowing CPT to undertake actions without having their hands tied by worrying that their personnel will be expelled from the country, and the cross-pollination of ideas from various project sites.

CPT is based on a commitment to a Biblical vision of nonviolent resistance to oppression. CPT seeks to follow a Biblical tradition of nonviolent direct action which began with the refusal of Hebrew midwives to kill infants as ordered by the Pharaoh (Exodus 1:8-2:10), and culminating with Jesus' teaching of loving your enemies (Matthew 5:43-48). From the beginning, CPT has sought to be on the cutting edge of creative action to reduce violence, willing to run risks similar to those which a soldier is willing to endure. As Ron Sider (1984) said in his speech which sparked the founding of CPT, "Unless we are ready to die developing new nonviolent attempts to reduce international conflict, we should confess that we never meant the cross was an alternative to the sword."

CPT in Chiapas

In June, 1995, the first three CPTers visited Chiapas as part of a SIPAZ delegation. During this, as in several subsequent trips, CPT delegates met in Mexico City with Mexican Mennonites and North American Mennonite Central Committee workers, who were cautiously supportive of CPT efforts but concerned about the implications for Mennonites and church agency workers elsewhere in the country of a high profile CPT presence (Shupak and Weaver, 1995).

Shupak, an human rights worker with Mennonite Central Committee in Mexico, had visited Chiapas earlier that year with the exploratory delegation which led to the founding of SIPAZ. With encouragement from MCC, CPT signed on as a member of the SIPAZ coalition. In 1996 a CPT delegation spent time in three rural communities as part of the Fray Bartolome de las Casas Human

Rights Center (CDHFBC) Peace Camps.

In 1997, three delegations traveled to Chiapas, preparing for a full-time CPT presence there. In early December, delegation members met with members of the then little-known indigenous pacifist group known as *Las Abejas*, thousands of whom had just been expelled from their homes and communities by paramilitaries.

While continuing as members of the SIPAZ coalition, CPT decided to establish an independent presence in Chiapas, since CPT's approach of using nonviolent direct action in-country was significantly different than SIPAZ's focus on information, workshops, impartial accompaniment and conflict resolution. CPT's first permanent team was established in June, 1998, six months after the massacre at Acteal. CPT became a partner with the *Abejas* in their nonviolent struggle for justice, with a close relationship to both the Diocese of San Cristobal and to CDHFBC. Working closely with the diocese and later with CDHFBC, members of SERPAJ-Mexico, a mostly Catholic pacifist organization based in Mexico City, were important parts of the Diocese-*Abeja*-CDHFBC relationship of which CPT now became an ally. SERPAJ member Oscar Salinas, a Catholic Priest and Vicar of the diocese, was a key figure not only for CPT, but also for SIPAZ and the *Abejas*.

Over the next three and a half years, CPTers, while living in San Cristobal, became part of the life of prayer, fasting and nonviolent resistance of the *Abeja* communities of Acteal, X'oyep, and Tzajalchen, visiting each several times per month, usually staying for several days, entering into the daily prayer life, special events and commemorations of the community and frequently carrying out joint actions to challenge the military presence in Chenalhó. During the course of this study, in December, 2001, CPT ended its full-time presence in Chiapas after 3 1/2 years.

CPT and *Las Abejas*

Ta xi xano, ta slu sali Cajualtic. (Tzotzil)
Caminamos en la Luz de Dios. (Spanish)
We are marching in the light of God. (English)
-Song sung by CPT/*Abejas* in Tzotzil, Spanish, English[72]

The Chiapas work presented CPT with a unique opportunity. For the first time CPTers would be working with partners who closely shared CPT's ideological and spiritual approach: persistent, direct nonviolence rooted in a strong commitment to the Way of Jesus. While the *Abejas* and CPT have vast differences in culture, traditional Indigenous Mexican versus modern, white, North American, they found a deep common bond in actions rooted in prayer, fasting, and walking.

CPT arrived at a time when *Las Abejas* were deeply discouraged. In the fall of 1997, they had experienced massive forced displacements at the hands of paramilitaries, followed by the massacre at Acteal on Dec. 22, followed by more massive displacements, followed by the incursions of the military, including that of January 3 in X'oyep (see pp. xii-xiii) and the establishment of ten bases in their communities, followed by the expulsion from the country of the priest who had accompanied them for 30 years.

The Acteal massacre introduced the *Abejas* to the world. And because of the nature of this introduction, they were seen principally as victims. The fact that they were unarmed and very religious (praying and fasting at the time of the massacre)[73] added to the sense of injustice of the attack, but not to the sense of the *Abejas* as actors in the conflict. What CPT saw in the Bees was a movement which was, like them, committed to nonviolent action. CPT's identification of the *Abejas* in this way encouraged their self-identification as pacifists, and their recognition of a sense of being actors in the conflict.

José Vázquez, current president of the *Mesa Directiva* of the Bees, explained the mutual

[72] This South African freedom song, "Si ya hambe kuke nyen kwen khos," has become a theme song for CPT/*Abeja* actions.

attraction between CPT and the *Abejas*:

> I realized what the work of CPT was like. They're not afraid either. They come in to risk their lives, just like the Bees risk their lives. We have always come along working hard like that, saying in the light of day what happens in the communities, that there are violations of human rights, that there is illegal privation of liberty, many things. (Interview 27)

CPTer Lynn Stoltzfus, who worked on and off in Chiapas for two years, feels like CPT

> helped [the Bees] not to find, but to recover, a sense of active resistance through nonviolence. . . at the end of a meeting, one of them said 'as an organization we've lost our voice to the outside, we're not exactly as we used to be, and maybe this [action] could help us recover that.'"

Rafael Landereche, a SERPAJ member who works for the Frayba Human Rights Center reflected on the way that CPT's actions encouraged the *Abejas* in their own nonviolent actions.

> CPT, with its nonviolent actions, such as praying with the soldiers, in a form which comes very much out of their culture, was like a spark which managed to wake up what was very much within the *Abeja* victims. This was achieved by their example, no? . . . When they arrived to pray with the soldiers, the *Abejas* came out with their own [action], in their own style. There weren't five people at the base, instead there were 2000 people who did a whole march. It is very interesting that it wasn't by imposition nor invitation, but instead the lighting of a spark which they understood. Because they understood the meaning of this, because it fit into their nonviolent spirit, but the cultural form was going to be different, no?
>
> . . . I think that the Bees needed a little push, no? In other words, they had this potential, this possibility, but maybe they were not energized. And when they saw that CPT did it . . . Not many people here encourage their nonviolent struggle. They might admire it, perhaps, but are they here around them. And so, in praise of the Zapatistas, no? So, it is only natural that, at a certain point, they kind of hesitate, that, are we on the right track, after all. But then CPT comes and "oh, it does make sense what we're doing." You do need once in a while some encouragement from the outside, no? (Interview 4)

CPT was also influenced by its relationship with the Bees. Teresa Ortiz described how the Bees organic commitment to nonviolence was a needed corrective to the intellectual nonviolence some westerners have.

> People that come from the nonviolent movement have a very, and I'm sorry to say, very elitist approach, it all comes from the head, and not from the gut. . . . Some people have written about war without knowing what it is. . . some of the real life choices you have to make, . . . a choice between paying somebody, and being massacred. I think when people go to Chiapas and are close to people and understand those things, their nonviolence approach becomes more human. (Interview 14)

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[73] In some of the early reports they were identified as evangelicals, although all of the victims were Catholics. This may have been because their religious passion impressed some observers as similar to the Evangelicals.

Scott Kerr explained how the *Abejas* taught him about loving enemies while pursuing justice:

> I've learned a lot from our partners here, like from the *Abejas* in that when we read these lines about loving your enemies, they'll talk about specific paramilitary groups that kicked them out of their homes, and they'll pray for them during their daily hours of prayer, and for me it's difficult to do that. . . . They still want justice, they still want justice for the massacre and justice for the displacement, but that is a different issue than loving them. . . . For them it means that they can love their enemies and they can wish them well, but if they're not to a point where they're willing to admit what they've done and come to a point of repentance to that, then justice needs to be done. For them that means that some of them will have to go to jail, others will have to pay a fine. (Interview 2)

Mexican SIPAZ worker Eduardo Rodriguez who as a Mennonite also had close ties to CPT, regarded the relationship between CPT and the *Abejas* as extraordinary, especially for indigenous groups who traditionally had been distrustful of outsiders.

> Now CPT and the Bees are doing demonstrations together, and from what I have heard, the Bees consider CPT to be a part of the Bees, as a part of the same organization, even though they know that it is an organization which comes from outside. Because of the nature of their actions and the principles which they stand for, there is a close identification between the Bees and CPT. This sense of trust is important, no?
>
> The negative impact of this work is that other political actors in Chenalhó, such as the evangelical Priistas, don't have a good image of CPT, because they say that they have come to support just one side. (Interview 7)

CPT and Immigration

From almost the first moments CPTers landed in Mexico, their confrontational style got them in trouble with the Mexican immigration authorities. It did not help that CPT opened its Chiapas project just at the time the Mexican government was expelling large numbers of foreigners from Chiapas for "interfering in the internal affairs of Mexico" by doing human rights observation under a tourist visa (the only visa available to them).

In April, 1997, a CPT delegation attempted to visit a prison in Oaxaca, the state just north of Chiapas, to visit political prisoners and their families and "to document widespread reports of arbitrary detention, torture and other serious abuses." The four were given citations by immigration authorities to appear in an immigration office in Mexico City because "the intended activities of the

team violated the terms of their tourist visas" (CPTNet, April 9, 1977). All four delegation members were then asked to leave the country under "voluntary departure status," just short of deportation (CPTNet, May 6, 1997). The following month, a dozen Europeans were expelled.

The next year, a month after establishing the CPT presence in Chiapas, two CPTers, Cliff Kindy and Pierre Gingerich, were given immigration citations at a checkpoint after attending a memorial service on July 22. A fax campaign was organized by North American CPT supporters, and Kindy and Gingerich were allowed to stay in Chiapas (CPTNet, July 28, 1998).[74] The following September, two more CPTers were given citations. In addition, every time they would travel between San Cristobal and Acteal or X'oyep or Polhó (the Zapatista autonomous community near Acteal), it was necessary to pass through two or three military and/or immigration checkpoints. It was at these checkpoints where citations would often be given to internationals. On a trip to Simojovel, in 1999, the team encountered eight military checkpoints (CPTNet, February 25, 1999).

Clearly, the intimidation and expulsion of foreigners was a part of the government's counterinsurgency strategy (Global Exchange, 1999). In addition, passing through the checkpoints was often intimidating and humiliating for indigenous Chiapanecos. CPT now faced the question of how to respond to this ongoing challenge. The team decided to try a new approach. Instead of telling the immigration authorities that they were going to Pantelhó, a city in the next municipality on down the road from Acteal, as other NGOs did, CPT decided to tell immigration where they actually were going. But at the same time, they decided to hold the government authorities to the same standard of integrity. They decided that no longer would they show their passports to soldiers, who had no legal authority to ask for them. Instead, they would offer to have their bags inspected for drugs and weapons, the stated purpose of the military checkpoints.

[74] When they appeared for the meeting with the immigration officer, a pile of faxes were sitting on his desk. "You have a lot of friends," he told the CPTers.

CPT corps member Scott Kerr describes the decision:

> All the foreigners . . . say they're going to Pantelhó, which is a nearby city, to buy artisans' crafts. Well if you've ever been to Pantelhó, there's no artisans' crafts to buy there. You know. That's the line. I mean immigration knows what they're doing. They may not know exactly where they're going, but they know what's happening. And CPT has really taken the initiative in telling them what's going on and to try and confront those things, and the soldiers as well, the soldiers will ask for passports and IDs, and CPT has taken the policy we're not going to show them these things, because they don't have the right to do that. That's the way that [they try to restrict] the travel of human rights observers.
>
> So, if we tell the soldier no, they can't have our passport, hopefully the next time a foreigner comes through who's not a CPTer they won't ask them. . . . If you have a law that says you can't have internationals visit Acteal, that's fine. But then we're more than willing to walk through that process with you, go through citation hearings and we're going to expose these laws to the world, and to other Mexican groups, to Mexican civil society, to the Mexican press, to our group of supporters. Because if your laws are just, you should not be ashamed of these laws. (Interview 2)

Marco Tavanti describes the confusion which reigned when the CPTers arrived at a military checkpoint one day and asked the soldiers to inspect their luggage, like their sign said they would do. This was a task, however, they were unaccustomed to, since their real purpose was to control the movement of people.

> I remember going through these checkpoints together. I remember when they decided not to give the passport, but to ask them to search the bags as they are supposed to do. I remember Anne Herman was there, and when they packed their bags, they put on top their underwear. So the soldiers had to pull out this big underwear of this old lady, very funny. Anyway they were stopping them and said you can't go ahead, "OK, we will walk, we will walk from the combi (bus)." (Interview 13)

The CPTers now instituted a strategy around the checkpoints consisting of prayer, informing immigration in advance of their plans, refusing to show documents to soldiers or to give information about allies such as the *Abejas*, and active dialogue and engagement with both soldiers and immigration officials. The following recounts the initiation of this policy.

> **Light into the darkness, Chiapas, Mexico**
>
> Saturday, February 27, four CPT'ers traveling to the municipality of Chenalho were stopped at the checkpoints as usual. At each checkpoint, the CPT'ers initiated a small prayer service for peace, lighting candles as a symbol of bringing "light into the darkness." The soldiers and immigration officers were invited to join the circle of prayer, and several of them did so.
>
> The action followed a new misinformation campaign initiated by the Mexican government on February 20 that targeted "outsiders" in the municipality of

> Chenalho. This is the time for harvesting coffee in this area, and progressive Mexican nationals had been recruited to accompany displaced indigenous people as they harvested coffee from their fields. The government claimed that the tensions in Chenalho stemmed from "outsiders" (those accompanying the indigenous farmers) training the Zapatistas, and that foreigners were fomenting "violent destabilization."
>
> The team had planned to visit the autonomous community of Polhó, situated near Chenalho, that Friday, but after consulting various people in San Cristobal, they wondered whether foreigners traveling to that area might feed into the government hype and serve as an excuse for a military incursion into one of the communities. In the end, after talking to people who had traveled from the Chenalho municipality on Friday night without incident, the four CPT'ers went ahead with their travel plans, deciding to be very open about what they were doing and to confront the government propaganda designed to prevent Mexican national and international workers from traveling in the area.
>
> Members of the team remaining behind in San Cristobal joined in an ecumenical prayer service for peace on Saturday and shared about CPT's attempts to "bring light into the darkness." (CPTNet, March 1, 1999)

This new effort of CPT came as the government campaign against foreigners continued in full-gear, and many from the NGO community were dubious of CPT's plan. SIPAZ was one of the organizations which objected on the grounds that it may make matters worse by drawing even more attention to foreigners (Interview 13). However, in the interviews conducted for this study in 2001, the immigration actions were widely cited as an example of CPT's creative and successful approach. For example, Tomás Johnson, of Cloudforest Initiative, said,

> When there was massive expulsions of foreigners, CPT could do actions, could get the citations, could go into Immigration and do the interviews, and they could somehow keep their people from being expelled, and I think that is a real strong statement on the organization itself, that they were able to protect the people that were here working. (Interview 22)

Gene Stoltzfus describes the challenge:

> instead of avoiding the soldiers and immigration, simply going with their candles and inviting them with prayer and continuing on their route. And that created a lot of discussion we know in the immigration and they didn't know what to do with us. . . . the experience of relating with them very directly and honestly, in the spirit of nonviolence with the immigration officers was a very successful thing to do, it was a good thing to do. (Interview 11)

The citations and immigration actions would continue for the rest of 1999, but (except for the 1997 delegation, which was before the permanent CPT presence), no CPTers would be expelled.

In August, 2001, I talked to an official of INM, the Mexican National Immigration Institute. After waiting for two hours, I was brought in. After several minutes of complaining about CPT actions at military bases which "approached the bounds" of permissible action, the official agreed to answer a few questions, but not on tape. I asked him why, at the same time he was expelling scores of internationals, he never had expelled any CPTers. He answered,

> I have personally greatly respected CPT's attitude because we know that they do not interfere in favor or against. They do not counsel the people to rebel against the government. Because they dedicate their efforts to prayer and fasting. They approach the permissible limit. . . . Ideology and faith do not have borders, but countries do, for better or worse, that is what allows us to live in harmony. (Interview 25)

Truth-telling is a central tenet of nonviolence. Satyagraha, which has become synonymous with nonviolent action, means "truth-force." CPT's approach to the Immigration was an application of this philosophy.

Creative Nonviolence and Consultation

Gene Stoltzfus explained how the change in CPT's way of relating to Immigration got the Chiapas project into the "CPT mode" of creative nonviolence.

> [In Chiapas] the NGO culture said, "Be careful, and never tell them what you're doing." And the most important decision that we made in CPT was that we're no longer going to be careful, we're going to tell them everything we're doing, and we're going to be brutally honest, and we're going to do it in the spirit of prayer and confrontation. And that was when the organization CPT became the spirit of CPT. From that time on we could talk about the work of nonviolence with much more boldness. We could enter into conversations with the *Abejas* and others about how to support the work of nonviolence with much more candor. We could initiate many projects in nonviolence. We could test out ideas, we could do a lot of things, that we couldn't do before. And that is sort of the paradigm of the contradiction that we always live with in CPT, where the dominant development philosophy of our global culture, which informs the work of peacemaking, sets limits on the things which you as a person from the outside should be able to do. And those limits in the work of peacemaking would say that you don't take initiative, you only support local initiatives. What we have learned in CPT is that we can successfully take initiatives on our own. Not only do we get away with it, but we introduce some new things to talk about. Now that approach always has to be informed by constant discussions with people locally. But we recognize that those people will not always give unqualified support, and we don't ask ourselves to always have unqualified support for us to take initiatives. We can make mistakes, but like the process of simply saying who we are and going through a process of

> public prayer and dialogue with soldiers and immigration officials, in Mexico, we introduce new energy and new possibilities and things to talk about. (Interview 11)

Being creative and "out there" must still be balanced with reading the signs of the times and hearing the counsel of the local allies. Lynn Stoltzfus, the CPTer with the most experience in Chiapas, pointed out that it is important to be sensitive to

> this whole dynamic of respecting people here and following their lead in what risks we take. And respecting that the risks we take and the things we do (which) might be vainglorious and wonderful, may also just create hell for the people we work with. In fact we aren't just totally free as Ron Sider would say, to run in and block tanks, and jump in the way of bullets, but we have to respect the reality of what's going on here and especially respect the reality of the people who invite us here. (Interview 5)

This dynamic of action and reflection is one which Paulo Freire reflected on in *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed.* Freire (1970) calls the process of action and reflection aimed at transforming the world "praxis."

> Let me emphasize that my defense of the praxis implies no dichotomy by which this praxis could be divided into a prior stage of reflection and a subsequent stage of action. Action and reflection occur simultaneously. A critical analysis of reality may, however, reveal that a particular form of action is impossible or inappropriate *at the present time.* Those who through reflection perceive the infeasibility or inappropriateness of one or another form of action (which should accordingly be postponed or substituted) cannot thereby be accused of inaction. Critical reflection is also action. (p. 123)

It is precisely this process that peace teams, like other social change organizations, must seek in order for their action to be meaningful. Although in early 2001, CPT would be called on the carpet by SIPAZ for insufficient consultation and questioned about their process of political analysis, already in 1999, a CPTNet press release mentions CPT's concern for respect for Mexican self-determination.

> In light of the expulsion of international human rights observers over the past two years, the delegation sought to plan an action which balanced a respect for the right of Mexicans to determine their own political paths with a desire to express the right of all people everywhere to speak out against injustice. (CPTNet, August 11, 1999)[75]

[75] It happened that I wrote this press release since I was serving as leader of this delegation.

CPT and the Military

> *I think that the strong center of CPT has been in its proposal that we realize that militarization is an aggression against the community.*
> –Padre Pedro Arriaga, Parish Priest of Chenalhó (Interview 26)

The primary focus of CPT action in Chiapas has been demilitarization. Specifically, CPT actions have tended to focus on military bases, mostly in the *municipio* of Chenalhó. These actions call upon soldiers to lay down their weapons and on the military to leave Chiapas. This focus came out of hearing that a primary concern of the Bees was the militarization of their communities.

The representative list of actions of the *Abejas* on p. 96 includes many of the CPT actions, so I do not construct a list here. CPT's actions are assertive, but also symbolic and respectful. They are never organized in an insulting way, although at times they have been interpreted as an infringement on Mexican sovereignty.

Over the four years of CPT presence in Chiapas, dozens of actions were held at military bases in Chenalhó. Frequently, meetings and dialogues were held between CPTers and officers, and many conversations were held with soldiers. Always, the message was the same, "Lay down your weapons. God forbids killing. The people of Chiapas do not desire your presence here. Go home and be with your families. The eyes of the world are upon you."

Meetings and conversations also occurred at times with paramilitaries, Priistas, and pro-government Evangelicals, although perhaps this was a weak point. CPT Director Gene Stoltzfus reflected that "if there was a sense of unfinishedness in CPT, I think we would have liked to have pushed the boundaries of connectedness a little bit more with some of those Presbyterian communities" (Interview 11).

Snapshots from the Front

The many CPT, *Abeja*, and CPT/*Abeja* actions were preceded and followed by processes of

reflection. After one meeting with the PRI leaders in a local community, the CPTers reported back to their *Abeja compañeros*. The *Abejas* informed them that the two they had met with were paramilitary leaders. Wendy Lehman reflected later on that meeting.

> During the meeting with Norberto and Juan, I recall thinking, "Is it possible that these two could have killed someone?" With the horrific stories we hear of paramilitary violence, it becomes all too easy to demonize their members. Yet this meeting made clear one of the truths of the conflict: that even the paramilitary members are in many ways victims. They come from low-income, indigenous families and communities and have faced racism and discrimination. Although clearly responsible for their activities, they are manipulated through offers of small monetary gifts and by warnings of the "dangers" of opposition groups.
>
> Both Juan and Norberto and displaced people we talk to bemoan the fact that they used to live as neighbors and family members yet now are in conflict. The violence inflicted by paramilitary members is horrific–particularly as culminated in the massacre of men, women and children at Acteal. Yet I was reminded of one displaced woman CPTers met about a year earlier. Despite all the violence she encountered at the hands of paramilitary members, she was still sympathetic to the poverty and the difficulties they, like she, faced, as she said, "Those poor people." (CPTNet, July 14, 1999)

The Planning Process, collaboration between the *Abejas* and CPT

The relationship between *Las Abejas* and CPT has been a dynamic one, with action plans coming out of a process of dialogue. Referring to the December 28, 1999 pilgrimage of the *Abejas* and CPT, CPTer Claire Evans reports:

> It was very exciting to be part of the planning process from the beginning because CPT had the idea that we should do something for the Jubilee, you know the year 2000 was rolling around, . . . liberating the captives, or whatever. So we just mentioned it to this group of the leadership of *Las Abejas* and then we were a part of a meeting of catechists where the idea came up, then the catechists talked among themselves, they have long, two-day meetings, and so they process, process, and then it came back to look like this procession. Just being part of that planning process and seeing how they work, and gaining appreciation of the roles the catechists play in the displaced communities in Chenalhó. That was exciting to see how it developed and I felt our ideas was just kind of a seed and then it turned into this other thing. We kind of turned it over to the *Abejas*, and that felt good to be part of the whole process. (Claire Evans, Interview 12)

Lisa Martens describes in this testifies to the impact of low intensity warfare and the power of the *Abejas*' nonviolent response:

> CHIAPAS: Slow Earthquakes
>
> by Lisa Martens (CPTNet, June 29, 1999)
>
> The pacifism of my Anabaptist ancestors was born of intimate engagement between what they held sacred, and of war-creating greed. The wars of the 1990s are as fierce and economically-driven as those during the radical reformation, but, even being a child of peace-loving foreparents, I am only beginning to fumble into direct interaction with the systems that kill. And my teachers are a non-violent group in Chiapas, Mexico, mostly of Catholics, who call themselves "*Las Abejas*." (The Bees)
>
> Along with most of the Indigenous in Mexico, *Las Abejas* live in a country where absolute support for the ruling government party, and the well-being of large land owners and foreign investors are higher priorities than the lives of peasants.
>
> On December 22, 1997, government-sponsored paramilitaries climbed a cliff and killed 45 of *Las Abejas* as they fasted and prayed for peace in the refugee town of Acteal. This brought the world to attention, and is one stark moment within the larger war waged against the Indigenous; a "gentle" and deadly form of conflict called "Guerra Baja Intensidad (GBI)" (Low Intensity Warfare). GBI is the attempted murder of a culture that includes driving people, with real threats of death, from the land where their families have been for thousands of years. It is the attempted robbery of dignity by forcing people's dependence on crowded, under-supplied refugee camps. It is a smothering of the population with military. In Chiapas today, there is one military person for every twelve citizens.
>
> May 31, 1999 was my first concrete lesson in the slow rumblings of engagement between GBI and *Las Abejas*. On that day, I was one of several internationals walking with seventy *Abejas* up a mountain path, singing, toward a military base. Weeks before, a group had planted corn on that base in order to return the land to its original life-giving purpose.
>
> Now, we were returning to weed and water those plants, claiming that the seeds of peace and justice need continual care. Along the way, we came to a place–today, a military checkpoint—where, for thousands of years, Mayan people have come to pray.
>
> *Abeja* women filled the entire road as we all paused to continue the ancient tradition, murmuring individually and simultaneously to God; calling for justice in Mexico. Soon after beginning, a green military jeep roared up and halted directly behind the women, who refused to be interrupted. A high-ranking official, flanked by two subordinates stepped out of the vehicle to the immediate salutes of nearby soldiers. The three paused for a moment; knowing that on either side of the narrow road were steep declines. Finally, stepping slowly, and brushing the skirts of unflinching, praying *Abeja* women, they found their way to the checkpoint.
>
> Three minutes later, a man leading a donkey piled high with firewood came from the opposite direction. He also wanted to pass, and in seconds, Las *Abejas* gave him more than enough space to comfortably continue along his

way.

Clearly, those things necessary to keep one's family alive and warm and fed, in one's home, are as sacred as any prayer.

I want to learn more.

Spiritual Warfare

A central part of CPT is its spiritual grounding. This spiritual grounding comes up regularly in conversations. One particularly poignant story of CPT's spiritual role in the struggle was told by Paula Bidle, UCC mission worker in Chiapas.

> I went up to Acteal with a group and on the way back down, immigration said "OK, you have to show up at the immigration office tomorrow, in San Cristobal."
>
> I had been avoiding immigration. I had had orders to go in to immigration for five years by that time, so I was on the black list. My main fear [was that] if I went in to immigration that I was never going to be allowed into the country again. That was a real risk. None of the people who had been deported had been allowed back in. Well, my kids were here, too, with me, at that point. So I thought, I could be deported immediately and never would be allowed to come back into Mexico. Both of which would have been terrible.
>
> So, I had to go through a process of discernment about whether I was going to go in to immigration, and so (CPTer) Kryss (Chupp) said, "Well, I want you to come in with us, before you go in to immigration, and we'll just give you some spiritual help."
>
> So, I came in, just before I went to immigration, and we sang songs, and did some prayers, and sort of visualized what it was going to be like to be there, and I went in, my spirit changed from one of fear to one of clarity and of possibilities and real love. So it was an amazing experience being there. Of course I had lawyers there with me too, and had done a lot of ground work getting embassy people to send faxes, so there was some support there, and there was some faxes from people in the US, [such as] Paul Wellstone. So that was a support, but my real support was spiritual, the prayers of CPT was what I felt when I went in there, that I was being held in prayer.
>
> And, you know, I was there for 2 ½ hours, and finally this guy who had been looking for me for five years said "OK, pues, vaya con Dios, have a good time enjoy your trip," at the end of it. Man! I felt like I'd been set free!
>
> So I think that the spiritual commitment of CPT is absolutely indispensable to what the work is all about here. I'm not sure that so many groups emphasize that so deeply, but I think that it really deeply corresponds to the reality here, of the people in the communities, too. They get that. And I think that probably Mexicans, probably Mestizos get it too. (Interview 16)

CPT's Impact

> *Paul: Do you think CPT has been effective at reducing violence?*
> *Fred Bahnson (CPT reservist): I think that question is more of a pragmatic, utilitarian, secular way of thinking . . . than a Christian way of thinking.* (Interview 8)

While it is impossible for any of us to ever know all the fruit, good and bad, born of the seeds we plant, observers of a situation often do have opinions about the nature of that fruit. The reports below credit CPT, together with the general international presence, with reducing violence. As we have seen previously, observers also credit CPT with encouraging the nonviolence of the Bees, thus creating space for local action, the second goal of peace teams.

- CPT's emphasis on loving the opponent has reduced violence.

> If there had not been internationals here during all this lead-up to the low intensity war, it would have been a lot worse, a lot worse. So CPT's presence has been very helpful. And also there's this great story about one of the immigration people, and I'm sure you heard it. Up in Chenalhó, CPT passed by there, and they said, "This is what we're doing, this is where we're going." And he said, "OK, well you're Mennonites," and so forth, and they came back down from the zone, a couple days later, and the immigration guy had this whole printout about who are Mennonites and what are they all about, and he'd gotten it off the internet. And he said "OK, well, I get it, about what you guys are doing. You're here for peacemaking work, you're not here to cause problems. You're not here to give arms to the Zapatistas." So, I think CPT's unique emphasis on being humane with the other side, and being prayerful with the other side and being respectful with the other side, has definitely reduced violence in the zone. (Interview 16)

- An *Abeja* member from Nuevo Yibeljoj feels like both prayer and publicity are important in CPT's effectiveness:

> When they do an action, a campaign of prayer, they invite the press. The CPT members always do a press release denouncing why they are here, why they are praying. So, through publications they publicize what they are doing. So the government also listens, and it knows that what CPT is doing is the truth. So I think the government is a little afraid, so I think the violence has been reduced because of this, through prayers and denunciations through the media. (Interview 19)

- Tomás Johnson cautioned against assigning too much credit for violence reduction to a small, foreign group like CPT when the real actors are the indigenous Zapatista supporters in the autonomous communities. At the same time he does believe that the international presence of

which CPT is a part reduces violence. He then lists three specific ways CPT has had a positive impact.

> Paul: What has been the impact of CPT in Chiapas? Have they actually reduced violence in some way?
>
> Tomás: The scale and scope of what's going on here is certainly much larger than any organization the size of CPT. CPT's vision which is shared by many organizations and people here is a part of something that has helped reduce violence, but I think it would be a stretch to say that they have had an impact. I tend to agree that an international presence in areas of conflict does help to reduce violence. If an international person is injured or tortured or treated unfairly, or has their human rights violated, it tends to cause a lot of problems for the government. The confluence of a lot of work of a lot of people like CPT has had an impact here. But I also think that the vision of the autonomous communities here in themselves have done a lot to reduce violence. The visibility of this conflict, it's international resonance, the way that the struggle in the communities has largely been a civil rights struggle, and their energies have gone into nonviolent action. I don't see really any difference between what CPT and the Bees do and what the autonomous communities do when they want to stop violent activity. . . .
>
> Some of the actions they did, particularly in Chenalhó, were very publicized by the national media. And that has two effects. One, it changes the general mentality of the public about what these "foreigners" are doing in Chiapas. You know there's always these things that the media has tried to portray–that the foreigners are going there to cause some problems and do bad things. So, when you see people going there and praying, everyone can identify with that. There's nothing bad about that.
>
> The other thing, it also has changed a lot of people that would not be changed by other types of actions. And I am talking about the members of the military.
>
> Of course the third one would be to be in solidarity and in support of *Las Abejas*, which is the easiest one. I think it has gone both ways.
>
> I think there has been a fear, and it comes more from North Americans, and even from members of CPT that the work of CPT is like telling the *Abejas* what to do, and that is not a very positive thing. I don't think that is the case. I think that from the beginning the *Abejas* were right to work with a group like CPT, because their nonviolence approach is very grassroots, very primitive, and not very well understood at the cognitive, analytical level. It comes right from the Bible, but it can be manipulated by the other side, and that is exactly what happened in Acteal, where the paramilitaries were demanding [that the *Abejas*] pay money for not participating in the guards. So that creates [something] that's not a totally nonviolent approach. To be able to recognize that we are a nonviolent people, but we are a nonviolent people not just because we are that way but because we have a belief in that, but to be able to bring it to a higher level, and this is what CPT has been able to help them do, and I think that's really good. (Interview 22)

- Even the immigration agent who made several CPTers sit through long interrogations about their actions, when asked if CPT reduced violence, responded that: "In a certain way they have contributed from the moment that we know that there are more eyes that see what the

government does and this obligates some of the bad elements within and without to watch their actions" (Interview 25).

In December, 2001, CPT made a tentative decision, which was confirmed in the Spring of 2002, to end their full-time presence in Chiapas. A CPT communication explained that the decision was based on the low level of lethal violence currently in Chiapas:

> the present level of lethal conflict in Chiapas leaves this project outside the mandate of CPT as a project that intervenes in situations where there is "lethal" violence. This is a similar conclusion to the conclusion reached by the team six months ago. In saying this, we do recognize the ongoing low intensity warfare and the fragile state of the justice/peace process. But the reality is that physical violence has dropped dramatically.

CPT also has experienced a chronic shortage of Spanish-fluent personnel. With the opening of the Colombia project in the Spring or 2001, some of CPT's Spanish-speakers were transferred to that project. The intensity and extremely lethal nature of current violence in Colombia highlighted the need to withdraw from full-time presence in Chiapas. CPT anticipates a continued occasional presence in Chiapas, continued membership in the SIPAZ coalition, and continued contact with the *Abejas* and the Chenalhó pastoral team.[76]

CPT/SIPAZ in Dialogue

CPT and SIPAZ in Chiapas have a close working relationship. CPT is an active part of the SIPAZ coalition and has been represented on the SIPAZ board. SIPAZ and CPT often consult each other on major decisions and the volunteers of the two organizations are friends and have spent time together socially. Members of both groups view each other as close allies, working together for the same objective with distinct strategies, work styles, and constituencies. The relationship also includes dialogue on peacemaking. One action, CPT's three days of prayer and fasting at Guadalupe Tepeyac, became a focus of this dialogue.

[76] An *Abeja* and a pastoral team member participated in an Spring, 2002 CPT delegation to Colombia.

The Action at Guadalupe Tepeyac

In early January, 2001, three CPTers made their way to Guadalupe Tepeyac, a village in the jungle far from Acteal, which had been an important center for the Zapatistas before the Mexican army had taken over the community and established a base there, leading the residents of the community to leave and become displaced. The CPTers set up their tent and unfurled their banners calling on the soldiers to leave their base and return the community to its original inhabitants. While this action appeared on the surface to be quite similar to dozens of other actions CPT had carried out previously in Chiapas, the coyuntura of this action meant that it would be received quite differently.

In the summer of 2000, two momentous political changes occurred in Mexico. After over 70 years of domination of Mexican politics, the PRI lost both the Governorship of Chiapas and the Presidency of Mexico. Governor Pablo Salazar came in promising to support the displaced in their efforts to return, and President Vicente Fox, of the conservative PAN party promised to end the Chiapas conflict in "15 minutes."

The EZLN requested of the Fox government three signs in order to continue dialogue. These were:

-release of Zapatista political prisoners

-compliance with the San Andrés accords by passing the COCOPA law, and

-removing seven military bases in Chiapas

The Fox government quickly removed several of the bases, but the Mexican military was reluctant to relinquish control of Guadalupe Tepeyac, a location which was both militarily strategic and symbolically important. In addition to removing several bases, in an action which directly effected both the lives of indigenous in Chiapas and of the NGO workers, Fox removed nearly all of the checkpoints in the state, making travel much easier for all. He also offered to meet Marcos.

It was into this context that the three CPTers entered. While CPT had received some local and even national Mexican press coverage in previous actions, this time the press was close behind

the CPTers as they began their jungle action, and soon any Mexican who picked up a newspaper or turned on the TV could see the *Norteamericanos* praying and fasting in front of the Guadalupe Tepeyac military base. Initial articles announcing their presence soon gave way to xenophobic denunciations of inappropriate foreign intervention in Mexican affairs.

Reaction was immediate. Bishop Arizmendi, just completing his first year in the Diocese, condemned the action at Guadalupe Tepeyac, saying that fasting should be done at home in secret, and not as a political action.[77] High level officials from both the state and federal governments contacted CPT in response to the action.[78]

For CPT, the action was a great success. Corps member Claire Evans remembers her reaction:

> By march or April, the military did withdraw those soldiers, it's hard to credit CPT with the whole thing, but we certainly put the issue to visibility to the local press in Chiapas, even in the US our little group of CPTers got a lot of publicity. . . . It was still appearing in the paper and when the three of us joined the walk from Yabteclum to Acteal. I think we got our name in the paper then because people remembered the Guadalupe Tepeyac thing. So CPT made a name for itself. (Interview 12)

SIPAZ objected strenuously to CPT's action in Guadalupe Tepeyac. Ricardo Carvajal, SIPAZ Chiapas coordinator, explained, "the fast in Guadalupe Tepeyac, for us was a terrible error" (Interview 3). "To us, it seemed that there was not a consideration of the larger framework, the national framework, the framework of other actors and other readings, the framework of where we are in the process of the restoration of the peace dialogues" (Interview 10).

Lynn Stoltzfus described the tension inherent in the divergent focuses of CPT and SIPAZ.

> There is tension because we at some level are very closely allied with the *Abejas*. I think that brings tension into SIPAZ's attempts to bring the *Abejas* and other groups together. I think it hasn't been a tension that can't be overcome at this point, but I think it is, at a fundamental level, a tension.
>
> There's been other tensions. The key example is Guadalupe Tepeyac. . . . Some

[77] This comment could be interpreted to be an indirect comment on Arizmendi's predecessor, Samuel Ruiz, who carried out a high-profile fast in December of 1994, calling for a disengagement of the two armies (Ross, 2000).
[78] CPT received calls from both Martha Sahagún and Rodolfo Elizondo, both high officials in the federal government. Governor Pablo Salazar publicly commented on the action.

> military bases had been removed, and SIPAZ questioned very strongly whether it was appropriate for us to have done that at this point, because they said it might give hard-liners more of a reason to be against any changes, whereas we felt very strongly that doing what we did kept those things from being forgotten, kept the real issues of what was needed in the peace process on people's agenda, so that they would be dealt with. (Interview 5)

CPT and SIPAZ had at least two meetings during which this action, and their differing interpretations of it, were discussed. Although no consensus was reached, SIPAZ suggested and CPT agreed, that it is important to check carefully with a number of partner organizations as well as local people in the area in which the action was to take place, before carrying out the action. CPT had done this to some extent, in the Guadalupe Tepeyac action, but agreed they could have done more. In the end, though, CPT still evaluated the action as a success, and SIPAZ saw it as a reckless and irresponsible mistake which could have had very negative consequences both for foreigners working in Chiapas and for the peace process as a whole.

None of the others I interviewed expressed as negative a reaction as SIPAZ did, and several expressed appreciation for the CPT action. However, Rafael Landereche, SERPAJ member and Frayba staff person, while pointing out that no one would have predicted the response of the press, cautioned CPT:

> A teaching for organizations which arrive from other countries to do nonviolent actions–I think that the vision should be to support the nonviolence of the people. Try to avoid being the protagonists. Make initiatives, because without initiatives you can't do anything, but doing actions which will not provoke a response that labels you as the actor. (Interview 4)

Guadalupe Tepeyac highlights a number of distinctions between CPT and SIPAZ. These include both philosophy and tactics. Chapter 4 explores several of these issues.

Chapter 4 - Ideological Issues Confronting Peace Teams: Contending Discourses and Contending Practice

As I sort out the issues raised for me by this study of peace teams in Chiapas, my thoughts are full of the many people and ideas which I have encountered over the last two years of working on this project. I think of the days in Acteal, X'oyep, and Yibeljoj, *Abeja* communities in the mountains of Chiapas, where I learned a little about the struggle for peace and dignity, the struggle for daily survival, and the dynamics of solidarity between the members of the local Maya-Tzotzil society in resistance and international accompaniment. I think about the days listening to and talking with the North American, European, and Mexican members of CPT and SIPAZ in Chiapas, where we engaged the concepts of justice and reconciliation, advocacy versus political independence, and transnational versus multinational movements for peace.

And I remember the months in the United States, where I read and transcribed tapes of interviews, read books, documents, theses, press releases and articles about Chiapas, the *Abejas*, SIPAZ, CPT, violence and nonviolence, and thought about the conclusions which I could draw from my experience. Now is the time of synthesis. The time to give back to all of you who have struggled with me over these issues my thoughts as my investigation comes to a conclusion (of sorts).

I began my study of Christian Peacemaker Teams and SIPAZ in Chiapas in relation to the *Abejas* and nonviolent indigenous struggle with a number of questions (see Appendix G), including numbers 1 and 3 below. Questions 2 and 4 emerged out of the interviews and dialogues. In this chapter I will explore a few of the many issues raised in these four questions.

1. Partisanship/nonpartisanship: To what extent do peace teams take sides? What are the implications of this? Is there a "right" position on partisanship?

2. Interference/noninterference: When should peace teams made up of foreigners take actions which may be perceived as undue interference in a country's affairs?

3. Justice/reconciliation: Is the ultimate goal justice or reconciliation? Does one come before the other? Are these goals sometimes contradictory? How do you decide when to denounce injustice and when to promote reconciliation?

4. Nonviolent Direct Action/Conflict Transformation: What is the relationship between these two concepts? How are they different? Are they complementary or contradictory? When is each approach appropriate?

These four issues are closely interrelated. And are all central to the differences between the work of CPT and the work of SIPAZ. In the schema which I propose, I identify CPT and SIPAZ with the contrasting sides of each dichotomy as follows.

Figure 7: The Issues



Figure 7 proposes a hierarchy which moves from discourse to praxis. We begin at the point where CPT's discourse focuses more directly on justice, with reconciliation recognized as a corollary goal, but one which receives less emphasis. Likewise, SIPAZ embraces the mission and discourse of reconciliation, while at the same time recognizing the corollary importance of justice. This forms a

theoretical basis for a later choice between partisanship and nonpartisanship, also a discursive choice. Now we arrive at the practice of the two groups where the practical questions of interference or noninterference and, finally, the question of nonviolent direct action and conflict transformation enter.

While these contrasts are important, the work of the two organizations is not competing, but instead is complementary. There is a need in Chiapas for both a partisan and a nonpartisan peace team intervention, and it is essential to hold up the twin goals of justice and reconciliation. As it is not possible for one organization to do both at the same time, there is a need for both organizations.

There are also several areas in which both groups, as peace teams carrying out third party nonviolent interventions, share common visions:

1. a commitment to active nonviolence;
2. a commitment to international, cross border action for peace;
3. close collaboration with local groups, including regular communication, consultation, and cooperation;
4. a commitment to actively engage in dialogue with those identified as the source or vehicle of the violence in a conflict, and a commitment to actively express love and compassion for these actors; and
5. a commitment to wide international distribution of reliable information about the conflict area with the purpose of encouraging governmental and citizen action to reduce violence in the conflict area.

Justice and Reconciliation

> Paul: Kori, when people talk about, like, that they want peace and justice, what do you think, is the difference, like, is there a difference between peace and justice? What do those words mean?
>
> Kori: Peace is, what I think it means is, when you all live together . . . and it symbolizes that you're all children of God and you should all be treated well.
>
> Paul: OK, so what's justice?
>
> Kori: Letting every person in this world have their rights.
>
> -Kori Chupp, 10 year old daughter of CPTer Kryss Chupp, interviewed by Paul Neufeld Weaver in Acteal, July 22, 2001 (Interview 15)

Justice

In seeking out the basis for the difference between CPT and SIPAZ, one candidate is the distinction between justice and reconciliation. I repeatedly posed to those I interviewed the idea that SIPAZ's primary goal was reconciliation, and CPT's goal was justice. But workers from both groups objected, both to the separation of the two concepts this implied, and also to the fact that either organization favored one path to the neglect of the other. So, although there is clearly a difference in emphasis–CPT probably talks more about justice, SIPAZ probably talks more about reconciliation–this dichotomy does not sit well for many of the interviewees. Often the discussion turned to the relation between the two, with a frequent comment being that justice was a precondition for reconciliation. "There can be no true reconciliation without justice," represents a general consensus of these comments. Despite this feeling, however, I am convinced that there is a difference in the place in which you start and in the way in which you conceptualize the conflict. This difference is reflected in the differing lenses through which nonviolent action is viewed by John Paul Lederach and Walter Wink. SIPAZ, connected to the conflict transformation ideas of Lederach, sees justice as one of several necessary goals (peace, mercy, and truth are the other three).

> Reconciliation is a journey toward a place where Truth, Mercy, Justice, and Peace meet.

> Such a journey . . . lies at the heart of God's intention for humanity. . . . I view reconciliation as *the* mission, the organizing purpose around which we understand and see God's work in history. (Lederach, 1999, p. 159)

So in this framework, justice is a necessary component of reconciliation, but reconciliation is the ultimate goal. Lederach argues against setting these voices against each other. "We must pay attention and give space to the different energies represented by the voices of Truth, Mercy, Justice, and Peace. . . . When we hear these voices as contradictory, we are forced into a false position of choosing one or the other."

Walter Wink (1992) sets the stage a little differently. "Resistance to evil and death . . . is the only way to live humanly in an inhuman world. Engagement in specific and incessant struggle against death's rule is in fact what renders us human in the time . . . that marks our days in the present world disorder" (p. 321). But Wink also sees reconciliation as part of this picture of the pursuit of justice, just as Lederach sees justice as part of the pursuit of reconciliation. "The goal is not only our becoming free *from* the Powers, however, but *freeing* the Powers; not only reconciling people to God despite the Powers, but reconciling the Powers to God" (pp. 319-320).

Wink and Lederach are both important intellectual leaders for nonviolence. However, my reading of Wink leaves me fired up about resisting the evil structures of injustice in the world while believing in the possibility of the redemption and reconciliation of the worst of the oppressors. My reading of Lederach calls me to a ministry of reconciling members of broken communities, nations, and ultimately, the world, while guarding against a false reconciliation which ignores injustice.

Some see a difference between North American and Latin American approaches to Peace and Justice. Gerald Schlabach notes that "the original preoccupation of North American pacifists tends to be *peace*; that of Latin Americans *justice*" (McManus & Schlabach, 1992). Rafael Landereche described the difference noted by a North American in a meeting between nonviolent activists from the north and south. "All of us here are for peace and justice. But Latin Americans are for peace and

justice, while we (North Americans) are for peace and justice" (Interview 4). (The type distinctions here are an attempt to communicate the hand gestures used when saying "peace and justice" during the interview.) This is an important point for peace and justice activists, especially those from the north, to note. While we all share these goals, the way we prioritize them is different depending on our position in society and the world. Those of us who come from positions of privilege are quicker to denounce violence and yearn for peace, as peace leaves us comfortable in our privilege. Those who are from the south and marginalized communities in the north are much closer to the daily institutional violence of injustice and therefore focus first on the need for justice.

An Abeja activist explained that

> Justice, for me is that no one receives poor treatment. In other words, that the indigenous or the poor, it doesn't matter the social class, have a just life. That there are not persons bothering other persons, or . . . that not just the government has rights, but also the indigenous, in other words, the human beings of the world, that we all be equal. (Interview 19)

Here justice equals equality, fair treatment, and treating each other properly. A CPT worker, then, brings in economics into the measuring of equality. "Each created one has sufficient for a whole life–manna and New Testament [economic] sharing . (Interview 31) Invoking the vision of manna begins to define the equality mentioned above, since in the time of when the Israelites were wandering in the Wilderness, the book of Exodus reports that God provided Manna for the people to eat, and those who collected much did not have too much, and those who collected little did not have too little.

This brings us to Jesús Roldán's comments, where he introduces the concept of "equilibrium" as a appropriate than "equality" in talking about justice, since equilibrium allows for different needs and desires among different peoples, but preserves the idea of balance or fairness.

> Jesús: For me social justice is that all of us have access to a more dignified life, [according to] the group you belong to, see what is it that you consider most important for your community. Maybe for indigenous people what they need for their social betterment is different, and even for people who live in cities, or, I don't know, in other sectors, that there

> be *an equilibrium* as far as the distribution of wealth in order to achieve social justice that all of us have access to health services, that we all have access to education, but always respecting the differences of each people, no?
>
> Pablo: Is equilibrium the same as equality or not?
>
> Jesús: I think it is different. Equilibrium is being more just in the distribution of wealth. It is not that we are against anyone having a little more, no? The problem is the accumulation of wealth, that there are people who accumulate terrible wealth. An equilibrium that is shared, that this wealth which some groups get is distributed better. (Interview 1)

In discussions with CPT about the concept of justice, concerns were raised repeatedly about the demands of the Abejas that the perpetrators of the massacre go to jail. The difficulty was that for several CPTers, their commitment to justice felt incompatible with the use of jails. Despite this concern, CPT did pass on to their constituency the Abeja desire for a "justice" which for them meant the arrest, trial and imprisonment of those who had authored and carried out the attack at Acteal. Only then, the Abejas believe, can reconciliation come. For CPT, steps toward justice would be the disarmament of the paramilitaries, the withdrawal of the Mexican military and police forces, the granting of autonomy and the fulfillment of the other aspects of the San Andres accords.

The reluctance of CPT to call for the imprisonment of the paramilitaries, alongside the fact that SIPAZ's justice demands in Chiapas are identical to those of CPT, should serve as an important reminder that we need to not oversimplify the dichotomies I have presented into thinking that CPT is not working for reconciliation nor SIPAZ for justice. Instead, as I have stated above, the difference is in which is the proximate goal. But each organization's proximate goal is molded and tempered by their ultimate goal. In other words, CPT cannot condone an act (imprisonment) along the path to the proximate goal of justice which is incompatible with the ultimate goal of reconciliation. Likewise, I believe that SIPAZ would not be a party to any dialogue or reconciliation process which they felt violated their deep commitment to justice, for example, accepting a negotiation in which one group was coerced to participate or in which the rights of both sides were not respected.

Reconciliation

SIPAZ's discussion of reconciliation emphasizes that reconciliation is a process which takes time. SIPAZ current director explained to me more than once that one should be prepared for a reconciliation process to take as long as it took the conflict to develop in the first place.

> Peace is constructed step by step, paying attention to a series of structural and situational considerations. It isn't something that can be achieved by applying a mechanistic formula. Nor is it something that one obtains just by signing some agreements–especially where the social fabric has been so torn and divided, as in the case of Chiapas. What is truly important in the creating of peace is the process of Reconciliation; that is to say, the re-establishment and the reconstruction of a series of healthy relationships, horizontal and vertical, between all those involved that will allow the places where people live to become "true communities and not just houses." This must be done by establishing firm foundations, which will demonstrate the true will of those involved to resolve conflict in peaceful ways. (SIPAZ *Report* 2:3, July, 1997)

Reconciliation, then, has to do with re-weaving the social fabric. As long as relationships in the communities of Chiapas are broken, the pain of the conflict will continue to replicate itself. Communities where there are two schools, two health centers, two governments, and where family members refuse to speak to each other illustrate some of the ways in which the social fabric has been torn. SIPAZ sees its role as helping to facilitate dialogue between individuals and groups which want to re-weave the social fabric, which desire such a dialogue but find it difficult to begin.

The nonviolent ethics of both CPT and SIPAZ call for the realization that forgiveness is an indispensable ingredient in reconciliation. One model for this process of forgiveness is the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It is instructive and relevant to our discussion of reconciliation and justice to note the process undertaken in South Africa. First, the truth and reconciliation process began after the end of apartheid. So, in relation to the issue under consideration, justice had been done. But this is not the retributive justice of jail, execution, or fines, but a justice which seeks to make things right. In order for things to be made right, it was important to bring out the stories of abuse and oppression, which had occurred under the apartheid regime in South Africa, and publicly identifying the perpetrators. But once that was done, the perpetrators, if

they had publicly repented of their acts, were offered forgiveness. Imprisonment and punishment in cases of large scale disruption of the social fabric such as in South Africa, Chiapas, or elsewhere, only serves to perpetuate the cycle of violence. However, it is essential for those responsible for crimes to recognize the harm their crimes have caused, and agree to turn in a new direction. \

Mexican SIPAZ worker Eduardo Rodriguez explained the steps needed to establish justice. Here, in contrast to CPT, Rodriguez accepts that in order for reconciliation, or "a new relationship" to happen, it may be necessary for someone to be punished or to "pay for social justice."

> Reconciliation has to do with a new relationship, with a new understanding, which results in justice for both parties. It isn't forgetting, because saying we forget is to say that what happened wasn't true, and in the future it will happen again. So for a complete healing, talking about a serous conflict, reconciliation consists in beginning by reliving the pain, giving form to this pain, and each one taking their responsibility. And if anyone has to pay for social justice, well, that's how it has to be, based on the law. Independently of if the other party has pardoned or not. Reconciliation does not mean immediate forgiveness. It may take a long time to arrive at forgiveness. But it is a process in which both parties are conscious that another kind of relationship can be achieved. It is not a relationship of forgetting, not a relationship of ignoring each other, but instead a relationship of pain, of seeing each other, of healing. (Eduardo Rodriguez, Interview 7)

This, then is no easy, cheap reconciliation which is done quickly and carelessly and falsely. Instead it is one which recognizes that there will be ongoing pain over the past, and one in which forgiveness is a goal to move toward.

After the Second Ecumenical Conference for Peace and Reconciliation, an article in the SIPAZ Report also talked about forgiveness. Here, SIPAZ here argues that in the communities of Chiapas there are people on both sides who have committed offenses for which they should ask for forgiveness.

> It became clear during the conference that in order to continue working together on peace and reconciliation, it would be necessary to ask forgiveness for the offenses committed against one another. Acknowledging that everyone had contributed in one form or another to the division and polarization within their communities and that as different religious groups they had accused each other was perhaps one of the most difficult things to accept. (SIPAZ *Report* 2:4, October, 1997)

SIPAZ sees, then, the need for a mutual accounting and forgiveness, where blame is shared by all

sides. This view rejects what SIPAZ sees as a facile view of some solidarity activists of the north, as well as some Mexican activists, that the "movement" is always right, and the "mal gobierno (bad government)" is always wrong.

CPT's primary commitment to the goal of justice, then, leads them to a primary action focus on nonviolent direct action. SIPAZ's primary commitment to the goal of reconciliation, leads them to focus their action in the communities on conflict transformation.

Partisanship and Nonpartisanship

A strong tenet of most third party intervention is that of nonpartisanship. This is alternatively expressed as impartiality, political independence, a refusal to take sides, objectivity, and, at times, even neutrality. In constructing a working definition of nonpartisanship in relation to peace team work, it is helpful to look at how it has been employed by the groups themselves.

Peace Brigades International (PBI), the oldest and largest of the established peace team groups which has around 50 full-time workers at any one time, states a strong commitment to nonpartisanship in its 1992 Mandate Statement:

> As an international third-party force PBI acts in an independent and non-partisan manner. According to its Vedchhi Declaration, non-partisanship implies:
> -dealing with all parties with an open mind
> -reporting as objectively as possible
> -refraining from judgmental responses
> -voicing concerns to those responsible without being accusative.
> Non-partisanship does not mean indifference, neutrality or passivity towards injustice or towards violation of human rights, personal dignity and individual freedom. On the contrary: PBI is fully committed to these values and struggles against violence - physical or structural - as a means of establishing peace. (PBI, 2002)

PBI encourages its workers to avoid becoming involved in the work of the groups whom they assist or escort, and to not become involved in the policies of the host country.

At a recent meeting, the members of the European Network for Civil Peace Services (ENCPS, 2000) discussed the question of impartiality and partisanship. They decided that

> we support every party which commits itself to deal nonviolently with the conflict, with respect for the other side and the will to dialogue. This does not exclude peace teams from having contacts with oppressive or violent parties, but these parties will not have our support.

Guus Meijer (1997) writes that there are

> dilemmas posed by the conflict resolution ethos of impartiality, neutrality or nonpartisanship, as requirements for third-party interveners. Many conflict situations are characterised by severe power imbalances between the parties, or by clear injustices suffered by one side, e.g. the denial of basic rights.

At times these power imbalances create a dynamic where a mediator is "accused of siding with the status quo, of 'pacification' rather than 'peacemaking'" (Meijer, 1997). It is for this reason that CPT questions whether it is right to try to be impartial, or even whether it is possible, since in a case of an imbalance of power, an impartial mediator may have the effect of strengthening the status quo.

CPT director Gene Stoltzfus says

> We are often accused of not being neutral, and the accusation is considered a negative accusation, but we take it positively. Neutrality is often being ahistorical, irrelevant, or simply identification with the people at the top. There is no such thing as neutrality. We all live in this world. We all take a stand somewhere. And so when you're accused of not being neutral, you're accused of not taking [the stance of] the person who is accusing you. (Interview 11)

At the same time, it can be argued that a neutral approach actually is a way of advocating for the side which has less power, when the act of coming to the table implies a recognition by the more powerful side that their opponent is a legitimate actor. This was the case with the first negotiations between the government and the Zapatistas in 1994, since it meant a cessation of active hostility and a willingness to discuss the demands of the new insurgent group. At a later time, negotiations became instead a way of prolonging the status quo. The evaluation of what approach is appropriate, effective, or consistent with a concern for justice, therefore, must depend on a clear reading of the historical moment, or *coyuntura*.

Donna Howard (2001) makes a distinction between partisanship, impartiality, and neutrality:

> *Nonpartisan* intervention does not take sides in the conflict or advancing political, sectarian, or other extraneous agendas. Nonpartisan service responds to demonstrable objective and external criteria rather than to alignments.

> *Impartial* intervention focuses on victims as individuals, making no distinction based on race, ethnic origin, political, philosophical, religious, or other beliefs.

Neutral intervention seeks the trust of all parties to a conflict by refraining from taking sides in hostilities or in political, racial, religious or philosophical controversies.[79] In practice, it is quite difficult to establish this difference in the consciousness of the actors in a conflict.

David Grant (2000) says that, "almost all of the literature" argues that third party nonviolent intervention (which Grant sees as a type of mediation) must be nonpartisan because it "keeps the interveners safer, it increases their credibility and it opens the way for mainstream acceptability." But Grant personally thinks that "non-partisanship may be only a temporary necessity for the immediate future," and that "nonviolent intervention, like any manifestation of power, can never be fully and purely non-partisan."

One value, then, of a nonpartisan stance, is to be in a position to promote dialogue and reconciliation out of built-up trust with all parties to the conflict. This is the priority of SIPAZ. SIPAZ uses the term "politically independent." SIPAZ defines this in their Statement of Purpose:

> In order to forestall or reduce violence and to protect and expand the precious political space in which dialogue is possible, the SIPAZ presence is: . . . *Politically independent.* In order to establish and maintain an identity as objective, credible observers, SIPAZ cannot be either part of or under the direction of any of the principal parties to the conflict and it must strive to observe and report without political bias. While we cannot be neutral on the issue of justice, we recognize that any real solution will require the participation of all parties to the conflict. Moreover, we believe that advocacy is not the only way to actively support justice. In the case of Chiapas we see that a key contribution we as outsiders can make to the achievement of justice is to draw on our experience, our reputations and our best energies to push forward a peace process in which Indian peasants and executive branch representatives sit down as equals to address the legacy of centuries of injustice. (SIPAZ, Statement of Purpose)[80]

In this statement, the SIPAZ founders and board have tried to map out a course somewhere between neutrality and partisanship, which they label "political independence." SIPAZ therefore

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[79]Howard draws on work by Larry Minear and Thomas Weiss for her definition of nonpartisan, Alain Destexhe for the definition of impartial, and the neutrality definition is based on Red Cross policy as founded in Geneva Conventions.

eschews advocacy and taking sides with any of the parties to the conflict, but later in the same paragraph, declares as a goal that "Indian peasants and executive branch representatives sit down as equals to address the legacy of centuries of injustice." This last statement may seem to have partisan overtones, since Indian peasants and executive branch representatives have never been political equals in Mexican society, and the belief that there is a "legacy of injustice" is at the core of the Zapatista and *Abeja* discourse.

However, in the Mexican context, this statement actually declares as a goal that which both the Indigenous resistance and the Mexican Government have ascribed to. Dominant Mexican discourse has been officially "revolutionary" for much of the 20th century. Justice and equality are clearly ideals which are held up and reflected in the Mexican constitution, even when not honored in practice.[81] At times, such as in during the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas, revolutionary principles such as land reform, and nationalization of oil and mineral resources have been put into practice. This is in sharp contrast to Guatemala and many other Latin American countries where such reforms never took root.

Since the Cardenas presidency of the 1930s, however, the PRI (the Institutional Revolutionary Party) and the Mexican government while maintaining revolutionary rhetoric, have become more institutional than revolutionary. In the 1980s the party took a turn toward economic liberalism, choosing to follow the line of the Reagan administration's Baker plan and the IMF's structural adjustment at the time of the 1983 debt crisis instead of following Peruvian Alan Garcia's call for a united front of debtor nations, and Cuba's call for nonpayment of the debt. Mexico is strategic for the United States as a major supplier of oil. Much of the oil production and reserves are located in the southeastern states, not far from the conflict area.

Therefore, maintaining control of this area is a high priority not only for the Mexican power

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[80]See Appendix E for the full statement of purpose.
[81] President Salinas even named his son Emiliano, after Emiliano Zapata.

structure, but also for Mexico's big brother to the north. At every level, international, national, and local, players have lined up on each side of the conflict. Following is a sketch of the sides.

Table 4: Political Divisions in Chiapas

Official side	Opposition
Government	EZLN
PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party)	PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution)
Corporative organizations	Zapatista support base
Ranchers	Popular organizations
Many Evangelicals	Diocese, catechists,
Many Mestizos	*Pueblo Creyente*
Paramilitaries	Most NGOs
Indigenous *Caciques*	Civil Society (*Abejas*, *Xi'nich*, etc.)
Army	
Police	Autonomous communities
Auténticos Coletos	Many international solidarity and human
U.S. government	rights groups

Since partisanship involves "taking sides" in a conflict, it is important to try to delineate what the sides are. Table 4 is designed to clarify the primary divisions within Chiapas. However, there are multiple exceptions to this schema, and it cannot explain all the conflicts in Chiapas. For example, both the EZLN and The Bees have evangelical members, and evangelical governor Pablo Salazar, an ex-PRI member, won with the support of many opposition parties, including the PRD. Expelled Evangelicals living in San Cristobal came to the defense of Samuel Ruiz when he was threatened by the *Coletos*.

SIPAZ has worked hard to develop relationships with the left side of the column, whose members were initially suspicious since they are an NGO and entered at the invitation of the Diocese. CPT has primarily related to the Civil Society of the Bees, but has also spent significant time in the Zapatista Autonomous community of Polhó, Chenalhó.

In many communities there have been local conflicts, not just between Priistas (members of the PRI) and Perredistas (members of the PRD), but also there have been violent conflicts within paramilitary groups, such as when "Peace and Justice" split into two groups. And some groups and

individuals allied with the Zapatistas have distanced themselves, also leading to conflict. So, while, the basic conflict since 1994 has been between the two groups above and is a political conflict (not religious), it is important to keep in mind the complex and changing nature of the conflict. Marina Pages, now SIPAZ Chiapas Coordinator, notes that

> The current context is not the same as the Chiapas of 94-95 when the situation was much more clear: on one side the PRI, on the other the opposition, of which the EZLN was a key component and an inspiration for many. This side was still much more united [at that time]. Currently, we are in a stage of advanced decomposition of the social fabric which makes taking sides . . . a source of greater division. (E-mail communication with author, 3/13/02)

Currently there is contention between the government and the resistance over granting autonomy, and other specific concessions which the EZLN has demanded. Both sides have publicly declared their willingness to sit down and negotiate and both sides recognize that Indigenous peoples are marginalized in Mexican society. It is in the direction of the resolution that there is a sharp difference, the government holding fast to a neoliberal vision, the Zapatistas holding to an autonomous, democratic, communal, egalitarian vision. On this issue, therefore, SIPAZ is very reluctant to take a strong public stand. SIPAZ seeks to not take stands which might make it more difficult for them to maintain dialogue with all sides to the conflict, their primary goal.

CPT, in contrast, assertively declares themselves on the side of the latter. CPT Mexico seeks to learn from and support indigenous nonviolent resistance to oppression. ... CPT Mexico will research and develop actions and campaigns to expose militarization, paramilitarization, and the dynamics of Low Intensity Warfare, . . . address how the U.S. and Canadian militaries are involved in Mexico's militarization . . . willing to challenge the Mexican government's use of immigration and military policies as a tool of Low Intensity Warfare. (CPT website, 2000)Comparing the public action requests the two groups send to their constituency, listed in Table 5, reveals a difference which is more quantitative rather than qualitative. Both call for the withdrawal of Mexican military troops from Chiapas, but CPT is more explicit than is SIPAZ. In their public political stances, CPT and

SIPAZ are very close together. Both call for demilitarization. Both encourage appeals to Mexican political authorities to honor negotiated agreements, to withdraw soldiers from Chiapas, to end support for paramilitaries, and to honor the democratic process. CPT does so through public actions and speaking directly to the military, immigration, and other government representatives, and SIPAZ encourages its supporters to contact the Mexican government.

Table 5: Some Public Action Requests Made by SIPAZ and CPT in their Publications

YEAR	SIPAZ	CPT
1998	"Urge the Zedillo administration to: disarm the paramilitary groups, ... respect ... international observers ..., guarantee the security of the EZLN delegation . . ., order a substantial reduction of federal troops in zones of conflict as a ... sign of your will to dialogue." (SIPAZ *Report*, Nov, 1998)	"Support June 25 Return of the Bees" (CPTnet, June 18, 1998) Write to your Senator asking them to intervene on behalf of Cliff Kindy and Pierre Gingerich so they are not deported from Mexico (CPTNet, July 24, 1998)
1999	"Urge the Zedillo administration to: disarm the paramilitary groups ..., order a substantial reduction of the army presence in the conflict areas of Chiapas . . ., recognize international observers" (SIPAZ *Report*, Aug, 1999)	Write to the chief of the Armed Forces to end military operations in the Lacandón, return of army to barracks, investigate kidnappings and assaults, write to the Chiapas governor, to ensure journalist and observer rights.
2000	"Urge the Zedillo administration: to implement UN recommendations including 'demilitarization of society ... [and] end impunity', to respect ... election observation an the autonomy of the Federal Electoral Institute ..., [and grant] a visa to experienced election monitor Ted Lewis."	"Bees request international faxes demanding disarmament and compensation for massacre."
2001	"Write President Fox: . . . call on him to act boldly . . . to establish the conditions necessary for renewing peace talks in Chiapas, including additional troop withdrawals and release of prisoners." (SIPAZ *Report*, Feb, 2001)	CPT supporters are asked to communicate to Mexican President Vicente Fox that "The time for the departure of the soldiers from Guadalupe Tepeyac is long overdue." La Jornada reports that CPT "demands the departure of the Mexican Army" from Guadalupe Tepeyac (CPT press release, Jan 4, 2001 and *La Jornada*, Jan 7, 2001)

Sources: SIPAZ urgent actions, SIPAZ *Report*, CPT press releases.

The difference is in their actions. While SIPAZ maintains a generally low profile within Chiapas and within Mexico, the type of actions CPT engages in--public actions at military bases calling for demilitarization--have brought them a fairly high profile. In addition, it does so as part of a close alliance with the *Abejas*. SIPAZ, while consulting closely with other organizations, does not champion the cause of, or ally themselves with, any one group.

In one of the few cases where SIPAZ did team up with other organizations, the 1996-97 effort to establish a "Northern Station for the Easing of Tension and for Reconciliation" in the northern zone of Chiapas, SIPAZ workers reported that "We have been instrumental in introducing the concepts of impartiality and objectivity to make the team more effective in its work" (SIPAZ *Report*, Jan, 1997). Even that attempt at impartially intervening was unable, in the short time the station was open, to gain the trust of all parties in the zone.

CPT, on the other hand does work that, in the words of corps member Scott Kerr, "clearly changes the power dynamic, in that [the paramilitaries and military] can't push around the . . . *Abejas* and Zapatista support community" (Interview 2). But at the same time it is important to Kerr that the military commander who he has befriended in X'oyep

> know that all the foreigners here aren't here to judge the military and all of us aren't on the Zapatista bandwagon. . . we understand that the soldiers are displaced too. . . it's nice to be the salt and light of God, to bring the message of love and compassion to the soldiers. (Interview 2)

So, the issue of partisanship is really one of degrees. Both CPT and SIPAZ, as well as every other peace team organization, avoid allying themselves with an armed actor in the conflict. Both speak out for demilitarization. SIPAZ works closely with CEPAZ, a Mexican NGO which does nonviolent conflict resolution work and with CORECO, which focuses on reconciliation.. But CPT was more willing to closely ally themselves with a nonviolent actor, the *Abejas*, who have been the target of persecution and displacement and have spoken out clearly in favor of the Zapatista objectives.

In terms of public perceptions, SIPAZ was described by several interviewees as being or attempting to be neutral, unbiased, or impartial. It was clear that SIPAZ had gained the trust of many actors, including some on both sides of the conflict. This was seen as essential by SIPAZ in order to pursue their goal of promoting dialogue and reconciliation (Interviews 1, 14, 16).

SIPAZ has worked hard for many years to clearly communicate its politically independent stance in both word and deed. However, in the charged atmosphere of Chiapas, that stance has been reinterpreted by others in many ways. In my reading and interviews I heard SIPAZ alternatively described by other actors and observers of the conflict as "pro-Zapatista" as well as "neutral." However, SIPAZ members pointed to one of their greatest accomplishments over the six years of work as finally establishing a clear identity as not allied with either side in the conflict. The predominant view of SIPAZ I encountered was that they were pro-peace but not pro-Zapatista. In El Limar, in the northern zone, *Paz y Justicia* (the paramilitary group) and the catechists of the diocese could only agree on one group to invite to their proposed dialogue: SIPAZ. "Everyone else was viewed as supporting one side or the other" (Marina Pages, personal communication, March 13, 2002). SIPAZ's position of being "in the middle" also gained it the trust of a number of embassies in Mexico City, particularly of countries from which SIPAZ volunteers came. SIPAZ *Informes* were used by embassy personnel as well as international human rights organizations as sources of impartial information about Chiapas. And SIPAZ has been called upon frequently to host official international diplomatic delegations from these countries and groups.

It is nearly impossible to distinguish in the field between either the terms or the concepts of nonpartisanship, political independence, impartiality, or neutrality. Statements declaring a group as nonpartisan but not neutral, may be effective rhetorically, but we should not expect this distinction to be understood by the general public.

The issue of nonpartisanship is slippery. The question as I posed it in my study is "Should peace teams take sides?" There is not a yes/no answer to this question. As with UN peacekeeping

missions, many peace team efforts, such as PBI and SIPAZ, adopt a policy of "nonpartisanship" (PBI) or "political independence" (SIPAZ). This policy is adopted for a variety of reasons. From the perspective of SIPAZ, it is important to enter the conflict areas impartially, so that trust and dialogue can be established with each of the parties to the conflicts, with the goal of eventually assisting these groups in coming together to dialogue. For SIPAZ, this trust is key to the work of conflict transformation.

There can be no true and . . . lasting solution if all of those who were parties to the conflict are not, in one form or another, part of the solution. All voices must be included. If not, you end up with what the indigenous peoples have criticized, exclusion. Referring to the Zapatista dream: 'a world which has room for all the worlds.' (Marina Pages, personal communication, March 13, 2002).

In other cases, nonpartisanship is essential to maintain the legal status of the international group in the host county and allow the work to continue. Only in rare cases is nonpartisanship adopted because the interveners really do not see one side with greater sympathy than the other.

The adoption of an active nonpartisan attitude, in the face of a vastly unequal power relationship (the case in the majority of armed conflicts in the world today) is sometimes criticized as an abandonment of those in greatest need of help. However, rather than depriving the marginalized group of support, an independent or intermediary role such as that of SIPAZ can lend greater credibility and some protection to the weaker side, since positioning themselves between the two groups is an implicit recognition of the marginalized groups right to equal consideration. In cases where dialogue or mediation does take place, the complaints of the marginalized group may gain a hearing and partial resolution as a result of the intervention of the "nonpartisan" actor.

SIPAZ's emphasis on listening carefully to the voice of both sides also leads them to be in a unique position among NGOs in understanding the marginalization of indigenous groups which are, or have been labeled "Priistas," or "paramilitaries," but who in many cases have also been victims of injustices. Marina Pages explains that

> It is almost impossible to talk about 'good' and 'bad' actors. If you count the dead and other victims, I can assure you that almost all have some of their own to count. There were also 18 PRI deaths in Chenalhó before the massacre. In the northern zone the balance is more or less equal, also. If on the level of the community you go in with the attitude of supporting one side, you will most likely be a factor of division. This is what has happened. Also, for human rights organizations, a new stage has started in which observation missions try to talk to both sides.

CPT, again, took a quite different approach. And the experience of the close alliance of CPT and the *Abejas* shows that *nonpartisanship or political independence should never be seen as an absolute prerequisite for peace team work.* There are times when the added weight of solidarity from outside actors who bring with them a privilege not accorded the local actors can change the power balance in favor of the oppressed. CPT chooses to intervene in conflicts where the U.S. and/or Canadian governments are at least an indirect actor. This accentuates the power of the CPT intervention, maximizing the effectiveness of actions by the CPT team, made up of North Americans, since the local government, which is backed by North Americans, has to pay attention to the actions of any North Americans in its midst. This has been a lesson which has been especially relevant in Latin America ever since Anastasio Somoza lost U.S. support and fell from power following the broadcast in the United States of a videotape of his national guard executing an unarmed ABC News reporter in 1979.

In addition, not only has CPT/*Abeja* solidarity affirmed and strengthened both groups' arsenals of nonviolent direct action (philosophically, strategically, and tactically), it has also allowed the *Abejas* to clarify their position as pacifists at the time in which they became integrated into international movements for justice. CPT takes sides by committing themselves to struggle nonviolently for the liberation of the oppressed. But it has learned how to do so while continually reaching out to individuals on all sides of a conflict. In Chiapas, CPT maintained a regular dialogue with Evangelicals, government officials, and members of the military. These attempts at dialogue, however, have not always led to acceptance of CPT actions by non-*Abeja* actors. Two internationals who work with the evangelicals observed:

"The Presbyterians of Chenalhó have a negative vision of CPT that they don't listen to them and with their protests they support the *Abejas* and are against the prisoners. Their actions are not appropriate." "CPT, although they have been in the field for a much longer time, have not been able to relate to all in Chenalhó" (Personal communication, March 13, 2002). CPT recognizes that they could have done better in outreach to these groups. (See Gene Stoltzfus quote in Chapter 3.)

Adopting a partisan or nonpartisan position, then, is not only a question of philosophy for peace teams. Rather it is also a strategic question. So the proper question may be not, "Which is right?" but instead, "Which position will better enable us to reduce violence and support justice and reconciliation in this particular context, given who we are and given the constellation of groups already involved in the region?" In some contexts, it will be important to have both types of intervening groups. In all contexts, it is important that groups such as SIPAZ which tend more toward nonpartisan intervention dialogue with groups such as CPT which tend toward advocacy. Both types of groups should be aware of how their actions are perceived and should try to evaluate how their actions impact the conflict.

Interference or Solidarity

One way in which the issue of partisanship and nonpartisanship has played out in practice has been in the question of involvement in local political issues. . In any coalitions of first-world/third world groups, the issue of what actions are appropriate for the outsiders is a central one. In Mexico this is an especially sensitive issue, because of the history of U.S. intervention and domination over the last 150 years. Mexican school children still learn the names of the *Ni*

SIPAZ keeps a low profile on Mexican political issues, but will encourage its international network to contact Mexican government officials to encourage them to honor the terms of the peace accords. They also support a demilitarization of Chiapas and the passage of the COCOPA law to fulfill the San Andrés accords on indigenous autonomy.

CPT maintained a high profile, and undertook public actions–usually consisting of prayer and fasting for demilitarization and justice–both by itself and with the *Abejas* at military bases, public plazas and multi-national corporations. Both groups strongly advocate respect for human rights, which some in Mexico interpret as interference in national affairs.

Requests made to the international constituency in 2001 by each group illustrate the similarity of their political goals. The following two statements appeared in international communications broadly distributed to each group's constituency. The context was the inauguration of President Vicente Fox in December, 2000, the first opposition party president to take power in over 70 years. Fox had sought renewed negotiations with the EZLN, and the Zapatistas asked for three "signs" from the government before agreeing to talks: release of Zapatista prisoners, withdrawal of the military from seven bases in Chiapas, and the fulfillment of the San Andrés Accords on indigenous rights and autonomy signed in 1996 by the government and the EZLN.

In the following months, both SIPAZ and CPT issued calls for the government to fulfill these conditions as a step toward peace.

SIPAZ: "Write President Fox: . . . call on him to act boldly . . . to establish the conditions necessary for renewing peace talks in Chiapas, including additional troop withdrawals and release of prisoners" (SIPAZ *Report*, Feb, 2001).

CPT: CPT supporters are asked to communicate to Mexican President Vicente Fox that "The time for the departure of the soldiers from Guadalupe Tepeyac is long overdue." *La Jornada* reports that CPT "demands the departure of the Mexican Army" from Guadalupe Tepeyac (CPT press release, Jan 4, 2001 and *La Jornada*, Jan 7, 2001).

While the political stances are not so different, the ways of expressing them are different, both in terms of language use and in personal action on the ground in Chiapas. In the above two statements, both groups called for troop withdrawals, but CPT called for the withdrawal of soldiers from a specific base. And while SIPAZ asked its international supporters to apply political pressure

through letters, faxes, and e-mails to newly inaugurated President Fox, CPT asks for the letters, but also three CPTers went to Guadalupe Tepeyac, the site of one of the military bases from which the EZLN was requesting withdrawal and a former center of the EZLN which had been occupied as a military base. The three CPTers spent the first three days of 2001 at Guadalupe Tepeyac in prayer and fasting. This action received more press in Chiapas and nationally in Mexico than any action CPT had done, and immediately, CPT was at the center of a controversy. Several articles in the press condemned the action as political interference in Mexico's sovereign affairs, a criticism which had been made in general of all internationals accompanying communities in Chiapas.[82]

SIPAZ felt the CPT action came at an inappropriate time, when space should have been given to President Fox to follow up on his promising words. SIPAZ also was very concerned about the effect on other foreigners who wished to stay in Chiapas on a long-term basis, rather than come and go every three months as the CPT workers did. Others supported the action as bringing attention to the plight of the displaced from Guadalupe Tepeyac. The military soon did withdraw from Guadalupe Tepeyac, and there were no reprisals taken on internationals or CPT. It is impossible to say what the impact of the CPT action was on the withdrawal, but that small step toward peace did happen.

In summary, comparing SIPAZ's nonpartisan or politically independent approach and CPT's "getting in the way" or taking sides approach, I would emphasize the following points:

Commonalities:

- Both approaches are consistent with third party nonviolent intervention goals of reducing violence and creating space for human rights work.
- Both approaches take political positions which encourage the national government to adopt specific policies which are part of the current contentious national debate when the

[82] Since the 1994 uprising, hundreds of internationals had spent time accompanying communities in Chiapas.

peace team group believes that these policies will help move toward peace and justice.

- Neither group allies itself directly with any armed party to the conflict, although their personal or organizational sympathies may lie more with the group fighting for those with less power, or those who have been the victims of greater violence.
- Both groups are effective in reducing violence and creating space for local action for human rights as part of a larger international solidarity presence. The vehicles for this effectiveness are neither conflict transformation nor direct action, but are identified as the physical presence (accompaniment) in the conflict zone which deters violence, and the international publicity and pressure placed on the government.
- While many foreigners were expelled from Chiapas, especially in 1997-99, neither SIPAZ nor CPT ever had personnel expelled, since the work of neither group was viewed by the government as consisting of direct support for an armed actor, or as carrying out work the government reserved for itself. [83]
- Both organizations believe in the indivisibility of justice and reconciliation and the necessity for both to come about in Chiapas.
- Neither group uses the terms "partisan" or "nonpartisan."

Distinctions:

- CPT worked closely on the ground with a local nonviolent actor which has advocated for the fulfillment of all the demands of the Zapatistas but believes in respect for their opponents. SIPAZ avoids close affiliation with any local group, especially those which are seen as a political actor. They maintain ties to many groups and try hard to connect

[83] However, CPT, the more activist of the two, did have workers cited multiple times for *citatorios*, or appointments, with immigration agents, and in some cases forced departure may have been avoided because the worker was planning to leave anyway.

with both sides in the conflict.

- SIPAZ does not participate in public actions within Chiapas. CPT does, actively engaging military personnel in dialogue and praying publicly that the soldiers will lay down their weapons and go home. These policies are guided by distinct ethics. For SIPAZ, as for PBI, foreigners should not intervene in the internal affairs of Mexico, but merely help create the space and provide the tools for Mexicans to determine their own future. For CPT, injustice has no borders. Christian Peacemakers must equally oppose injustice wherever it exists.
- CPT is guided by a spiritual tradition strongly based in Christianity and, literally, wears its beliefs on its sleeve. SIPAZ includes both religious and philosophical pacifists and does not present itself as a religious organization.[84]
- CPT works fervently for justice guided by a hope for reconciliation and a love for the enemy. SIPAZ works fervently for reconciliation, focusing great effort on reaching out to all sides, including the aggressors, guided by a sensitivity to the need for justice for the victims of violence and oppression. This represents a paradoxical and complementary distinction.

Suggestions for Peace Teams:

If you adopt a policy of nonpartisanship, do not tie your hands by preemptively eliminating nonviolent direct action from the potential reservoir of actions. The more limited definition of nonpartisanship as "not allying with any armed party to a conflict, and maintaining contact and communication with all sides,"[85] clearly expresses the intent to not take sides in a war, but leaves open space to advocate for justice in cases of abuses and the possibility of assisting nonviolent

[84] SIPAZ is "based on faith and/or the principles of nonviolent action and of Conflict Transformation" (Statement of Purpose) and works closely with many different religious actors.

[85] This is a definition of nonpartisanship which would include both SIPAZ and CPT in the tent.

human rights or social justice groups. Both conflict transformation and nonviolent direct action can be useful in reducing violence and creating space.

Marina Pages suggests that peace teams define their strategy in function of a profound political analysis of the situation in which they are thinking of intervening and carry out consultations with the greatest variety of possible actors. If it is a violent conflict, human rights and nonviolent direct actions can be the best entrance. If the war has developed to the point of a deep deterioration of the social fabric, it may be better to maintain a nonpartisan attitude and think of a long-term strategy of accompaniment of the processes of reconstruction and reconciliation. In conflict transformation it is said 'it will take as much time to come out of a conflict as it did to get into it.' (Personal communication, March 13, 2002)

Conflict Transformation and Nonviolent Direct Action

The controversy over the Guadalupe Tepeyac action illustrates the distinction at the heart of the difference between CPT and SIPAZ: the *method* which is emphasized. These two streams of practice within peacemaking movements today are sometimes in tension and sometimes fall more easily into complementary roles. In the case of SIPAZ and CPT they are labeled as "conflict transformation," on the one hand, and "nonviolent direct action," on the other. While most of the time these roles have worked out to be very complementary, at times, such as with Guadalupe Tepeyac, they come into tension. These two strategies parallel the orientation toward reconciliation and justice, respectively.

John Paul Lederach, who is an important advocate within the larger peacemaking and conflict resolution communities for the conflict transformation approach, describes transformation as both descriptive and prescriptive. It is descriptive in that it shows us how conflicts progress and change through different stages as well as how it changes the individuals involved in the conflict in terms of

their perceptions of themselves, others and the issues involved. It is prescriptive in that it implies a search for creative ways to transform a conflict to reduce its destructive potential and to enable the conflict to lead to constructive systemic change. The language of transformation also avoids implying that a conflict can really be "resolved" or "managed." (Lederach, 1995).

Conflict transformation aims at finding processes for listening to the parties to a conflict and bringing them together in dialogue in a way that will reduce the violence resulting from that conflict. While proponents may also have Gandhian roots, and promote a way of waging conflict which carries respect for the opponent, conflict transformation is most closely connected to traditions of mediation and negotiation. Lederach talks about finding a balance between truth, mercy, justice, and peace. Only in that way can reconciliation occur (Lederach, 1994).

Nonviolent direct action builds on the strategies and philosophy of revolutionaries such as M.K. Gandhi and is a form of struggle for justice and liberation which refuses to do harm to the other, while refusing to submit to the will of the oppressor. Both conflict transformation and nonviolent direct action share a commitment to loving the enemy, and to the end-goals of justice and reconciliation. They are sometimes expressed as different stages of one process, where nonviolent direct action is first needed to strengthen the side which is oppressed, allowing advancement to the next stage of dialogue and conflict transformation (Hart, 2001). However, in Chiapas both of these strategies were employed simultaneously,. The two models at times caused some strategic disagreements between the two groups, but more salient is the complementarity between the models and the work of the two groups, who see each other as natural allies (and often also close friends) in their work.

The writings of John Paul Lederach on Conflict Transformation and Walter Wink and others on nonviolent direct action are helpful in exploring the different ideological, theological, and practical bases to the two approaches.

Both approaches can be successful methods of violence reduction and creation of political

space. Conflict transformation techniques seek to create space for dialogue, direct action seeks to create space for power to shift to new political actors. It should also be noted that these two categories describe different tendencies, but are not mutually exclusive. Direct action is a way to transform conflict. However, conflict transformation does imply being in the middle, and direct action implies advocacy.

Walter Wink (1992) writes of the principalities and powers, a phrase which CPT uses a lot. For Wink, this Biblical image represents what he calls "The Domination System" in which the Satanic power of evil and oppression reside. Earthly institutions can and do become part of this demonic Domination System "when it abandons its divine vocation for pursuit of its own idolatrous goals" (p. 72).

> Despite any excellences these institutions may individually possess, they are collectively caught up in a world-system blind to its Creator and drunk on self-aggrandizement. They are at one and the same time divinely ordained and acolytes of the kingdom of death. (p. 78)

Wink denounces the "myth of redemptive violence" which came into the Judeo-Christian tradition by way of the Babylonian religion. "Violence was for the religion of ancient Mesopotamia what love was for Jesus: the central dynamic of existence" (p. 14). The struggle between the two competing paradigms of love and redemptive violence continues in the world today. The hegemonic idea is that of redemptive violence. "We can 'take out' Osama Bin Laden and in so doing things will be better." "The Atom bomb will save lives." And so on. This myth is also played out in every movie where the good ones defeat the evil ones through violence.

For Wink, nonviolent direct action was Jesus' prescription for opposing the domination system with creative love. He traces this theme throughout the Bible and sees it as normative for Christians today. The job of a Christian is to nonviolently resist the evil system which oppresses.

There shouldn't be any more shedding of blood. We are all human beings, children of one God, and we are here in the world. Therefore, we deserve to all live in dignity, together as sisters and brothers. There shouldn't be some above who think they're really big, and others below who are seen as very small, but instead we are all equal. . . . When we have achieved this, when there is

justice, when there is dignity, *not until then* will we see peace. *Abeja* de Nuevo Yibeljoj (Interview 19)

Conflict transformation and nonviolent direct action are not mutually exclusive. Lederach's vision is one which includes justice as a goal, and, in fact, as a goal which is even more achievable because transformation allows both sides to understand the perspective of the other. And for Wink, ultimately, the reconciliation of rebellious institutions to God is the end to which we aspire. However, they do represent different ways of approaching conflict.

In this way I believe these two approaches to active nonviolence accurately reflect much of the difference between the practice of SIPAZ and the practice of CPT. SIPAZ seeks to transform the conflict in Chiapas nonviolently by being a bridge between different parties to the conflict, by bringing international pressure to bear for human rights, and by physically accompanying those whose lives are threatened. By creating space for local groups to pursue reconciliation, they open up opportunities for greater justice, as well.

CPT believes that often, we are tempted to go down the easier path of seeking resolution to a conflict when it is not yet the moment for that to happen. Mennonite sociologist and CPT reservist Julie Hart describes several stages of a conflict. These include a latent stage, when the conflict is building; a confrontational stage, during which nonviolent direct action is most appropriate; a negotiation stage, in which facilitation of dialogue and mediation may be appropriate; and a peace-building stage, when the torn fabric of society is woven back together (Hart, 2001).

CPT's charism is to be part of the confrontational stage, because it is this stage that they feel is most often left unaccompanied. SIPAZ, however, was founded based on the observation that there were lots of solidarity groups in Chiapas; what was needed was something different, an approach which listens to and respects all sides, and eventually will be able to bring those sides together to listen to and respect each other. This approach fits best with Hart's peace-building stage.

Chapter 5 - Conclusion

Critical Pedagogy and Peace

I refuse to add my voice to that of the "peacemakers" who call upon the wretched of the world to be resigned to their fate. My voice is in tune with a different kind of language, another kind of music. It speaks of resistance, indignation, the just anger of those who are deceived and betrayed. It speaks, too, of the right to rebel against the ethical transgressions of which they are the long-suffering victims.

-Paulo Freire (1998)

A final question I have battled with is that of the relationship between critical pedagogy[86] and nonviolence. In pondering this question I have found myself heading in three directions. One place I have gone is to re-examine the ideas and practice of Gandhi and Freire in dialogue with each other. I find several important commonalities here, and also some striking distinctions. The most important commonality is that both men were deeply committed to and involved in the struggles of the oppressed in their particular context, Gandhi in South Africa and India, Freire in northeastern Brazil and later in all of Brazil, Latin America, and beyond. Both men advocated a struggle which embodied the principle of love and respect. This love cuts both ways, asserting the importance of what we people in the United States might call "self-esteem," and Chiapanecos might call recovery of dignity, as well as a love for the opponent in the struggle. Both hold the conversion of the opponent as a goal to be sought after. However, Gandhi was much more clearly positioned as a leader of a movement and was at times criticized for being undemocratic. Freire was a strong advocate of empowerment of the oppressed, but did not position himself as a leader of a movement.

A second direction is to examine the different pedagogies of nonviolent and violent action. Violence produces the desired results when it either eliminates the opponent, forces the opponent to

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[86] Critical Pedagogy is the practice of education as liberation. It grew out of the publishing by Brazilian educator Paulo Freire's work *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970). Today, such writers as Peter McLaren, bell hooks, Ira Shor, Sonia Nieto, Henry Giroux, Donaldo Macedo, carry on Freire's tradition, applying the critical lenses of race, class, and gender to educational practice.

acquiesce, or through terror reduces civilian support for the opponent. Nonviolence is also coercive at times, but many times produces the desired results when either the opponent is converted, the opponent is persuaded to compromise, or the sympathy of the civilian population is won, reducing the power base of the opponent. Conversion, persuasion, and gaining sympathy are all pedagogical acts, provoking critical transformation of consciousness. The pedagogies of violence and nonviolence would be a worthy focus of further research.

A third place which the relation between critical pedagogy and nonviolence takes us is to the responsibility of educators to build the general consciousness of the possibility of peace. Just as a movement was needed for people in the 19th century to shift their beliefs about slavery (Sowell, 1994), today we need a massive worldwide movement to change our beliefs about war and violence. In order for war to be eliminated, it is necessary for people to stop seeing violence as the last resort (which too often and too quickly converts to the first resort) for resolving conflicts. Part of this struggle is a re-visioning of history which gives recognition to the nonviolent struggles of hundreds of groups all over the world throughout history.

Equally important is to view conflicts not as isolated aberrations of human society, but as consequences both of difference and of injustice. Educators' responsibility here is, together with students, to do as Freire proposed, to read the word and read the world, locating themselves within the systems of injustice and within the context of multiple identities involving culture, language, religion, power, nationality, sexual orientation, age, intelligence, gender, race, and class. Then as individuals and groups we decide what action we will take to construct the kind of world we envision. The educator's role here is to facilitate an understanding of how to struggle for justice and social change without doing violence to others.

While most writings in critical pedagogy do not refer specifically to nonviolence, a few have focused on it. Others bring a focus which implies nonviolence. For example, Michael W. Apple (1990), in his book *Ideology and Curriculum*, writes (quoting Marcus Raskin) that "no inhuman act

should be used as a shortcut to a better day."

While the purpose of this dissertation is not to thoroughly examine the question of peace education, it is important to address the issue as a way of understanding the processes which are at work behind nonviolence, be it nonviolent direct action or conflict transformation.

In "Towards a critical pedagogy of peace education," Svi Shapiro (2001) makes an argument for a pedagogy which prepares students to deconstruct violence, create culture and resolve conflict peacefully.

> More than ever we need an education that will address why we make wars, destroy lives, brutalize and devalue others, and follow those who lead us into the blind rage of ethnocentrism or other forms of hatred and bigotry. At the very least globalization will require a more balanced vision of education for our children–one that concerns itself not just with the capacity to work in the post-industrial economy. It will demand also the ability and will to contribute to the making of a pluralistic culture in which there is tolerance and respect for difference, and where conflicts are resolved through democratic means. In the 'new world order' of both growing global integration and intensifying communal strife, educating for a less violent, more peaceful world must be seen as an urgent priority of public policy. We do not know just how many lives will depend upon it but based on recent experience we may surely expect that it will be many.

The education that Shapiro is here advocating, one which reveals and reflects on the cause of war and prepares students for building a world without war is the most important task we as educators face. Every school should be a "peace school," contributing toward a new society.

Shapiro argues that this kind of education should focus on producing specific ways of relating to conflict with others:

> Peace education would be expected to yield four kinds of highly interrelated dispositional outcomes:
> - accepting as legitimate the "other's" narrative and its specific implications;
> - a willingness to critically examine one's own group's actions toward the other group;
> - a willingness to experience and show empathy and trust toward the "other";
> - and a disposition to engage in non-violent activities.

Shapiro's vision is consistent with a holistic, conflict transformation approach. While it may be resisted as being more radical, I would emphasize point four, and change "non-violent activities" to "nonviolent direct action." A vision of a world without war is not a vision of a world without social

struggle, injustice and strife. It is not even a nonviolent future, since individual acts of violence may very well continue. It is, instead, a vision of a world where conflict is waged without the organized, officially sanctioned, planned, technological mass killing of war.

Nonviolence as a Pedagogical Act

The only learning that significantly influences behavior is that of self-discovery or self-appropriation (and self-transformation) of learning, which has been assimilated through experience.
-Carl R. Rogers (quoted in CDHFBC, 2001, p. 13)[87]

As Freire (1998) said, "Education is that specifically human act of intervening in the world." Education, therefore, is a transformative act. To educate is to change. This is not only an ideological statement, conventional educational research also supports this. Events which we experience, research tells us, are much better retained than events which we hear about or read about.

Nonviolent action, then, is a pedagogical act, since it is about the transformation of society. What is needed for both peace (the abolition of war) and for justice (equality) is a change of consciousness of the level which occurred in the 1800s when people first started to imagine that it would be possible to imagine a world without slavery. Although slavery had existed for millennia, some people dared to imagine that it could be different, and then went on to work to make their imagination a reality. Our task for the twenty-first century is to imagine a world without war, and then to make that world a reality.

Teaching and Nonviolence

As critical educators, we must develop and use peace curriculum. We must create and demand the space in our classrooms to teach nonviolence. And we must be models of nonviolence in our classrooms and in our lives.

- Teaching about Violence: We cannot challenge our opponent unless we know it. In this case,

the opponent is violence in all its manifestations, and especially killing, which deprives the other of any chance to choose, to struggle, to exist. Students need to understand how violence works in its political, economic, physical and psychological aspects. They need to understand the human consequences of war, and the ways that any concentration of power, be it racism, sexism, classism or imperialism contributes to violence (White, 2001; Chomsky, 1993; Chomsky, 2000; Hernandez, 2001; Berquist, Peñaranda & Sanchez, 2001).

- Telling the Story of Nonviolence: Our histories must include the history of nonviolent struggle. Not just of Tolstoy, Gandhi, and King, but also of all the *Abejas* and Zapatistas of the world. Of both those who chose nonviolence because of an ideological commitment and of those who chose nonviolence because it worked. We must teach of the general strike in Guatemala in 1944, of the Czech resistance of 1968, of labor struggles throughout the last century. We need to teach how those marginalized by nationality, sex, income, or ethnicity have struggled nonviolently for justice throughout history (Sharp, 1973; Hawkley & Juhnke, 1993; Juhnke & Hunter, 2001; Sutherland & Meyer, 2000).
- Training for Nonviolent Action: Schools must teach students how to analyze, strategize and organize. Knowing how to effect social change must be at the center of the curriculum (Herr & Herr, 1998; Wink, 1987; Hahn; 1992; Sharp, 1973; Lakey, 2001).
- Nonviolent Pedagogies: Finally, the way we teach must be consistent with what we are teaching. Are we using teaching approaches which are nonviolent, which respect the spirit of each student? Are we constructing democratic classrooms (O'Reilley, 1993; Freire, 1994; Howard, 1999)?

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[87] This quote appeared in Spanish in a book published about Chiapas, as it appears here it is my translation from Spanish.

Concluding Thoughts

The Story

The stories of peace work in Chiapas are still being told. The fragments recorded here just give a glimpse, through the lens of a privileged, white, male, North American. These fragments reveal the outlines of a multi-ethnic movement–Mayan, European, North American, Mexican–that is seeking to work out the implications of living with a belief in social change toward justice, and weaving a strong fabric of healthy communities. Its meeting place is stunningly beautiful, and painfully divided. Coming from different directions, religiously, culturally, politically, Chiapanecos and their compañeros are coming together around the realization that nonviolence is not just the absence of something, it represents a new-old way of coming together, to negotiate change and continuity.

The Impact

Violence Prevention

International accompaniment does prevent violence. I have heard this message clearly from all sides. Liam Mahony and Luis Eguren (1997; Mahony, 2000) found this to be true in their research about PBI's work in Guatemala in the 80s. In Chiapas in 2001, local communities in resistance, peace team members, and a government official all separately conveyed to me their belief that the work of CPT, SIPAZ, and other groups which do accompaniment have served to prevent violence against indigenous communities.

Creating political space

Both groups also have as part of their purpose the creation of space for local actors to pursue peacemaking goals. In the case of SIPAZ this is seen in terms of facilitating dialogue between the

various sides in the conflict. SIPAZ provides trainings in conflict transformation as well as a physical and personal space for dialogue. SIPAZ also creates space through accompaniment and inter-religious dialogue. For CPT, creation of space is viewed in terms of developing, together with the *Abejas*, a repertoire of nonviolent actions for justice. CPT seeks to encourage groups like the *Abejas* in their pacifist approach to justice work.

The Issues

Pacifists of the Bees, SIPAZ and CPT working in Chiapas today approach their task with clearly distinct strategies. Each group has established a different political space for itself, adopting distinct postures toward the primary political actors, the EZLN and the Mexican government.

La Sociedad Civil de *Las Abejas*, while endorsing the agenda of the Zapatista movement, has maintained a separate organizational structure, and has negotiated on their own terms with the government and with local parties. The Bees' separateness has enabled them to maintain a strong spiritual center to their action which is in contrast to the political orientation of the Zapatistas. Their nonviolent response to the atrocities committed against them has been and is a witness to the world of another way of fighting violence, the way of love, the way of relentless persistence.

SIPAZ–while advocating for justice and internationally pressuring the Mexican government to negotiate in good faith, honor signed agreements, and avoid military solutions–has also placed a high priority on listening to all sides in each local manifestation of the conflict, avoiding alliance with parties to the conflict, and reporting information in an impartial way. SIPAZ's relentless persistence in treating each group and individual with respect and dignity in the midst of violent polarization has won them the trust they set out to gain.

CPT, while forcefully denouncing military occupation at the gates of the bases, has also prayed for and dialogued with the Generals, Colonels, and Privates who enforce the occupation. CPTers have planted corn on military bases, spent hours and days praying and fasting with the *Abejas*, and kept

watch over a village threatened with paramilitary violence. Their relentless persistence has led immigration agents to study Menno Simons and soldiers to lay down their guns.

Eight years after the explosion of January 1, 1994, and 510 years after the beginning of white domination in the Americas, the problems of poverty and violence, of exploitation and division, of mistrust and miscommunication persist. Chiapas slowly fades from international awareness, and even Mexicans only occasionally find news from the mountains of the southeast on the front page. It is not yet possible to say that justice and reconciliation have come to Chiapas, a region still beset by inequality and strife.

But it is also true that of the many conflicts of the last twenty years in countries extending from Peru to Mesoamerica, Chiapas has been no less complex, but has been less bloody. Many actors can be credited with a part in preventing an even greater violence from engulfing Chiapas– Mexican civil society which overwhelmingly supported the EZLN's demands but equally strongly opposed a war, an army which obeyed the President's orders to stop their bombing, an indigenous guerrilla army which rebelled but did not seek power, and which adopted nonviolent action as their primary, and, for most of the last seven years, their only strategy, an international human rights and a solidarity community which accompanied indigenous Mexicans struggling for justice and reconciliation, and, last, and in a small, but still important way, three tiny groups of peacemakers.

The task of restoring the balance is not completed, in fact it has just begun, it has just begun again in a forever renewing cycle of human effort to work out the relationship among people, between people and the earth on which they live, and between people and their creator.

Peacemakers have different vocations, but the same goal. CPT seeks to "restore the balance" by adding their voice to the side of the weaker and more marginalized party. SIPAZ seeks to restore the balance by bringing unequal parties to the table as equals. And *Las Abejas* seek to restore the balance by pursuing the just cause of their indigenous compañeros, restoring indigenous peoples to their rightful place as owners of their own lives, but utilizing a strategy which will not destroy the

country they seek to save, preserving the balance of a reconciled community.

List of Works Cited and Consulted

Below appears a list of sources organized into the following categories:

Interviews

Books, articles, chapters, websites, and unpublished sources.

CPT Press Releases

SIPAZ Newsletters and Urgent Action Alerts

Interview List

Interviews carried out between March and August, 2001 by Paul Neufeld Weaver
All interviews taped and transcribed unless otherwise indicated.

No.	Name(s)	Language of interview	Organization	Location of interview	Date
1.	Jesús Roldán	Spanish	SERPAJ	Mexico City	3/20/01
2.	Scott Kerr	English	CPT worker	SCLC[88]	3/21/01
3.	SIPAZ Team Ricardo Carvajal (Mexico Coordinator), Marina Pages (Assistant Coordinator, now Coordinator), Mirjam Pol, Amanda Stein, Mateo Stein, Silvia	Spanish	SIPAZ	SCLC	3/22/01
4.	Rafael Landereche, Span and Eng (and Scott Kerr, CPT)		Frayba-SERPAJ	SCLC	3/22/01
5.	Lynn Stotzfus	English	CPT worker	Acteal	3/23/01
6.	*Abeja* member	Spanish	*Las Abejas*	Acteal	3/24/01
7.	Eduardo Rodriguez	Spanish	SIPAZ worker	SCLC	3/25/01
8.	CPT - Chiapas team Scott Kerr, Lynn Stoltzfus, Chris Schweitzer, Fred Bahnson	English	CPT	SCLC	3/25/01
9.	Mirjam Pol**	Spanish/Eng	SIPAZ worker	SCLC	3/26/01
10.	CPT/SIPAZ encounter ten members of both teams present	Span/Eng	CPT/SIPAZ	SCLC	3/26/01
11.	Gene Stoltzfus	English	CPT director	Chicago	6/22/01
12.	Claire Evans	English	CPT member	Chicago	6/29/01
13.	Marco Tavanti	English	former SIPAZ	Chicago	6/29/01
14.	Teresa Ortiz	Span/Eng	Cloudforest Initiative	Minneapolis	7/11/01
15.	Kryss & Kori Chupp	English	CPT	Acteal	7/22/01
16.	Paula Bidle & Diocese of San Cristobal	English	United Church of Christ Mission Board, SIPAZ	SCLC	8/01/01

[88] SCLC is San Cristobal de las Casas

17.	Eduardo Rodriquez	Spanish	SIPAZ	SCLC	8/02/01
18.	Presbyterian Pastor	Spanish	Presbyterian Church	Town of Chenalhó	8/07/01
19.	*Abeja* member	Spanish	*Las Abejas*	Acteal	8/07/01
20.	*Abeja* Member	Spanish	*Las Abejas*	Xoyep	8/08/01
21.	Marina Pages	Spanish	SIPAZ worker	SCLC	8/08/01
22.	Tomás Johnson	English	Cloudforest Initiative	SCLC	8/08/01
23.	Heike Kammer	Spanish	SIPAZ worker	SCLC	8/09/01
24.	Fr. Miguel Chanteau	Spanish	Catholic Church	SCLC	8/09/01
25.	Official of INM	Spanish	INM (Mexican Immigration Institute)*	SCLC	8/10/01
26.	Fr. Pedro Arriaga	Spanish	Catholic Church	SCLC	8/10/01
27.	*Abeja* member	Spanish	*Las Abejas*	Xoyep	8/10/01
28.	Gabriela Campos*	Spanish	former diocesan worker	SCLC	8/11/01
29.	Marlin Yoder/Sara King	English	MCC (Mennonite Central Committee)	Cuernavaca, Mx	8/13/01
30.	Cliff Kindy*	English	CPT	Lima, Ohio, USA	12/01/01

* not taped ** not transcribed

All translations of interviews done by Paul Neufeld Weaver

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List Of CPTnet Chiapas[89] Releases 1995 - 2001

This is a list of all the "press releases" sent to the CPTnet e-mail list from 1995 - 2001. In June, 1995, the first CPT delegation traveled to Chiapas as part of a SIPAZ delegation. In 1996 there was no activity. In 1997 two delegations traveled to Chiapas, and in May, 1998, the first full-time presence was established. In December, 2001, the full-time presence was ended, with at least one visit by corps members and one delegation planned.

This list was compiled in February, 2002, by Paul Neufeld Weaver from CPTNet on-line archives available at:
http://www.prairienet.org/cpt/archives.php Please send any corrections to weaverp@frontiernet.net

Yearly number of releases:
1995: 4 releases
1996: 0 releases
1997: 19 releases
1998: 26 releases
1999: 46 releases
2000: 42 releases
2001: 45 releases

1997-98 about 2 per month
1999-2001 about 4 per month
The CPT-Chiapas press releases generally represented about 1/5 of the total number of releases for any given month.

1995:
4 releases

- Chiapas: IMMEDIATE CAMPAIGN TO FREE JORGE SANTIAGO S. April 14, 1995
- CPTNET June 7, 1995 CPT SENDS DELEGATION TO CHIAPAS
- CPTNET June 27, 1995 PEACEMAKER TEAM VISITS CHIAPAS
- CPTNET August 24, 1995 HUMAN RIGHTS IN MEXICO: URGENT URGENT In June a team of five CPT persons visited Mexico to express concern for the situation in Chiapas and to learn how our churches might respond. We have just been advised of a telephone threat received by one of our contacts, David Fernandez Davalos, the Director of the Miguel Augustín Pro Center for Human Rights in Mexico City.

1996 - 0 releases
no CPTnet releases on Mexico in 1996

1997 - 19 releases

April, 1997
- MEXICO: Delegation Finds Hope and Conflict: {April 6, 1997}
- MEXICO: Pinpricks of Irritation: {April 7, 1997}
- MEXICO: Officials Impede Peacemakers to Document Abuse in Oaxaca {April 9, 1997}
- MEXICO: Peacemaker Delegation Causes Public Discussion in Oaxaca, Mexico {April 9, 1997}
- MEXICO: Christian Peacemakers hear Stories of Abuse in Oaxaca, Mexico {April 11, 1997}

May, 1997
More Human Rights Workers Expelled from Mexico *Tue, 6 May 1997 09:10:34 -0700 (PDT)*
Mexico: Government Expels More Human Rights Workers *Tue, 20 May 1997 02:35:39 -0700 (PDT)*

Aug, 1997
MEXICO: A War of Love
Wed, 13 Aug 1997 13:22:05 -0700 (PDT)
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: Support violently displaced villagers Action Requested

[89] A few releases in 1997 are about visits to Oaxaca by CPT Chiapas delegations.

Wed, 20 Aug 1997 05:20:44 -0700 (PDT)

Mexico Urgent Action: E-Mail address update
Sat, 23 Aug 1997 08:56:09 -0700 (PDT)
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: Unarmed civilians tell army to leave
Tue, 26 Aug 1997 20:00:59 -0700 (PDT)
CHICAPAS, MEXICO: PRAYERS FOR PEACE AMIDST VIGILANTE VIOLENCE *Sun, 31 Aug 1997 04:39:03 -0700 (PDT)*

Oct, 1997
Mexico: Update on Chiapas Refugees
Thu, 16 Oct 1997 21:03:28 CDT

Nov, 1997
CHIAPAS: As Violence increases, CPT Sends Delegation
Fri, 21 Nov 1997 12:30:59 CST

Dec, 1997
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: URGENT ACTION
Thu, 04 Dec 1997 11:13:06 CST
CHIAPAS MEXICO:NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE TO PARAMILITARY ACTIVITY *Sat, 06 Dec 1997 17:05:10 CST*
CHIAPAS: CPT'ers pray for an end to terror
Tue, 09 Dec 1997 19:19:35 CST
CHIAPAS: Tangled roots *Tue, 09 Dec 1997 08:44:56 CST*
CHIAPAS: Reflection for the Body of Christ
Sat, 27 Dec 1997 21:18:32 CST

1998 - 27 releases

Jan, 1998
CHICAGO: CPT sending delegation to Chiapas, Mexico *Fri, 16 Jan 1998 14:32:22 CST*

Feb, 1998
MEXICO: CPT Delegation Departs for Southern Mexico Today *Sat, 21 Feb 1998 12:49:52 CST*
MEXICO: BEE'S NONVIOLENCE PUT TO TEST *Wed, 25 Feb 1998 17:31:04 CST*
Chiapas: Priest expelled from Chenalhó county *Thu, 26 Feb 1998 23:09:37 CST*

May, 1998
CPT Delegation Meets with Christian Leaders Working to End Religious Tensions *Fri, 29 May 1998 17:30:18 CDT*

June, 1998 (Full time presence begins)
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: Delegation Visits X'oyep *Tue, 02 Jun 1998 18:06:43 CDT*
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: Delegation Visits Polhó *Wed, 03 Jun 1998 18:52:08 CDT*
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: THE RETURN *Thu, 11 Jun 1998 18:13:00 CDT*
CHIAPAS, ACTEAL, CHENALHÓ: An Urgent Call To Walk with Sisters and Brothers *Sun, 14 Jun 1998 10:07:21 CDT*
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: URGENT ACTION: Support June 25 Return of The Bees to their Home Communities *Thu, 18 Jun 1998 15:52:08 CDT*
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: The Bees walk freely, if only for the morning *Fri, 26 Jun 1998 15:38:22 CDT*

July, 1998
CHIAPAS, Mexico: CPT'ers permitted to remain in country *Tue, 28 Jul 1998 18:47:21 CDT*
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: CELEBRATING THE RISEN CHRIST IN ACTEAL *Wed, 29 Jul 1998 09:53:34 CDT*
CHIAPAS: CPT'ers threatened with deportation *Sat, 25 Jul 1998 08:38:27 CDT*

August, 1998
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: Small Miracles *Fri, 07 Aug 1998 09:59:40 CDT*
Chiapas, Mexico: War for Economic Reasons *Mon, 10 Aug 1998 11:52:27 CDT*
Chiapas, Mexico: Marching in the light of God with the Bees *Thu, 13 Aug 1998 14:40:59 CDT*

CHIAPAS,MEXICO: CPT SPENDS FOUR DAYS IN X'OYEP WITH THE BEES *Sun, 23 Aug 1998 13:34:46 CDT*
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: A Community lives in fear
Tue, 25 Aug 1998 09:22:04 CDT

September, 1998
Chiapas Update: August 17-August 31 *Sat, 12 Sep 1998 07:51:06 CDT*
Chiapas, Mexico: Immigration Harassment *Wed, 30 Sep 1998 09:40:10 CDT*

October, 1998
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: Update on the Bees *Fri, 09 Oct 1998 08:39:16 CDT*
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: DEVELOPMENT, PEACE AND JUSTICE
Tue, 13 Oct 1998 10:47:24 CDT

November, 1998
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: LOS ENCUENTROS *Thu, 19 Nov 1998 12:50:16 CST*
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: HUNDREDS COMMEMORATE ACTEAL
Wed, 25 Nov 1998 10:22:20 CST

December 1998
Chiapas, Mexico: Polhó as Model of Autonomy *Fri, 04 Dec 1998 10:40:57 CST*
Chiapas, Mexico: Picnic in the Park *Tue, 15 Dec 1998 10:22:26 CST*
Chiapas, Mexico: Another Acteal? The Plight of Union Progreso
Mon, 21 Dec 1998 10:37:44 CST

1999 - 47 releases

Jan, 1999
Chiapas, Mexico: Away in a forest, no crib for a bed
Fri, 01 Jan 1999 09:26:26 CST
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: Alvaro Obregón Christmas
Fri, 08 Jan 1999 17:57:43 CST
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: Embers by the path
Tue, 12 Jan 1999 17:49:56 CST
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: Meeting with the Military
Mon, 25 Jan 1999 09:26:30 CST

Feb, 1999
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: Marijuana in Magdalena
Thu, 04 Feb 1999 09:31:50 CST
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: DRUGS IN THE CHIAPAS HIGHLANDS
Wed, 10 Feb 1999 14:23:08 CST
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: Update February 8-21, 1999
Thu, 25 Feb 1999 18:37:13 CST

March, 1999
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: LIGHT INTO THE DARKNES
Mon, 01 Mar 1999 12:56:02 CST
Chiapas: Safer and Stronger Together
Mon, 08 Mar 1999 13:55:08 CST
CHIAPAS, MX: SCRIPTURE REFLECTIONS FOR HOLY WEEK
Fri, 26 Mar 1999 11:46:20 CST
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: Palm Sunday Prayers for Peace
Mon, 29 Mar 1999 16:35:43 CST
CHIAPAS UPDATE: March 10-24, 1999
Mon, 29 Mar 1999 12:28:09 CST
Chiapas Update: March 25-29
Wed, 31 Mar 1999 11:58:52 CST

April, 1999
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: PEACEMAKERS PLANT CORN ON MILITARY BASE *Mon, 05 Apr 1999 23:08:39 CDT*
Chiapas, Mexico: Doing Our Work
Mon, 12 Apr 1999 16:43:25 CDT
CHIAPAS UPDATE - Mar. 30 - Apr. 10
Wed, 14 Apr 1999 14:27:29 CDT
CHIAPAS UPDATE - April 13-19
Tue, 20 Apr 1999 17:40:45 CDT
CHIAPAS UPDATE, April 20-26, 1999

Wed, 28 Apr 1999 09:21:22 CDT

May, 1999
CHIAPAS: Reflections on Acteal service
Thu, 06 May 1999 10:17:37 CDT

CHIAPAS UPDATE: April 27-May 3, 1999
Wed, 12 May 1999 08:39:12 CDT
CHIAPAS, MX: Pentecost delegation begins work
Thu, 27 May 1999 12:33:40 CDT

June, 1999
Chiapas, Mexico: Call to Prayer
Fri, 04 Jun 1999 07:40:41 CDT
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: PRAYER PROCESSION IN ACTEAL
Mon, 14 Jun 1999 11:40:19 CDT
CHIAPAS UPDATE: MAY 23-MAY 31, 1999
Fri, 18 Jun 1999 14:48:55 CDT
CHIAPAS: Slow Earthquakes *Tue, 29 Jun 1999 18:12:34 CDT*

July, 1999
CHIAPAS UPDATE: June 14-30, 1999
Wed, 07 Jul 1999 11:09:45 CDT
CHIAPAS: A Visit to "the Other Side"
Wed, 14 Jul 1999 13:19:55 CDT
CHIAPAS: A Meeting with the General
Fri, 16 Jul 1999 08:44:39 CDT
CHIAPAS, MX: ST PETER THE DISPLACED
Sat, 17 Jul 1999 10:46:04 CDT
CHIAPAS: This Time, "Divide and Conquer" Failed
Tue, 20 Jul 1999 11:30:10 CDT
Chiapas Update: July 3-17, 1999
Sun, 25 Jul 1999 07:32:27 CDT

Aug, 1999
CHIAPAS: Peacemaker Delegation Arrives in Chiapas
Fri, 06 Aug 1999 19:25:38 CDT
CHIAPAS,MX: CPT holds "Celebration of Hope"
Thu, 12 Aug 1999 12:20:18 CDT
CHIAPAS, MX: Chiapas team prays for hearts to change
Thu, 19 Aug 1999 09:05:47 CDT
CHIAPAS URGENT ACTION: INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE NEEDED.
Fri, 27 Aug 1999 10:52:19 CDT

Sept, 1999
CHIAPAS UPDATE: July 21-August 13, 1999
Mon, 06 Sep 1999 10:53:56 CDT
CHIAPAS UPDATE: August 16-23, 1999
Mon, 13 Sep 1999 13:54:40 CDT
CHIAPAS, MX: Bishop Raul Vera
Mon, 27 Sep 1999 18:28:30 CDT

Oct, 1999
CHIAPAS, MX: Disappearance or death?
Mon, 25 Oct 1999 14:55:58 CDT
Chiapas, Mexico: Prayer Alert
Thu, 28 Oct 1999 14:01:58 CDT

Nov, 1999
CHIAPAS: Tears and Coca-Cola. Acteal's Day of the Dead.
Sat, 06 Nov 1999 08:52:28 CST
CHIAPAS UPDATE: September 5-September 29, 1999
Thu, 11 Nov 1999 06:03:09 CST
CHIAPAS: Prayers Offered on Mexican Army Base for Newly
Mon, 15 Nov 1999 18:35:44 CST

Dec, 1999
Chiapas Update: October 1 - November 1, 1999
Fri, 03 Dec 1999 19:03:08 CST
CHIAPAS UPDATE: November 30-December 4, 1999
Sat, 11 Dec 1999 11:22:11 CST
Chiapas, Mexico: They will be called 'Oaks of Justice

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Jan, 2000
CHIAPAS UPDATE: December 5- December 26, 1999
(Thu Jan 06 2000 - 14:42:37 EST)
CHIAPAS: Prayer Action for Displaced at Military Base
(Mon Jan 10 2000 - 11:11:07 EST)

CHIAPAS: "Cristo es PRI"-CPT'ers pray in Canolal
(Fri Jan 14 2000 - 13:25:39 EST)
CHIAPAS: One thousand witness against military
(Tue Jan 18 2000 - 11:37:34 EST)
CHIAPAS UPDATE: December 28, 1999-January 7, 2000
(Sun Jan 23 2000 - 12:48:59 EST)

Feb, 2000
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: *Las Abejas* -"No more deaths of innocents"
(Fri Feb 18 2000 - 12:47:13 EST)

March, 2000
CHIAPAS: Corn Tells Mexican Military to Choose Life
(Mon Mar 06 2000 - 10:08:24 EST)
CHIAPAS: " Tent for Lent" highlights plight of displaced
(Thu Mar 16 2000 - 11:04:58 EST)
CHIAPAS: CPT'ers Erect Tent for Lent on Mexican Military Base
(Mon Mar 20 2000 - 15:08:14 EST)
CHIAPAS: "Tent for Lent" Presence Engages the Military
(Thu Mar 23 2000 - 14:40:00 EST)
Chiapas Tent for Lent: Day 6--A call for support
(Mon Mar 27 2000 - 19:11:11 EST)

April, 2000
Chiapas: "We will not Comply with Political Maneuvering"
(Thu Apr 13 2000 - 14:22:08 EDT)
CHIAPAS: One Displaced Person's Story-Hope in Spite of Pain
(Sat Apr 15 2000 - 22:30:38 EDT)
CHIAPAS: Death and Resurrection-Transforming Violence
(Thu Apr 20 2000 - 12:27:59 EDT)

CHIAPAS: Military Base Transformed into Peace Camp
(Thu Apr 27 2000 - 18:52:49 EDT)

May, 2000
CHIAPAS, MX: Pain on all sides
(Wed May 31 2000 - 12:10:54 EDT)

June, 2000
CHIAPAS: CPT'ers accompany *Abejas* on speaking tour t
(Wed Jun 07 2000 - 10:11:48 EDT)
CHIAPAS: Pentecost Actions Against Militarization
(Sat Jun 17 2000 - 13:35:07 EDT)
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: CPT'ERS PRAY AT PUBLIC SECURITY BASES
(Tue Jun 20 2000 - 10:14:22 EDT)
CHIAPAS UPDATE: June 11-24, 2000
(Thu Jun 29 2000 - 19:20:06 EDT)

July, 2000
CHIAPAS UPDATE: June 25-July 2, 2000
(Sat Jul 08 2000 - 10:58:23 EDT)
CHIAPAS: Transformation of military base revisited
(Mon Jul 17 2000 - 10:27:17 EDT)
CHIAPAS: Delegation prays for return of displaced
(Fri Jul 28 2000 - 09:33:22 EDT)

Aug, 2000
CHIAPAS: Bees request international faxes demanding disarmament of paramilitaries and compensation for massacre
(Fri Aug 04 2000 - 11:32:18 EDT)
CHIAPAS: Bees to march, take demands to Governor on International Day of Indigenous Peoples
(Thu Aug 10 2000 - 19:30:36 EDT)
CHIAPAS: Funeral march for the Martyrs of Acteal

(Fri Aug 11 2000 - 15:00:05 EDT)
payment for coffee
(Mon Aug 21 2000 - 12:26:22 EDT)

September, 2000
CHIAPAS UPDATE: August 6-20, 2000
(Sat Sep 02 2000 - 15:03:23 EDT)
CHIAPAS UPDATE *(Tue Sep 12 2000 - 16:04:35 EDT)*

Oct, 2000
Chiapas, Mexico: Going Home *(Wed Oct 11 2000 - 18:58:03 EDT)*
(Wed Oct 11 2000 - 14:18:15 EDT)
CHIAPAS, MX: Moving again--94 *Abejas* families move from X'oyep
(Tue Oct 24 2000 - 07:42:16 EDT)
CHIAPAS: Team corrects AP and Prayers for Peacemakers Reports
(Tue Oct 31 2000 - 13:51:29 EST)

November, 2000
CHIAPAS: Pray with the Pilgrims. Jubilee Pilgrimage 2000
(Fri Nov 03 2000 - 10:11:25 EST)
(Thu Nov 02 2000 - 07:12:07 EST)
CHIAPAS UPDATE: October 1-29, 2000
(Sat Nov 04 2000 - 09:38:18 EST)
CHIAPAS: Move Against Paramilitaries Sparks Tension
(Tue Nov 14 2000 - 10:15:49 EST)
CHIAPAS: CPT'ers present in threatened camps
(Wed Nov 15 2000 - 02:43:56 EST)
CHIAPAS UPDATE: October 30 - November 17, 2000
(Fri Nov 24 2000 - 17:20:36 EST)
CHIAPAS: PEACEMAKER TEAM ENTERS MEXICAN ARMY BASE FOR PRAYER PROCESSION *(Thu Nov 30 2000 - 02:14:57 EST) (Wed Nov 29 2000 - 11:50:54 EST)*

December, 2000
CHIAPAS: CPT Delegation visits refugee communities
(Mon Dec 04 2000 - 12:28:42 EST)
Mexico: Walking a Thousand Miles *(Fri Dec 15 2000 - 09:57:00 EST)*
Chiapas: Update Nov 30 - Dec 24 *(Tue Dec 26 2000 - 14:28:12 EST)*
Chiapas: The Acteal Massacre, Three years later
(Thu Dec 28 2000 - 08:49:51 EST)

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January, 2001
Chiapas, Mexico: Your Action invited for Guadalupe Tepeyac
(Thu Jan 04 2001 - 09:28:18 EST)
Chiapas, Mexico: Pacifist Christians Fast for the Demilitarization of Guadalupe Tepeyac *(Sat Jan 06 2001 - 09:27:27 EST)*
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: FAST FOR DEMILITARIZATION IN GUADELUPE TEPEYAC *(Fri Jan 12 2001 - 14:11:38 EST)*
CHIAPAS, MX: An Open Letter to Mexican Civil Society
(Sat Jan 20 2001 - 13:12:51 EST)
CHIAPAS, MX: CPT'er Questioned by U.S. Immigration in Mexico City *(Fri Jan 26 2001 - 10:19:12 EST)*

Feb, 2001
Chiapas Update Jan.21-31, 2001 *(Wed Feb 14 2001 - 16:44:51 EST)*
CHIAPAS: CPT'ers vigil outside San Cristobal prison
(Sat Feb 17 2001 - 11:34:38 EST)

March, 2001
CHIAPAS: What's in a cup of coffee?
(Thu Mar 01 2001 - 17:03:05 EST)
Chiapas: "Encounters with Ex-Soldiers"
(Sun Mar 04 2001 - 09:59:20 EST)
CHIAPAS Lent Resources: Who will roll away the stone. . . of economic injustice? *(Mon Mar 05 2001 - 14:38:52 EST)*

CHIAPAS: CPT Welcomes the Zapatista March to San Cristobal de Las Casas *(Mon Mar 12 2001 - 18:51:51 EST)*
CHIAPAS: Peace and Indigenous Rights
(Sat Mar 17 2001 - 11:01:18 EST)
CHIAPAS UPDATE: February 13-24, 2001

(Tue Mar 20 2001 - 13:27:10 EST)
CHIAPAS, MX: Mourning and Healing in Acteal
(Mon Mar 26 2001 - 15:47:46 EST)

April, 2001
CHIAPAS: March 13 vigil at Nestle's
(Mon Apr 02 2001 - 14:21:09 EDT)
CHIAPAS: CPT witnesses during Lent
(Thu Apr 12 2001 - 15:01:28 EDT)
Chiapas, Mexico: Coffee Pyre in Acteal: *Abejas* Cry Out For Economic Justice *(Mon Apr 23 2001 - 12:32:44 EDT)*

May, 2001
CHIAPAS: Faith, Struggle and Nonviolence
(Sat May 05 2001 - 18:48:45 EDT)

CHIAPAS: Racism and Indigenous Rights in Mexico
(Tue May 15 2001 - 15:55:58 EDT)

June, 2001
CHIAPAS UPDATE: May 28-June 11, 2001
(Thu Jun 21 2001 - 16:00:11 EDT)
CHIAPAS: Enjoy Tourism? *(Fri Jun 29 2001 - 08:49:33 EDT)*

July, 2001
CHIAPAS UPDATE: June 13-June 29, 2001
(Thu Jul 05 2001 - 23:42:53 EDT)
CHIAPAS: The Prayer of Elders and the Rest of Us
(Mon Jul 09 2001 - 20:58:02 EDT)
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: "PLAN PUEBLA-Panama-We Reject It Completely" *(Wed Jul 18 2001 - 02:58:17 EDT)*
CHIAPAS UPDATE: July 1-8, 2001 *(Mon Jul 23 2001 - 05:05:38 EDT)*

Aug, 2001
CHIAPAS: "Just like the mustard seed, our resistance grows"
(Sun Aug 12 2001 - 10:27:04 EDT)
CHIAPAS: CPT delegation members perform "Theatre of Repentance." *(Mon Aug 20 2001 - 14:31:52 EDT)*
Chiapas Prayer Alert: Displaced Set to Return Home
(Fri Aug 24 2001 - 00:48:39 EDT)
CHIAPAS: The Heartbeat of Cordial Relations
(Tue Aug 28 2001 - 09:57:35 EDT)

Sep, 2001
CHIAPAS: No Weapons Allowed *(Sat Sep 01 2001 - 10:59:07 EDT)*
CHIAPAS: Tears and smiles - Farewell at last
(Tue Sep 04 2001 - 09:29:30 EDT)
CHIAPAS: So Far, So Good *(Wed Sep 05 2001 - 23:37:30 EDT)*
CHIAPAS: Stories from a returning community--Chuchtic
(Thu Sep 13 2001 - 07:31:07 EDT)
CHIAPAS: Six displaced communities plan their return
(Tue Sep 25 2001 - 14:48:32 EDT)

Oct 2001
CHIAPAS, MEXICO: *Abejas* March Where Federal Police Fear to Tread *(Sat Oct 06 2001 - 10:32:17 EDT)*
CHIAPAS: It's the violence you can't see that hurts
(Tue Oct 09 2001 - 18:26:15 EDT)
CHIAPAS: The Final Return *(Wed Oct 31 2001 - 23:52:36 EST)*

Nov 2001
CHIAPAS UPDATE: September 4-9, 2001
(Thu Nov 08 2001 - 14:08:08 EST)
CHIAPAS: Returned, but justice not forgotten
(Mon Nov 12 2001 - 12:20:31 EST)
Chiapas Update: September 10-28, 2001
(Thu Nov 15 2001 - 16:00:17 EST)
Chiapas Update: September 29 - October 22, 2001
(Fri Nov 23 2001 - 10:24:53 EST)

CHIAPAS UPDATE: October 23- November 6, 2001
(Mon Nov 26 2001 - 10:25:23 EST)

CHIAPAS: The Mexican Major and the Canadian Penny
(Wed Nov 28 2001 - 09:06:33 EST)

Dec. 2001
CHIAPAS: Paying the Price of Justice
(Mon Dec 03 2001 - 16:20:13 EST)
CHIAPAS: From Los Chorros to Nestle--An Invitation to End Economic Violence *(Fri Dec 07 2001 - 14:20:06 EST)*
CHIAPAS: A light on the future and an invitation to pray
(Mon Dec 10 2001 - 16:28:39 EST)
CHIAPAS UPDATE: November 11-December 10, 2001
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- **Violence in Northern Zone** - ***July 2, 1996***
- **Hunger strike political prisoners** - ***October 27, 1996***
- **Office of CONPAZ attacked** - ***November 4, 1996***
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- **Harassment of peace-workers** - ***December 6, 1996***
- **Massacre in Acteal (Chenalhó) - 45 Tzotzil Indians killed** - ***25 December 1997***
- **A Step Away from the Point of No Return** - ***January 3, 1998***
- **Anti-foreigner campaign** - ***March 3, 1998***
- **Religious Leaders Call for End to Violence** - ***March 26, 1998***
- **New attacks on the peace process** - ***April 16, 1998***
- **At Least Eight Dead in Government Action against Autonomous Municipality** - ***June 13, 1998***
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- **New military incursion in La Selva** - ***August 22, 1999***
- **In defense of the protectors of Mexican human rights** - ***November 10, 1999***
- **Indigenous law approved by Congress unleashes a national debate** - ***May 3, 2001***
- **Mexican Human Rights Defender Assassinated** - ***October 25, 2001***

Appendix A: Mapping lethal violence in the twentieth century

The massacre in Acteal came near the end of a century which may well be remembered as the century of killing. Matthew White counts "165 wars or tyrannies of the 20th century which have killed more than 6,000 people." (2001) Hannah Arendt, who wrote the classic text *On violence* noted that the twentieth century "has become indeed, as Lenin predicted, a century of wars and revolutions, hence a century of that violence which is currently believed to be their common denominator."

The horror of 3,000[90] deaths in New York City on Sept. 11, 2001 must be magnified sixty thousand times to appreciate the significance of the 200 or so million deaths of the last one hundred years (White, 2001). Several researchers who have studied the history of lethal violence have labeled the twentieth century the most violent of human history, not only in terms of sheer numbers, but also in terms of percentages of the planet's population killed. Michael Renner counts 44 deaths per thousand people in war-related deaths, more than twice the level of the 19th century, when the previous record was set (Renner, 1999). White estimates that "between 4 and 5 percent of all human deaths in the twentieth Century (or something like one in 22) were overtly caused by other people" (2001).

One of the earliest cases in the twentieth century was also the case where the largest percentage of a single group of people was killed. In Germany's colonial war against the Herero of Southwest Africa (today Namibia) in the first decade of the twentieth century, at least 60,000 of the 80,000 members of the Herero nation were killed, 75% of the group, and 38% of the population of the colony of Southwest Africa (White, 2001; Katchavivi, 1990). Table A1 shows the ten cases with the greatest death tolls, as well as the single greatest one-day toll and the highest percentage.

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[90] *USA Today* reports 3,181 deaths, combining the two attacks on September 11, 2001 on New York City and Washington, DC (*USA Today*, January 2, 2002).

Table A1: Lethal Violence in the Twentieth Century
The Ten Largest Cases[1]: Representing 2/3 of the 190 Million[2] Killings in the World from 1900-1999

Rank	Dates	Event	Principal Location/s	Nationality and Number of Those Who Died	Killers' Nationality and # they Killed	Death Toll
1	1937-1945	World War II and Hitler's Rule	Europe/ Asia	Russian (18-20 m), Chinese (8-12 m), Polish (5-6 m), Jewish (5-6 m), German (5-6 m), Japanese (2-3 m) Yugoslavian (1-2 m)	German (15-25), Japanese (5-15), Russian (5-10), American and British(2-5)	50,000,000
2	1924-1953	Stalin's Rule	USSR	All nationalities of what was the USSR	Russian/other nationalities	20,000,000
3	1949-1976	Mao Zedung's Rule	China	Chinese	Chinese	18,000,000[3]
4	1914-1918	World War I	Europe	Russian (4 m). German (3 m) French (2 m) Austro-Hungarian (1m) British (1 m), Armenian (1 m) Turkish (1 m), Italian (1 m)	Germany Russian, French Austro-Hungarian Turkish Italian, British	15,000,000
5	1918-21	Russian Civil War	Russia	Russian	Russian	9,000,000
6	1917-37	Warlord/Nationalist	China	Chinese	Chinese	4,000,000
7	1900-1908	King Leopold's Genocide	Congo Free State	Congolese	Belgian	3,000,000 + 5m 1890-99
8	1950-53	Korean War	Korea	Korean(2.1m), Chinese(.6m), American (50,000)	Korean, Chinese, American	2,800,000
9	1960-75	Indochina War	Vietnam, Cambodia Laos	Vietnamese (1.9 m), Cambodian (.5 m), Laotian (250,000), American (58,000)	Vietnamese, American	2,700,000
10	1945-49	Chinese Civil War	China	Chinese	Chinese	2,500,000

Source: Matthew White (2001), Twentieth Century Atlas, available at: http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/atrox.htm (See this site for a comprehensive list of 19th and 20th century atrocities, over 165 of which killed more than the World Trade Center bombing.)

Single Largest One-day (24 hr) Death Toll

March 9, 1945[4]	Fire-bombing	Tokyo, Japan	Japanese	American	90,000

Source: Green, Richard J (1998) Noncombatant deaths in WW II, available at www.holocaust-history.org/~rjg/deaths.shtml

Case with the Highest Percentage of a National Population Killed

1904-1907	Herero War	Southwest Africa	Herero	German	60,000 38% of the colony pop.[5]

[1] For the purposes of this chart, "lethal violence" is defined as the death of a (born) human being deliberately caused by another human being. *Largest" is in terms of number of deaths. A "case" is defined as a war, campaign, or attack (if isolated – which is usually a subjective judgement call). The chart is compiled according to the information available to me at the date indicated. If you have changes to suggest to these figures, contact me, Paul Neufeld Weaver, at weaverp@frontiernet.net

[2] 190,000,000 is the figure I get by adding White's estimate of 180,000,000 and my estimate of 10 million non-political murders.

[3] This does not include the 20-30 million estimated deaths caused by famine as a result of the Great Leap Forward.

[4] If you count all those who died as a result of one day's acts, the highest is the A-bombing of Hiroshima by the United States on August 6, 1945 where 70,0000 died immediately and another 130,000 died later as a result of the bombing.

[5] 75% of the Hereros who made up 1/2 of SW Africa's population) were killed in this war which the Germans called the Herero War (White, 2001) This percentage rivals what is perhaps the worst atrocity of history proportionally, the War of the Triple Alliance (1865-70), where Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, backed and instigated by Britain, invaded Paraguay and killed 50% of the population (80% of the male population).

Matthew White sees much of the 20th century's incidents of lethal violence to be linked to each other in what he calls the "Hemoclysm" (Greek for "blood flood"). In China

> the Eastern Hemoclysm began with the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in . . . 1911 leading to 38 years of civil war and the Japanese invasion. In 1949, the bloodbath of the interregnum gave way to a greater bloodbath as the Communists consolidated power under Mao (who died in 1976). When seen as a continuum, this phase of Chinese history was a 65 year nightmare which took some 75 million lives. (White, 2001)

The first sparks of the Western Hemoclysm were the Balkan Wars (1912-13) which quickly ignited the First World War. This brought down four of the most powerful monarchies in Europe, leading to a power vacuum which was eventually filled by the Nazis in Germany and the Communists in Russia, who came into the conflict during the Second World War. The death of Stalin in 1953 finally extinguished the Western Hemoclysm after the loss of some 80 million lives.

Together, these two halves of the Hemoclysm represent 155 million deaths, or 80% of the estimated 180 million deaths which occurred in the 165 atrocities White has documented. Another 5 million was from the series of conflicts in Southeast Asia from the 50s to the 70s, and nearly 3 million in the Korean War (White, 2001). About 12 million lives were taken in conflicts in Africa, mostly in the first decade and the last quarter of the century (See Table A2 for the final decade of the century.)

Nearly 3 million are from the New World, with the highest numbers from Mexico (1910-20), Colombia, Central America, and Brazil. Conflicts in the Middle East and Central Asia (especially Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran and Iraq) account for another five million killings. In addition to White's total of 180 million (2001), I add 10 million for non-political murders (figured by multiplying an average world population of 2 billion by an average murder rate of 4/100,000 per year multiplied by 100 years), bringing to total to an estimate of 190 million.[91]

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[91] R.J. Rummel who has spent his career calculating and explaining killing, especially what he calls democide, or death by government, has higher estimates. He calculates 170 million democides, and, additionally, 38 million battle deaths from 1900-1987. For the entire century, then, you would have 208 million, plus 20 million or so for the last 13 years, plus murders (10 m) for a total of 238 million (Rummel, 1995)|

It is important to note that some of White's figures include deaths by famine. These numbers are included when the famine was part of an intentional policy to kill, or when the famine was the direct outcome of a war.

A famine that is generally accepted to be a direct result of political policies was the 1930-33 famine in the Ukraine in which Stalin refused to allow in relief using the 3 million deaths in the famine as a way to force the Ukrainians to give up their resistance to collectivization. There are many cases of famines as the result of war, most famously the Ethiopian famines of the 1970s, but also Somalia, Congo, and elsewhere. The international embargo on Iraq, instituted following the US-led war with Iraq in 1991 has resulted in between one and two million deaths according to documentation by the UN and others (ICA, 2001)

The largest single case of deaths by forced starvation is the 30 million deaths attributed to the mass collectivization of Mao's Great Leap Forward. Nobel Prize winning Indian economist Amartya Sen, in a work cited both by the Right and the Left, looked at Chinese population figures. He discovered that there was a drop in the natural increase in population in 1958-61, and calculated that there had been 30 million excess deaths during Mao's forced collectivization. However, Utsa Patnaik, writing for the international Maoist publication *Akhbar*, points out that the belief that there had been a famine in China did not emerge until Sen published his calculations. Patnaik argues that the calculations used by Sen were faulty, because he disregarded a drop in the birth rate during those years. Patnaik argues that the real increase in deaths during the period was 10 million, and that there was no visible famine, but rather shared hardship that resulted in a general rise in the death rate, spread out over the general population.

However, even on the Left, some accept Sen's arguments. Chomsky writes

> The terrible atrocity fully merits the harsh condemnation it has received for many years, renewed here. It is, furthermore, proper to attribute the famine to communism. That conclusion was established most authoritatively in the work of economist Amartya Sen. (Chomsky, 2000)

Chomsky goes on, however, to cite Sen's less publicized work which announces an even greater tragedy. He compares the death rates and life expectancies in China and India from 1949-1979. The two countries had similar death rates in the late 1940s, when India became independent from England and the Communists took over in China. But from 1949-1979 they followed vastly different policies. China's policies led to a much sharper drop in the death rate than did India's. If India would have adopted China's program, there would have been about 3.8 million fewer deaths per year by the 1980s (Chomsky, 2000, Patniak, 1999). Over fifty years that total adds up to nearly 200 million additional deaths in India, nearly equal to the total killed in the whole world cited in Table A1.

The toll of different economic policies can also be applied to the countries of the former Soviet Union. My calculations, which are admittedly estimates, show an increase of 600,000 deaths per year in Russia since 1990 and the fall of communism. If we were to include all the nations of the former Soviet Union, the yearly toll would equal the yearly toll during Stalin's regime, often cited as the most murderous in the history of the world. The excess deaths since the fall of the USSR might be attributed to capitalism. However, the death rate in the USSR actually started rising around 1965. An important question for research is the cause of this rise.

The death toll I give in Table A1 for Stalin of 25 million is based on Matthew White's estimates. R.J. Rummel has a much higher estimate of 43 million for Stalin and 61 million for the Soviet Union's existence. Most of these were deaths from forced labor (Rummel, 1994)

It is difficult to calculate the toll of economic violence. But this kind of violence has been discussed by pacifists at least since Gandhi. In a CPT-Chiapas press release in October, 2001, Rusty Dinkins-Curly wrote:

> We see the violence of poverty in the children's stomachs swollen from hunger. We hear the voice of the violence of poverty when a young man watches his grand mother dying and says, "We cannot afford the medicine the doctor recommended." We hear the voice of the violence of poverty when people beg for pesos on the street in San Cristobal.
>
> But their poverty is no accident. The price of their main cash crop, coffee, has been driven down again and again on the world market by the manipulation of huge multi national corporations (CPT October 9, 2001)

The death tolls of the twentieth century

Table A1 is primarily based on Matthew White's estimates which were based on numerous sources. Shown are estimated death tolls from the major cases of atrocities in the twentieth century.

It is important to note that White's list does not include homicides. About 10 million people were killed in the twentieth century from non-political and non-war related homicides.[92]

Table A2 gives the numbers for the last decade of the twentieth century, and Table A3 gives the totals for the twentieth century for Latin America.

Here are five additional cases which took over one million lives.

2.1 million	Expulsions of Germans from Eastern Europe	1945-1947
1.65 million	Cambodia: Khmer Rouge Regime	1975-1979
1.25 million	East Pakistan (Bangladesh): Massacres	1971
1 million	Iran-Iraq War	1980-1988
1 million	Nigeria: Biafran Revolt	1967-1970

In the Americas (Table A3), the majority of lethal violence of the last century occurred in Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, and Guatemala which also account for a majority of Latin America's population.

[92] The United Nations gives a world homicide rate of 8.86/100,000 for 1990-94 and 5.82/100,000 for 1980-84. If we figure 4/100,000 x 2.5 billion x 100 years we get 10 million (UN, 2001)

Table A2: Lethal Violence in the Last Decade
1991-2000
The Ten Largest Cases[1]

Rank	Location/Event	Dates	Victim Group(s)	Perpetrator(s)	90's Death Toll	Death Toll of event
1	North Korean Regime[2]	1948-present	North Koreans	North Korea	1,000,000 (famine)	1,000,000 + 1 m famine
2	Second Sudanese Civil War	1983-present	Sudanese - mostly from the south	Sudanese - mostly from the north	1,000,000	1,900,000
3	Congolese Civil War	1998-present	Congolese - in the East	Congolese	1,000,000	1,700,000
4	Afghan Civil War	1980-present	Afghanis	Soviet Union, Afghans	500,000	1,400,000
5	Eritrea and Ethiopia: Ethiopian Civil Wars	1962-1992	Ethiopians, Eritreans	Ethiopians, Eritreans	100,000	400,000 + 1 m famine
6	Iraq: US and International Sanctions	1991-present	Iraqi	US/UN	1,500,000	250,000 + 1.5 m sanctions[3]
7	Rwandan Massacres	1994	Primarily Tutsi	Primarily Hutu	1,000,000	1,000,000
8	Mozambican Civil War	1975-1993	Mostly Mozambican civilians	Mostly Renamo rebel group	150,000	1,000,000
9	Colombian violence	1948-present	Colombians	Colombians	250,0000	700,000[4]
10	Somalian Civil War	1991-present	Somalis	Somalis	400,000	400,000

(Chart compiled by Paul Neufeld Weaver, weaverp@frontiernet.net 2002)

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1 For the purposes of this chart, "lethal violence" is defined as the death of a (born) human being deliberately caused by another human being. "Largest" is in terms of number of deaths. A "case" is defined as a war, campaign, or attack (if isolated – which is usually a subjective judgement call). The chart is compiled according to the information available to me in September, 2001.

2North Korea, where up to one million people died between 1995 and 2000 from famine, is listed first, since these deaths could have been avoided by alternative policies which allowed more aid and admitted the severity of the famine sooner. However, it should be noted that while it is difficult to estimate deaths in many cases of violence, in the case of North Korea this is particularly true since so little information is available and the situation is ongoing. "The North Korean famine bears numerous parallels to the one that China experienced a generation earlier. Both famines resulted from a series of climatic calamities interacting with overzealous attempts to transform social institutions in line with Marxist ideals. Both famines persisted for several years because secretive governments were initially reluctant to admit the existence of adverse conditions and were opposed to relief efforts being undertaken earlier." China's Great Leap Forward pattern of mortality increases, when applied to the North Korean context, results in a model implying about 1 million excess deaths in North Korea between 1995 and 2000." Source: The North Korean Famine and Its Demographic Impact, from the June 2001 Population and Development Review. Rummel (cited in White, 2001) estimates 1.6 million democides, 1948-87.

3 Source is ICA (2001)

4 This number is my calculation. Berquist, Peñaranda and Sanchea. (2001) Violence in Colombia - 250,00 homicides 1990-2000, White (2001), 200,000 in La violencia, 1948-51, estimated 50,000, 1952-89.

Table A3: Lethal Violence in the Americas in the 20th Century:Cases involving over 25,000 dead[1]

Rank	Dates	Location/event	Victim Group(s)	Perpetrator(s)	Death Toll	% of pop[2]
1	1900-1999	Hemispheric Homicides[3]	Homicide victims, USA: 1,110,000, Colombia: 600,000[4], Brazil: 600,000, Mexico: 400,000, Other 22 countries: 400,000	Individuals	3,000,000	1%
2	1910-1920	Mexico - Mexican Revolution	Mexicans	Mexicans	1,250,000[5]	8.3%
3	1900-1999[6]	Brazil	Amazonian Indians	Brazilians	500,000	0.7%
4	1900-1912	Brazil & Peru	Rubber workers	Rubber companies	250,000[7]	0.3
5	1954-1990	Guatemala	Primarily Mayan	Primarily government	200,000[8]	2.5%
6	1946-1958	Colombia: la violencia	Colombian	Colombian	200,000	1.0%
7	1899-1902	Colombia: War of a Thousand Days	Colombian	Colombian	100,000	2.0%
8	1932-1935	Bolivia and Paraguay-Chaco War	Bolivian and Paraguayan	Bolivian and Paraguayan	100,000	3.0%
9	1970-1999	Colombia: Guerrilla war, drug war and political killings	Colombians	Colombians (with US backing and support)	75,000	.25%
10	1972-1991	Nicaragua, Somoza vs. Sandinistas and Sandinistas vs. Contras	Nicaraguans	Nicaraguans (with substantial US backing)	60,000	2.0%
11	1957-1986	Haiti	Haitians	Duvalier dynasty	50,000	1.0%
12	1931-1932	El Salvador, Peasant Revolt-`massacre	Mostly Indigenous farmers.	Government	32,000	2.0%
13	1976-1983	Argentina	Activists	Military Junta	30,000	0.1%
14	1980-1999	Peru - government vs. Shining Path	Peruvians	Peruvians	30,000	0.1%

(Chart compiled by Paul Neufeld Weaver, weaverp@frontiernet.net 2002)

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[1] In every case on this chart, the majority of the victims were unarmed civilians, although in 1, 6-11, and 13-15 there were also armed struggles going on which are included in the numbers. Unless otherwise indicated, source is White (2001).

[2] Calculated as percent of national population at the midpoint of the years cited.

[3] These are homicides not classified as political. Matthew White cites the twentieth US total as 1,056,296 for 1900-1996, adding 54,000 for 97-99 equals 1,110,000. This can also be calculated based on average homicide rate of 6/100,000 per year x 150 million mid century population x 100 years with 100,000 added for higher rates in 70's and 80's. Homicide rates in the 1990's in the Americas varied from 2-3 per 100,000 in Canada and Chile to 40/100,000 for El Salvador and 75/100,000 for Colombia. The average for the Americas is 14.7/100,000. (Bergquist, 2001) Rates rose in the latter part of the century in most of the hemisphere. Assuming an average 10/100,000 rate for the century with an average population of 300,000,000 we get 30,000 homicides per year x 100 years = 3 million homicides in the Americas. More than 1/2 of those took place in the US and Colombia. Brazil would be third with about 600,000 homicides, followed by Mexico with about 400,000. The other 22 countries of the Americas account for about another 500,000 together.

[4] Calculated based on average homicide rate of 30/100,000 per year x 20 million x 100 years. There may be some overlap between these figures and the other three listings on this page for Colombia, but it is clear that Colombia has had very high rates both of political killings and deaths from "common violence".

[5] White (2001)

[6] Many of these deaths, Rummel estimates 75,000, happened during the military rule from 1964-85 (White).

[7] White (2001), Galeano(1973)

[8] Source: UN sponsored Historical Clarification Commission, quoted in Witness for Peace (2000)

Appendix B: Discussion Of Sources

I looked for source material, primarily books and articles, in two areas:

1. Chiapas, focusing on the situation in the highlands of Chiapas over the last ten years, with particular attention to the Church, The Bees, and the Acteal massacre.
2. Peace teams, looking at their historical development, various deployments, and philosophy, with particular attention to CPT and SIPAZ.

In addition, I consulted work on lethal violence in the 20th century and UN Peacekeeping, as well as on the ideological issues which I deal with in this work. These works, while not referred to in this section, are in the bibliography, some with annotative comments.

Chiapas

General Resources on Chiapas

My preferred introduction to the situation in Chiapas is John Womack's *Rebellion in Chiapas: An historical reader* (1999). Womack presents to us documents relating to indigenous struggle in Chiapas from the last 500 years, with excellent commentaries helping us place these documents in their historical context. Thus the Zapatista struggle is located as part of a centuries-old struggle for land, freedom, and justice. The Acteal massacre appears as one of many atrocities, and the current international solidarity with Chiapas finds its roots in the advocacy of Bartolomé de las Casas.

Neil Harvey's *The Chiapas rebellion: The struggle for land and democracy* (1998) is a readable scholarly presentation of the local, national and international aspects of the conflict in Chiapas. He places special emphasis on economic issues and indigenous peasant struggle.

In *Basta: Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas, Revised Edition* (1999) George Collier (with Elizabeth Lowery Quaratiello) studies the roots of Zapatismo in the political,

social, economic, ethnic and religious struggles of the twentieth century in Chiapas. An anthropologist, Collier has studied the highland indigenous communities of Chiapas for four decades. He describes the change in focus of organizing in Chiapas (and elsewhere) in the 90s from organizing as "peasants and workers" to organizing as "indigenous peoples." This change in expression of self-identity by peoples in struggle is an important characteristic of the Zapatista struggle, and has had an impact throughout Mexico where there are over 50 distinct indigenous groups.

In reading the discussion of international organizations in Chiapas, Collier lists SIPAZ among "international sympathizers" with the Zapatistas. It is unclear whether this represents ignorance by Collier of SIPAZ's nonpartisan stance, or whether this reflects the failure of SIPAZ to fully implement or communicate effectively its stance. This second edition is a reprint of the original text published in 1994, shortly after the Zapatista uprising, with a brief epilogue added for this 1999 edition.

A popular book written in journalistic style is *The war against oblivion: The Zapatista chronicles*, 1994-2000, by John Ross (2000). Ross is a reporter who has lived in Mexico for years, and in his passionate style he tells the story, with all the details and intrigue, of the first six years of Zapatista struggle. His previous work, *Rebellion from the Roots* (1995) describes in equal detail the first 8 months of the uprising. While he has an impressive amount of good information, he does not always get his facts straight. Still, this is a useful book (Although he does better in terms of accuracy in *The War Against Oblivion.* Ross' *Annexation of Mexico* (1998) is a history of Mexico since independence with special attention to relations with the United States and the events of the 90s such as NAFTA, the Zapatista uprising, Carlos Salinas, and the resistance of Mexican civil society.

First World, ha ha ha: The Zapatista Challenge (Katzenberger, 1995) presents 32 voices, both Mexican and international, in texts written in the first year after the uprising. Authors include Noam Chomsky, Blanch Petrich, Elena Poniatowski, and Leonard Peltier, and interviews of both *Subcomandante* Marcos and Bishop Samuel Ruiz are here.

In *Chiapas: los desafios de la paz (Chiapas: Challenges of peace),* editors Cynthia Arnson and Raul Benitez Manaut (2000) have brought together 26 writers, mostly Mexican academics, but including some foreign Mexico experts (American Neil Harvey and Central American Edelberto Torres-Rivas) as well as a politician, Manuel Camacho Solis, and a church leader, Gonzalo Ituarte. This is a theoretical and comparative text, searching for the roots of the crisis, comparing the peace process and the role of civil society in Mexico with situations in Central America and Colombia, and analyzing "the indigenous question'.

A short book written by a Brethren newspaper publisher and activist with ties to CPT is *Conflict in Chiapas: Understanding the modern Mayan world.* Here Worth Weller (2000) describes his own sojourn in Chiapaneco indigenous communities to which he was introduced as part of a CPT peacemaking mission and draws links between Mayan struggle in Chiapas and Lakota struggle in South Dakota. He has a good series of color and black and white photographs that show people in Chiapas and South Dakota, their struggle, and the military occupation of Chiapas.

A good reference is *Para entender Chiapas: Chiapas en cifras* (Understanding Chiapas: Chiapas in numbers, 1997). Although already somewhat dated, here are 150 pages of charts, tables, and photos showing demographic, development, social, economic, human rights, political, religious and military data about Chiapas. A great sourcebook to check out the landscape behind the stories we tell.

Our word is our weapon (2001) is a hefty anthology of writings by *Subcomandante* Marcos, the leader of the Zapatistas. Perhaps one of the most prolific of revolutionary leaders since Lenin, here we can hear the many keys in which this literary warrior sings. Some samples:

> Zapatismo is not an ideology, it is not a bought and paid for doctrine. It is . . . an intuition. Something so open and flexible that it really occurs in all places. Zapatismo poses the question "What is it that has excluded me?" "What is that has isolated me?" . . . In each place the response is different. Zapatismo simply states that question and stipulates that the response is plural, that the response is inclusive. . (p. 440)
>
> This March 8 is a good time to remember and to give their rightful place to the insurgent Zapatistas, to the women who are armed and unarmed.
>
> To remember the rebels and those uncomfortable Mexican women now bent over knitting that history which, without them, is nothing more than a badly made fable (p. 12)
>
> If you would like me to sum it up, I would tell you that in the same way that we became soldiers so that one day soldiers would no longer be necessary, we also remain poor, so that one day there will no longer be poverty. It is for this that we use the weapon of resistance (p. 161)

An excellent introduction to the county of Chenalhó, the municipality in the central highlands where the *Abejas* live, is Christene Eber's article Buscando una nueva vida: Liberation through autonomy in San Pedro Chenalhó, 1970-1998 (2001a). Eber, an anthropologist, explains the political and social dynamics of Chenalhó up to the massacre at Acteal. Eber is one of the foremost academic experts on Chenalhó. Also of interest is her book, *Women and alcohol in a highland Maya town: Water of hope, water of sorrow (2000).*

Several books have come out in the past two years about women in Chiapas. Two of them are *Never again a world without us: Voices of Mayan women in Chiapas, Mexico* by Teresa Ortiz (2001) and *The other word: Women and violence in Chiapas before and after Acteal*, edited by Rosalva Hernandez (2001). Women as equal partners in revolutionary movements have taken a big step forward with the advent of the Zapatista struggle. Zapatista women have expressed their determination to be change agents in their revolutionary declaration, "never again a world without us," which Ortiz uses as the title of her book. Through interviews of women and

some men in the Chiapas highlands, introduced by in-depth explanations of the cultural, historical and political context, Ortiz gives both a good overview of the conflict as well as presenting Mayan voices. Of particular interest for my study is the section on the *Abejas* and paramilitaries in the northern zone where SIPAZ works. This work gives a good feel for the civilian Zapatista movement of autonomous communities who are creating an alternative political and economic structure.

The Other Word (Hernandez, 2001) focuses primarily on the massacre at Acteal as a crime against women, who were 34 of the 45 victims of the massacre. It places this atrocity in the context of the health and social position of women in the Chiapas highlands, political participation, and sexual violence.

The Church in Chiapas

Two texts reflect on the life and work of Samuel Ruiz, bishop of the San Cristobal diocese from 1960 to 2000, and the most significant religious leader of the struggle for change in Chiapas since Bartolome de las Casas. Gary MacOein's book, *The People's Church* (1996) is passionate, but poorly and carelessly written, with many historical and factual mistakes. In contrast, Carlos Fazio's *Samuel Ruiz: El caminante* (1994), although written before the Zapatista uprising, is detailed and profound. It goes into the roots both of Ruiz' development, but also of the Catholic church in Mexico. It follows Ruiz' development of the indigenous church in Chiapas, and also connects this to the international movements of liberation theology. Both of these books are somewhat dated by now.

Las andanzas de Miguel (The wanderings of Miguel) is the autobiography of Father Miguel Chanteau (1999), the French priest who served the parish of Chenalhó, of which Acteal is a part, for 33 years. Chanteau was expelled a few days after the massacre for suggesting that

official security forces were linked to the massacre.

Human Rights

The Fray Bartolomé de las Casas Human Rights Center has carefully documented the human rights landscape in Chiapas. Two documents used here are *Militarización y violencia en Chiapas* (Militarization and Violence in Chiapas) (1996) and most recently, *De la memoria a la esperanza* (From memory to hope) (2001) which includes an overview of the work of the center, a summary of civil solidarity and the civil observation brigades program run by the center, a recap of the previous six years, follow-up of government responses to the Acteal massacre, paramilitary activity, deaths and disappearances, ecological impacts, establishment of the rule of law, and the vote on the accords of San Andrés.

Acteal and *Las Abejas*

While most of the books discussed above have good contributions about Acteal, the books in this section focus especially on Acteal.

The Fray Bartolomé de las Casas Human Rights Center has written extensively about the massacre of 45 members of the *Abejas* at Acteal on Dec. 22, 1997. Among these is *Acteal: entre el Duelo y la Lucha* (Acteal: between Grief and Struggle. 1998). This report tells what happened in detail, looks at the physical and psychological impact on the victims, explores the responsibility and response of different actors, and includes testimony.

In *Acteal de los Mártires: Infamia para no olvidar (*Acteal of the Martyrs: Infamy we cannot forget), Martín Álvarez Fabela (Alvarez, 2000) has a chapter for each day from December 20 to January 12. This book intensively narrates the days of the tragedy in the context of a "past of oppression, a present of struggle, and a future of hope." A tragedy of the publishing business

in México is that an important book such as this one was published with only 1000 copies printed.

Two scholars have written about the *Abejas*. Neither of these works has yet been published. Gabriela Campos (2001), who recently concluded studies at the National Anthropological School (ENAH) in Mexico, worked with the Bees for ten years as a pastoral worker. She drew upon her personal experience and minutes of meetings with the local catechists as well as declarations of the *Mesa Directiva* (steering committee) of the Bees to focus especially on the relationship of the Bees with the Diocese and the development of *teología indígena* or indigenous theology.

Marco Tavanti (2001), of Loyola University, was a volunteer with SIPAZ in 1999. In his doctoral dissertation he maps the identity of the Bees as "Tzotzil-Mayan, Catholic-Christian, pro-Zapatista, and as a human-indigenous rights movement." He addresses the nonviolence of the *Abejas*, the political nature of the movement, the relationship to the diocese, and the roots in an indigenous world-view. Tavanti has excellent charts, maps, and tables of military and paramilitary presence and international accompaniment, among other things.

Peace Teams

General

Most of what has been written about peace teams has come out in the last ten years. Most of it has been descriptive, with some attempts to analyze the basis, typology, organization and impact of the movements.

An excellent overview of peace teams is provided by *Nonviolent intervention across borders: A recurrent vision*, by Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan and Thomas Weber (Eds.) (2000). This book brings together 15 contributors, including both activists and academics. Thirteen

specific peace interventions are studied, including: the Sahara Protest Team of 1959, the Cyprus Resettlement Project of 1972-74, Peace Brigades International, Witness for Peace, CPT, and Pastors for Peace which were started in the 80s, and seven efforts initiated between 1991 and 1994. Two additional chapters discuss the history of the movement and present a typology for classifying different kinds of actions. The actions retold here represent great diversity of goals, nationalities, scope, and success. Together, they involved over 17,000 participants from more than 30 countries.

The most compelling book on peace teams is *Unarmed bodyguards: International accompaniment for the protection of human rights* (1997). The authors, Liam Mahony and Luis Eguren have both been active in the oldest ongoing peace team organization, the Peace Brigades International. In their very readable, even gripping, text, they focus primarily on the PBI work in Guatemala during the 80s, and also look at the work in Sri Lanka, El Salvador, Haiti and Colombia. This book explores the effectiveness of protective accompaniment, the nonviolent technique perfected by PBI work around the world over the last two decades. PBI relies on a strong nonpartisan stance to achieve legal status in the countries it works in, allowing it to create space for human rights activists to work safely. Eguren and Mahony, through numerous interviews with former government and military personnel, as well as with activists who were accompanied, convincingly argue that PBI's work has been successful in saving lives.

The historical and moral basis for peace teams is explored in Thomas Weber's *Gandhi's peace army: The Shanti Sena and unarmed peacekeeping* (1996). Weber, an Australian professor of legal and peace studies, starts out looking at conventional peacekeeping missions. Then he traces the origins of the idea of large-scale nonviolent intervention to stop war, both in western movements based in Europe and the United States and eastern, Gandhian manifestations.

The rest of the book focuses on historical and philosophical discussions of Gandhi, and an in-depth look at the Shanti Sena, the movement that Gandhi proposed, and which was organized on a large scale in India after Gandhi's death.

Lisa Schirch (1995) interviewed 26 people from twenty peace organizations about their experience in peace team work. In a very practical approach Schirch discusses reasons for intervening, types of interventions, issues of who intervenes, timing and method. She also looks particularly at the potential of peace team intervention in the civil war in Sudan that has taken 2 million lives over the past 30 years.

Pat Coy (1997) wrote a doctoral dissertation on the PBI work in Sri Lanka from the perspective of a participant/observer. Coy who spent a year working with PBI in Sri Lanka, looks in detail at PBI's work there. He critiques the work and offers an interesting discussion of the role of privilege in the dynamic of protective accompaniment.

Christian Peacemaker Teams

While no books have been written on Christian Peacemaker Teams, CPT members have been prolific in writing articles, press releases, reports, and chapters for books. Some several hundred pages are available on the CPT website (2000). They give a good feel of the experience of CPT workers and are written with the intention of influencing the reader to support the work of CPT and to take action in solidarity with the partner groups, such as the Bees, who are struggling for justice against US-backed violent oppression. There are also articles that have been published in the press in Mexico (and other countries CPT has operated) which sometimes give a window into how others view CPT.

SIPAZ

Like CPT, no definitive history of SIPAZ has been published. However, SIPAZ also has

published its own information, mostly through its quarterly "Report" (2000). In sharp contrast to CPT, which has a policy of only publishing stories, alerts and reports that relate directly to its work or that of its partner organizations, SIPAZ's publications are mostly reporting and analysis of the situation in Chiapas. There are, however, internal documents that record the history, work and processes of SIPAZ. An unpublished case study report written by Carlisle Levine about SIPAZ for the 2000 Reflecting on Peace Practice conference in Europe is quite complete and helpful (2000, 2002)

Appendix C: "What would Jesus Do?" A Sermon on the *Abejas* and a Christian Response to the Events of September 11, 2001

This sermon text suggests the strategies of the *Abejas* be utilized in responding to the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center attacks in the United States.

What Would Jesus Do?
Sermon given at First Mennonite Church, Mt. Lake, Minnesota
9/16/01 by Paul Neufeld Weaver (with some additions and corrections 2/22/02)

Sometimes something happens in our lives which leaves such a deep impression it somehow changes all that goes after it. For those of us living today in the United States, the destruction of the World Trade Towers last Tuesday was one of those events. Our first response was one of shock. Never in my lifetime have so many people in this country died from a violent act in one day. In fact, probably only once before in U.S. history were a similar number of people killed on a single day (In the war between the north and the south, 140 years ago, about 4,000 people were killed in the battle of Antietam near Sharpsburg, Maryland on Sept 17, 1862.) It is not real surprising that in the midst of the profound mourning and grieving, there are also sharp calls for revenge and retribution.

What should our response and role be as Christians? This, I believe, is an important question. To put it another way, "What would Jesus do?"

I think, at a theological level, we all know the answer to this question. Not only do we have the teachings of Jesus, "Love your enemies, do good to those who persecute you, Blessed are the peacemakers, do not hold anger in your heart, etc." But we also have his example: feeding the hungry 5,000, healing the soldier who arrest him and scolding his friend who tried to defend him, and, the most important example of all, the one at the center of our faith: when faced with a challenge to his ministry of salvation of humankind, he chose to sacrifice his own life rather than to use violence to achieve his ends. He acted out the story of nonviolent action which is at the centre of our faith story.

So how do we apply Jesus' example and teaching to our situation today?

Our country has been the victim of a ghastly attack. Do we join in the call for revenge? Do we choose to support the smashing of our enemies? Or do we take the hard and, perhaps, costly road of loving our enemies. I say costly because I know that in time of war, talk of peace is often viewed as disloyalty or even treason.[93]

I would like to tell you a story of a group of Christian brothers and sisters who have inspired me in this road, a group of people who refused to join their neighbors in their war-effort, and paid a huge price for that choice.

In a small, poor, village in a small, poor state, in a relatively unimportant, poor country, there lives a group of Christians who for the past 40 years have fervently studied the scriptures to understand

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[93] For example: "When contemplating college liberals, you really regret once again that John Walker is not getting the death penalty. We need to execute people like John Walker in order to physically intimidate liberals, by making them realize that they can be killed too. Otherwise they will turn out to be outright traitors."
-- Ann Coulter, nationally syndicated columnist, in her address at the 2002 Christian Political Action Conference (CPAC) (quoted in Sojonet, 2/13/02)

God's word in the context of their life today. These people, in the region known as Chenalhó in the state of Chiapas, in the southern part of Mexico, live in a county where 80% of the houses have dirt floors, where most people don't have electricity, where few have running water, where most people don't speak the national language of their country, Spanish, and therefore have difficulty defending their rights in the courts or in the marketplace. These indigenous Mayan people have been the victims of 500 years of domination, exploitation, discrimination and abuse by the European conquerors and their descendants. In that situation, their neighbors divided into two groups. One group decided that in view of those 500 years of history, the best path to success in the future was to become as much like the conquerors as possible. Join them in their style of living, economy, politics, and we will be rewarded. And indeed they were, the government gave them many material and political rewards. This group is known as the Priistas. The other group decided that in order to save their way of life, they must, once again, as their ancestors had done in every century since the conquest, rise up in a violent rebellion to claim their rights. A new American Revolution. This group is known as the Zapatistas.

Our friends, the Mayan Christians in Chenalhó, searched the scriptures to find guidance in their response, and they found that Jesus teaches them that the Kingdom of God speaks directly to the questions of injustice and violence. In asking the question of what to do in the face of 500 years of oppression, their study of the scriptures in the context of their lives led them to choose the side of justice over the side of expediency, therefore, they could not side with the Priistas, who had cooperated with the oppressor. This also made them very sympathetic to the Zapatistas, who were demanding land, housing, work, food, health care, education, democracy, justice, liberty, national independence, indigenous autonomy, rights for women and peace. But they also saw that God's desire was that the people of God work for peace and reconciliation and resist evil in a nonviolent way, not a violent way. This group of mostly Catholic, Mayan Christians called themselves the Bees, because bees work together, and serve their queen. For the Bees, their queen is the reign of God (reino/reina).

For several years they tried to follow the challenging path of supporting the Zapatista's demands for justice while rejecting the calls to take up arms. The Priistas demanded that the Bees take arms, or at least give money to buy arms to fight the Zapatistas. Their refusal to do so resulted in daily threats, and then burning of houses and their flight from their communities. Many of these refugees gathered in 1997 in Acteal, a small hamlet in the cool, lush highlands of central Chiapas. They began undertaking vigils of prayer and fasting for peace in their land. On one such day, Dec. 22, 1997, 60 paramilitary Priistas, armed by the Mexican army, which receives U.S. military support, entered the community where the Bees were praying and fasting with one of their catechists, Alonso. The paramilitaries opened fire on the praying bees, who fled into the hillsides, and over the next few hours were hunted down while the Police and army stood a few hundred yards away and did nothing. Altogether, 45 were killed that day, 21 women, 15 children, and 9 men.

The assassins hoped to stifle the spirit of the Bees, and they certainly achieved their goal of causing suffering and fear and grief. But, they did not stifle the spirit of the Bees. Instead, the Bees built a special building to house the graves of the 45 which would be a monument to the martyrs and an inspiration to people from all over the world who have visited Acteal in the almost four years since.

"We were left very sad but not with fear. On the contrary, our hearts and minds were strengthened to continue struggling. It is as if they left us a ladder to climb higher. This is our stepping stone to scream louder, to speak with force, to think clearer, to unite us. They killed their bodies, but were not able to kill their souls. The souls of the 45 who lost their lives are now at the side of our Lord, Jesus

Christ. They died praying and fasting, asking God for peace, for a calm to fall on Chiapas and all of Mexico. They were poor with many needs. They were suffering and hungry. They are now joyful in heaven." -Antonio Gutierrez

In the months before the massacre, Christian Peacemaker Teams had been visiting Chiapas to discern CPT's mission there. With the massacre, it was clear that the Bees should be accompanied. Working with the Bees, CPT hoped to provide protective accompaniment and to develop creative nonviolent actions together.

Since that time, CPT and the Bees have been partners in the nonviolent struggle for justice and peace. They have undertaken pilgrimages, and public witnesses of prayer and fasting at military bases, multinational corporations, and sites of violence. They have publicly called for an end to military presence in the communities. CPT has journeyed with the Bees and together learned much about faith and nonviolent struggle.

This, I believe, is an answer for us.

Here, again is the response of the Bees to the terrorist attack against them:
1. They denounced the crime publicly.
2. They institutionalized their mourning for and remembrance of the victims.
3. They demanded justice for the perpetrators of the crime. Justice for the Bees means detention and trial of both the material and intellectual authors of the crime - both those who pulled the triggers and those who planned the attack.
4. They publicly declared their rejection of violence and refusal to take up arms against their enemies.
5. They established close links with individuals and groups all over the world to publicize their cause and build a movement for justice and peace.
6. They continued to study the scriptures, pray and fast, actively protest injustice, and preserve their communities.

We must grieve the loss of those who died in the attack on the world trade centers, and find ways to memorialize and remember those who lost their lives and those who died trying to save others. We must also denounce the crime and demand that the international community find and try the material and intellectual perpetrators of the crimes. And we must firmly refuse to adopt the violent tactics tomorrow which we so vehemently denounce today. We must declare publicly that our God calls us to love our enemies and pray for our persecutors. And we must creatively discover what kind of nonviolent actions we can carry out to bring a just peace to our world.

The killing of war and terrorism is a major cause of suffering in our world. In the past century 200 million people were killed by the intentional acts of other human beings. Several groups of people have seen a major percentage of their population wiped out. In our congregation there are people whose families at some point came from other nations of the world which are no strangers to the terror of violence. And many of these nations have experienced long and grievous suffering. Russia/Soviet Union: fifty million killed; in the civil war following the revolution of 1917, WWII, and Stalin's terror. That is more than the populations of Minnesota, South Dakota, North Dakota, Colorado, Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, Missouri, and Wisconsin combined. Southeast Asia; Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam experienced a loss of 5 million people in; the French war in the 50s, the U.S. war in the 60s and 70s, and the communist Khmer Rouge of the 70s. Paraguay, where over 50% of the population was eliminated in the British-backed campaign of Brazil and Argentina in the 1860s.

Most recently we have heard from an MCC worker who was in Iraq, where over the last 10 years over a million people have died as a result of sanctions and the deliberate U.S. bombing of civilian water-purification facilities in that desert nation. A proportional amount of deaths in the United States would come out to 12 million people, or 3,300 people every day for 10 years. When then U.S. secretary of State was asked on "Sixty Minutes" how she could justify that level of casualties, she replied "I think this is a very hard choice, but the price - we think the price is worth it."

When we feel we are justified, any level of death becomes justifiable. As I said before, the attack last Tuesday was the highest single death toll of a violent act in the United States since the civil war, but in other countries the toll has been much higher. Perhaps the highest ever one-day toll was on March 9, 1945 when 100,000 people perished in the U.S. firebombing of Tokyo. [94]

We need to not only be gentle as doves but also wise as serpents. We need to understand what is behind mass violence and what is it that makes people capable of doing it. It is easy to think of the perpetrators of violence as evil, deranged people. Yes, there is evil in violence, but it is the kind of evil of which we all can potentially take part in. It is the evil of falling into the trap of thinking that the end justifies the means, that our goal is so worthy we need to do whatever we have to to achieve it. That is why I get so scared when I hear people say things like the following quotes I heard the other day on a talk show. "We need to be just as bad as the terrorists." "We've got to play by their rules." "We need to use any and all means necessary."

We become terrorists if we believe that God has appointed us to exact vengeance on our enemies. And it is that cycle of violence and terror which then becomes perpetuated. And be sure that both here and there, there have been and will be civilians who will pay with their lives. In wars in the 1990s, 90% of the victims were civilians.

Recently, a delegation from the US-based group, Witness for Peace visited Acteal and talked to a leader of the *Abejas*, Antonio Gutierrez, who I was able to spend time with this summer. Antonio talked about how "even today, men, women, and children continue to be displaced. Some have died in the displaced camps because of their situation of scarce medical resources and food and because of fear of continued paramilitary violence. It is not right that there is not true justice." And then he explained how they keep going. "We are waiting for an answer from our Lord Jesus Christ, so that we can find a true peace; a peace with justice, a peace with democracy, a peace with life, a peace to bring a better life to all."

I believe it is our task as people of faith in the 21st century, to find that peace. Jesus came to teach us how to use nonviolent action to stop violence and achieve justice. It certainly isn't popular, it wasn't for the Bees, it won't be here. That was also true for the first Christians. Pagan Celsus attacked Christians for disloyalty to the empire, since they refused to serve in the army. If everyone behaved as Christians did, he said "the empire would be ruined."

Nonviolence is not only right, but it works! Think of the most horrific tyrant you can. Perhaps Hitler comes to mind. The amazing thing, if you are willing to ask new questions of history, you get surprising answers. Would nonviolence have worked against Hitler? It not only would have, it did! Walter Wink, in Engaging the Powers, gives numerous examples. In Bulgaria, Hitler's demand that

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[94] If you count later deaths as a result of one day's attack, then the dropping of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima by the United States has the highest death toll, about 70,000 died immediately in that intentional attack on an unarmed, civilian populace, and eventually approximately 200,000 died from the attack.

they turn over their Jews, met with massive protests, and all the Jews were saved. Finland saved nearly all its Jews, Denmark's entire population collaborated in smuggling 6,500 Jews to Sweden, and on, and on. What is surprising about history is how often nonviolence has worked. In the 20th century, a dozen countries got rid of dictators through nonviolent revolutions, and several African countries, as well as India, used it to achieve their independence from Colonialism.

Hitler's generals, who were so effective against violent resistance, admitted to their interrogators after the war that they had found themselves unable to deal with nonviolent resistance. The tragedy is that neither most Jews, nor most Christians in Europe knew of the potential of nonviolence to effectively resist the Nazis.

(Walter Wink showed me a new perspective on Matthew 5:38-42 (turning the other cheek, walking the extra mile, giving the coat and the cloak). He points out that these, in the context of Hebrew culture and the politics of Roman occupation, were examples of active nonviolent resistance.)

Could God be giving us as an historic peace church the task of educating our nation in the 21st century that there is another way to fight? Those who have been led to believe that the only choice is to kill or do nothing need to hear that that is a false choice. There is another choice. That choice is the third way of Jesus. It is the choice to work fervently and actively against violence, injustice, exploitation, and inequality in a way that recognizes that the enemy is a child of God, in a way that shows true love for the enemy, and seeks her or his redemption, as we seek our own redemption.

Forgive us, our sins, as we forgive those who sin against us. And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil. For Thine is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory, forever. Amen.

*Note written in February, 2002: Current tallies put the Sept 11 toll at 3,181 (*USA Today*), the World Trade Center deaths were 3,094 (*War Times*). This is about 25% less than the number estimated killed at Antietam. It is also about the same as the number of Iraqi's who die daily as a result of war, bombing, and sanctions, and the number of Colombians who die monthly from violence there. The U.S. bombing campaign in Afghanistan, Oct 7 to the present, has killed over 4,000 (this does not include victims of the Northern Alliance.)

This text was lightly edited in December, 2001, and again on February 22, 2002.
Paul Neufeld Weaver weaverp@frontiernet.net

Appendix D: Partial Listing Of Cross-Border Peace Team Organizations 1959-2001

Year(s)	Organization	Primary Action Sites*	Participants' Nationality*	# Participants[95]	Objective	Met Objective?[96]
1959	Sahara Protest Team(SPT)	Ghana/Upper Volta/Sudan	US/England/France/Ghana	20	stop A-bomb	no
1972-74	Cyprus Resettlement Project	Cyprus	US/India	33	peacebuilding	?
1981-present	**Peace Brigades International[97] (PBI)**	Guatemala, El Salvador, Sri Lanka Haiti, Colombia, Canada	US/Canada/Spain (other European)	600(est)	violence reduction	yes
1983 - present	**Witness for Peace(WFP)**	Nicaragua, Guatemala, Mexico	United States	5000(est)	prevent U.S. invasion reduce Contra violence	yes yes
86-present	**Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT)**	**Hebron**; Haiti; **Chiapas;** US; **Canada; Colombia, Puerto Rico**	United States, Canada	1000(est)	violence reduction	yes
1988-present	**Pastors for Peace**	United States, Mexico, Cuba, Nicaragua	United States	1000(est)	end Cuba embargo	no
1991	Gulf Peace Team	Iraq	(from 15 countries)	85	stop war	no
1991-99	Project Accompaniment	Guatemala	Canada	1400	protect refugee return	yes
1992 - present	**Dhammayietra**	Cambodia	Cambodia + some others	5000+	stop war	yes
1992	Lusitania Expresso	East Timor, Australia	Portugal/France/Japan/Cape Verde, Guinea/US/UK/Australia/Germany Canada/Denmark/Sweden/Brazil/Italy/Spain/China/Netherlands/Czechoslovakia	70	stop aggression	no
1993	Mir Sada	Croatia	Italy/France/US/Mexico/Japan UK/Belgium/Netherlands/Poland/Greece/Sweden/Norway/Czech Republic/Germany	3000	stop war	no
1993	Cry for Justice	Haiti	US/Canada	75	violence reduction	yes
1994-2001	Balkan Peace Team	Croatia	US/UK/Norway other Euro	dozens	conflict resolution	?
1995-present	**SIPAZ (International Service for Peace)**	Chiapas, Mexico	US/Canada/Germany/France/Uruguay Mexico/ other European and Latin American		reduce violence and promote dialogue	yes

*In some cases only the principal countries are listed.

[95] People who were present in the site of the action for at least several days - some numbers are estimates.

[96] Many projects had some level of success at gaining international attention to a problem without meeting their ultimate goal, and other project, such as Mir Sada, were evaluated as of very low effectiveness, even by the participants.

[97] Bold denotes currently active groups.

Appendix E: SIPAZ Statement of Purpose

Statement of Purpose

Servicio Internacional para la Paz / International Service for Peace
Box 2415, Santa Cruz, CA 95063 USA
Tel and Fax: (int 1) 831 425 1257
E-mail: admin@sipaz.org

Political Context

The uprising in Chiapas that began on January 1, 1994 was sparked by indigenous resistance to deep-seated injustice. It continues today in a low-intensity conflict marked by complex negotiations, a tense military situation, and the deep polarization of communities throughout the region.

While largely a domestic struggle within Mexico, its international dimensions, both causative and consequential, are extremely important and underscore the need and opportunity for an international role in its resolution. Indeed many observers believe that international public opinion has already played a key role in limiting the scope of the violence at the most explosive moments of the conflict.

SIPAZ
International Service for Peace (Servicio Internacional para la Paz or SIPAZ) is a response from the international community to the shared sense among many Mexican sectors that international opinion can contribute to the search for peaceful solutions, through dialogue, to the conflict.

SIPAZ was organized at the invitation of Mexican human rights and church contacts.

Grounded in a commitment to active nonviolence, SIPAZ reflects the support for a dignified, just and lasting peace of its member groups around the world.

Objectives
In order to forestall or reduce violence and to protect and expand the precious political space in which dialogue is possible, the presence of SIPAZ is:

- Pro-active. The primary function of SIPAZ is not to react to confrontations or human rights violations but rather to work actively to promote communication and dialogue in place of violent confrontation.

- Supportive. Rather than proposing solutions, SIPAZ is primarily concerned with enhancing the context in which Mexicans are working to resolve Mexican problems.

- Politically independent. In order to maintain its identity as an objective, credible observer, SIPAZ cannot be either part of or under the direction of any of the principal parties to the conflict and it must strive to observe and report without political bias. While we cannot be neutral on the issue of justice, we recognize that any real solution will require the participation of all parties to the conflict. Moreover we believe that advocacy is not the only way to actively support justice. In the case of Chiapas we see that a key contribution we as outsiders can make to the achievement of justice is to draw on our experience, our reputations and our best energies to push forward a peace process in which Indian peasants and executive branch representatives sit down as equals to address the legacy of centuries of injustice.

- Nonviolent. Convinced that truth has the power to free, we rely on truthfulness as our strength and our security. We will use no violence whether in word or deed. Moreover in the spirit of nonviolence we strive to see all we meet as potential participants in a solution and seek to establish with them relations

based on mutual respect.

- International. We see ourselves as representatives of the international community in its concern for a just peace in Chiapas. We count North American, Latin American, and European international representation as part of our organizational base.

- Faith-based or rooted in a deep commitment to nonviolence. Inasmuch as religious faith and/or spiritual commitment are a fundamental basis for the involvement of most participants in this project, we hold up this common ground as a source of inspiration, sustenance and strength in our work together.

The SIPAZ international team in Chiapas:
- maintains communication with all actors involved in the conflict to strengthen the conditions that make dialogue possible;
- serves as an objective and credible source of information and analysis on the conflict in order to maintain the attention of the international community and to increase support for the peace process;
- provides an international observer presence and accompanies those working in support of the peace process as a deterrent to human rights abuses and violations;
- strengthens local peacebuilding capacities through workshops and courses and by supporting dialogue and reconciliation initiatives.
- SIPAZ recognizes and respects the principles of non-intervention and sovereignty of the Mexican State and its citizens upon whom must depend the negotiation and initiative that are necessary in order to achieve an eventual solution to the conflict.

The coalition members of SIPAZ represent many years of experience in international non-governmental peacemaking and conflict resolution. Building on that experience, SIPAZ seeks to play a facilitative role, enhancing the context in which Mexicans are working to solve largely Mexican problems.

At the same time, SIPAZ encourages the international community to examine its relationships with Mexico and its role in creating greater political, economic and social justice.

SIPAZ INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Mairead Corrigan Maguire, Nobel Peace Prize, 1977, Ireland
Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, Nobel Peace Prize, 1980, Argentina
Rigoberta Menchú Túm, Nobel Peace Prize, 1992, Guatemala
Jose Ramos-Horta, Nobel Peace Prize, 1996, East Timor

Appendix F: CPT-Chiapas Goal Statement

CPT IN MEXICO

CPT established a full-time, violence-reduction presence in the Mexican state of Chiapas in June, 1998.

CONTEXT

More than 1/3 of the population of Chiapas are Mayan Indians who maintain their cultural traditions, languages, and communal lifestyles despite centuries of colonialism and marginalization. The interests of Mexican elites and transnational corporations to exploit Chiapas' great natural wealth (petroleum, hydroelectric power, hardwood forests) has come into conflict with the desires of indigenous peoples to live an alternative economic model. Following the Zapatista uprising in January, 1994, the Mexican government implemented a low-intensity warfare strategy relying on militarization and paramilitarization to thwart indigenous resistance.

Currently, about 70,000 soldiers (more than 30% of the total Mexican armed forces) are stationed in Chiapas. The state of Chiapas is comprised of 111 municipalities (counties) within a number of distinct geographic areas each experiencing variations of this low-intensity warfare: Los Altos (the highlands - central mountains); La Selva (the jungle - Zapatista headquarters); Las Cañadas (the canyons); La Zona Norte (the Northern zone - large cattle ranching area).

OVERARCHING GOALS

In this context and in response to invitations from the Diocese of San Cristóbal de las Casas and Las Abejas (the Bees) for international accompaniment, CPT Mexico functions as a physical and structural violence-reduction presence. The team's overarching goals can be summarized in three main areas:

I. Nonviolent Resistance

A. CPT Mexico seeks to learn from and support indigenous nonviolent resistance to oppression. Indigenous nonviolent actions include efforts at alternative community building, and the spiritually-based nonviolent resistance of the Bees which seeks to love their enemies into conversion.

B. CPT Mexico will encourage nonviolent resistance by modeling our own spiritually-based nonviolent direct actions.

C. CPT Mexico seeks, through visible, nonviolent presence and action, to "open up space" so that change can take place. This might take the form of:

1. Selected accompaniment of campesinos or human rights workers

2. Physically getting in the way of violence

3. Breaking down barriers as team members explore connections with PRI and paramilitary communities

II. Confronting Low Intensity Warfare

A. CPT Mexico will research and develop actions and campaigns to expose militarization, paramilitarization, and the dynamics of Low Intensity Warfare.

B. CPT Mexico will address in particular how the U.S. and Canadian militaries are involved in Mexico's militarization through funding, training, strategic planning, intelligence gathering, etc.

C. CPT Mexico is committed to understanding and communicating the economic roots which drive the Low Intensity Warfare strategy in Chiapas by focusing on stories that illustrate how Globalization/Neo-Liberalism affect people at the grassroots.

D. CPT Mexico is willing to challenge the Mexican government's use of immigration and military policies as a tool of Low Intensity Warfare (to restrict the movement and activities of internationals observing and promoting human rights) both in the field and through legal channels as necessary in order to carry out our work.

III. Education for Action

A. CPT Mexico seeks to increase understanding and action for peace among our constituencies in the U.S. and Canada by:

1. Fostering human linkages between people of faith in North America and Chiapas through delegations and special prayer/action campaigns.

2. Sharing stories which highlight the parallels between the struggles of indigenous peoples in Chiapas and those of indigenous peoples in the U.S. and Canada as well as other areas where CPT works.

CPT IN CHENALHÓ

A variety of factors converge to influence CPT Mexico's decision to focus primarily in one county in the highlands - Chenalhó. While there is currently less overt violence (shootings, kidnappings, disappearances) in Chenalhó than in some other parts of the state, the dynamics of low-intensity warfare are very entrenched and a sort of stalemate has set in. The profile of the situation cries out for nonviolent intervention.

Military - With a civilian population of approximately 30,000 in an area of 140 square kilometers (87 square miles), Chenalhó is the most militarized county in the state of Chiapas. Around twenty army bases dot the mountain ridges and valleys with one soldier for every twelve inhabitants (source: CIEPAC). Most military installations are civic action camps, providing food, medical care, and other benefits to primarily Priista (government supporting) communities. These bases are strategically located throughout Chenalhó in such a way as to completely surround Zapatista and Abejas communities.

Paramilitary - Paramilitary groups (indigenous village residents mostly aligned with the PRI government or right wing Cardenista party) continue to carry arms, posing an ongoing threat to refugees longing to return home. Enticed by economic benefits (some say they are paid $700/month), paramilitary members extort money from village residents and coerce them into participating in lootings, killings, etc. with the message, "If you're not for us, you're against us." Observers at various levels (community residents, parish priests, Diocesan bishops, academics) assert that these groups receive weapons and training from the army and protection from the police. CPT'ers have observed armed indigenous men in civilian clothes riding in police vehicles on numerous occasions.

Displaced - Of the estimated 20,000 displaced people in the state of Chiapas (those who have fled their

homes due to paramilitary violence), more than half (10,500) are in the county of Chenalhó. That means over 1/3 of the county's residents are currently living in refugee camps (crowded conditions, temporary housing, inadequate water supply, donated food) in host communities far from their fields and sources of livelihood. After more than two years of living under such conditions, despair is palpable. Many refugees seem to be settling in for a long haul of being away from home and are, little by little, building more permanent housing in the camps.

Las Abejas - Chenalhó is also home to 4000 members of Las Abejas (the Bees) - Mayan pacifist Christians (both Catholic and Protestant) committed to working for social justice nonviolently. Approximately half of the Abejas in Chenalhó are among the displaced, living primarily with other Abejas in the villages of Acteal and X'oyep. Acteal was home to around 400 people before the refugees swelled their number to 1200. The 13 families living in X'oyep welcomed 1100 displaced people into their community. The Abejas speak of justice, not vengeance, with regard to the December 22, 1997 massacre that took the lives of 45 of their loved ones in Acteal. They pray for their enemies while insisting on disarmament and demilitarization of their communities. In the words of one CPT advisor, "It is through the Abejas in Chenalhó that the spirit of God is moving."

GUIDING QUESTIONS

- What are the possibilities for nonviolent action in the situation to:

  1) open space for real changes in the current dynamics;

  2) keep hope alive among those committed to peaceful change;

  3) keep the situation of Chiapas on the nation's social agenda?
- What are the primary pressure points for such public action? (Military, paramilitary, politicians)
- How might an intentional, visible, international presence connecting to all actors in the county both deter further violence and help create space for change/reconciliation?

CPT's work in Chenalhó includes regular visits to:

- Abejas communities (Acteal, X'oyep, Tzajalchen);
- Military bases, generals/commanders (Acteal Alto, Majomut and X'oyep, etc.);
- PRI/paramilitary communities, particularly the churches (Pechiquil, Acteal Alto, Canolal, Majomut, Tzanembolóm, etc.);
- Presbyterians and possibly Pentecostals in Polhó (to establish/deepen relationships with Zapatista Christians which hopefully could lead to some joint activities/actions);
- Police entities in the region.

Appendix G: Statement of Problem: Reflections on Dissertation Proposal and Direction

Paul Neufeld Weaver 3/1/01

The discussion during my dissertation proposal defense on January 31 was of great help in raising important questions and in clarifying the focus of my work. The following represents my thinking at this point in relation to these three issues.

Although I'm not yet changing the title of my work, the following alternative title perhaps represents where my thinking is at after the proposal defense: **"Satyagraha in Chiapas, 1992-2001: Three Experiments in Nonviolent Action for Liberation."**

I go into the dissertation research with the following three questions as my key foci:

1. What is the story? What are the stories of each of the groups within the story of Chiapas? What are the discourses? Who are the actors? Where are the roots?
2. What are the interpretations which the three principal pacifist groups (SIPAZ, CPT, and the *Abejas* (or Bees)) currently working in Chiapas bring to their work, to their commitment to nonviolence, and to their political agenda?

There are four concept areas(or sets of terms or concepts) that I am interested in examining in the context of the work and ideological commitments of the three groups. These are:

a. violence/nonviolence - here I want to dialogue with members of each group about how they define violence and nonviolence. I also want to see how other actors in Chiapas view these groups in relation to violence/nonviolence. What does it mean to have love, truth, and faith as guiding principles for action in a "postmodern world" that questions the universality of those principles?

b. justice/social change - what constitutes justice? What is the vision of a just society? How do the visions of the three groups relate to the visions of the two sides in the Chiapas conflict, the Zapatista vision and the official. How then does each groups pursue social change?

c. power/agency - How does the commitment to nonviolence relate to the view of the nature of power and personal and group agency? How is the issue of partisanship defined and addressed by each group? Each group defines themselves in terms of their rejection of violence. Both implicitly and explicitly, each distances themselves from the two antagonists in the conflict, the Zapatistas and the government, on the basis of the commitment to nonviolence. However, the distinction is made differently in each case. To what extent do these different degree of partisan/nonpartisan distinctions change the stance of each group? Are the distinctions that are internally emphasized recognized externally, by other groups in the region? (The Acteal massacre is one big indication that they are not!)

d. difference - How do imperialism, racism, sexism, classism and other forms of marginalization enter in to the analysis and praxis of each group? To what extent are these issues barriers and to what extent are they organizing principals? How does difference relate to the three previous concepts above?

I would like to frame the analysis of these four concept areas in the writings of others, particularly of Gandhi, Freire, Sharp, Wink, and Foucault, as well as those who have written specifically on peace teams, but the key focus will be on the theory and practice of the practitioners in the field in these three groups.

3. How do these groups and others outside of these three groups assess the impact of these three groups?

Each group has stated goals in terms of reducing violence, promoting social justice, aiding reconciliation, etc. What are these goals, and how do internal and external actors evaluate the success or failure in relation to the achievement of these specific goals? What other impacts have each of the groups had which they or others evaluate as significant but which may not have been listed as specific goals? In what specific ways can/does the experience of pacifist groups in Chiapas inform the work of peace teams in general?

Appendix H: The Martyrs of Acteal

These are the people who lost their lives on December 22, 1997 in Acteal, Mexico (Eber, 2000)

María Capote Pérez

Martha Capote Pérez

Marcela Capote Ruiz

Marcela Capote Vázquez

Graciela Gómez Hernández

Guadalupe Gómez Hernández

Roselia Gómez Hernández

Daniel Gómez Pérez

Juana Gómez Pérez

Lorenzo Gómez Pérez

Sebastián Gómez Pérez

María Gómez Ruiz

Paulina Hernández Vázquez

Susana Jiménez Pérez

María Luna Méndez

Catarina Luna Pérez

Juan Carlos Luna Pérez

Marcela Luna Ruiz

Juana Luna Vázquez

Lucía Méndez Capote

Vicente Méndez Capote

Margarita Méndez Paciencia

Manuela Paciencia Moreno

Miguel Pérez Jimenez

Alejandro Pérez Luna

Juana Pérez Luna

Silvia Pérez Luna

María Pérez Oyalte

Juana Pérez Pérez

Rosa Pérez Pérez

Ignacio Pukuj Luna

Marcela Pukuj Luna

Loida Ruiz Gómez

Manuel Sántiz Gómez

Alonso Vázquez Gómez

Victorio Vázquez Gómez

Antonia Vázquez Luna

Juana Vázquez Luna

Margarita Vázquez Luna

Rosa Vázquez Luna

Verónica Vázquez Luna

Antonia Vázquez Pérez

Josefa Vázquez Pérez

Marcela Vázquez Pérez

Micaela Vázquez Pérez